Fr. Charles René Billuart, O.P.

Mystery of the Holy Trinity

Summa Sancti S. Thomae

Sonnet 3.7 Translation

ON THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

A.I. TRANSLATION
SONNET 3.7

ON THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

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BY
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TO THE MOTHER OF GOD

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PREFACE

Since this sacred Mystery is the fundamental article of our entire religion, before we enter into metaphysical and difficult questions concerning it, I deemed it appropriate to assert its truth and existence, and to declare what can be known about it by the natural light of reason. Hence:

A Note on the English Translation

This translation presents Charles-René Billuart's treatise "On the Mystery of the Holy Trinity" from his Summa Sancti Thomae Hodiernis Academiarum Moribus Accommodata (Summa of Saint Thomas Adapted to the Customs of Modern Academics), pages 439-576 of the first volume, published under the patronage of Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Lequette of Arras, Boulogne, and Saint-Omer.

Billuart (1685-1757) stands as one of the most rigorous and faithful Thomistic theologians of the eighteenth century. His treatment of the Trinity represents scholastic theology at its most precise, offering a systematic exposition of this central Christian mystery according to the method and doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The work explores the metaphysical and theological depths of Trinitarian doctrine, including the divine persons, relations,

processions, and other technical aspects of the mystery as understood in the scholastic tradition.

This translation renders Billuart's intricate theological Latin into clear modern academic English while preserving the technical precision of his Thomistic vocabulary. The original paragraph structure is maintained with bolded section numbers to facilitate reference. All footnotes are included and translated with their original numbering preserved. Billuart's characteristic clarity and logical rigor make this text particularly valuable for those studying classical Thomistic approaches to Trinitarian theology.

Caveat Lectoris

However, given the technical constraints of digital reproduction, readers are strongly advised to consult the original Latin text whenever uncertainty arises regarding specific passages, particularly those containing numerical designations, bibliographical references, or technical terminology. The complexity of scholastic Latin, with its precise distinctions and technical vocabulary developed over centuries of theological disputation, demands careful attention to textual accuracy. Furthermore, all citations and references should be independently verified against authoritative editions. Image quality issues may result in the misidentification of book numbers, chapter divisions, or other bibliographical particulars essential for accurate scholarly reference. Readers utilizing this translation for academic purposes are therefore urged to treat it as a preliminary aid to understanding rather than a definitive rendering, maintaining recourse to the Latin original as the ultimate arbiter of textual meaning and accuracy.

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE TRUTH AND KNOWABILITY OF THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

Article I. An Account of the Principal Heresies Against the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

There were three principal heresies against this mystery: the first was that of Sabellius, who denied the distinction of Persons; the second was that of Arius, who denied Their consubstantiality; the third was that of Macedonius, who attacked the divinity of the Holy Spirit. All heresies in this matter can be traced back to these three main categories.

Sabellianism

The first author of this heresy was Praxeas, originally from Asia at the beginning of the third century, according to Tertullian in his book against the same Praxeas, chapter 1, where he says: "Thus Praxeas accomplished two works of the devil in Rome: he drove out prophecy and introduced heresy; he put the Paraclete to flight and crucified the Father." He says that Praxeas drove out the Paraclete because he had denounced Montanus, who was called the Paraclete, as a heretic to the Roman Pontiff; and in this Tertullian was

mistaken. He says that Praxeas crucified the Father because, since he did not distinguish the incarnate Son from the Father, he asserted that the Father had been affixed to the cross; hence the adherents of this heresy were also called Patripassians. Noetus of Ephesus according to Epiphanius, or of Smyrna according to Theodoret, around the year 245 A.D., revived the same heresy, which Sabellius, his disciple, around the year 257 A.D., made more famous under his name and patronage. Hence those who defended it were called Sabellians, and were also called Monarchians, because they acknowledged only one person in God. The error of the Sabellians consisted in acknowledging only one person in God, who, however, because of various effects or functions, was called Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Father insofar as unbegotten and the principle of creation; Son insofar as incarnate; Holy Spirit insofar as sanctifying souls—just as the same sun is said to be illuminating, heating, and productive, because it has the power to illuminate, to heat, and to produce; they used this example. Against Sabellius, St. Dionysius of Alexandria wrote to Dionysius, the Roman Pontiff. While vigorously attacking Sabellius's error, he seemed to some to incline to the other extreme and to prefigure the Arian heresy; of which more below.

This heresy was first condemned by the same St. Dionysius of Alexandria in a synod convened in Alexandria in the year 319, then in the Council of Milan in the year 347, and in the Council of Sirmium in the year 351, assembled against Photinus, the bishop of Sirmium (Sirmium, a city in Hungary), whose heresy's first tenet was that God should be confessed as solitary in the Jewish manner, that there was no person of the divine Word or of the Holy Spirit, but that there was one operation of the Father and the Son and the

Holy Spirit. This is the very same heresy as that of Sabellius: from Socrates, book 2, chapter 24.

This heresy can also be said to have been pre-condemned in the Council of Antioch in the year 270, against Paul of Samosata, the bishop of Antioch, the teacher of Photinus and a contemporary of Sabellius, whose error concerning the Trinity was akin to Sabellianism. For he removed the Trinity of divine persons just as Sabellius did, asserting indeed that the Word was coeternal with the Father, but without a distinct hypostasis, which it only began to have when it insinuated itself into Jesus as a mere man; and through this temporal mission and eternal utterance it became the Son.

There was, however, this difference between the two heresies, according to Leontius in On Sects, act 3, that Sabellius said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit were the same, and called God a thing of three names, establishing that there was no Trinity at all: Paul, however, did not say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit were the same; but he said that the Father was that God who had created all things; the Son was that mere man; the Spirit was that grace which had come upon the Apostles. Add to this that Paul of Samosata said that the Word had only operated in Christ, not suffered, which Sabellius, however, foolishly asserted.

Arianism

Arius, born in Libya in the part that is near Egypt, was in his external bodily appearance composed toward gravity and modesty, eager for novelties, exceedingly skilled in dialectical subtleties. He was a schismatic before he was a

heretic: for he had joined himself to Meletius, from whom departing, he was ordained a deacon by St. Peter of Alexandria; but when he had again defected to Meletius, he was expelled from the Church by the same St. Peter. However, after the death of St. Peter, he returned to the Church, and having been ordained a priest by Achillas, he was placed in charge of the parochial church of Baucalis. Moved by envy because St. Alexander had been elevated to the see of Alexandria while he was overlooked, he broke out into open heresy against the divinity of the Word in the year 317. For when St. Alexander in an ecclesiastical assembly was discussing the Most Holy Trinity, and was asserting that the Son was equal in honor and consubstantial with the Father, Arius openly opposed him, asserting that there was one true God properly so called, namely the Father, the only eternal, the only true, etc., who had begotten the only-begotten Son: but that this Son or Word was not consubstantial with the Father, but a perfect creature, created from nothing or from non-existent things, that there was a time when he was not, that he was subject to change, that only by participation and pre-eminence of grace was he called God by name. Hence he inverted the hymn of glorification, teaching his followers to sing: "Glory to the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit." Arius also erred regarding the mystery of the Incarnation, asserting that the Word had assumed an unanimated body, and that the divinity supplied the functions of the soul. These things are evident from the synodical letter of St. Alexander, from the synodical letter of the Council of Nicaea, from St. Athanasius in his second oration against the Arians, from the letter of Arius himself and his first disciples to St. Alexander, which St. Athanasius relates in his letter on the synods of Rimini and Seleucia; and

from Arius's own Thalia, which was a soft and impure song in which he had expressed all the poison of his heresy. St. Alexander immediately crushed this nascent heresy in a synod of one hundred bishops assembled at Alexandria, but he did not extinguish it: for Arius, having been condemned, fled to Palestine, where, among others, Eusebius of Nicomedia especially undertook the patronage of him and his errors. Having convened a council in Bithynia, Eusebius received Arius back into communion, and with his associates sent letters to all the bishops to admit the same Arius to communion. Another Eusebius of Caesarea also undertook his defense, as did Constantia Augusta, the sister of Constantine the Great.

Constantine, to counter this conflagration, with the assent of St. Sylvester, convoked the Council of Nicaea of 318 bishops, in which Arius was condemned, and with his disciples was sent into exile; but in the year 330, through the agency of Constantia who was near death, he was recalled, and having issued an equivocal profession of faith, by the order of the emperor, he returned to Alexandria the following year. St. Athanasius, then the patriarch of Alexandria, resisted, and could be persuaded neither by letters nor by the threats of the emperor to receive Arius into communion.

In the year 335, Arius was restored to communion by the Eusebians in the Council of Jerusalem; but when the people of Alexandria kept him from entering the church, and always execrated him as a heresiarch, at the urging of the Arians who had assembled in the Council of Constantinople against Marcellus of Ancyra, a defender of the Nicene faith, the emperor summoned Arius to Constantinople, where the treacherous heresiarch swore to the formula of the Nicene

faith, referring his oath by a mental reservation to another heretical formula which he had concealed under his arm, as Socrates relates.

Hence St. Alexander, then the bishop of Constantinople, foresaw that Arius would triumph, and therefore, with St. James, the bishop of Nisibis, he resorted to prayers and fasting, to whose vows God, assenting, deprived Arius of both communion and life. For on the Saturday preceding the Sunday on which his supporters had boasted that they would introduce him into the church, he lost his soul together with his bowels in the latrines, as St. Athanasius narrates in his first oration against the Arians; St. Epiphanius in Heresy 69, Socrates in book 1, chapter 25; Sozomen in book 2, chapter 28.

The Arian heresy in the course of time was divided into three sects. The first maintained that the Son of God was dissimilar in all things; hence they were called Anomoeans, that is, dissimilar. The leaders of this sect were Aëtius, Eunomius, and Eudoxius; Valens, Ursacius, Germinius, Auxentius of Milan, and others adhered to them.

The second sect was that of the Semi-Arians, who denied homoousios or that the Son was consubstantial with the Father, but asserted that he was similar in all things, and therefore said kat'ousian, and homoiousios, that is, similar to the Father; which they professed in the formula of faith issued in the Synod of Ancyra in the year 358. The leaders of this faction were Basil of Ancyra, Macedonius of Constantinople, who later published a heresy against the Holy Spirit, and Meletius of Antioch, whom St. Cyril of Jerusalem favored. Whether they were heretics because they would not admit the word homoousios rather than

homoiousios, we shall discuss below in a historical digression.

The third sect was that of the Acacians, named after its leader Acacius, the bishop of Caesarea. This sect proclaimed the Son not consubstantial with the Father, nor one of the creatures, but similar, yet not in substance or ousia: hence it defended neither homoousios with the Catholics, nor homoiousios with the Semi-Arians, nor anomoios with the Anomoeans, but homoios, that is, similar to the Father, just as a statue is similar to the man it represents.

Macedonianism

Macedonius was first a deacon of the Church of Constantinople under St. Alexander, the bishop of this see. Then he succeeded Eusebius in the same see of Constantinople through the efforts of the Arians and amidst various slaughters of citizens, with the Catholics resisting who adhered to Paul who had been ordained earlier. During his episcopate, he harassed the Catholics with various cruelties: but when he had dared to transfer the body of Constantine the Great from the temple of the Apostles to another place without the knowledge of the emperor Constantius, he thereby aroused a serious sedition among the people, and made the emperor hostile to himself, and finally in the small council of Constantinople in the year 356, he was deposed from the episcopate by the Acacians.

He stood on the side of the Semi-Arians who, although they rejected homoousios or consubstantial, nevertheless admitted homoiousios or similar in substance; indeed, as some believe according to D. Fleury, volume 3,

book 14, number 30, after his deposition, he admitted homoousios; but then, that is, in the year 360, he began to disseminate his new heresy, asserting that the Holy Spirit was not of the same substance and a participant of the same honor as the Father and the Son, but the minister and creature of both: hence they were also called Pneumatomachi, that is, fighters against the Holy Spirit.

To this perfidy adhered Basil of Ancyra, Eustathius of Sebaste, Eleusius of Cyzicus, and all the other bishops who had been deposed by the Acacians in the small council of Constantinople in the preceding year; likewise a great multitude of people in Constantinople, in Bithynia, Thrace, and the Hellespont, and finally in various other nations, deluded by the apparently pious and composed manners of the Macedonians.

This nascent heresy was greatly increased, partly by zeal, partly by money, especially by Marathonius, a disciple of Macedonius and bishop of Nicomedia, so that the Macedonians were called Marathonians by many.

Against this heresy, St. Athanasius, hiding in the desert to escape persecution, sharpened his pen in his book on the Holy Spirit to Serapion; St. Basil in his book on the Holy Spirit to Amphilochius; St. Gregory of Nyssa in his book on the Holy Trinity, etc.

This heresy was condemned 1) in the synod of Alexandria celebrated after the return of St. Athanasius in the year 362; 2) in the synod of Illyricum in the year 367; 3) in the Roman synod which Pope Damasus celebrated shortly afterward; 4) in another Roman synod which the same Damasus held against Apollinaris; 5) finally in the second ecumenical council, which is the first Council of Constantinople held in the year 381, on the kalends of May,

in the 15th year of Pope Damasus, during the reigns of Valentinian, Theodosius the Elder, and Gratian. In it, not only the Macedonians, but also the Photinians, Sabellians, Apollinarians, and again the Arians were struck with anathema, as is evident from its first canon. Also, the symbol was issued which is now sung in the Church, in no way, however, different from the Nicene except according to a greater explanation.

We shall discuss in their proper place the various difficulties that arise concerning this heresy and this council.

Socinianism and Other Errors

Under the name of Socinians we include all those who, around the middle of the 16th century, revived the long-dormant heresies of Sabellius, Arius, and Macedonius, the principal leaders of whom were from the flock of Lutherans and Calvinists: Michael Servetus, a Spaniard, burned at Geneva at the instigation of Calvin himself; Valentine of Naples, also delivered to the flames at Bern; John Campanus, Paul Alciati of Milan, Laelius Socinus of Siena, Faustus Socinus, the nephew of Laelius, a Calvinist.

Although all these men taught and debated among themselves many impious dogmas concerning the Trinity, not in one but in diverse and confused ways, nevertheless they all agreed in this, that denying the Most Holy Trinity, they said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit were indeed three, but not three persons, nor of the same substance, that only the Father was the true God: hence they were called Trinitarians and new Arians. Likewise, they were sometimes called Campanists from their authors, sometimes Valentinians, sometimes Servetians, but more frequently

Socinians from Faustus Socinus who made this sect more famous and disseminated it more widely, especially throughout Poland and Transylvania, whence they were also called Transylvanians. He died at Luclawice in Poland in the year 1594, at the age of 65.

Among other things, he taught with Sabellius that in the divine essence there was only one person of the Father, and that it was contradictory for God to be one in essence and three in persons. With Arius: that the Son of God or Christ was neither a divine person nor God; nevertheless he was called God metaphorically and improperly because of the sublime power shared from the true God, the Father. With Macedonius: that the Holy Spirit was indeed the power and efficacy of God, but it did not follow from this that he was a divine person.

To those who err against the Trinity can be added the Gentiles, Jews, and Mohammedans, who, while acknowledging that God exists, deny that he is three in persons: "It is impossible," says Mohammed, "for God to generate a Son because he lacks a wife"; a statement worthy of its author! Also Peter Abelard who, according to St. Bernard in epistle 190 to Innocent II, among other errors posited grades in the Trinity, modes in majesty, numbers in eternity; finally, he established that the Father was full power, the Son a certain power, the Holy Spirit no power; Arnold of Brescia followed him, according to the same St. Bernard in epistle 195.

Furthermore, Abelard's error consisted in this, that he divided the divine attributes among the persons, not by adaptation or appropriation, as is done in theology, but by partition and assignment, and thus he said that omnipotence belonged to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the

Holy Spirit; and because wisdom serves power by directing it, but goodness does not, hence he said that the Father was full power, the Son a certain power, the Holy Spirit no power. To these can be added Abbot Joachim who around the year 1190 asserted that the three persons were not one essence numerically, but collectively; Raymond Lull who said that the three Persons were three essences, whence they were also called Tritheists, asserting three Gods.

Heretics who accept the Holy Scriptures are to be refuted by their authority: Jews likewise, from the Old Testament; Gentiles, by the motives of credibility of our religion and the solution of the contradictions which they object; but Mohammedans who by the precept of their author are most ignorant, are not led by the weight of reasons; hence scarcely any place for disputing with them is left. Nevertheless, St. Damascene advises in his book On Heresies near the end that they should be asked by what testimony, by what miracles, by what authority they have Mohammed as a true prophet, as it was established to the world concerning Moses and the other Prophets, and also concerning Jesus of Nazareth whom Mohammed honors, although not as God.

They respond indeed that Mohammed received these things which he sanctioned from God without witnesses while he slept. Very well; but how do they know this? And why do they place faith in a vile man narrating his dreams without witnesses in so momentous a matter, especially when he himself in his writings forbade anything to be written or done without witnesses, as the same Damascene says in the cited place.

Moreover, because he himself in his Koran bears witness to the Gospel, hence one can argue against his

followers from it and from other Holy Scriptures; for there is no reason why they should admit the Gospel in one place and reject it in another, why they should say that the Gospel is corrupted here, but not there, unless they clearly prove it, which is impossible for them.

But if they should admit no Scripture, we should deal with them as with pagans, and they should be refuted through miracles and extrinsic testimonies of the credibility of our religion, and furthermore, we should show them the absurdity of their religion, which is in no way consonant with reason.

Article II. On the Truth and Existence of the Most Holy Mystery of the Holy Trinity.

This mystery consists in this: that there is one God numerically and individually in three persons, or one and the same individual divine essence in three really distinct persons—the unbegotten Father, the begotten Son, and the proceeding Holy Spirit. To demonstrate this, we must establish both the distinction or plurality of persons against the Sabellians, and their consubstantiality against the Arians and Macedonians. Thus:

§ I. The Distinction or Plurality of Persons Against the Sabellians Is Affirmed from Sacred Scripture.

Sabellius, as I have already stated, acknowledged only one person in God, or, if you prefer, three persons only in the sense that one man is said to play multiple roles. Thus he claimed that one and the same person is called Father in creation, Son in incarnation, and Holy Spirit in the

sanctification of souls, confusingly misinterpreting that from which the name is derived with that which the name is meant to signify. For although the term "person" derives from "personare" or representing multiple persons, as occurs in comedies, it is nevertheless used to signify different supposita [individual substances], as I will explain below. Against these individuals, therefore, and against the Socinians, who say that the Holy Spirit is not a person but an accident or virtue and efficacy of God:

The assertion is proven: Sacred Scripture consistently posits in God a certain distinction and plurality which can only be that of persons, and not merely of attributes, offices, or effects, which are all the evasions of the Sabellians and Socinians. Therefore:

1 According to Sacred Scripture, there exists in God true paternity and true filiation: "The Lord said to me: You are my Son; today I have begotten you." Psalm 2. The Apostle testifies in Acts 13:34 that these words refer to Christ and the true Son of God, thereby proving the divinity and resurrection of Christ, which is also evident from the words that follow: "I will give you the nations as your inheritance, and the ends of the earth as your possession," which can apply to none other than Christ. "I came forth from the Father," John 16; "The only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father," John 1; "My Father will love him, and we will come to him," John 14; "That we may be in His true Son," 1 John, last chapter throughout, and elsewhere continuously. But paternity and filiation necessarily require the distinction of supposita and persons, as St. Thomas teaches in Contra Gentiles, Book 4, ch. 5. For neither a foot nor a hand, neither an accident like color or heat, nor diverse attributes, nor diverse offices of the same person, nor diverse connotations

of the same person to various effects, is called father or son. Only he is and is called Son who is a person really proceeding from another in the likeness of his nature. Therefore.

2 In God is posited a procession of one from another with terms by which only persons are signified, not properties or offices or effects, such as "I," "you," "he," "this," "another," etc. "Today I have begotten you," Psalm 2; "I proceeded from God," John 8; "This is my beloved Son," Luke 9. Concerning the Holy Spirit: "He will glorify me, because he will receive of mine," John 16; "He will give you another Paraclete," John 14. For neither a foot nor a hand, goodness nor wisdom, can say, "I did," "you do." Nor can the same person according to diverse offices or effects say of itself, "he did," "another did," "you do," "I made you," "I begot you," "I proceeded from you," "he will glorify me," "he will receive of mine," etc. Therefore.

3 In God is posited a society of many where one is with another: "I am not alone, because the Father is with me," John 16; "I was with him forming all things," Proverbs 8; in another: "The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father," John 1; with another: "The Word was with God," ibid.; sitting at the right of another: "The Lord said to my Lord, sit at my right hand," Psalm 109. But this plurality or number according to society is necessarily understood of distinct persons, not of the same person by reason of diverse attributes, offices, or effects. For who but the most inept of men would say of the same person, e.g., the Most Christian King, who is simultaneously King of France and Duke of Burgundy, and who in these titles has diverse offices and diverse effects, that the Duke of Burgundy is with the King of France, is in the King of France, is in the bosom of the King of France, sits at the right hand of the King of France?

Similarly, who would say of the same king, who by reason of diverse properties is intelligent and willing, that the King of France is with the King of France, is in him, in his bosom, with him, sitting at his right hand, etc.? Therefore.

4 Christ says to the Jews in John 8: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true; and: I am one who bears witness concerning myself, and the Father who sent me bears witness concerning me." Here Christ, because in human affairs testimony is true where there are multiple persons testifying, proves his testimony is true because he and the Father testify concerning him. Therefore, either Christ's entire reasoning collapses, or he and the Father are distinct persons, not the same person having diverse offices, attributes, or effects. Therefore.

5 Finally, and what thoroughly refutes Sabellius, according to Sacred Scripture, plurality and number is posited in God before the Incarnation, before the sanctification of souls, and before the creation of the world: "In the beginning was the Word," John 1; "The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning," Proverbs 8; "Glorify me, Father, with the glory which I had with you before the world existed," John 17; "Before the daystar I begot you," Psalm 109; "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their power by the spirit of his mouth," Psalm 32. Likewise, plurality is posited with respect to the same effect: "Whatever he (the Father) does, these things the Son does likewise," John 5; "I was with him forming all things," Proverbs 8; "All things were made through him," John 1; "Upholding all things by the word of his power," Hebrews 1; "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation... And all things were created by him and in him,"

Colossians 1. Therefore, Sabellius falsely claimed that plurality is posited in the divine by reason of diverse effects, and that the same person is called Father insofar as he creates, Son insofar as he becomes incarnate, and Holy Spirit insofar as he sanctifies souls.

But because what I have said thus far mostly concerns the persons of the Father and the Son, and little the person of the Holy Spirit, whom the Socinians particularly attack (for they acknowledge the Son or Christ to be a person, albeit not divine, but they maintain the Holy Spirit is merely an accident or quality, namely, the virtue and efficacy of God), against them I specially add the following:

1 In Matthew 3, Mark 1, and Luke 3, the story of Christ's baptism is described, in which three persons are reported: the Son who is baptized, the Father who says, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," and the Holy Spirit of whom it is stated: "And the Holy Spirit descended in bodily form like a dove upon him." But it is proper to a person, not an accident or quality, to assume bodily form, just as we read that Angels showed themselves in human form. Therefore. The Socinians respond that no form of a dove appeared, but that these words only signify God's grace descending gently from heaven upon Christ in the manner of doves. But they openly and shamelessly contradict Sacred Scripture, which says: "Descended in bodily form," and "Christ saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and coming upon him."

They reply: If from the fact that the Holy Spirit descended under the form of one dove, we rightly conclude that he is one person, then from the fact that he descended upon the Apostles under the form of multiple tongues, it

would be permissible to conclude that they are multiple persons.

I respond by denying the supposition of the antecedent. For we do not conclude that the Holy Spirit is one person from the fact that he descended under the form of one dove, but from the fact that he descended under the form of a dove, we conclude that he is a person, because it is proper to a person to assume a personal form, and it would be absurd to say that accidents or qualities assume such forms. Whether he assumes one or multiple forms is irrelevant, just as whether there is one or multiple images of a man, there is still only one man.

2 In Matthew 28, Christ commands his disciples to baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. But it would be ridiculous for someone to be said to be baptized in the name of some quality; and just as the Father and the Son are persons, as the Socinians concede, so is the Holy Spirit who is associated with them. Therefore.

3 In John 14, Christ says: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete (or Consoler)," where the word "another" clearly imports a distinct person. Therefore.

4 Actions which are proper only to persons are attributed to the Holy Spirit in Sacred Scripture: 1) Speaking is attributed to him, Matthew 10:19; 2) Teaching, John 6:13; 3) Bearing witness, John 15:26; 4) Foretelling the future, John 16:13; 5) Understanding the deep things of God, 1 Corinthians 2:10; 6) Commanding that some be taken into the apostolic ministry, and installing them in this rank, Acts 13:2; 7) Distributing gifts of grace as he wills, 1 Corinthians 12:11. These actions, however, are fitting only for persons. Therefore.

The Socinians respond that from these actions it cannot be inferred that the Holy Spirit is a person, because these and similar actions are attributed in Sacred Scripture to things that certainly are not persons. Thus in 1 Corinthians 13, charity is said to be patient, kind, not jealous, etc.; in Romans 7, sin is said to seduce and kill; in chapter 3, the law is said to speak; in 1 John 5, blood and water are said to testify. Just as, they say, these expressions are figurative, so are ours; and just as therefore it cannot be inferred from these that either charity, sin, law, blood and water are persons, so neither can it be inferred from our texts that the Holy Spirit is a person.

But against this: from the fact that some expressions of Sacred Scripture are sometimes and in certain places figurative, it is wrongly inferred that they are always and everywhere figurative. Rather, from the subject matter and the things being discussed, from the circumstances, from what precedes and follows, it must be judged whether Sacred Scripture is speaking figuratively or not. And everything indicates that what we have brought forward concerning the Holy Spirit is not figurative, and conversely, what the Socinians bring forward is figurative. For: 1) Actions are attributed to the Holy Spirit that can only be performed by persons, and which are never read as being attributed to qualities or inanimate things, namely, understanding, willing, and commanding. 2) In various other places of Sacred Scripture, the Holy Spirit is consistently described as a person, never the things the Socinians adduce. 3) Figurative expressions are employed when the matter is clear and there is no danger of error; but it is clear to all that charity, law, sin, blood, water and similar things are not persons. Yet the word "Spirit" signifies substance, so when

things proper to persons are attributed to it, everyone is led to believe it is a person; which is so true that all Christians and heretics other than the Sabellians and Socinians firmly believe the Holy Spirit is a person. Hence, if what Sacred Scripture says about the Holy Spirit were to be understood in a metaphorical sense, God would have failed his Church by providing an open occasion for error in such a difficult matter. 4) The metaphors by which the actions of persons are attributed in Sacred Scripture to charity, sin, law, water, blood, and similar things are used very rarely and in passing. But the actions of persons are consistently and everywhere attributed to the Holy Spirit. Metaphors are used in teaching and argumentation; but rarely or never when events are simply narrated. St. Luke, however, in Acts 13, plainly and simply narrates: "The Holy Spirit said: Set apart for me Saul and Barnabas for the work to which I have called them." And in chapter 10: "The Spirit said to him (namely, to Peter): Behold, three men are looking for you. Rise, therefore, go down, and go with them without hesitation, because I have sent them." Such simple narratives, joined with the pronoun "I," "me," clearly demonstrate that the Holy Spirit is a person who commands, calls, sends, etc.

5 Finally, although gifts, virtues, and graces are sometimes denoted in Sacred Scripture by the name of the Holy Spirit, because they are from him, nevertheless, lest there be any place for error, the Holy Spirit himself is often distinguished from them in Sacred Scripture, which completely refutes the Socinians. Thus in Luke 4: "Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit"; in Acts 1: "You shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you"; in 1 Corinthians 12: "There are diverse gifts, but the same Spirit... To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; to

another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, faith in the same Spirit... But all these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to each one as he wills." I omit many other passages, some of which will be referred to presently when discussing consubstantiality.

§ II. The Consubstantiality of the Persons Against the Arians and Macedonians Is Asserted from Sacred Scripture.

Note: The consubstantiality of the Persons can be understood in two ways: 1) that they are of entirely the same and individual nature, unmultiplied and undivided in them, and this is the Catholic understanding; 2) that they are indeed of the same nature, but only specifically, divided and multiplied in them, as with two supposita of human nature—and this sense is the error of Paganism that admits a plurality of Gods, into which the Semi-Arians seemed to be declining when they said the Son was similar to the Father in substance, though they did not dare to assert it explicitly. Neither did the pure Arians champion this sense, because it is an obvious error plainly contrary to Sacred Scripture and reason, as we have seen regarding Polytheism. They denied, therefore, with the Macedonians, the consubstantiality of the persons, because they believed that some of them—the Arians regarding the Son, the Macedonians regarding the Holy Spirit—did not possess true divinity, but were of created nature.

It remains, therefore, to prove the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit (for concerning the Father there has never been doubt), which once established, their consubstantiality with the Father understood in the Catholic sense is proven. For if the Son and the Holy Spirit are true

God as the Father is, there will certainly be in them one and undivided divinity even according to the Arians and Macedonians, who hold with us that there is only one God. Hence:

The Consubstantiality or Divinity of the Son Against the Arians

Proof: He is God, and consubstantial with God the Father: 1) who in Sacred Scripture is called God in the same manner as the Father, or to whom divinity is attributed in the same way as to the Father; 2) who is asserted to be equal to God the Father; 3) to whom is granted the same power and virtue as to God the Father; 4) to whom the same worship, the same adoration as to the Father is accorded; 5) whose superiority to every creature is asserted and from whom every inferiority of creature is removed. Now such is the case with the Son in the divine; therefore, etc. The major premise is evident, for by no clearer indications can divinity be declared. Thus:

Proof of the first part of the minor premise, first from the Old Testament. In Psalm 109, it is said: "The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at my right hand," where David names the Son as Lord equally as the Father, therefore as God; for this supreme reason of lordship is founded in deity. Christ himself used this passage, Matthew 22, to prove his divinity. Peter, Acts 2, and Paul in Hebrews 1: "To which of the angels did He ever say: Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool? Are they not all ministering spirits, etc." As if to say: he who is called Lord and sits at the right hand of God is not with respect to God a minister and inferior as are all creatures; therefore, neither is he a

creature, but equal to God and true God. Isaiah 45, speaking of Christ: "Truly you are a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Savior"; and Baruch 3: "This is our God, and no other shall be accounted in comparison with him"; and he adds: "After this he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men."

From the New Testament; John 1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," God indeed with whom the Word is, namely the true and supreme God.

You will say with the Arians and Socinians: In this proposition: "And the Word was God," or as it appears in Greek, "and that Word was God," the emphatic article "the God" is not expressed, as it is expressed in Greek in the earlier proposition about the Father, "the Word was with God," by which it is signified that the Word or Son is a lesser God than the Father, and is called God only participatively. For the rule is that when God is placed without the article, it is accepted as God only by participation.

I respond by denying the consequence and say that this rule is not universally true, for in the same chapter God is spoken of the Father without the article: "There was a man sent from God"; "they were born of God," etc. Similarly in Romans 1. And conversely, in chapter 5 of the First Epistle of John, the article is prefixed when it is said of the Son: "This is the true God." Why the Evangelist did not prefix the article here is explained by Maldonatus from the property of the Greek language, that it is not accustomed to prefix the article to the predicate of a proposition, but only to the subject. However, in the Greek language, God is the predicate of this proposition, as is clear from the objection itself.

First John, final chapter: "That we may be in his true Son. This is the true God and eternal life." John 20, St.

Thomas says to Christ: "My Lord and my God." In Romans 9: "Christ... who is over all, God blessed forever." In Titus 2: "Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ." If, therefore, Christ is true God, God over all, the great God, he is not God by participation only, by adoption, or by imitation.

The second part of the minor premise is proved. In Philippians 2: "Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God"; in Colossians 2: "In him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily," that is, truly and not merely in shadow; John 16: "All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine." And in John 17, he says to the Father: "All mine are thine, and thine are mine"; but where all that is in one is found in another, there is equality: therefore the Son is equal to God the Father; therefore truly God, otherwise he would not be equal, but infinitely distant and unequal.

The third part of the minor premise is proved. John 1: "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing"; Colossians 1: "All things were created by him and in him, and he is before all, and by him all things consist"; Hebrews 1: "Upholding all things by the word of his power"; John 5: "For whatsoever he (that is, the Father) doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner." Where the same omnipotent power is attributed to the Son as to the Father, therefore the same nature, both because power or virtue follows the form and nature of a thing, and because omnipotence belongs to God alone.

The Arians once responded that the Son does all that the Father does, as his instrument and creature subordinate to him. But against this I infer: Therefore, whatsoever the Father does, the Son does not similarly, but dissimilarly, for

the mode of acting in an instrument is far different from the mode of acting of the principal cause. Again: therefore he does not uphold all things by the word of his power, but by the power of the Father, which plainly contradicts the cited Sacred Scriptures.

Moreover, if the Word is a creature, even if more excellent than others, it was made either by the Father alone, or by itself together with the Father. This second option is self-contradictory, otherwise it would exist before it was made; therefore the first must be true: therefore not all things were made by the Word, and the Father does something that the Son does not do, which again openly contradicts Sacred Scripture.

The Socinians respond that these testimonies ought not to be understood concerning the creation of things, but concerning the restoration of the Church and the redemption of humankind through Christ.

I infer again, manifestly against Sacred Scripture: Therefore whatsoever the Father does, the Son does not likewise; not all things were made by him; without him was made something; not all things were created by him and in him; not "all the things that are in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers," as the Apostle nevertheless asserts in the same place, Colossians 1; indeed, nothing at all was created through him.

The fourth part of the minor premise is proved. John 5: "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father"; Psalm 71: "All kings shall adore him, all nations shall serve him"; Psalm 96: "Adore him, all you his angels," which the Apostle in Hebrews 1 understands of the Son. In Sacred

Scripture, moreover, adoration is never commanded except for the true God.

The Fathers also emphasize with the Apostle in Hebrews 1 the already cited passage: "Sit at my right hand," which signifies equality of honor. For as St. Chrysologus observes, just as the Father says to the Son: "Sit at my right hand," later the Father is said to sit at the right hand of the Son, "The Lord at thy right hand," to signify that both have an equal degree of honor. "Thus at the right hand," says the aforementioned Father in Sermon 58, "sits the Son, so that the Father does not sit at the left; divine acknowledgment is unique and singular, where supernal virtue receives nothing to the left."

The fifth part of the minor premise is evident from what has been said. For if the Son is true God with the Father and equal to him, if all creatures are made through him and consist in him, if finally he is worshipped with the same honor as the Father, then he is superior to all creatures. Hence also Sacred Scripture constitutes in him, as in the Father, the reason for the ultimate end and blessed life. John 17: "This is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." And First John, final chapter: "This is the true God and life eternal."

The Consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit Against the Macedonians

Proof: The divinity of the Holy Spirit is proven by the same five means.

1) He is expressly named God, Acts 5, where Peter says to Ananias: "Why has Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldst lie to the Holy Spirit? Thou hast not lied to

men, but to God." 1 Corinthians 12: "There are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all." And afterwards it is added: "But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh," where he who is called Spirit is God. That same Lord of hosts who in Isaiah 6 says: "Go, tell this people: Hearing, hear and understand not," is called the Holy Spirit by Paul in the final chapter of Acts: "Well did the Holy Spirit speak to our fathers by Isaiah the prophet, saying: Go to this people, and say to them: With the ear you shall hear, and shall not understand"; John 4: "God is a Spirit." Thus the Socinians lie when they say that the Holy Spirit is nowhere called God in Sacred Scripture.

2) Equality in nature is attributed to him in 1 John, final chapter: "And these three are one"; Matthew 28, in dignity: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit"; in immensity, Wisdom 1: "The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world, and that which containeth all things hath knowledge of the voice"; in all knowledge, 1 Corinthians 2: "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God"; and below: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God."

3) Divine power and virtue are attributed to him. Psalm 103: "Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created: and thou shalt renew the face of the earth"; Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth." Likewise everywhere the resurrection of the dead, the sanctification of souls, the governance of the Church, and the greatest of all wonders, the work of the Incarnation, are attributed to the Holy Spirit. Luke 1: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall

overshadow thee," where the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High are equated.

4) The majesty of God and divine honor are attributed to him. 1 Corinthians 6: "Know you not, that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you... glorify and bear God in your body," where the Holy Spirit is again called God, and a temple is attributed to him, which is proper to divinity alone. Hence such veneration is due to him that an injury done to him is an injury to God, and is said to be unforgivable. Hebrews 10 and Matthew 12: "Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but he that shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him," etc. Hence again, the glory of the ultimate end and beatitude is attributed to him, 1 Peter 1: "The Holy Spirit sent from heaven, on whom the angels desire to look."

From these it is evident that he is superior to all creatures. We omit many other testimonies, which can easily be referred to one of these five points.

§ III. The Plurality and Consubstantiality of the Persons are Simultaneously Proven from Sacred Scripture.

Thus far we have proven the plurality and the consubstantiality of the Persons separately; now we present testimonies from Sacred Scripture by which both are proven simultaneously.

From the Old Testament

1 Genesis 1: "Let us make man in our image and likeness," where plurality is indicated, and immediately after, "God created man in his image," where unity is indicated.

The responses of the Socinians—namely that God speaks in the plural number in the manner of an artisan who, when preparing for a work, as if spurring himself on, says "let us make a statue," or for the sake of honor in the manner of princes, or that the plural number refers to Angels—are futile. The first is false and entirely foreign to usage, for that artisan would be considered nearly insane who, alone among the instruments of his craft, would say, "let us make a shoe." As for the second, although it has become customary in the Hebrew language for the second and third person to be addressed in the plural number for the sake of honor, it is not customary for the first person to speak of himself in the plural number, as is evident in Nebuchadnezzar and Pharaoh, although they were most ambitious kings. Neither in the Greek nor Latin language is anyone accustomed to speak of himself in the plural number, unless he speaks in the name of many. Thus kings speak of themselves in the plural number because they speak in the name and from the counsel of nobles. Thus Christ, in John 3, says: "We speak what we know, and we testify what we have seen," because He speaks in His own name and that of the Father, indicating that the Father testifies together with Him, as Rupert notes and Christ Himself openly professes in the following chapter 8. Thus Hannibal in Livy, book 39, when he says: "Let us free the Roman people from long-lasting concern," speaks in his own name and that of those standing by, whether friends or servants, as if they were consenting and nodding in agreement. I present these examples because they are the very ones that the Socinians oppose. As for the

third objection, its falsity is evident from the fact that man was not created in the image of Angels but of God, and that Angels are in no way mentioned as having contributed anything to the creation of man.

2 Genesis 18: "(To Abraham) the Lord appeared in the valley of Mamre... and when he had lifted up his eyes, three men appeared standing near him: when he saw them... he adored toward the ground. And he said: Lord, if I have found favor in your eyes." Pondering these words, St. Augustine in book 3 against Maximinus, ch. 26, says: "He sees three, and he calls them not Lords, but Lord, since the Trinity, though three persons, is one Lord God."

3 Psalm 66 ([1]): "May God, our God, bless us, may God bless us," note the number; and lest by naming God three times the Psalmist should seem to assert three Gods, he immediately adds: "And may all the ends of the earth fear him," and similarly in many other places.

From the New Testament

4 Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." By these words both the unity of essence is designated by saying in the singular "in the name," not "in the names," and the Trinity of persons by saying "of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."

The Socinians respond that to be baptized in the name of the Son and the Holy Spirit is to be baptized with the baptism of the Son and the Holy Spirit: "Name," in this context, being taken for baptism itself; but the fact that we

[1] Psalm 67:7 in the Masoretic

are baptized with the baptism of the Son and the Holy Spirit does not follow that they are either true Gods or distinct persons; just as, although in 1 Corinthians 10 the Israelites are said to be baptized in Moses, it does not follow that Moses was the true God.

But against this, we are said to be baptized in the name of the Son and the Holy Spirit in the same way as we are said to be baptized in the name of the Father, not because we receive his baptism, but because infinite is his power in whose name we are baptized and sanctified. Nor does what is offered concerning Moses contradict this: for the Apostle does not say that the Israelites were baptized in the name of Moses, but in Moses: which two expressions differ greatly: for the Apostle himself, in 1 Corinthians 1, teaches that no one is baptized in the name of any creature: "Were you... baptized in the name of Paul?" Because to him in whose name we are baptized we owe faith, obedience, and adoration. The Israelites are said to be baptized in Moses, therefore, because through Moses, or with Moses as leader, they were baptized, namely typically, in the cloud and in the Red Sea, because to go under the cloud and enter the sea which submerged the Egyptians was a figure of the future baptism of Christ, by which our enemies, that is, sins, are submerged, and we are overshadowed by the heavenly dew of the grace of the Holy Spirit.

5 1 John 5:7: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit: and these three are one."

In this most forceful testimony, the Socinians attack two things: the authenticity of the text and its meaning.

Regarding the text's authenticity, they say that this verse 7 of chapter 5 of the First Epistle of John is spurious: 1)

because it is not found in older and most approved copies; 2) because it was not cited by SS. Athanasius, Hilary, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzen, and others, against the Arians and Sabellians, although it would have been most suitable for refuting them.

To the first, we admit that this verse, either in its entirety or in parts, is not found in certain ancient manuscript copies; but it is found in many more very ancient and of the best note. 1) It is found in the codices used by the authors of the Complutensian edition of 1517: these codices were very ancient, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, as Cardinal Ximenes testifies in the preface. Robert Stephanus in his most elegant edition of 1550, from sixteen copies gathered from Italy, Spain, and France, notes only seven in which not the entire verse is missing, but only a part, namely these words, "in heaven," without which the whole force of the text remains. 3) The theologians of Louvain, from that great number of manuscript codices against which they compared the sacred Bible once and again, count only five in which that verse is missing; and on the contrary, they note that in fifteen codices, these words of verse eight concerning the three earthly witnesses: "And these three are one," on which the Socinians place emphasis, are not read. 4) It was read in the most ancient and most approved copies which Cassiodorus used in the 5th and 6th centuries, as is evident from his work entitled: "The Complexions of Senator Cassiodorus on the Epistles and Acts of the Apostles and the Apocalypse," which was recently found in the library of the Chapter of Verona and was ordered to be printed in the year 1721 by the most illustrious D. Maffei. In this work, therefore, Cassiodorus, explaining the summary of chapter 5 of the First Epistle of John, says thus: "To which thing testify

on earth three mysteries, water, blood, and spirit, which are read to have been fulfilled in the Passion of the Lord; in heaven, moreover, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one God." Moreover, Cassiodorus took the utmost care in seeking out and comparing among themselves ancient and approved codices, as he himself testifies in the preface and chapter 8 of the book of Institutions, section 5. 5) It is read in a most ancient British codex, the authority of which was so great for Erasmus that, although in the first two editions of the New Testament he had omitted this verse, in the third he restored it.

That it is not found in a few copies could have happened: 1) from the perfidy of the Arians who erased this text as too contrary to their error, as Jerome testifies in the Prologue to the Catholic Epistles, if indeed this prologue is St. Jerome's, about which critics now dispute. But be that as it may, St. Ambrose often reproaches the Arians with the vice of this fraud in book 2 on Faith, ch. 15, book 5, ch. 16; book 3 on the Holy Spirit, ch. 10. 2) This omission could have happened from the fault of the copyist who, having arrived at these words of verse seven: "There are three who give testimony," by a slip of the eye passed to verse eight where the same words are repeated, and this lapse is frequent for copyists when, with almost no interval interposed, the same words are repeated.

Moreover, our Vulgate edition was completed according to copies which were handled everywhere by the faithful; these, however, can be adulterated much more difficultly because of daily use and the certain danger of detecting fraud, and therefore they deserve much greater faith than those which lie in the corners of libraries, where

due to the negligence or malice of copyists they are securely exposed to fraud and adulteration.

To the second point, namely that several Fathers did not cite this verse against heretics, we respond that others did indeed cite it. Tertullian cited it, in the book against Praxeas, ch. 95; St. Cyprian in the book on the Unity of the Church, not long after the beginning. Itacius Clarus in the 4th century, or according to others Vigilius in the 5th century, in the book against Varimadum, ch. 5; Eugenius of Carthage in the explanation of the Catholic Faith subscribed by almost four hundred bishops and offered to Huneric, the Arian king of the Vandals, in the year 484, as Victor of Vita reports in book 3 on the African Persecution, and Gennadius in the book on Ecclesiastical Writers, ch. 97; Jerome in the prologue to the Catholic Epistles, Cassiodorus as I said above; also according to Bellarmine in book 1 on Christ, ch. 6; St. Athanasius in the book to Theophilus on the Unity of the Deity of the Trinity: the author of the disputation of the same Athanasius at the Council of Nicaea, and Fulgentius in the book against the Objections of the Arians, near the end. This positive proof certainly prevails over the negative argument of the Socinians. Therefore, that in the writings of some ancients we do not read that this verse was cited by them, very likely happened because they came upon a defective codex, or because not all of their writings have come down to us, or have been corrupted by the enemies of the faith.

Regarding the meaning of this verse, the Socinians say that by these words: "And these three are one," is not signified the unity of nature or substance, but the unity of testimony, because in verse eight following, concerning the spirit, blood, and water, it is likewise said: "And these three

are one," which nevertheless is not understood of the unity of nature, but of the unity of testimony, insofar as they concur in the same testimony about Christ that he is the truth, just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

I respond 1: these particles of verse eight: "And these three are one," are missing in many Latin codices. The Louvain correctors count fifteen in which they are not read. Innocent III in a decretal which exists in the 3rd of Decretals, title 41, ch. In a certain 8, says: "In most codices, probably Latin, is by no means had." Greek codices have it indeed, not however as it is referred, but thus: "And these three are in agreement," that is, they concur in one testimony. Whence it is rightly presumed that by the fraud of the Arians, or negligence of copyists in Latin codices in which these words are read, they fell out. However, although it is not so read in our Vulgate, it should nevertheless be so explained that it corresponds to the Greek original; so that the sense is, spirit, water, and blood concur to testify to the same thing, namely that Christ is true man, and although in both verses there is a certain parity in giving testimony, it is not necessary, however, that there be parity in the meaning of these words: "And these three are one."

I respond 2: given that these words express parity, it is certainly found. For these three, spirit, water, and blood, are in some way substantially one. Let the sense therefore be: spirit, water, and blood testified concerning Christ at the time of the Passion: spirit while he expired crying out, blood and water flowing from his side; and these three are substantially one; that is, they pertain to one and the same human substance in Christ, just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit pertain to one and the same divine substance,

with this difference, however, that this divine substance is supremely simple and one, while the human is composite.

6 John 10: "I and the Father are one"; "I and the Father are," behold the distinction of persons; "one," the consubstantiality. Whence St. Augustine, tract 36 on chapter 8 of John, says: "What he said, 'one,' frees you from Arius: what he said, 'are,' frees you from Sabellius." The Fathers particularly pressed this passage against heretics, wherefore it is worth the effort to explain all its force more clearly, and to explode the evasions of heretics.

Christ, therefore, in that place wishing to prove his divinity was true, which was the only question among the Jews, premised that what the Father had given him was greater than all things, namely divinity, for thus speaking of his sheep, he says: "No one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father who gave them to me is greater than all: and no one can snatch them out of the hand of my Father." As if he were saying: Just as no one can snatch my sheep out of the hand of my Father, so neither out of mine, because I am equal and consubstantial with him; for what he gave me is greater than all, and therefore it is divinity itself; otherwise it would not be what is greater, nor would the consequence be valid, that just as no one can snatch from the hand of the Father, so neither from his own: whence explaining himself more clearly in what follows, he adds: "I and the Father are one," which certainly if it is not understood of complete unity in substance, what he had said before is weakened, that what was given to him by the Father was greater than all, and that no one can snatch from his hand because no one can from the hand of the Father.

That this was the meaning of Christ's words the Jews plainly understood, since for that reason they wanted to

stone him and accused him of blasphemy, because he made himself God. For it follows in the same place: "The Jews therefore took up stones to stone him"; and a little later: "For a good work we do not stone you, but for blasphemy; and because you, being a man, make yourself God."

Nevertheless, neither Christ nor the Evangelist corrected this opinion of the Jews as if it were false; rather, on the contrary, Christ confirms what he had said before, according to their opinion, from his works: "If," he says in the same place, "I do not do the works of my Father, do not believe me. But if I do: and if you will not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father"; that is, as he had said before, because "I and the Father are one" in divine nature. For what is one with another by unity or concord of affection and will alone, as heretics interpret, is not properly said to be in the other, nor to be simply one, as we said above. Moreover, the Jews understood these last words of Christ just like the former ones, indeed and as confirmatory of the former ones, according to the same sense of the unity of nature, since for that reason they wished to lay hands on him again, for the Evangelist immediately adds: "They sought therefore to apprehend him, and he went forth out of their hands." Whence St. Augustine, tract 48 on John, says: "Behold, the Jews understood what the Arians do not understand: for they were angered because they perceived that it cannot be said: 'I and the Father are one,' except where there is equality of the Father and the Son."

To this peremptory authority, heretics oppose 1: the following words of Christ, by which he explains in what sense he said he was God and the Son of God: "Is it not," I pray, "written in your law: I said, you are gods? If he called them

gods to whom the word of God was addressed, and the Scripture cannot be broken: do you say of him whom the Father has sanctified and sent into the world: You blaspheme, because I said, I am the Son of God?" He understands, therefore, only that he is God and the Son of God by grace and adoption, as are other holy men, not by nature and natural filiation.

I respond by denying the consequence. For by these words Christ does not intend to explain in what sense he called himself the Son of God, but that for him to call himself the Son of God is not blasphemous, and he proves this by an argument not from similarity, but from the lesser to the greater: as if to say: The Law calls gods those to whom the word of God came, and it contains no blasphemy: therefore, a fortiori, it is not blasphemy for me to call myself the Son of God, who have been specially sanctified by the Father and sent into the world. Having repelled the charge of blasphemy from his words, he immediately returns to proving his divinity through works, as we saw. The heretics insist: Christ by the words just cited proves that he is the Son of God because the Father sanctified him: but the filiation of God through sanctification is adoptive filiation through habitual grace, as in other saints, and not natural: therefore.

I respond 1: by denying the major. Because, as I was just saying, Christ by these words does not directly want to prove that he is God and the natural Son of God, but by an argument from the lesser to the greater, that he is not guilty of blasphemy in that he said he was God, since Sacred Scripture without blasphemy calls gods those who are commonly holy, while he is holy in a special way and sent by the Father.

I respond 2: by distinguishing the minor: filiation of God through accidental sanctification of grace is adoptive filiation of God, I concede; filiation of God through substantial sanctification of the hypostatic union, I deny. Christ, however, was sanctified not only in the former, but also in the latter way, as we shall prove in the treatise on the Incarnation.

Heretics object 2: the words of Christ in John 17: "I pray, Father... that they may be one, as we also are one"; but the disciples about whom the discourse is there were not one among themselves by unity of nature, but only of will and affection: therefore similar is the case for the Father and the Son.

Some respond that Christ there prays as man, and prayed that, just as between God the Father and himself as man there is a unity of perfect charity, so there might be among the disciples.

I respond 2: from St. Athanasius, 4th sermon against the Arians, that Christ by these words did not intend similarity in all things, but only in some, indeed not so much similarity as an example that can be participated in by imitation to some degree. So that the sense is, just as I and the Father are in harmony of will by nature, may the disciples have similar harmony by grace. For it is familiar to Sacred Scripture, whether from natural or divine things, to propose examples for moral ones, without intending complete parity: for thus it is said in Matthew 5: "Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," the sense being that we strive through grace as much as possible to imitate the perfection of the Father, not however that our perfection be infinite and essential, like the perfection of the Father. Similarly when he says in Matthew 10: "Be wise as serpents,

and simple as doves," he does not want us to become serpents and doves naturally, but that by the example of the serpent and the dove we learn prudence and simplicity. Thus therefore, concludes St. Athanasius, "not that we might be what he is was it said by Christ that they may be one as we also are, but according to our nature, and insofar as it can be done, that from there we might borrow a formula and similitude... He indeed is one with his Father by nature; we, however, become one among ourselves by affection and spirit, having for an archetype exemplar the natural unity of the Son with the Father."

7 What is more explicit than that of John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," as we have already pondered. Whence St. Ambrose, book 1 on Faith to the Trinity, ch. 5, elegantly says: "But our fisherman has excluded all heresies in this short chapter; for what was in the beginning is not enclosed by time, is not preceded by a beginning, therefore let Arius fall silent. But what was with God is not confused by commingling, but is distinguished by the solid perfection of the Word remaining with the Father, so let Sabellius be silent. And the Word was God; therefore this Word is not in the utterance of speech, but in that designation of heavenly virtue, so let Photinus be confuted. But what was in the beginning with God teaches the inseparable unity of sempiternal divinity in the Father and the Son, so let Eudoxius and Eunomius be ashamed."

§ IV. The Plurality and Consubstantiality of the Persons Proven by Tradition.

1. From the form of Baptism which has been consistently in use since the beginning of the Church; this form contains the profession of three Persons in one numerical substance, as we have discussed above.

2. From the protests of the entire Church against heresies arising concerning this mystery, namely those of Sabellius, Arius, Macedonius, and others. From this, it is evident that this is and has been the ancient and constant doctrine of the faithful.

3. From the Holy Fathers who testify that this has been the perpetual and unwavering tradition of the Church from its beginnings, which they set forth against emerging errors. Tertullian, in his book against Praxeas, chapter 2, after having explained this mystery as it is believed by the Church, says: "That this rule has prevailed from the beginning of the Gospel, even before the earliest heretics, not to mention before Praxeas, who is but of yesterday, will be proved by the very novelty of Praxeas, who is of yesterday." The Fathers of the Council of Antioch, in their epistle to Paul of Samosata: "We have determined to set forth in writing and expound the faith which we have received from the beginning and which we hold, transmitted and preserved in the Catholic Church down to the present day from the blessed Apostles." St. Athanasius, in his book on the Decrees of the Council of Nicaea, addressing the Arians: "You, O newcomers, what Fathers can you cite who favor your phrases? You will certainly never be able to name anyone prudent and wise." The First Council of Constantinople, assembled against Macedonius for the divinity of the Holy Spirit, in its synodical letter to the bishops of the West: "This faith (concerning the Trinity of Persons in the same

individual divine nature)... is most ancient and congruent with the washing of Baptism."

Another remarkable testimony to the tradition of the Church concerning the divinity of Christ is provided by an ancient author from the second or third century, cited by Eusebius in Book 5 of his History, chapter 27, and by Nicephorus in Book 4, chapter 21, whom many believe to be Caius, a most learned presbyter of the Roman Church. This author, therefore, writing against the heresy of Artemon and his followers, who asserted that Christ was merely a man and claimed that the ancients, including Pope Victor of Rome, agreed with them, says: "They affirm that all the ancients and the Apostles themselves received and taught what they now declare... and that the truth of the proclamation was preserved until the time of Victor... but from the time of Zephyrinus, who succeeded Victor, the truth was adulterated. And perhaps what they say might seem credible, were it not first contradicted by the divine Scriptures, and then by the writings of certain brothers older than the time of Victor, I mean Justin, Miltiades, Tatian, Clement, and many others, in all of whose works Christ's divinity is asserted. As for the works of Irenaeus, Melito, and the rest, who does not know that in these Christ is proclaimed both God and man? Psalms also and songs of brothers written from the beginning by the faithful celebrate Christ as the Word of God, attributing divinity to him. Since, therefore, church doctrine has been proclaimed for so many years, how can it be that all up to the time of Victor proclaimed the doctrine these men claim? How are they not ashamed to fabricate such calumnies against Victor?"

4. From the Holy Fathers who in the first three centuries before the Council of Nicaea expressed this faith in their writings.

From the first century

Hermas, a disciple of Paul, in his work called "The Shepherd," Book 3, similitude 5, says: "The Son of God is not placed in the condition of a servant, but in great power and authority." In similitude 9, number 2: "The Son of God is more ancient than every creature, so that he was present in counsel with his Father in founding creation." And in number 14: "The name of the Son of God is great and immeasurable, and the whole world is sustained by him." Now, he who is not placed in the condition of a servant is God; for everything that is not God must necessarily serve God. He who is immeasurable and more ancient than every creature is God. He who founded and sustains the world is God; for who, except God, could found and sustain the world? He who was present with the Father as a partner in founding the world is God with the Father, and distinct from the Father in some way, namely in person, for no one is a partner to himself. Therefore, etc.

If you say that Pope Gelasius relegated this work to the apocrypha, the response is that this was done not because it was a work of false attribution or harmful doctrine, but because it was not to be placed within the canon. For Eusebius in Book 3 of his History, chapter 3, and St. Jerome in his Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers under Hermas, attest that it is a genuine work of Hermas; and that it is a work of excellent quality and useful to the Church is testified by the same authors in the same place, and by St.

Athanasius in Book 1 on the Incarnation of the Word. From this it is evident that St. Jerome corrected what he had stated more harshly in Book 1 on Habakkuk, chapter 1, that this work was "to be condemned as foolish."

St. Clement, Paul's fellow worker and successor of Peter in the Roman See, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, number 16, says: "The scepter of God's majesty, our Lord Jesus Christ, did not come with a display of arrogance or pride, although he could have done so, but in humility, as the Holy Spirit spoke of him; for he says (Isaiah 53) that he had no form or glory." Truly, he who is the scepter, that is, the virtue and power of God, is God. Likewise, the Spirit who foretells future events is God. Therefore, Christ is God, the Holy Spirit is God. In number 361, speaking again of Christ: "Who being the brightness of his majesty, he is made so much greater than the angels, as he has obtained a more excellent name than they. For it is written: 'Who makes his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.' But of the Son the Lord said: 'You are my Son, today I have begotten you... sit at my right hand.'" And in his second Epistle to the same Corinthians, number 1: "Brethren, we ought to think of Jesus Christ as of God, as the judge of the living and the dead." Noël Alexander in his History of the 4th century, chapter 12, article 12, proves that these epistles are rightly attributed to St. Clement.

St. Dionysius the Areopagite, another disciple of St. Paul, in his book on Divine Names, chapter 1, says: "And so, in almost every theological treatise, we see the supreme divinity holily celebrated as singular and unique because of that impartible simplicity and unity, yet as Trinity because of the expression of the superessential fecundity in three persons." The same Noël Alexander in his History of the 1st

century, dissertation 22, proves that these books and others commonly attributed to St. Dionysius the Areopagite are his genuine works, against Morin, Launoy, Erasmus, Daillé, etc.

St. Ignatius, martyr, a hearer of John the Evangelist, in his Epistle to the Ephesians: "Be zealous to be established in the doctrines of the Lord and the Apostles, that all things which you do may prosper in flesh and spirit, in faith and charity, in the Son and the Father and the Holy Spirit... Be subject to the bishop and to one another, as Jesus Christ was to the Father according to the flesh, and the Apostles to Christ and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit." And in his Epistle to the Magnesians: "There is one God who manifested himself through Jesus Christ his Son, who is his eternal Word, not proceeding from silence." Catholics, the Anglican church, Ussher, Vossius, and others recognize these epistles as the genuine product of St. Ignatius, against certain French Calvinists, Blondel, Daillé, etc.

From the second century

St. Polycarp, another disciple of St. John the Evangelist and also of St. Ignatius, bishop of Smyrna, and with him the entire church of Smyrna, in the epistle which they wrote concerning the martyrdom of St. Polycarp to the churches of Pontus, as found in Eusebius, Book 4 of his History, chapter 15 - in that epistle, the holy Martyr is represented as praying to God shortly before his death: "Father of your only-begotten and blessed Son Jesus Christ... I bless you for bringing me to this day, that I might partake in the company and cup of your Christ... in the incorruptibility of the Holy Spirit... Therefore, I praise you for all things, I bless you, I glorify you through the eternal

High Priest Jesus Christ your only-begotten Son, through whom to you with him in the Holy Spirit be glory now and for ages of ages." From this we have not only that Christ is the only-begotten Son of God and eternal High Priest, consequently God begotten from the substance of the Father from eternity, but also that the three divine Persons are to be honored with the same glory, and are therefore equal to each other.

St. Justin Martyr in his Second Apology: "Him (the Father) and him who comes from him... the Son and prophetic Spirit, we worship and adore, honoring them in reason and truth." But adoration is due only to God. In the same work: "Because he is the Word and Firstborn of God, he is also God." In the same place he says that Christians are baptized in the name of the parent of all things, and of the Lord God, and of the Savior Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit. And in his Dialogue with Trypho, he proves that there are several persons in God from these words: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." The Socinians raise many objections from St. Justin, which we will address in the solutions to objections.

Athenagoras, a Christian philosopher, in his Apology for Christians to the emperors, says: "Who, then, would not be astonished to hear those called atheists who proclaim God the Father, and God the Son, and the Holy Spirit, explaining their power in unity and their distinction in order?" Here the trinity of persons in the unity of substance is clearly explained. He adds in the same place that Christians are especially concerned to understand what is the union of the Son with the Father, what the Father shares with the Son, what is the Spirit, what the unity of the three, what the distinction of those united. Also: "That we may," he says,

"acknowledge God and his Word, and the Holy Spirit, with equal honor and power." These statements very clearly indicate the trinity of persons in the unity of essence.

The Socinians object: 1. Athenagoras establishes there as a principle that everything that is begotten must at some point have begun, and must at some point cease to be, from which it follows that the Word, which is begotten, was not from eternity. 2. He says that the Word is the reason of the Father, but the reason of the Father is not distinct from the Father. 3. He says that the Word proceeded from the Father to be the act of creatures and to bring them forth from nothing, and therefore calls it the first offspring of the Father, and places it in idea and operation. These things prove that the Word is not eternal.

I respond to the first objection: the term "begotten" is taken by Athenagoras there as equivalent to "made" or "created," for he is speaking there of created things. To the second, I deny that this was said by Athenagoras, but he speaks thus: "For from the beginning, God, being eternal mind, had in himself from eternity Λὸγον," that is, reason or word or speech, "since he is eternally rational." This is very true, and most accepted among all theologians, namely that God from eternity has or produces the Word, because from eternity he is intellective and rational. To the third, I respond that all these things were said by Athenagoras about the procession of the Word ad extra (externally); for it is to be carefully observed that the ancients distinguished a twofold procession of the Word, one eternal ad intra (internally) latent in God, the other temporal ad extra in the creation of the world, when God externally uttered this word "let there be light," etc., and they called both processions "generation," the eternal one in the proper and strict sense, the temporal

one improperly and metaphorically, insofar as the manifestation of something latent and hidden is said to be as it were its generation. Since, therefore, the creation of the world is attributed to the Word, it is said by the ancient Fathers to be as if born and generated, when it externally operated and became known by its operation.

St. Irenaeus, a disciple of Polycarp, bishop of Lyons and martyr, in Book 1 against Heresies, chapter 2, thus expounds the faith of the Church: "The Church," he says, "disseminated throughout the whole world to the ends of the earth, received from the Apostles and their disciples this faith, which is in one God the Father Almighty... and in one Jesus Christ, the Son of God, incarnated for our salvation, and in the Holy Spirit." He also teaches that Christ existed before the Virgin Mary in Book 1, chapter 19, Book 2, chapter 55, and elsewhere; that he is eternal, in Book 2, chapters 18, 43, 55, and elsewhere; that he is true God in Book 1, chapters 2 and 19, Book 2, chapters 18, 43, and 55, Book 3, chapters 6, 8, and 18, and elsewhere.

They object: 1. St. Irenaeus says, in Book 2, chapter 49, that the Father is greater than the Son; 2. In the same place, that the Son did not know the day of judgment; 3. In Book 4, chapter 17, that the Father commanded the Son to create the world; 4. In the same place, that the Father alone is justly called God and Lord.

I respond to the first and second objections: both are to be understood of Christ as man. To the third, I distinguish: the Father commanded the Son properly as a superior to an inferior, I deny; improperly insofar as by eternal generation he communicated to him his will to create the world, I concede. To the fourth, he says that the Father alone is called God by the exclusion of false gods which the

Gnostics admitted, not by the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit. These responses will be explained more fully in the solutions to objections.

From the third century

St. Clement of Alexandria, a presbyter, in Book 1 of the Pedagogue, chapter 6: "O mystical wonder!" he says, "There is indeed one Father of the universe, there is also one Word of the universe, and the Holy Spirit is one, and he is everywhere." And in Book 3, chapter 12: "Let us praise the one Father and Son... together with the Holy Spirit, who is one all, in whom all things are, through whom all things are one... To whom be glory now and for ages of ages. Amen." And in his Exhortation to the Gentiles, he proves that the Son is eternal and true God.

They object: 1. Clement of Alexandria, in Book 4 of the Stromata, teaches that the Father does not fall under demonstration, but the Son does; 2. In Book 5, he calls Christ the first-created wisdom; 3. In Book 6, he says that God made the Son; 4. In Book 7, that the nature of the Son is nearest to the only omnipotent one; 5. Christ serves the will of the Father. All of these deny divinity to the Son.

I respond to the first objection: the sense is that the Father does not fall under demonstration per se and immediately, because he must be revealed through the Son, his Word. To the second and third, "create" and "make" are taken for "generate." To the fourth, although the Greek word φύσις, which Clement of Alexandria uses, is generally taken for "nature," it is sometimes used for "person." Thus it was used by St. Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, in his epistle to Alexander of Constantinople, found in Theodoret, Book 1,

chapter 4, and by Synesius in hymn 3, as Witasse observes in this question 4, article 2, section 4. But even if it is taken for "nature," it can be said to be nearest to the Father, because it is the very nature and essence of the Father. As for his saying that the Father alone is omnipotent, the sense is that the Father is God, which God is alone omnipotent, not that he is the only omnipotent person. For in Book 3 of the Pedagogue, chapter 7, he likewise calls the Son omnipotent. To the fifth, he says the Son serves God improperly, insofar as he does his will.

Tertullian, besides what we have already reported about him, says in his book against Praxeas, chapter 2: "We believe indeed in one God, yet under this dispensation, which we call the economy, that of the one God there is also the Son, his Word... through whom all things were made... This One was sent by the Father into the Virgin, and was born of her as a man and God... and named Jesus Christ... who thereafter sent the Paraclete, the sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." In the same place: "Perversity... which thinks it possesses the pure truth when it believes in one God in no other way than by saying that the self-same person is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as if in this way also all were not one, since all are from one, by unity of substance of course, and yet the mystery of the economy is guarded, which arranges the unity in trinity, setting forth three: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." In the book On Modesty, chapter 21: "There is the Trinity of one divinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit." We will address the objections of the Socinians from Tertullian in the solutions to objections.

St. Cyprian, on the Unity of the Church, chapter 4: "Of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit it is written: 'And

these three are one.'" And in his epistle to Jubaianus concerning one who was baptized by heretics, he says: "If he obtained remission of sins... he was made the temple of God. I ask, of which God? If of the Creator, he could not, because he did not believe in him; if of Christ, neither could he become his temple who denies the Lord Christ; if of the Holy Spirit, how could the Spirit be propitiated with him who is the enemy either of the Father or of the Son?"

St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, in his confession of faith: "One God, Father of the living Word... Father of the only-begotten Son, one Lord, alone from alone, God from God... true Son of the true Father, eternal of the eternal, and one Holy Spirit... in whom is manifested God the Father... and God the Son... a perfect Trinity, which in glory and eternity and kingdom is neither divided nor alienated... Therefore the Son was never lacking to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son, but the same Trinity remains unchangeable and invariable always." It is no obstacle that in his disputation against Aelianus, a pagan, he called Christ a creature and a creation. For this is true of Christ as man; or if you understand it of Christ as the Son of God, he did not say it by way of definition and affirmation, but by way of disputation, accommodating his words to the understanding of the pagan man whom he wanted to lead to the faith. Thus St. Basil explains him in epistle 64 to the Neocaesareans. I omit many others, for these indeed suffice for our purpose; moreover, the discussion will return to some of them in the solutions to objections.

Finally, in the 4th century, in the Council of Nicaea in the year 325 against Arius, and in the Council of Constantinople in the year 381 against Macedonius, the Catholic faith concerning the Trinity and consubstantiality of

the persons in one and undivided God was asserted, which thenceforth all the faithful unanimously profess in the Symbol which the Church sings.

Special Arguments Against the Jews

Although what we have thus far deduced from the Old Testament has force also against the Jews who admit it, nevertheless, because they say that we interpret it in an alien sense, to preclude this escape for them, I argue against them as follows:

The Jews are bound to acknowledge that we interpret the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament in a sound and legitimate sense, if the more ancient rabbis before the birth of Christianity interpreted them in the same sense as we do. And so it is. Therefore. The major premise seems necessarily to be conceded by them: for just as they do not wish to assent to us as being prejudiced and partisan, so neither do we to them. Let judges free from both parties be chosen, such as are from their own nation and religion, doctors who before Christians scrutinized and interpreted the Scriptures. And indeed if they reject the credibility of these, to whom will they give credence? To Holy Scripture itself perhaps? But the very sense of it is what is disputed between us and them. Add to this that if the more ancient and chief doctors of the Mosaic law had erred in this principal mystery of religion, the Synagogue and the whole Jewish nation would have been subjected to the most manifest danger of capital error in the faith, which seems entirely foreign to that singular providence and benevolence with which God has pursued this too unhappy nation.

I prove the minor premise from Galatinus in his work entitled Concerning the Secrets of the Catholic Truth, Book 2, chapter 1. 1. Rabbi Simeon, son of Joahi, in the book called Zolae, on these words of Deuteronomy 6: "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord," or as the Hebrew text has it, "God, our God, God is one," speaks thus: "Rabbi Ibba says: Hear, O Israel, God, who is the beginning of all things, ancient, is the ancient of ancients, the garden of roots and the perfection of all things, and is called Father: our God, the depth of rivers and the fountain of sciences, which proceed from that Father, and is called Son: God, this is the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the two and is called the measure of voice: one, and concludes and binds one with the other; nor indeed can one be divided from the other; and therefore he says: Gather, O Israel, this Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and make them one essence and one substance, because whatever is in one is in the other; he was whole and is whole and will be whole." The same Rabbi Simeon says in the same place: "This secret of the Son will not be revealed to everyone until the Messiah comes, because then, as Isaiah says, the earth will be filled with the knowledge of God, as the waters cover the sea." Indeed, nothing more lucid, nothing more express can be brought forth, even by Catholic doctors themselves, to confirm the truth of our religion. However, he says that this mystery was to be revealed to all only when the Messiah came, because of the propensity of the Jewish people to idolatry, who, having conceived three persons in one essence, could have been led to adore three gods.

2. The same Rabbi Simeon interprets these words of Isaiah 6, "Holy, Holy, Lord God of hosts," thus in Hebrew:

"Holy, this is the Father; Holy, this is the Son; Holy, this is the Holy Spirit."

3. Rabbi Jonathan, son of Uziel, in the Chaldaic paraphrase interprets the same text thus: "Holy Father, holy Son, holy Holy Spirit."

4. The same Jonathan reads these words of Psalm 109, "The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at my right hand," thus in Chaldaic: "The Lord said to his Word."

It is true indeed that it is not read thus now in the Chaldaic paraphrase of Jonathan, because the more recent Jews have corrupted it; but Galatinus asserts that he read it so in a very ancient copy, at the time when the Jews were expelled from the whole kingdom of Naples by order of the Catholic king. The same is asserted by Lyranus, a Jew before his conversion and very well versed in the books of the Jews, on the aforementioned Psalm 109. And finally, in another book of the Jews which is called Collection of Sentences, it is stated that the Targum, that is, the Chaldaic translation of Jonathan ben Uziel, thus expounds: "God said to his Word: Sit at my right hand."

5. Christ himself, wishing to prove his divinity to the Jews from that Psalm 109, "The Lord said," etc., thus addresses the Jews, Matthew 22: "What do you think of the Christ? Whose Son is he? They say to him: David's. He says to them: How then does David in spirit call him Lord, saying: The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at my right hand. If therefore David calls him Lord, how is he his son? And no one," continues the Evangelist, "was able to answer him a word." From this silence of the Pharisees, it is manifestly evident that the opinion was then constant and undoubted among the Jews that this Psalm was composed by David, and that these quoted words of his were said concerning the Messiah

or Christ. Peter also supposes this as indubitable, Acts 2, proving from the same words the divinity of Christ, with none of the Jews contradicting, although they now deny both. Now, this being supposed, the Jews are bound to acknowledge in God several distinct persons, namely one associated with the other and sitting at the right hand of the other.

Article III. Objections Answered.

We have already addressed several arguments from heretics in our proofs, but others remain that must now be examined and resolved. 1 We will present objections from authority against the trinity of Persons; 2 objections from authority against their consubstantiality; 3 objections from reason against the entire mystery.

§ I. Objections from the authority of Holy Scripture against the trinity of Persons.

First objection: The older and newer Sabellians cite several passages from Holy Scripture which assert that God is one, is alone, that there is no other besides him, and similar statements. But these do not in the least undermine the truth of our mystery. For we do not say there are many Gods, but one and unique God subsisting in three persons. Hence these terms—one, alone, and similar ones—exclude the multiplicity of divinity such as the pagans imagined, but not the trinity of Persons subsisting in one and the same numerical divinity, as Christians believe.

Second objection: They cite all those passages in which Christ is called a creature, made, subject to the Father,

less than the Father, etc., from which they infer that he is not God, and consequently that there is only one divine eternal person, who by connotation of various effects is called Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But since the Arians and Socinians urge these same points against the divinity of the Son, we will address them now under Consubstantiality.

Third objection: The Socinians especially object against the person of the Holy Spirit: The Holy Spirit is often called in Holy Scripture the spirit of God; but the spirit of someone is not a person distinct from him. 2 In Acts 8, he is called the gift of God, but a gift is not a person. 3 In Acts 2, the Holy Spirit is said to be poured out, which is not compatible with a person. 4 In 1 Thessalonians 5, it says: "Do not extinguish the Spirit." And in IV Kings 2, Elisha said: "I pray that a double portion of your Spirit be in me": but to be extinguished and doubled are not compatible with persons. 5 In Matthew 3, we are said to be baptized in the Holy Spirit: but that in which we are baptized is not a person, but water: therefore.

Response to the first point: I distinguish the minor premise: the spirit of someone is not a person distinct from him if the term spirit is taken for his essence or part of his essence, granted; otherwise, denied. The term "spirit of someone" is used in many ways. Sometimes it is taken for his whole essence; as when we say: The spirit of an Angel, the term spirit signifies the whole essence of the Angel; for an Angel is nothing but spirit, and thus is not a person distinct from the Angel. Sometimes it is taken for part of the essence, as when we call the soul the spirit of man, and then the spirit is not a person distinct from man. But sometimes it is taken for a person distinct from the one whose spirit it is called; as in Revelation 3, Angels are called the spirits of God, where

spirit undoubtedly implies persons distinct from God. Similarly, in Genesis 1, the wind is called the spirit of God, where the term spirit signifies, if not a person distinct from God, at least a distinct supposit. Nothing prevents, therefore, that he who is called the spirit of God may be a person distinct from him. In the matter at hand, if the spirit of God is taken absolutely for the nature of God, it is not a person distinct from him; but if it is taken relatively and notionally, it is a distinct person, because proceeding from the Father and the Son, it is necessarily distinguished from them in personality. More on this below.

Objection: In 1 Corinthians 2, the Spirit of God is compared to the spirit of man: but the spirit of man is not a person, therefore.

Response 1: From this argument, if it had any validity, it would follow that the Spirit of God would be a part of God, just as the spirit of man is a part of man, consequently that God would be composite, which the Socinians do not admit.

Response 2: I distinguish the major premise: The Spirit of God is compared to the spirit of man in some respect, granted; in all respects, denied. The Apostle compares the Spirit of God to the spirit of man in this respect: that just as no one knows the internal movements of man except the spirit of man, so no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God. Thus, there is a certain similarity in the manner of knowing, not in the manner of subsisting.

To the second point: I deny the minor premise. For just as a person can give himself, so can he be given by another. Hence Christ, in John 6, says that he was given by God to men. And in Galatians 1, it is said that he gave himself for our sins.

To the third point: I again deny the minor premise. For it is no more repugnant for the Holy Spirit to be poured out to many than to be given to many. And this indeed is a miracle of divine power, but no more astonishing than that Christ, who is a person, is given to many distant in place and time, to whom he is united as drink and food.

To the fourth point: I respond that by the Holy Spirit in these passages, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are understood. For we do not deny that by the Holy Spirit in the Holy Scriptures his charisms are sometimes signified, but we say that the Socinians wrongly conclude from this that by the name of the Holy Spirit always his gifts are understood; for we have proved that he is often expressed as distinct from his gifts.

To the fifth point: I respond that to be baptized in the Holy Spirit is to be cleansed and washed in soul by the virtue or baptism of the Holy Spirit, the metaphor being taken from water by which we are washed and cleansed as to the body. From this the Socinians can no more infer that the Holy Spirit is not a person than from the fact that we are said to be baptized in Christ, nourished by Christ, or to put on Christ, they could infer that Christ is not a person.

§ II. Objections from authority against the consubstantiality of the Persons, and first against the consubstantiality of the Word, from Holy Scripture.

First objection: The Arians and Socinians argue: In the Scriptures the Son is said to be less than the Father, inferior to him and subject to him. John 14: "The Father is greater than I"; 1 Corinthians 15: "And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be

subject unto him that put all things under him": which cannot be understood of Christ as man, since as man in passible flesh he was already and even more subject to the Father than he will be then, namely at the end of the world: therefore.

Response: Both these authorities are to be understood of Christ as man. Regarding the first, this is clear from the context; for Christ says: "I go to the Father, because the Father is greater than I": but to go to the Father does not belong to Christ according to the divine nature, according to which he is always in the Father. Regarding the second, this is also clear from the preceding words, where the Apostle speaks of the resurrection of Christ, which belongs to him only as man. Although in passible flesh before glorification and the end of the world he was already subject to the Father, and indeed his subjection appeared more manifestly then in suffering, nevertheless at the end of the world after the general resurrection his subjection to the Father will be more apparent in two ways: 1 because then, with enemies conquered, the reprobate condemned, the predestined glorified, the kingdom pacified on all sides, he will refer the glory of such victory and peace not to himself but to the Father as the principal Author; 2 because after the general resurrection of bodies, and the glorification of all the predestined, clarity will appear in the humanity of Christ, by which all will then recognize it to be an instrument of divinity, and therefore subject to it, as far as that operation by which divinity will subject all things to it, according to Philippians 3: "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself."

They insist, Things of different kinds are inappropriately compared with each other: thus it would be inappropriate to say, man is wiser than a dog. But God the Father is more distant from man than man is from a dog: therefore this statement would be senseless: "The Father is greater than I," if it is understood of Christ as man and a mere creature.

Response: I distinguish the major premise: if there is no analogy between these things, even an analogical one, granted; otherwise, denied. Thus we rightly say, man is stronger than a lion, has a better sense of smell than a dog, this speech is sweeter than honey, more bitter than wormwood. But there was a certain analogical agreement between Christ as man and God, with respect to the power of working wonders and other things: therefore Christ could rightly say of himself as man: "The Father is greater than I"; just as in 1 John 3 he said: "God is greater than our heart"; unless perhaps you understand it of Christ as God in the sense of the Greek Fathers, about which in the following instance. Hence,

They insist again, The Council of Sardica in its synodical epistle, St. Athanasius in Oration 9 against the Arians, St. Hilary in book 9 on the Trinity, Damascene in book 4, ch. 6, and commonly the Greek Fathers understand the Father to be greater than the Son, even as God: therefore.

Response: The Greek Fathers do not understand this of absolute and properly called greatness, by reason of some essential property which would be in the Father and not in the Son, but of improper greatness by reason of origin; so that the Father is said to be greater than the Son inasmuch as he is prior to him in origin. Hence the Council of Sardica in the aforementioned epistle: "No one," it says, "denies that

the Father is greater than the Son, not on account of another hypostasis (that is, substance according to the ancient Greeks) nor on account of any other difference, but because the name of the Father is itself greater than the name of the Son." And St. Athanasius in the cited oration, p. 180: "The Father," he says, "is greater not indeed in magnitude or age, but because he has his origin from him." These expressions of the Fathers, who certainly fought with all their strength against the Arians, are to be interpreted charitably, but should not be used frequently, as St. Augustine notes in De Trinitate 4, ch. 20.

They will continue to say, Hilary in his book on Synods says that the Son even according to divinity is ministering, subject and obedient to the Father: therefore.

Response: The holy Doctor, who was a fierce opponent of Arianism, means nothing else by these modes of speaking than that the will of the Son always exactly corresponds to the will of the Father, and fulfills it; one who does this among men is called a minister, subject and obedient.

Second objection: The Son is said in the Holy Scriptures to be made and a creature; Ecclesiasticus 24: "The Creator of all things, and he that created me, rested in my tabernacle"; ibid., "From the beginning, and before the world, was I created"; John 1, the divine Precursor says of Christ: "He that shall come after me, is preferred before me": which cannot be understood of Christ as man, who was conceived six months after John the Baptist, according to the words of the Angel to Mary. Therefore.

Response 1: To the first passage: the term "create" in these places is taken generally for the production of a thing according to substance, in which sense one is said in Latin to

"procreate" children, that is, to beget; and Psalm 101: "A people that shall be created shall praise the Lord"; and this is clear from the context, since it says there: "I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures."

Response 2: According to Gregory Nazianzen and Augustine in sermon 58 on the Words of the Lord in John, there is no discourse there about uncreated Wisdom, nor about created wisdom, but about wisdom in general as it presides over works of the intellect, which Solomon, who frequently uses figurative expressions, introduces as speaking through personification, as if it were a person, say a virgin, or a queen created by God before all ages. Nor does it matter if you say that wisdom in general is nothing, and therefore cannot be said to be created; this is indeed true in the proper and natural sense, but not in the figurative sense; thus, for example, I can through personification introduce human nature in general speaking thus: "God adorned me with intellect, and created me more excellent than brutes and stones."

Response 3: According to St. Thomas ([2]), creation is attributed to wisdom so that we may attribute to it whatever is perfection in these terms and remove what is imperfection. "From this," says the holy Doctor, "that wisdom is called both created and begotten, the mode of divine generation is suggested to us. In generation, what is generated receives the nature of the generator, which is perfection; but in generations which occur among us, the generator himself is changed, which is imperfection; in creation, however, the creator is not changed, but the created does not receive the nature of the creator. The Son is therefore said to be both

[2] 4 Cont, Gent, c. 8.

created and begotten, so that from creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. And thus the synod explained this understanding of Holy Scripture, as is clear from Hilary."

When he is said to be the firstborn before every creature or the firstborn of all creation, the sense is not that he is the first of creatures, but that he was begotten before any creature was made: for elsewhere he is called the only-begotten of God the Father, but how could he be the only-begotten if he were one of the creatures?

To the second passage: I respond that the sense is: he who is to come after me, to preach, is preferred to me, or precedes me in dignity, as is clear from the causal immediately following: "Because he was before me," namely, by eternal generation; otherwise that causal would be added in vain. For who, says St. Chrysostom on this passage, is so foolish, so insane as not to understand that he who was before him is superior to him at the same time?

Third objection: Ignorance and impotence are attributed to the Son. Ignorance; Mark 13: "Of that day (of judgment) no one knows, neither the angels, nor the Son, but the Father." Impotence; Matthew 20, Christ says: "To sit on my right or left hand, is not mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by my Father." And John 5: "The Son cannot do anything of himself, unless he sees the Father doing it": therefore.

Response to the first: That testimony is to be understood of Christ as man, who as such is said to be ignorant of the day of judgment, not because he was absolutely ignorant; for Peter says in John 21: "Lord, you know all things"; but because he was ignorant for our sake,

that is, he did not know it in order to reveal it to us, for he who conceals something he knows seems to others not to know it, yet in this sense the Father knows it, because he revealed it to Christ as man: but Angels not only do not know it in order to reveal it, but do not know it absolutely. Hence there is not a complete parallel with Christ, which is not required to safeguard the sense of Holy Scripture.

This is the solution of many. Another solution is, understanding these words also of Christ as man, not in the sense that he simply does not know, but that he does not know from the condition of human nature. This is from Gregory the Great, epistle 42, where he says: "In the nature of humanity he knew the day and hour, he did not know it from the nature of humanity. Therefore, the knowledge which he did not have from human nature, in which he was created with the Angels, this he denied having with the Angels." If you say, according to the quoted words, only the Father knows: therefore the Son is entirely ignorant; I respond that these things are said not by exclusion of the divine Persons, for the Son has all things that the Father has, John 16, therefore also this knowledge, and the Holy Spirit searches out the deep things of God, 1 Corinthians 2; but by exclusion of creatures, none of which from the condition of its nature can know this day.

To the second testimony: I distinguish in two ways: 1 it is not mine to give to you, as man, granted; as God, denied; 2 it is not mine to give to you, that is, it is not for my equity to give you by right of relationship, as you ask, what must be obtained by merits, granted; it is not for my authority to give you the kingdom absolutely, denied.

To the third testimony: It can similarly be understood of Christ as man; but if it is understood of Christ as God, the

sense is not that he is not omnipotent like the Father, nor that he does not act by his own divine power, but that he has it from the Father by eternal generation, and thus does not operate from himself as an unbegotten person, but as born and originating from the Father, and consequently as he has seen the Father doing.

Fourth objection: Divinity is ascribed to the Father alone by exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore. I prove the antecedent: the Father alone and one is called God in Holy Scripture: 1 John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent"; where he clearly supposes that Christ is not God: for if someone addressing Benedict XIV would say: "This is the truth, that the faithful may know you, the only Pope, and John your legate whom you have sent," we would immediately understand that he excludes everyone from the papacy, and that the legate sent is not the pope. 2 1 Corinthians 8: "As concerning the meats sacrificed to idols, we know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no God but one. For although there be that are called gods, either in heaven or on earth (as there are many gods and many lords), yet to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things... and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things." 3 The same Apostle in Ephesians 4, exhorting them to concord, says: "One Spirit... one Lord... one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all." Therefore.

Response 1: The Socinians who raise these objections contradict both themselves and Holy Scripture: Holy Scripture, which elsewhere asserts that Christ is true God, as is clear from the proofs; themselves, because they confess that Christ is God and indeed true God, although of a nature

different from the Father. Thus Socinus in his response to the first four chapters of Wicki: "It is openly most false," he says, "that we openly affirm that Christ is not true God, indeed we publicly profess the contrary and in our writings published in both Latin and Polish languages, not a few, we assert that Christ is true God." And Smalcius in his response to the second part of Smiglecki's refutation, ch. 3: "Christ," he says, "our God and true God is to be called by the highest right and is in reality": therefore they contradict themselves, when they want only the Father to be true God.

Response 2: I distinguish the antecedent: the Father alone and one is called God by exclusion of false gods, granted; by exclusion of the divine Persons, denied. For the term "alone" or similar ones in Holy Scripture do not always import total exclusion, nor do they always remove everyone distinct from the one of whom they are predicated, but often either those who are completely alien and different from him, or certain ones who are being dealt with or who are understood from the subject matter. Thus Luke ch. 9, after describing the transfiguration, says: "And as the voice was made, Jesus was found alone": he says alone, to exclude only Moses and Elijah who were previously present, not the three Apostles who remained with Christ. Ibid. ch. 10, Martha complaining about her sister says: "Lord, do you not care that my sister has left me to serve alone?" She says alone, not to exclude servants and handmaids, but her sister. And what approaches more closely to our proposition, in Deuteronomy 32, Moses says: "The Lord alone was his leader" (of Israel): by these words Moses certainly does not intend to exclude either himself or the Angel who was in charge of this nation, but only strange gods: hence he adds: "And there was no strange god with him." Therefore in the cited places the

Father alone and one is called true God, not by exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit, but by exclusion of false gods of the Gentiles.

Thus when St. John says that the Father alone is the true God, he does not intend to exclude the other divine Persons, but only the strange gods of the Gentiles, since the same Evangelist in Epistle 1, ch. 5, says of Christ: "This is the true God, and life eternal"; nor does he add: "And Jesus Christ whom you have sent," as if he were not God with the Father, but to signify that Christ is not only God, but also something else, namely man, and thus for eternal life it is not sufficient to believe in one and triune God, but it is also required to believe in the incarnation. To the opposing example, the disparity is that since we know that the office of the Supreme Pontiff belongs only to Benedict XIV, by the term "alone," we immediately understand that everyone else is excluded from the papacy. On the contrary, since from other passages of Holy Scripture we know that the divine nature is proper to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, by the term "alone" in the proposition of Holy Scripture we do not understand that the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded from the notion of Deity, but any other diverse nature.

Some following St. Augustine in De Trinitate, book 6, ch. 9, explain the Evangelist's proposition thus: "That they may know you, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent, to be the only true God"; for it is not unusual in Holy Scripture for one thing to be predicated of two at the same time, and yet to be interposed between the two. Thus 1 John 3: "Everyone who is not just is not of God, and he who does not love his brother," that is: "Everyone who is not just and who does not love his brother is not of God."

Similarly in the second testimony, the Apostle calls the Father one God, not to exclude the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the gods of the gentiles; just as when he calls the Son one Lord, he does not exclude the Father from the consortium of lordship, so when he calls the Father one God, he does not exclude the Son from the consortium of divinity. The Apostle did not want to explicitly call Christ God in that passage, lest the multiple appellation of God should suggest to the Corinthians recently converted from gentile superstition some suspicion of plurality of gods, and they might think they had not abandoned the old superstition, but changed it.

But speaking generally, the Father is called God rather than the Son or the Holy Spirit by appropriation. Appropriation is when things that are common to the three Persons are, for certain reasons, specially attributed to one: thus omnipotence is attributed to the Father, because he is the font and origin of the whole divinity; wisdom to the Son, because he is the Word proceeding through intellect; goodness to the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds through love, and yet both omnipotence, and wisdom, and goodness are common to the three Persons. Thus, therefore, the Father is sometimes called God in preference to the other Persons by appropriation, either for the reason already given, because he is the font of the whole divinity, or because in the economy of our salvation he assumed the person of God to whom just satisfaction would be rendered; the Son is called Lord, because he bought the Church with his blood, and merited salvation for those who would otherwise perish. The third person is called the Holy Spirit, because he is the sanctifier of souls and the giver of graces, and yet the three persons are both God and Lord and Holy. This kind of

appropriation is frequent in Holy Scripture. And from this the third testimony is explained. Unless you say that by these three terms, Spirit, Lord, and God, the whole Trinity is designated; for the whole Trinity is Spirit, Lord, God, and Father of all. Confer dissertation 6, a. 1.

If you say in the first part of the second testimony when the Apostle says: "We know... that there is no God but one," he takes the name of God adequately for all that is God; therefore when he afterwards adds: "Yet to us there is but one God, the Father," he likewise takes this term adequately for all that is God.

I respond by denying the consequence. For what he had said generally and adequately in the first part, that there is one God, in the second part he as it were distributes and proves in parts; namely, 1 because there is one God the Father from whom are all things; 2 because there is one Lord through whom are all things. Hence taking the term God adequately in the first part, he restricts it to the Father in the second part and uses it personally and appropriatively.

Fifth objection: According to the Apostle in Acts 20, it is more blessed to give than to receive: therefore the Father is more blessed and more perfect than the Son, since he gives and the Son receives; Matthew 28: "All power is given to me"; John 5: "He gave him to have life in himself"; John 10: "That which my Father has given me is greater than all."

Response: This axiom is verified only when what is given is not as great nor entirely the same as the giver himself, as happens in all created causes with respect to their effects: but when what is received is one and the same thing with the giver himself, as happens in divine things, then it is not less blessed to receive than to give; since in this case the giver and the receiver are not distinguished in being or

substance in which beatitude is founded, but only in the relative opposition of giver and receiver, producer and produced.

Nor should you say that reception implies imperfection, namely the lack and need of what is received: for this is true when the reception is not eternal and at the same time necessary as is the reception of the Son and the Holy Spirit; for they have always received the divine nature, and it could never happen that they did not receive it. Hence we cannot with foundation in reality conceive any instant, even virtually prior, in which they lacked the divine nature: just as, on the contrary (to anticipate an instance), if the world had been created from eternity, we would conceive an instant virtually prior in which it would be supposed to lack existence, because it would not have it necessarily.

Objection: Revelation 5, the saints say: "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive power, and divinity, and wisdom": therefore he does not have divinity by nature and necessarily.

Response: By divinity is understood the praises and encomiums of divinity, just as in the preceding verse they say: "You are worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory and honor and power," that is, the confession and commendation of virtue and power.

Sixth objection: Christ is frequently distinguished from God in Holy Scripture: therefore. I prove the antecedent: 1 In Acts 13, and elsewhere, he is called the Son of God; but the Son is distinguished from him whose Son he is; 2 Christ is called a Priest, in Hebrews 5: but a Priest is distinguished from God; 3 Christ is the mediator of God and men, 1 Timothy 2: but the mediator of God and men must be distinguished from him: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Christ as man is distinguished from God, granted; as God, I subdistinguish: he is distinguished from God personally considered, granted; essentially and absolutely considered, denied. Hence to the first passage, the Son of God the Father is not the Father, but he is nevertheless God. To the second, Christ is a Priest as man, not as God: similarly to the third, Christ as man is the mediator of God and men. It is indeed true that for Christ to be a mediator, he had to be God in order to confer infinite dignity on his satisfaction, but nevertheless he performed the parts of a mediator as man according to the cited Apostle: "The mediator, the man Christ Jesus." If you say that the office of mediator also pertains to the person of Christ, I will respond that then Christ was a mediator between men and God personally considered, namely the Father and the Holy Spirit, and not between men and God essentially and absolutely considered. On this in the treatise on the Incarnation.

You will say: If when it is said in Holy Scripture of Christ that he is God, we wish to understand this with all propriety, why not by the same right do I understand with all propriety, when it is said that he is a creature, made, less than the Father, and similar things?

Response: We also understand with all propriety of Christ as man, that he is a creature, made, less than the Father, and similar things. But the Arians who do not want him to be at the same time God, cannot understand Holy Scripture with all propriety, when it says: "This is the true God," etc.

Objections from the Ante-Nicene Fathers against the consubstantiality of the Word

The Socinians object with the ancient Arians that the Fathers of the first three centuries, before the rise of Arianism—Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Gregory of Neocaesarea, Dionysius of Alexandria, and others—whom they claim impugned the consubstantiality and co-eternity of the Word with the Father: therefore.

Response 1: All these cited, except perhaps Origen, about whose mind concerning the present mystery the learned dispute, held the right faith concerning the substance of this mystery, as is already clear from what has been said, and will be clear from what is to be said: we do not deny, however, that some wrote about it less properly and less cautiously, both because they spoke more securely before the rise of heresy, and because they were then devoted to Platonic philosophy, they spoke of the mysteries of our faith according to the principles of this philosophy, and thus wrote about this mystery in almost the same way as the philosophers of this sect had written about the Father of all things and about his mind, which was also called λόγος by them.

Wherefore St. Jerome speaks thus about these ancient Fathers in Apology 2 against Rufinus: "I will not immediately judge them to be heretics: for it is possible either that they erred simply or that they wrote in another sense, or that their writings were gradually corrupted by unskilled copyists, or certainly before Arius, like the noonday demon, was born in Alexandria, some spoke innocently and less cautiously, and things which cannot avoid the calumny of perverse men." To this also applies what St. Augustine says in De Civitate Dei, book 16, ch. 2: "For many things pertaining to the Catholic

faith, while they are being agitated by the cunning restlessness of heretics, in order that they may be defended against them, are both considered more diligently and understood more clearly, and are preached more insistently."

Response 2: Given that one or the other thought differently, the thread of Tradition is not broken because of this, as it is based not on the opinion of a few, but on the common sense of the Fathers and the faithful. With these two general responses premised, I descend to individual cases.

As for Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Gregory of Neocaesarea, we have already examined what can be objected from them; we have also adduced positive and clear testimonies of St. Justin and Tertullian, which must be recalled here, but because the Socinians also oppose many things from these two and from Dionysius of Alexandria, their minds must be examined more accurately.

Concerning St. Justin Martyr

The Socinians object: St. Justin in his Dialogue with Trypho expressly proves that the Father is invisible, but the Son visible. The same is taught by Irenaeus in book 4, ch. 37; Tertullian against Praxeas, ch. 16; the bishops of the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata in their letter, and others. Therefore St. Justin along with others does not consider the Son to be consubstantial with the Father.

Response: Indeed the ancients considered the Father invisible and the Son visible, yet they did not deny the consubstantiality of the Son, but affirmed him to be true God, as we have proved: hence even after the Nicene Council, St. Hilary in book 4 on the Trinity near the end, Theodoret

against Heresies ch. 1, and others whom no one would suspect of having denied the consubstantiality of the Word, said the same thing, and since it is otherwise certain that neither these nor those admitted several gods, it is evident that they did not consider the Father invisible and the Son visible by reason of different nature, as if the Father by his nature were invisible and the Son by his nature visible. They therefore said the Father was invisible because, being unbegotten, the font and origin of the whole divinity, he does not have one from whom he might be sent outward; but the Son, being begotten from the Father, his splendor through whom he is manifested and the Word through whom all things were made, is sent outward, and especially for the restoration of the human race; and thus was made visible either in an assumed body, when he appeared to the patriarchs of the Old Testament, or in human nature, when he was incarnate.

Objection 1: St. Justin and other Ante-Nicene Fathers say the Father is invisible because He is immense, uncircumscribed, and cannot be moved from place to place. Therefore, when they say, on the contrary, that the Son is visible, they believe that He is not immense or uncircumscribed by place.

I respond by making a distinction: St. Justin and other Fathers say the Father is invisible because He is immense, uncircumscribed, etc., due to the peculiar property of the first Person, by reason of which He cannot be sent to assume any exterior form, this I concede; due to a peculiar condition of His nature that does not belong to the Son, this I deny.

Objection 2: St. Justin in the same work says that He who appeared to the ancients was not the creator of the universe; therefore, not God.

I respond by denying the conclusion. For St. Justin does not intend to deny that the Son is with the Father the creator of the universe, since in his epistle to Diognetus, he expressly calls Him the creator of all things. He only intends to say that He who appeared was not the first Person to whom, by appropriation, omnipotence and creation are attributed, as I will explain more fully below.

Objection 3: St. Justin in the same place, as well as St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, and others, say that the Son in these appearances was the Father's minister, that the Father commanded Him, and that He is the cause of the Son. But these imply inferiority. Therefore...

I respond that "minister," "command," and "cause" are taken by them in a broad and improper sense: "minister" insofar as He executed the Father's will; "command" insofar as the Father in eternal generation communicated to Him the reason and will of things to be done; "cause" insofar as He is the principle and origin of the Son; not in a strict and proper sense, insofar as to minister implies inferiority, to command implies superiority, and cause implies the dependence of an effect upon it.

Objection 4: St. Justin in the same place says that the Son is something other than the Father; and in Apology 2, he calls the Son the second power, and the Father the first God.

I respond that these statements are made with respect to person and not nature, so that the sense is that the Son is a different person from the Father, the second person, and the Father the first.

Objection 5: Justin in the cited dialogue says that the Son was generated from the Father by power and counsel; therefore, not by nature or necessity.

I respond by denying the conclusion. For "power" is taken there for any faculty of acting, and "counsel" as opposed to blind necessity, because God does not act without reason.

Objection 6: St. Justin, in the same place, teaches that the Son is generated from the Father as fire is kindled from fire. But the nature of the kindling fire and the kindled fire are distinct, and one can be extinguished without the other being extinguished. Therefore...

I respond by making a distinction in the major premise: "as" indicates some similarity, I concede; complete similarity, I deny. The similarity lies in this: just as fire kindles fire without any diminution of itself, so the Father generates the Son without any diminution or alteration of Himself. In other respects, there is no similarity. The holy Fathers used this example and many others (such as the ray emanating from the sun, the human word produced by the intellect, etc.), and we use them to form some idea of the eternal generation of the Word. But these examples have more dissimilarity than similarity, and so they should not be understood except by removing all the imperfections they involve in creatures.

Concerning Tertullian

The Socinians object: Tertullian teaches that the Word or Son did not exist from eternity; therefore... They prove the antecedent from his book against Hermogenes, chapter 3. When this heretic contended that matter was unbegotten

and eternal, because God, being God from eternity, was also Lord from eternity, and He could not be Lord unless there was something of which He was Lord, Tertullian responds that although God is God from eternity, because divinity is His substance, He is not Lord from eternity, because this name refers to the exercise of power. He proves this by analogy, namely because God is not Father or Judge from eternity: "And the Father is God, and the Judge is God; yet He is not therefore Father and Judge always, because He is God always. For neither could He be Father before the Son, nor Judge before sin; but there was a time when both sin and the Son were not, which made the Judge and the Father Lord." Therefore...

Some respond that Tertullian by "Son" understands a creature, in the sense in which Moses said: "Is not He your Father who possesses you, who made and created you?" So says Noël Alexander.

Others respond that Tertullian is not speaking here from his own opinion, but from principles admitted by Hermogenes, which he turns against him. Thus, Tertullian's argument is: according to Hermogenes, God is Lord from eternity precisely because He is God from eternity, and therefore there must be something outside Him from eternity, namely matter itself, upon which He exercises dominion. Therefore, similarly, He is Father from eternity because He is God from eternity, for God is no less Father than Lord. But the minor: He is not Father from eternity since He produces nothing outside Himself from eternity; for matter, according to Hermogenes, is unproduced. Therefore, just as God is not Father from eternity, neither is He Lord, and consequently matter is not eternal, which is what Tertullian solely intends against Hermogenes, with whom he

had no controversy about the eternal generation of God. So says Honoratus Tournely. This response partly coincides with the first, insofar as it understands by "Son" something produced outwardly, just as the first does.

Others respond that Tertullian takes "Son" in the manner of jurists, not for one who is begotten internally, but born externally, as we will explain shortly. So says Charles Witnsse.

Objection 1: Tertullian teaches that the Word or Son was created and born at the very creation of the world, or shortly before. Therefore...

They prove the antecedent, first, from the book against Hermogenes, who, as I said, contended that matter was unbegotten and eternal. In chapter 8, concerning Sophia, he says: "Finally (God), as He perceived her necessary for the works of the world, at once creates and generates her within Himself: 'The Lord,' he says, 'created me the beginning of His ways for His works... before the abyss I was begotten.' Therefore, let Hermogenes acknowledge that Sophia of God is also proclaimed as born and created, lest we should believe anything to be unborn and uncreated except God alone. For if within the Lord what was from Him and in Him was not without beginning, namely His Sophia, born and created from the time that She began to be agitated in God's mind for the arrangement of the works of the world, how much more would something not begin without a beginning which would be outside the Lord. But if Sophia is the same as the Word of God... without whom nothing was made... How could it be that something more ancient than the Father existed for the only-begotten and first-born Son of God the Word?... Thus, in this regard, Hermogenes puts matter before God by putting it before the

Son. For the Son is the Word, and God is the Word, and 'I and the Father are one,' unless he will bear with equal mind that matter be put before him, which is equated with the Father."

They prove the same antecedent, secondly, from the book against Praxeas, chapter 6: "Therefore, hear also Sophia, created as the second person: 'The Lord created me the beginning of His ways for His works. Before the earth was made... before all the hills He begot me,' creating and generating her in His own mind. Then know her as standing by in the very separation: 'When He prepared,' she says, 'heaven, I was present with Him at the same time... For as soon as God willed to put forth in their substances and forms those things which He had arranged within Himself with the reason of Sophia... He first brought forth the Word itself, having within itself its inseparable reason and Sophia, that through it all things might be made.'" And in chapter 7: "Then, therefore, even the Word itself takes its form and adornment, its sound and voice, when God says: 'Let there be light.' This is the perfect nativity of the Word, when it proceeds from God, created by Him first for thought in the name of Sophia: 'The Lord created me the beginning of His ways'; then begotten for effect: 'when He prepared heaven, I was present with Him': thereafter making Him equal to Himself, from whom by proceeding He became Son... 'Do you then,' you say, 'grant the Word to be some substance?'... Plainly... whatever substance the Word was, that I call a person, and claim for it the name of Son, and while I acknowledge the Son, I defend Him as second from the Father." Therefore...

I respond that all these things were said by Tertullian about the external, not the internal Word, or about the Word

with respect to His external and visible generation, not His internal and invisible generation. For it should be recalled what I said above about Athenagoras, that not only Tertullian, but many other ancients, even after the Nicene Council, distinguished in the Word a twofold procession or generation or nativity: one internal, remaining in God, by which the Word proceeds from the Father as the invisible image of His substance, God from God, light from light, and this is the proper and natural eternal generation. The other is external, by which the Word is outwardly uttered in the production of creatures—"Let there be light"—as signifying the command by which all things were made. This, according to the ancients, is the temporal generation or nativity, but improperly so called, by analogy to the nativity of men who are not said to be born until they come forth from the womb into the light and are manifested outwardly. Tertullian expresses both of these generations or nativities in the very words cited from chapter 7 against Praxeas: "This is," he says, "the perfect nativity of the Word when it proceeds from God, created by Him first for thought"—here is the internal and eternal generation—"then begotten for effect"—here is the temporal and external generation. Similarly in chapter 6.

Objection 2: Tertullian, speaking of the generation of the Word that occurred when the world was created, says: "He creates and generates her within Himself," chapter 18 against Hermogenes. Therefore, he is not speaking of generation outward, but inward. 2) In chapter 7 against Praxeas, he says that by that generation, when the world was then made, the Son was made equal to the Father. Therefore, before that time, He was not equal. 3) In the same place, he calls this generation the perfect nativity of the Word, and says that through it the Word took on form and adornment.

Therefore, before this time, it was not perfect. 4) In the same place, he says that then the second Person and the Son were created. Therefore, before that time, He was neither Person nor Son. 5) In the same place, chapter 9, he calls the Son a portion of God, and in chapter 6, he says He was separated from God. 6) Finally, in the cited passage against Hermogenes, he proves that matter, if it were eternal, would be preferable to the Son as something more ancient and stronger. Therefore, he supposes the Son is not eternal.

To the first objection, I respond that Tertullian speaks this way because through that temporal generation, the Word, though it came forth outwardly, did not depart from the Father. Thus Tertullian himself says in Apologetic, chapter 2: "He did not recede from the matrix, but proceeded."

To the second, he says the Son was made equal to the Father, that is, demonstrated to be equal.

To the third, he calls this nativity perfect and says through it the Word took on form and adornment, insofar as through it what was previously hidden and unknown was outwardly declared to be the Word of God.

To the fourth, similarly, he says that then the Person and Son were created, that is, outwardly demonstrated and declared. Or, as others maintain, Tertullian here takes "Person" and "Son" not in the manner of theologians, but of jurists, of whom he was most tenacious. Jurists call the fetus, while it remains in the womb, a portion of the mother, but a son only when it has come forth from the womb into the light. Similarly, although according to theologians, a person is any individual of a rational nature subsisting by itself, among jurists, a son, as long as he is in his mother's womb, is not considered a person.

To the fifth, he calls the Son a portion of God, not because He is only part of the divine substance, but because 1) He is only one Person of the divinity, not all that is God; 2) because He proceeds from the Father, the source of all divinity, and is posterior to Him in origin, and to that extent less, although consubstantial with Him. He says "separated," meaning "distinct."

To the sixth, Tertullian argues from the absurdity against Hermogenes from his own principles, namely, if, as Hermogenes wants, matter is unproduced and unbegotten, while the Word, though eternal, is produced and begotten, then by this title alone of generation and origin, matter would be preferable to the Word as something more ancient and stronger.

Although we do not deny that these and other sayings of Tertullian are rather harsh and alien to our theology, they should be softened and benignly explained, as we have done thus far, since there is no reason to doubt his mind concerning the eternity and consubstantiality of the Word, as is evident not only from his most explicit testimonies which we have adduced in the proof and many others, but even from the very passages objected. For in chapter 18 cited against Hermogenes, he says: "Who would not rather commend this (Sophia)?... Not subject to Himself, not different in state... What kind of thing could God have needed, who needs his own rather than another's?" In the same place: "For the Son is the Word, and God is the Word; and 'I and the Father are one.'" Chapter 5 of the book quoted against Praxeas: "Before all things, God was alone, Himself to Himself both world and space and all things; but alone because there was nothing external besides Him. Yet not even then was He alone, for He had with Him what He had

in Himself, His own Reason, that is." And in the same place, chapter 8: "Therefore the Word was both in the Father always, as He says, 'I am in the Father': and with God always, as it is written, 'and the Word was with God,' and never separated from the Father, or different from the Father, because 'I and the Father are one.'" What could be more explicit? Other objections that could be made from the same Tertullian, such as that he said the Father is invisible, the Son visible; the Father commanded the Son, the Son obeyed the Father; the Son proceeds from the Father as the ray proceeds from the sun, the river from the source, have been solved in the preceding sections.

Concerning St. Dionysius of Alexandria

Objection: St. Dionysius of Alexandria, while opposing Sabellius, advocated the Arian dogma; for in his epistle to Euphranor and Ammonius, he writes that the Son of God is a work and something made, neither proper by nature nor His own, but alien, second to the Father. And he adds that the Father is compared to the Son as a farmer is compared to the vine, and a ship-builder to a ship. "For as one who makes a work, He did not exist before He was made." These words contain the pure dogma of Arius.

I respond that St. Dionysius of Alexandria, when he was accused by certain Pentapolitans of the perverse dogma that later became Arius's, on account of the words related and certain other similar ones in the cited epistle, issued an Apology which he sent to Dionysius, the Roman Pontiff. In this Apology, he completely removed from himself the suspicion of this error, explaining according to an entirely Catholic sense the somewhat harsh words that had escaped

him in the cited epistle due to excessive zeal in refuting Sabellius. He showed that by the examples he had used, he had intended only to prove against Sabellius the distinction of Persons, not to deny their consubstantiality. All these things are evident from St. Athanasius, who published a book on the opinion of St. Dionysius of Alexandria concerning this matter, in which he quotes many fragments from his Apologetic books. Among these, from the Apology sent to Dionysius, the Roman Pontiff: "I also wrote in another epistle, where I show that the accusation they bring against me is false, as if I were saying that Christ is not consubstantial with God (note the word 'consubstantial' before the Nicene Council). For although I say that I have not found or read this name anywhere in the Sacred Scriptures, yet our arguments, which they have concealed, do not differ from this opinion. For I adduced human offspring as an example, undoubtedly congeneric." Also: "Since the Father is eternal, the Son is also eternal, light from light; for if there is a Father, necessarily there is also a Son." Wherefore St. Athanasius, among other things that he writes in defense of St. Dionysius, speaks thus in the cited book: "As far as the Bishop of Alexandria is concerned, it is sufficiently clear from his Apology that he is not of the opinion which these say he was, or that he had accepted any of the perverse opinions of Arius; on the contrary, his writings effectively demonstrate that the attacks commonly made against him are calumnies."

St. Athanasius adds that the examples used by St. Dionysius were brought forward and understood by him concerning Christ in respect to His humanity, which is of a different substance from divinity, as the vine from the farmer, the ship from the builder, not concerning the Son

according to divinity, whom he acknowledges to be consubstantial with the Father, as is evident from his words related above, and again from these following words which St. Athanasius quotes: "Although it is my statement that I did not find this word 'consubstantial' in the Sacred Scriptures, nevertheless I found the thing itself and recognized that the Son, who is the Word, is not alien to the substance of the Father."

I omit Origen, whom the Socinians also oppose to us, because several Holy Fathers, among whom are Jerome, Epiphanius, St. Augustine, and the Angelic Doctor, as well as many theologians, acknowledge that he did not in fact think correctly about the Son, not that he openly taught the heresy proper to Arius, namely, that the Son is a creature made from nothing in time, but that he said the Son, even as God, is not of the same individual nature as the Father and is less than Him by some degree of perfection. Many, however, also deny this, relying on reasons certainly not to be despised. But be that as it may, no one should be surprised if Origen, who in the judgment of the Church and the Holy Fathers erred in many matters against the faith, also erred in this point.

Objections Against the Divinity of the Holy Spirit

First objection from the Sacred Scriptures: In Romans 8, it is said: "The Spirit Himself asks for us with inexpressible groanings." But to ask is not characteristic of God. 2) In John 1, it is said that all things were made through the Word; therefore, also the Holy Spirit. 3) In Amos 4, according to the Septuagint version, God is said to create the

Spirit. 4) In John 6, He is said not to speak of Himself, but whatever He has heard. Therefore...

To the first, I respond with St. Thomas (2-2, q. 83, a. 10), from St. Augustine, that this is not to be understood in a formal sense, but in a causal sense, so that the Spirit does not Himself ask, but makes us ask. This is similar to Genesis 22, where God says, "Now I know that you fear the Lord," that is, "I have made it known." It does not follow that the entire Trinity, or the Father and Son, should also be said to ask in this sense; because although the grace of prayer is truly the work of the entire Holy Trinity, it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness and our sanctification are attributed, the beginning and sustenance of which is constant prayer.

To the second, I say that all things of a different nature were made through the Word; otherwise, it would follow that the Father also was made through the Word.

To the third, I say that "spirit" there is taken for wind, as our Vulgate has it.

To the fourth, I say that the sense is that He received from the Father His nature and knowledge, and therefore that He does not speak as an unbegotten person but as one proceeding, yet from His own knowledge.

For the solution of certain other objections from the Scriptures, note that when something is said in Sacred Scripture about the spirit that is not fitting for God but only for a creature, it should be understood either of the wind, which is also called "spirit," as in Exodus 15: "Your spirit blew and the sea covered them"; or of the gifts of grace and virtues which are called the Spirit of God, Joel 2: "I will pour out my spirit"; or of Angels, whether good or evil, or our souls, which are spiritual creatures and are called spirits.

Second objection from the Fathers: 1) St. Basil held that the Holy Spirit should not be called God, as is evident from Oration 20 of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his praise. 2) Similarly, St. Hilary in his 12 books on the Trinity does not give the name of God to the Holy Spirit. 3) Even the Council of Constantinople did not define that the Holy Spirit is God. 4) The Church in ancient times did not direct its prayers to the Holy Spirit, which it undoubtedly would have done if it had believed Him to be God. As for what the Socinians add, that the Holy Spirit is never named God in the Sacred Scriptures, this is an obvious falsehood, as is clear from the proofs.

To the first, I respond that St. Basil held that the Holy Spirit should not be called God, not from error about His nature—for it is evident from his epistles and from the lauded oration of St. Gregory that he consistently denied that He is a creature and defended His consubstantiality with the Father and the Son—but from economy, in order to avert more serious persecutions of the Church. For at that time, Arians on one side and Macedonians on the other were harassing the Church, and there was a danger that, if they joined forces, they would eject all Catholic bishops from their sees and substitute heretics. To avert this evil, St. Basil thought that, while retaining the true faith in the Holy Spirit, the name of God should for the time being be omitted. Some indeed disapproved of this economy of St. Basil, others praised it, among them St. Athanasius and St. Gregory Nazianzen.

To the second, I respond that St. Hilary used a similar economy in his books on the Trinity; in them, however, he denies that the Spirit is a creature, and in his Commentaries on Matthew, chapter 33, he openly confesses His divinity:

"They are baptized," he says, "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, so that those whose divinity is one, the gift may also be one, and the name of the Trinity is one God."

To the third, the Council of Constantinople defined that the Holy Spirit is "the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, and who together with the Father and Son is adored and glorified," which is plainly the same as if it had explicitly said: "The Holy Spirit is God."

To the fourth, the Church in earlier centuries directed prayers to the Father alone, not because it believed the Son and the Holy Spirit to be devoid of divinity, but because the Father, being the source of all divinity, is said by appropriation to act the role of God, the Son is regarded as mediator, and the Holy Spirit as the author of our prayers.

Objections of the Tritheists

The Tritheists, in the 6th century, led by Punopponus, admitted against the Arians that the three persons in God are divine and consubstantial, but they understood consubstantiality as the same nature in species, not in number, in the way that multiple humans are consubstantial, that is, of the same human nature in species; so that just as there are as many humans as there are persons, there are as many gods as there are persons. This heresy is refuted by all that we have adduced both from Sacred Scripture and from the Fathers in proving the consubstantiality of the Persons; for these show that there is one nature in number in God. Also by those things with which we impugned the plurality of gods in the preceding treatise. It remains, therefore, for us to answer the arguments of the Tritheists.

First objection: Certain Fathers, among whom is St. Augustine in Psalm 68, compare the three persons in God to three fragments of gold. Many Holy Fathers, including St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Damascene, and especially St. Gregory of Nyssa in two works, one against the Greeks, the other to Ablabius, compare the divine nature in regard to unity to human nature, which is common to many. From this twofold comparison, it is clearly evident that there are as many gods as there are divine persons, just as there are as many humans as there are human persons, and as many substances of gold as there are fragments.

To the first, I respond that this first comparison is not made in all respects, but only in this: that just as each fragment of gold is truly gold, so each person of the Trinity is truly God. This was sufficient for the Fathers disputing against the Arians, who contended that the Son and the Holy Spirit are mere creatures.

To the second, I respond that this second comparison is more harmful than helpful to the Tritheists, for the Fathers cited do not make it to prove that the divine nature is divided in the three Persons, as human nature is divided in multiple humans, but on the contrary, to persuade that even human nature, common to many, is one, and should be said, strictly speaking, to be one human being, not many human beings. Into this philosophical error they were driven by excessive zeal in refuting the Arians, who constantly pressed the parallel with human nature, saying: If there are three persons in God and each is God, then there are three gods, just as there are three humans where there are three human persons. To this importunate argument, the Holy Fathers responded in two ways: 1) That there is not the same reason for divine and human nature; for the latter, because of its

limitation, cannot, while remaining one, be communicated except to one person, so that with the multiplication of persons, it is multiplied. The divine nature, however, because of its infinite fecundity and illimitability, can, while remaining undivided, be communicated to three persons. This was the common, true, and obvious response. But to remove from the Arians every pretext for disputation, some responded 2) that even human nature, common to and communicated to many, is one, and it is only by usage and abuse that many humans are said to exist, when it should be said that there is one human. Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa in his book On Common Notions against the Greeks, St. Cyril of Alexandria in book 9 of his Commentary on John, St. John Damascene in book 3 On Faith, chapter 8, and others. These views, I confess, are abhorrent to our true philosophy, which recognizes no nature that is one and common in reality, but it is an error against reason, not against faith, which benefits neither the Tritheists nor the Arians or Socinians.

Objection 2: Tertullian against Praxeas, chapter 13, says that Catholics are not permitted to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three Gods, lest this license should give them occasion to escape martyrdom, since then, no differently from the Gentiles, they could swear by Gods and Lords. Therefore, he believes there are in fact three Gods, although this should not be said because of the inconvenience that would follow.

I respond by denying the conclusion. For Tertullian does not adduce this alone as the reason for this prohibition, but others, and principally the unity of the divine nature. When, therefore, Tertullian had proven against Praxeas that there are several distinct persons in God and that each is God, and Praxeas inferred from this that Catholics preach

many gods, Tertullian responds that, given but not conceded that Catholics speak in this way, they would not do so without some appearance of foundation in the Sacred Scriptures; for it is said in Psalm 44 and Hebrews 1: "Your throne, O God." Praxeas urged: Why, then, do Catholics not openly and everywhere preach many gods? Tertullian responds that this is not permitted to them for three reasons: 1) because it was never used by the Apostles; 2) because there is only one divine nature, and there should be a distinction between worshippers of one divinity and multiple divinities; 3) because if this were permitted to them, they would easily avoid the trial of martyrdom. Therefore, Tertullian acknowledges there one divine nature in number, which he teaches repeatedly and consistently in the same book against Praxeas and elsewhere, as is evident from the proofs.

Moreover, it is well known to everyone that none of the ancient Fathers descended to such impiety and absurdity as to assert many gods. This observation suffices to refute all that the Tritheists can object from them.

§ III. Objections from Reason Against the Entire Mystery.

Objection 1: This mystery contradicts several principles known by natural light, and firstly, this one: "Things which are identical to a third thing are identical to each other," upon which the entire art of syllogism rests; for the persons are identified with the divine essence, and yet they are really distinct from each other. Secondly, this principle is not preserved: "Nothing produces its own being," for the producing person and the produced person have the

same being. Thirdly, it overturns this principle: "A person renders nature incommunicable to another supposit," because the nature which is in the Father is communicated to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this mystery is against reason, and consequently impossible.

I respond by denying the antecedent. (3) To the first objection, I respond: 1. This axiom is to be understood of those things which are identical to a third thing both in reality and in concept, which is explained in two ways. The first sense is that this third thing is not virtually multiple, but that the extremes are united to it under the same formality and concept, not under different ones; hence, although action is identical to motion, as likewise is passion, it does not follow that action and passion are identical, because action imports a relation as that from which motion is in the mobile thing, while passion imports it as that which is from another. Similarly, although paternity is really identical with the divine essence, and likewise filiation, nevertheless these two in their proper concepts import opposite relations, hence they are distinguished from each other. Thus says the holy Doctor. The second sense is that the extremes are so identified with a third thing that they are not distinguished from it by reasoned reason [ratione ratiocinata]; not, however, in such a way that the distinction of reasoned reason between the extremes and the middle positively and always infers a real distinction of the extremes among themselves; otherwise, syllogisms could only be made with synonyms, which is false; nor did the holy Doctor say this, concerning which see Sylvius here q. 20, a. 3; but only permissively and in certain matters, namely, when it

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3 Q. 28, a. 3, ad 1.

happens that the extremes are virtually distinguished from the middle through concepts or formalities that import opposition between themselves. For by the very fact that the extremes differ from the middle by reasoned reason, they can, from that aspect in which they differ from the middle, import some opposition between themselves, such as a relative one, and then by reason of that opposition they are really distinguished from each other, although they are really identified with the middle with which they have no opposition. And so it happens in God. For paternity and filiation are virtually distinguished from the essence in such a way that from this aspect they import concepts that are relatively opposed to each other, but not with the essence; hence it happens that they are really identical with the essence and yet really distinct from each other.

That you may understand this more profoundly, note (4) carefully that it is proper to an infinite thing to identify things to itself while preserving their formal concepts when they do not imply imperfection. Thus, for example, the formal concept of wisdom, which is to know things through the highest cause, likewise the formal concepts of justice, mercy, etc., are most perfectly preserved in God, notwithstanding their real identity with the essence. Similarly, therefore, the formal concept of relation must be perfectly preserved in Him, notwithstanding its real identity with the essence. But the proper concept of relation is to be opposed to its correlative and to be really distinct from it; hence the divine relations, notwithstanding their real identity with the essence, are relatively opposed to each other, and by reason of this opposition are really distinct

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4 In 1, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4.

from each other. If you carefully consider these points, you will easily solve the objections that can be raised.

Other Thomists explain this principle differently, saying that it is only verified when the extremes are adequately united to a finite third thing that is not communicable to really distinct things; but not when they are only inadequately united to an unlimited third thing that is communicable to really distinct things. Now, a personal relation is identified with the essence in such a way that it does not, however, equal it, because it is not identified with the other relations with which the essence itself is identified, nor is the essence itself so identified with one personal relation that it is not also identified with others, and remains communicable to them because of its infinite fecundity and unlimitedness. And these relations, as has been said, however much they are identified with the essence, preserve their formal concept, which is to be opposed to each other, and therefore to be really distinct. This amounts almost to the same as the previous explanation, and it can be illustrated by some analogous similarity (for a perfect parity of this matter cannot be had in created things, which, because of their limitedness, cannot be identified with several really distinct things; hence it is not surprising that neither Aristotle nor other philosophers, destitute of faith, touched on these explanations). Just as it is true in natural things that things which are united to a third thing are united to each other, so it is also true that things which are near or present to a third thing are present to each other. Thus, for example, two bodies cannot be present to one space without being present to each other. If, however, there be given some third thing which, remaining the same, exists in several distant places, or in several really distinct parts,

neither those places nor those parts will be present to each other, although they are present to the same third thing, because they are not adequately present to it. Thus the body of Christ is present to several hosts, which nevertheless are not present to each other. The foot and the head are present to the same soul, yet these parts are not present and near to each other.

From these points you may gather that the reason why these and similar expository syllogisms are not valid: "This God is the Father, this God is the Son: therefore the Son is the Father"; "This divine essence is paternity, this divine essence is filiation, therefore filiation is paternity," is not because the form of the expository syllogism fails in this mystery, but because in these and similar cases it is not preserved. For just as in a syllogism with a common term, it is required that the middle term be perfectly distributed, so it is of the nature of an expository syllogism that the middle term be perfectly singularized, which is not the case here; for these terms, "this God," "this essence," although they are singular, are nevertheless equivalently universal, or have the force of a common term, because that God, this singular essence, is communicable to several supposits, which is proper to a common term. Hence we should not use those terms as middle terms for expository syllogisms, because they are not perfectly singularized, but we should use them as common terms, but then they must be perfectly distributed, not indeed by saying: "Every God," but, "everything that is God is the Father," etc.; "everything that is the divine essence is paternity," etc.; but then these propositions are false, because something is God, namely the Son, which is not the Father, and something is the divine essence, namely filiation, which is not paternity.

To the second objection, I respond: The Father does not produce His own being, but only communicates it, which He can do because that being is of such eminence and fecundity that, while remaining the same, it can be possessed by several. And since it is entirely the same in the Father and the Son, it is not from the Father as from a cause with dependence, but as from a principle of origin.

To the third principle, drawn from the definition of person, I respond: This is understood by many to mean that personality renders not the nature in itself incommunicable, but the composite and the person, or the nature reduplicatively as personated, which is also verified in this mystery; for the person of the Father, or the divine nature with the mode of paternity and as personated, is not communicated to another, for there is only one Father in the divine. However, granting that in created things it is understood differently, so that in them personality renders the nature itself in itself incommunicable to another supposit, because the created nature, being finite, is fulfilled by a single personality. Nevertheless, it must be verified in the divine in the first sense, both because on account of its infinity and infinite fecundity it is not adequately comprehended or fulfilled by one personality as is a created nature; and also because personality in the divine is not something absolute as in created things, but something relative; and it is of the nature of the relative that it has a correlative.

Objection 2: From the infinity of the divine nature, we conclude with St. Thomas that it is one and cannot be multiplied. But a person in the divine, as virtually distinct from the essence, is also infinite. Therefore, there is only one.

I respond: 1. I distinguish the minor: a person in the divine, as virtually distinct from the essence, is infinite by reason of the essence which it includes, I concede; by reason of its relative concept precisely, I deny. For since, as we shall say, in this respect it does not add perfection, neither does it add infinity, but it abstracts from infinity and finitude. I respond: 2. Given the minor, I deny the consequence. The disparity is that since a person in the divine is constituted by a relation, as we shall see below, and this necessarily requires a term which it respects, it does not import infinity simply, but in a certain genus, e.g., paternity in the concept of paternity, and therefore it does not exclude any other person, but only another Father. But if there were several infinite essences, since they would not be relatively opposed to each other, nor consequently distinguished by reason of that opposition, they would have to be distinguished by some formal and essential concept which one would have and not another, which therefore would not be infinite.

Objection 3: A reason cannot be assigned why there are rather three persons than two or four, or more. Therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent, and I assign the reason: because in God there must be one unproduced person and two produced ones, and no more. I prove the antecedent: personal distinction in the divine, as we shall say below, is only according to the relation of origin, from which it follows: 1. That there can be only one unproduced person, since between unproduced persons there is no relation of origin. It follows: 2. That since there are only two processions in the divine, one through the intellect, the other through the will (for procession in the divine is not considered in terms of transient action, but immanent,

which is twofold, understanding and willing), there are consequently only two proceeding persons or terminating the twofold procession. Of these matters, more below.

You insist: There can be several processions through the intellect and several through the will, as in us. Therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent: 1. Because if there were several processions in the divine intellect, or in the divine will, it would follow that there would be infinite ones, for once several are posited, the limit or number of them cannot be established by any reason; but it is improper to admit actually infinite processions and persons in God.

Those several processions in the divine intellect (the same can be said of the will) would be distinguished either specifically or numerically: not specifically, because divine intellection is one with specific unity; not numerically, because numerical distinction is derived from matter and limitation, which is repugnant to God. Hence the disparity between our processions and the divine ones is valid regarding the present objection.

You reply: At least there can be in God a procession through power, no less than through intellect and will. Therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. (5) Because power is a principle of acting upon another, hence according to power, action is taken toward the outside, and thus according to the attribute of power, the procession of a divine person is not taken, but only of creatures.

St. Thomas presents many other arguments of the Gentiles in 4 Contra Gentiles, chapter 10, and solves them in chapter 14. Similarly, Bellarmine in books 1 and 2 on Christ;

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5 Q. 27, a. 3, ad 1.

John of St. Thomas here in disputation 12, articles 3 and 4, presents and refutes many other sophisms of the Socinians. See if you wish. But most of them are either solved by what has been said, or will be solved in the course of this treatise. Hence we now pass over them.

Article IV. Whether the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity can be Known by Natural Light.

I say 1: The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity cannot be known or demonstrated by any natural reasoning. (6) This is against Abelard and certain others who maintained that the mysteries of our faith could be demonstrated by reason, whom St. Bernard refutes in chapter 19 of Ecclesiasticus and in book 5 of Considerations, chapter 8.

This is proven first by authority. In Matthew 14, it is said: "No one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and the one to whom the Son wills to reveal Him." Similarly in chapter 16, Christ says to Peter who professed His divine sonship: "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven." And Pope Hormisdas in epistle 79 to Emperor Justin: "The secret of the Trinity could not be investigated by any nature of visible or invisible beings."

It is proven secondly by reason. (7) We can know nothing about God through natural reason except from created effects; for we know nothing about God a priori or through cause, since there is no cause of God or the Trinity.

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6 Here q. 3, 2, a. 1, o.

7 Here q. 32, a. 1, o.

But from created effects, at least natural ones, we cannot arrive at knowledge of such a great mystery. Therefore, etc. The minor is proven: an effect, no matter how perfectly known, does not lead to knowledge of its cause except insofar as it proceeds from that cause and has an intrinsic connection with it. Thus, for example, an effect proceeding from an artist, such as a house from a builder, manifests the art from which it inherently proceeds and the person as an artist, but not other accidental qualities of this person that do not pertain to the art, e.g., that he was tall or short, white or black, fat or thin, dressed in red or green, etc. But created effects do not proceed from nor depend per se on God as triune, but only as one. Therefore, etc. The minor is proven: Created effects proceed from God by reason of divinity as the radical cause, and by reason of omnipotence as the proximate cause. But omnipotence belongs to God prior to the relations by which the persons are constituted, and pertains to the nature as it is one, not as it is triune in persons, for each person does not have a proper and distinct omnipotence. Hence it is commonly said that the works of the Most Holy Trinity ad extra [toward the outside] are undivided. Therefore, created effects do not proceed per se from God as triune, but only concomitantly insofar as the productive power is one and the same in the three persons. Thus, if by impossibility God were not triune, creatures would still exist, because the power that produces them would remain.

From this you may infer, first, that even supposing faith, this mystery cannot be evidently demonstrated by natural reason alone, because divine revelation does not make creatures per se depend on and proceed from God as

triune, nor does it place in creatures any vestige of the Most Holy Trinity.

If you say: Natural reason dictates evidently that God is truthful in revealing; therefore, supposing the revelation of this mystery, reason dictates evidently that it exists;

I respond by distinguishing the consequent. Reason dictates evidently that it exists through a natural medium intrinsically connected with that mystery, I deny; through an extrinsic medium, namely the authority of the revealer, I concede. We do not deny that the created intellect, aided by faith and using it, can by its natural power know that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity exists; but we deny that it, even supposing faith but not using it, can prove this mystery through some natural medium intrinsically connected with it, because, namely, faith does not provide such a medium, since, as we have said, it does not make creatures depend per se on the Most Holy Trinity. Hence, however much the created intellect is perfected by divine revelation, it can never evidently know the Trinity in created effects, because it is not cognizably contained in them.

You may infer, secondly, for the same reason, that not even the possibility of this mystery can be established by natural reason alone. You may infer, thirdly, that if a human wayfarer [on earth] were to know quiddatively the beatific vision, the light of glory, the hypostatic union, which does not seem to be repugnant, since every created thing is knowable through its proper species, he would also evidently know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity as to whether it exists, because of the connection that those supernatural effects have with the Trinity, not indeed as cause, but as object or united extreme. Thus I said in the proof of the conclusion, "from created effects, at least natural ones."

You will say against the conclusion: Many pagan philosophers knew the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity. Hence St. Augustine relates that he read in Platonic books the beginning of the Gospel of John: "In the beginning was the Word," etc., not indeed in the same words, but in similar ones. And that famous saying of Trismegistus: "The Monad begot the Monad and reflected its ardor upon itself." By these words, the divine origins seem to be openly expressed. Therefore, etc.

I respond, first, that philosophers did not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity through its proper characteristics, which are paternity, filiation, and procession, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "We speak the wisdom of God... which none of the princes of this world knew," that is, none of the philosophers; but they knew only certain essential attributes which are appropriated to the persons, such as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. Hence by the Word in Platonic books is not understood a person begotten by the Father consubstantial with Him, but the ideal reason through which God created all things, which is appropriated to the Son. The saying of Trismegistus does not refer to the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, but to the production of the world, which the one God produced on account of love of Himself. Modern heretics add that the work which is circulated under the name of Trismegistus is not his, but of some Christian of the early centuries, because in that work many things are read expressed from the sacred Scriptures which Trismegistus, who was more ancient than Moses, could not have seen.

I respond (8) that if certain pagan philosophers had some knowledge of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, they drew it not from created effects by natural reason, but either from the teaching and tradition of the Hebrews, or from reading the Holy Scriptures or Sibylline books, or from divine revelation as in the Sibyls themselves, or even from the revelation of demons, who before they fell had divinely known this mystery, and imparted knowledge of it to humans, either by God's command or out of malice, so that by positing three persons, they might persuade humans that there are three gods. Hence Plato, who is said to have admitted the Trinity, also admitted three gods.

You will rejoin: God as one is not less supernatural than as triune; but He can be naturally known as one; therefore, etc. I respond by distinguishing the major: He is not less supernatural in the order of being, I concede; in the order of knowable object, I deny. Because created effects proceed from Him as one, not as triune, as has been said. Other arguments against this conclusion we shall propose after the following conclusion.

I say 2: Supposing faith, this mystery can be persuaded by various congruities, and defended from opposing arguments: hence it is commonly said that it is above, but not contrary to reason.

The first part is proved by proposing various congruities: 1° from reason; 2° from examples; 3 from the ternary number.

From reason, the first congruity is sought from the nature of the highest good, which is maximally self-diffusive, which maximum diffusion shines forth especially in the

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8 In 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4.

mystery of the Most Holy Trinity. The second is founded on the nature of friendship and society, which is fittingly required for the highest happiness, but friendship and society require a number of equal persons; for there is no friendship or society between things of different species, e.g., between man and beast or stone. The third congruity is founded on the fact that to generate something similar to oneself is a perfection. The fourth, because in us we experience a procession of word and love, which, since it can be purified of its imperfections, seems necessary to admit in God. The fifth congruity is proposed thus: a being absolutely infinite, as God is, must include every possible conceivable entity, and therefore both the absolute and the relative: but the relative requires a correlative distinct from itself to which it is referred, for nothing is referred to itself. Hence these relatives, because they have relative opposition to each other, are really distinct from each other, but because they have no opposition with the absolute, they are really identified with it. Furthermore, relative opposition in the divine is founded on origin, which is twofold, one through intellect, the other through will: hence there are three relatives, one unproduced and producing, two produced. Thus we have three relatives really distinct from each other, and identified in one absolute. And because these three relatives in the divine cannot be accidents, because accident involves imperfection, it follows that they are substances and indeed persons, because on account of relation and correlation they are incommunicable.

From examples. First, in the rational soul are found being, knowing, and willing. Likewise in the same soul there is memory, intellect, and will, and yet it is one. So St. Augustine in book 14 on the Trinity, chapter 8. Second, in

the sun there are three things: orbit, splendor, and heat, and yet it is one; so St. Augustine in sermon 1 on the Words of the Apostle, chapter 3. In a tree there are trunk, branches, and leaves, and yet it is one tree. These examples, however, as St. Thomas notes somewhere, have more dissimilarity than similarity.

From the ternary number. In the world, the entire universe consists of three genera of beings: being, living, and understanding; there is a threefold principle of natural beings: matter, form, and privation. Three parts of time: past, present, and future. Three measures of duration: time, aevum [angelic time], eternity. Three species of quantity: line, surface, body. Three dimensions of body: length, width, depth.

In man, a threefold faculty: memory, intellect, will. A threefold operation: vegetative, sensitive, intellectual. A threefold operation of the mind: simple apprehension, judgment, discourse.

In Angels, three hierarchies; in each hierarchy, three choirs; in each choir, a threefold operation: purgation, illumination, perfection. Finally, in all creatures, these three are found: unity, species, and order. Likewise, one, true, good. Also, being, potency, and operation.

Hence the ternary number is so celebrated that by it we signify what we think perfect in every way, as when we say, for example, "thrice blessed," and that saying of the poet: "God rejoices in the odd number." Because indeed the ternary number contains the perfections of all, namely the principle, which is unity; the species, which is duality; and the completion, which is the third unity.

The second part is proved. Whatever arguments are posited against the teachings of faith do not proceed from

principles of nature known per se, and hence do not have the force of demonstration, but are either probable reasons or sophistical. Therefore there remains room to solve them. The antecedent is proved. Truth is not contrary to truth, but only to falsity. But the principles of nature known per se are true, and likewise the teachings of faith are most true. Therefore, whatever arguments, etc.

The same truth is proved by all the motives of credibility of the mysteries of our religion, concerning which in the treatise on Faith. It is further proved by the solution of objections, which we discussed in the preceding section. From all of which follows what we added in the conclusion, that this mystery, although it is above, is not contrary to reason.

You will say, first: This second conclusion seems to contradict the first. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved. By all these reasons and examples the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity seems to be demonstrated. Therefore, etc.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the antecedent. For by these reasons and examples, although the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is somehow and probably persuaded, it is not effectively persuaded. And indeed it is shadowed in the ternary number, but not demonstrated. In the examples we have already said there is more dissimilarity than similarity. As for the reasons, I likewise deny that they demonstratively prove and convince. For the pagan philosopher will respond to the first that the nature of the highest good is preserved by the fact that it can communicate its perfection to creatures ad extra to infinity, and that it does in fact communicate itself infinitely from the perspective of the mode of communication by bringing a being out of nothing. But the communication of the same

undivided nature to different persons is repugnant; the contrary of this cannot be evidently proved to him by natural reason, although in reality it is so, and indeed belongs to the highest good.

To the second, he will respond that friendship and society are required for the happiness of man, who finds in his depths misery rather than full goodness; but that this is required for the happiness of God, who is in Himself the center of all good and possesses all its fullness, will be difficult to demonstrate, and can reasonably be denied.

To the third, he will deny that it can be proved according to natural light that generating something similar to oneself is a perfection simply speaking, since in creatures it happens with a division of nature, which involves imperfection and is repugnant to our mystery.

To the fourth, he will likewise deny according to natural reason that, from the fact that in us there is a procession of word and love, there is similarly in God, because this procession in us is accidental, which is repugnant to God; but that it can be substantial, mere natural reason does not evidently demonstrate.

To the fifth, he will say either that there is no formally relative being, as many Catholics think in created things. Or that if it is formally given in God, it cannot be identified with the absolute, because absolute and relative are completely disparate, and so disparate that they cannot be really identified, but must be really distinguished, whence it would follow that in God relative can only be given eminently, which would certainly destroy the truth of our mystery, nor could the opposite of this be demonstratively shown by natural reason. Add that by no natural reason can it be proven that this relative is something substantial and a

person. Hence St. Thomas notes in q. 32, a. 1, that whoever would try to persuade unbelievers of this mystery by natural reasons would derogate from our faith, which is only about those things that transcend our reason, and would give philosophers an occasion for error or for ridiculing our faith, which they would think rests on these reasons. "Therefore the things of faith," concludes the holy Doctor, "should not be attempted to be proved except by authorities, for those who accept authorities. But for others it is sufficient to defend that what faith preaches is not impossible."

You say, secondly: From this second conclusion it follows that it can be proved by natural reason that this mystery is at least possible. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved: It can be proved not to involve contradiction, as we say in this second conclusion, and is evident from the solution of objections in the preceding article. But what is proved not to involve contradiction is proved to be possible. Therefore, etc.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major: it can be proved not to involve contradiction positively and evidently, I deny; negatively and probably, I concede. In this sense I distinguish the minor, and deny the consequent. When therefore we solve arguments from reason and contradictions which are opposed to the possibility of this mystery, we proceed only from probabilities and appearances; but by no reason, either a priori or a posteriori, do we demonstratively prove their falsity. And this indeed is sufficient that this mystery not be judged impossible, but not that it be evidently known as possible; for false things, as the philosopher says, are sometimes more probable than true things. And who, having solved all the arguments of the pagans and contradictions

opposed, would persuade himself that all his solutions are invincibly demonstrative and that no implication remains to be solved, beyond those already solved? No one, certainly, because no one, whether Angel or man, can thoroughly penetrate this sacrament which transcends all nature.

You insist: From what has been said, it cannot be demonstrated that this mystery is impossible. Therefore it can be proved to be possible, for between possible and impossible there is no middle ground.

I respond by denying the consequent. For although between possible and impossible there is no middle ground, there is a middle ground between the demonstration of possibility and the demonstration of impossibility, namely opinion, doubt, or ignorance of both, and this happens in mysteries which, since they transcend all natural light, do not fall under demonstration.

You will press further: This mystery is evidently credible; therefore it is evidently possible. The consequent is proved by arguing from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent: What is evidently impossible is evidently incredible; therefore what is evidently credible is evidently possible.

I respond by denying the consequent. Because the credibility and possibility of a thing are sought from different principles; the latter, like truth, is sought from what is in the thing; but the former is sought from extrinsic factors, namely testimonies, signs, etc. To the proof, I deny that this argument is from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, both because both the consequent and what is brought forward as its opposite are affirmative; but of opposed enunciations one must be negative; and also because of this particle "evidently." For by

reason of it both can be denied of the same thing, namely that it is evidently possible and evidently impossible. Thus the argument should be formed: What is evidently impossible is evidently incredible; therefore, what is not evidently incredible is not evidently impossible. All of which we admit.

You ask whether and what notion of this mystery was granted to the Jews?

I respond 1: To the patriarchs, prophets, and those excelling in singular holiness, a clear notion of this mystery was granted. It is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture. To the aforementioned was granted the notion or explicit faith of the Incarnation of the Word: but this presupposes a clear notion of the Trinity, since Christ is the second person of the Trinity incarnate. Therefore, etc. The major is proved from the desires of the saints of the Old Testament. In Matthew 13, Christ says: "Amen I say to you, that many prophets and just men have desired to see the things that you see, and have not seen them." And in John 8: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my day: he saw it, and was glad." But this desire to see Christ presupposes knowledge of Him.

It is proved, secondly, from the Fathers. St. Ambrose in book 1 on Cain and Abel, chapter 8, and St. Augustine in book 2 on the Trinity, chapter 11, teach that Abraham recognized the Trinity when he saw three and adored one. St. Epiphanius in heresy 5: "One Trinity," he says, "was always announced and believed in that singular divinity by those who excelled above others, such as the prophets and men endowed with extraordinary holiness were." Likewise Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and others.

It is proved, thirdly, by reason. The patriarchs and prophets themselves committed this mystery to writing, as we saw above. Therefore they knew it.

I respond 2: That a clear notion of this mystery was granted to certain scribes and doctors of the law of the Jewish nation is probable.

It is proved, first, from what we related above from Galatinus; secondly, because we have this mystery written in the Sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament; nothing therefore prevents the doctors of the Jewish nation, who scrutinized the Sacred Scriptures, from having seen it in them.

I respond 3: According to the Fathers, to the common people of the Jewish nation no knowledge of this mystery was granted. So Tertullian against Praxeas, chapter 31; Theodoret in sermon 2 on the Greek Affection; St. Hilary in book 8 on the Trinity; St. Gregory Nazianzen in oration 37; St. Basil in book 2 against Eunomius; St. Gregory of Nyssa in book on the Image of God; St. Chrysostom in homily 5 on the Incomprehensible Nature of God; and others.

They adduce several reasons for this economy, the principal of which is that the Jewish nation, being more prone to idolatry, was incapable of this mystery. "Since they had been in Egypt for a very long time," says Theodoret in the place cited, "and had learned there the cult of many gods according to Egyptian rite, most wise God neither manifestly nor completely delivered to them the mystery of the Trinity, lest from it they should take occasion for a multitude of gods, inclining to the impiety of the Egyptians." Another reason is that a more perfect knowledge of divinity was to be reserved for Christ and the new law as more noble, and hence a clearer distinction between the two laws would be had.

You will say: To the Jewish nation was granted faith in Christ; but, as has been said, faith in Christ presupposes knowledge of the Trinity. Therefore, etc. The major is proved: The Jewish nation could be saved, and many of them attained salvation; but no one can be saved without faith in Christ; for there is, says Sacred Scripture, "no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved." Therefore, etc.

I respond by distinguishing the major: To the Jewish nation was granted implicit faith in Christ, I concede the antecedent; explicit faith, I deny the antecedent. For this was not required before the Incarnation, but implicit faith was sufficient, which does not presuppose knowledge of the Trinity. That the common people of the Jewish nation did not have explicit faith in the Incarnation is evident from the fact that the Jews wanted to stone Christ because He said He was God, and that they thought the Messiah would come as a temporal king who would liberate his people from enemies and servitude by arms. Hence the Apostles, from this opinion of the common people, asked Christ in Acts 1: "Will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?"

HISTORICAL DIGRESSIONS

Digression I. On the Council of Nicaea.

§ I. Who convoked the Council of Nicaea? Who presided over it?

Against Arius

Note 1: Nicaea, in which this first general council was assembled, was the metropolis of Bithynia, not Nicaea of Thrace, in which latter city the Arians, while the Council of Ariminum was pending, held a council, in order to deceive the simple-minded by the similarity of names, and to impose the heretical formula of this conventicle as the Nicene one.

Note 2: This council was convoked in the year 325 of the common era, in the 12th year of the most holy Pope Sylvester, the 20th year of Emperor Constantine, with Paulinus and Julian as consuls; and it was concluded in the same year. So from Eusebius who was present at it, book 3 of the Life of Constantine, chapter 14; from the Council of Chalcedon, act 2; and from Socrates book 1, chapter 9, and from many others. Therefore, the Chronicles of Eusebius and Cassiodorus should be corrected in this part; likewise the History of Sozomen, which refers the celebration of this council to the pontificate of Julius I, with these words:

"Julius, Bishop of Rome, was hindered by advancing age, but Vitus and Vincent, presbyters of the same Church, were present in his place." Scholars clearly show from Sozomen himself that an error has crept into the name of Julius, and plausibly conjecture that copyists inadvertently read "Julius" instead of "πόλεως" (that is, of the city), so that it should read not "Julius" but "Bishop of the city of the Romans." Nicephorus and certain others have followed the corrupted text of Sozomen.

Present at this council were 318 bishops besides many clerics and philosophers; Constantine the Great was present, who sat below the bishops and only with their consent.

Note 3: The Council of Nicaea was celebrated for three reasons: 1) to settle the dissensions of the churches concerning the time of celebrating Easter; 2) to extinguish the schism of Meletius; 3) and especially, to condemn the Arian heresy.

Regarding the first matter, which concerned discipline, the holy synod decreed that Easter should be celebrated everywhere on the Sunday immediately following the fourteenth moon of the first month.

Regarding the second matter, it was decreed that Meletius should remain in his own city, namely Lycopolis, without any authority, content with the title of dignity and office alone.

Regarding the third matter, which is treated here: Arius, summoned to the council, heard, and convicted of heresy and blasphemies, especially by Athanasius still a deacon, who had accompanied St. Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, for the purpose of defending the faith, was struck with anathema, the heresy was condemned, and a symbol of faith was published to which the word "ὁμοούσιον"

(consubstantial) was added; this is reported by Socrates, Theodoret, Rufinus, and Athanasius in his book "On Faith to Jovinian," as I subjoin here.

Symbol of the Council of Nicaea

"We believe in one God the Father almighty, creator of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God; born of the Father, that is, from the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God; begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made, which are in heaven and on earth. Who for us men and for our salvation descended, and was incarnate, and became man, suffered, was buried; and rose again on the third day; and ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father, and will come again to judge the living and the dead. And in the Holy Spirit."

Then the Fathers immediately add against the Arians: "But those who say that there was a time when he was not, and that he came from things that are not, or from another subsistence or substance, or that the Son of God is created, or changeable, or alterable, the catholic and apostolic Church declares anathema."

With these matters thus established by the council concerning these three points, the synodal Fathers published twenty canons concerning discipline, about some of which theologians dispute, especially concerning the 3rd on the celibacy of clerics and concerning the 6th on the See of Alexandria which it equates to the Roman as regards patriarchal rights. About these, Baronius can be read at the year 325; Cabassut, Notice Eccl. 4th century. With these

noted, a double question occurs at present: Who convoked this Council? Who presided over it?

I say first: Constantine the Great convoked the Council of Nicaea, but with the consent of Saint Sylvester, the Roman Pontiff.

The first part is denied by no one, and it is established from the letter of the Council of Nicaea itself to the Alexandrian church in Theodoret book 1, chapter 11; from Eusebius book 3 of the Life of Constantine; from Nicephorus book 2, chapter 14, and others.

I prove the second part: 1) From the VI general synod, act 18, in the acclamatory address, where it is read thus: "Arius, divider and partitioner of the Trinity, arose, and immediately Constantine ever Augustus and Sylvester the praiseworthy assembled the great and distinguished synod at Nicaea." And although these words are not of the council, but of him who recited the acclamation, since however they were spoken in the council with no one objecting, the council is considered, by tacitly approving them, to have made them its own, and from this it is legitimately inferred that this was its opinion.

I prove 2) from Rufinus book 1 of History, chapter 1, where he says: "Then he (Constantine) convened an episcopal council at the city of Nicaea according to the judgment of the priests." If according to the judgment of the priests, undoubtedly according to the judgment of the greatest and first priest, the Roman Pontiff, who had dealt with him about these matters the year before when Constantine was then in Rome, and who had sent his legates to preside over the council, as I will say presently.

3. It is not credible that the most religious prince, most observant of priests and bishops, would have convoked

a council neglecting the supreme Pontiff of the Church, contrary to the usage of the first three centuries, contrary to the canons and rights of the Apostolic See.

4. Contrary to the usage of the first three centuries: for in the first three centuries, only Pontiffs and bishops convoked councils with no intervening mandate of emperors: as is evident from the councils of the Apostles which were the model for the rest; likewise from councils assembled against the Montanists, against the Novatians and others; likewise concerning the celebration of Easter and concerning discipline, in the convocation of which secular princes did not intervene.

5. Contrary to the canons: Julius I, who succeeded Sylvester after Mark, in his letter to the Orientals in Socrates book 2, chapter 13, says: "The ecclesiastical canon forbids that decrees be sanctioned for the churches without the judgment of the Roman bishop," or as Cassiodorus translates in the tripartite history: "Councils ought not to be celebrated without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff." And the VIII ecumenical council, canon 17, condemns those who say that a synod cannot be celebrated without princely presence, since nowhere have the sacred canons decreed that secular princes should meet in councils, but only bishops. But if according to the canons councils ought to be celebrated by bishops alone, why not also convoked. And in the Council of Chalcedon, first action, the legates of the supreme Pontiff accused Dioscorus of Alexandria because he dared to make a synod without the authority of the Apostolic See, which, they say, was never permitted, never done. Compare the sixth proof of the following conclusion.

6. Contrary to the rights of the Apostolic See. For to the Roman Pontiff alone by Christ's institution belongs the

right of convoking general councils: therefore. I prove the antecedent: he alone has the right of convoking general councils to whom authority over the universal Church was entrusted by Christ; but this is the Roman Pontiff alone, Peter's successor, to whom Christ said: "Feed my sheep." About this see Cardinal Jacobatius in the 2nd apparatus on general councils. Hence the Emperor Valentinian, when bishops requested that they be granted permission to come together to establish the doctrine of faith properly, responded: "To him who was one of the number of laymen, it was not permitted to interpose himself in such matters, and therefore priests and bishops, he said, to whom these cares belong, let them come together by themselves wherever it pleases them."

You will say: In the VIII ecumenical synod of Constantinople IV in the year 869, the vicars of the Oriental sees said: "You know that in past times there were emperors who assembled synods and gathered from the whole world for the disposition of such causes": therefore.

I respond: Emperors in past times convoked councils not by supreme right, but by the consent and dispensation of the most holy Pontiff, so that a council convoked by an emperor, or any other secular power, was never held as legitimate and ecumenical, except after the consent of the Roman Pontiff was obtained.

You will object: The Pontiffs themselves often asked emperors either to proclaim or to permit councils to be proclaimed, thus Liberius asked Constantius: therefore.

I respond: The Pontiffs asked this of emperors, not because they did not have the power of proclaiming councils, but because they could not usually exercise this power without the consent of emperors, either because emperors

favored heretics and raged against Catholics, as happened with the Arian Constantius, or because since the Church then had dominion over no city or province, it was necessary for emperors to grant some place for the celebration of the Council, or finally because by the law "Conventicles," title "On Bishops and Clerics," it was provided that assemblies should not be made without the prince's permission, which still holds in many kingdoms.

I say second: Hosius, Bishop of Córdoba in Spain, Victor (some read Vitus, others Bito or Vito) and Vincent, Roman presbyters, presided over the Council of Nicaea in the name of the most holy Sylvester, whose legates they were.

St. Athanasius in his Apology and in his letter to the Solitaries, and others everywhere, assert that Hosius presided over this council. Launoy, whom we have as an adversary here, as in the previous conclusion, does not deny this, but denies that he presided in Sylvester's name, and says he presided either in Constantine's name or because of the celebrity of his name. Likewise he does not deny that Victor and Vincent were present at the Council, but denies that they presided. Against him I prove the conclusion:

1. From Gelasius, Bishop of Cyzicus, a Greek author of the 5th century, who in book 4 of the History of the Council of Nicaea clearly asserts that Hosius held the place of Sylvester, Bishop of greatest Rome, together with the Roman presbyters Victor and Vincent.

2. From Socrates book 1, chapter 9, where he says: "Present at this council were Hosius, Bishop of Córdoba, Vitus and Vincent presbyters, Alexander Bishop of Egypt, Eustathius of great Antioch, Macarius of Jerusalem, etc." These words, if attention is paid to the order established by the council itself among the churches, so that 1st place is

Roman, 2nd Alexandrian, 3rd Antiochene, 4th Jerusalemite, clearly show that Hosius, Vitus and Vincent who are listed in first place presided in the name of the Roman Church, otherwise he would not have placed a Córdoban bishop and simple presbyters before the patriarchs.

3. From the epitome of canons which Pope Adrian offered to Charlemagne, in whose preface it is read thus: "It should be known that Hosius was honorable among the 318 Fathers of the Council of Nicaea and was sent from the Apostolic See with Victor and Vincent presbyters."

4. From Gregory VII, chapter 3 of the Apologetic: "Hosius of Córdoba, Victor and Vincent presbyters of the Roman Church, presided over the Council of Nicaea on behalf of Pope Sylvester." The same testify Leo IX in his letter to Michael Patriarch of Constantinople; Photius in his book on the 7 Synods; Hincmar of Reims in his work against Hincmar of Laon, and others.

5. As Launoy admits, Hosius presided over the Council of Nicaea: but it is by no means likely that a simple bishop of Córdoba would have presided over all the bishops and patriarchs of the world personally present, unless he had held the legation of the supreme Pontiff.

Launoy responds, as I have already said, that Hosius presided as Constantine's legate or because of his merits and celebrity of name. But neither can be said: not the first, because Constantine himself was personally present at the council, nor could he confer on Hosius the right of presiding over the council, since he professed that he himself did not have it, sitting below the bishops, and not wanting to sit except with their consent; not the second, for merits or celebrity of name are indeed valuable for gaining veneration, not for conferring the right of presiding over a council, in

which hierarchical order must especially be observed. Add that there were present at this council several bishops in no way inferior to Hosius, whether you consider sanctity or doctrine. For there were present Paphnutius, Potamon, Spiridion, James of Nisibis, and others conspicuous for sanctity and the marks of persecutions. There were present Eusebius of Caesarea, Eustathius of Antioch, Alexander of Alexandria, and others most excellent in doctrine.

6. I prove the conclusion by reason founded on ecclesiastical usage and law: either Hosius, Victor and Vincent presided over the council in Sylvester's name, or no one presided in this Pontiff's name. This second cannot be said: therefore the first. The major is evident, because no one else besides the three praised is assigned or can be assigned who presided over the council in Sylvester's name. I prove the minor: 1) from Julius I; from the Council of Chalcedon; from Constantinople IV and other authorities cited in the third proof of the previous conclusion; 2) the Roman council from the letters of Italy and Gaul under Pope Damasus, Liberius's successor, rejects the authority of the Council of Ariminum, because Liberius did not preside over it; thus it writes in the synodical letter to the Illyrians in Theodoret book 2, chapter 22: "If indeed the number of bishops who were assembled at Ariminum in one place should not have the force of prejudice, especially since the formula was composed without the Roman bishop, whose opinion before all others was to be awaited, nor others consenting to him." 3) The Fathers of the V general council with Emperor Justinian left no stone unturned so that Pope Vigilius would be present at and preside over their assembly, knowing well that otherwise their sanctions would be invalid. Hence the ecumenical synod, reproving the council of the Iconoclasts

under Constantine Copronymus, brings this reason: "It did not have, it says, as helper the Roman pope of that time... As the law of councils declares"; I omit what can be brought forth from divine law in assertion of this same truth, because they are not of this place and time. Now it suffices for us that the ecclesiastical law then was in force that no general council should be celebrated without the presidency of the supreme Pontiff, from which it is legitimately inferred that Sylvester presided over the Nicene through his legates, otherwise it would have been of no force, and the Arians who tried everything to weaken the authority of this council would undoubtedly have objected this cause of nullity, namely that the Roman pontiff had not presided over it.

You will say: Proclus, Bishop of Constantinople, in synodical letters to the Orientals in Facundus of Hermiane book 8, chapter 1, and Facundus himself book 11, chapter 1, say that Eustathius of Antioch was first of the Nicene Fathers, and Felix III, in letter 5 to Emperor Zeno, calls Eustathius "President of the 318 Fathers who convened at Nicaea": therefore.

I respond: Eustathius is called first not by authority, but by doctrine and eloquence; likewise he is called president or said to have presided, not because he was absolutely first, for the Alexandrian patriarch preceded him, but because he was among the first, as patriarch of the third see. For all bishops of the primary sees are sometimes said to preside. Thus Cedrenus in the Compendium of Histories: "There presided over it, he says, holding the place of Pope Sylvester of Rome, Vitus and Vincent presbyters, Metrophanes of Byzantium, Alexander of Alexandria, Eustathius of Antioch, and Macarius bishop of Jerusalem." Similarly Nilus, metropolitan of Rhodes, in his booklet on Synods.

You will insist: According to Eusebius book 3 of the Life of Constantine, chapter 11, and Theodoret book 1, chapter 7, Eustathius of Antioch occupied the first seat in the right order: therefore.

I respond: The first seat in the right order was not more honorable, but the first in the left order. This is evident from the Council of Chalcedon, in whose first action the seating of the Fathers is so arranged that on the left sat the legates of the Apostolic See, and after them the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Antioch; on the right Dioscorus of Alexandria and Juvenal of Jerusalem. Several reasons are given for this custom, among which this pleases us: that in the middle of the bishops' seating, the holy Gospels, which bore the type of Christ, would be placed in a sublime place, so that because they sat on the left side, they would be at Christ's right.

You will say 2: Sozomen book 1 of History, chapter 416, reviewing the bishops of the primary sees, puts Sylvester of Rome in the last place, whom he says, burdened by age, was not present at the council, but sent legates: therefore.

I respond: Sozomen did not observe the hierarchical order of the patriarchal sees in his narrative, but began in reverse order from the inferior and ended with the supreme; for 1st place he lists Macarius who in the hierarchical order of patriarchs is last; 2nd place Eustathius of Antioch who is third; and 3rd place Alexander of Alexandria who is second. Finally the Bishop of Rome who is first.

You will say 3: The Nicene Fathers in their synodical letter to the Alexandrian church say that Alexander, bishop of that church, presided over the decided matters: therefore.

I respond: 1) According to interpreters, "presided" or "president" is not read in the Greek text, but "author of the

proceedings" is read. 2) Given that "presided" or "president" should be read, the Fathers spoke thus, not because Alexander presided before the legates of the most holy Pontiff, but because he was of greatest authority in the council, for a double reason: 1) because he was bishop of the second see; 2) because the state of the Alexandrian church was especially known to him, and the evils threatening it from the faction of Arius and the Arians who had burst forth from its bosom; and therefore he suggested and advised much for restoring peace to his church and extinguishing heresy. This the Nicene Fathers themselves indicate with these other words of the same letter: "Through much labor he undertook to bring the state of your church to tranquility."

§ II. Whether the word ὁμοούσιος, or consubstantial, was appropriately inserted into the Nicene Symbol?

I respond affirmatively.

Proof: This word signifies that the Son is not only similar to the Father, but is of the very same nature and essence, which is the Catholic faith, and therefore was supremely suitable for defeating the Arian heresy, which reduced the Son to the order of creatures: therefore it was appropriately added.

Confirmation: The Arians misused other words: for when the Nicene Fathers said the Son is from God, the Arians assented, but understood him to be from God as all other creatures are from God who made all things. When the Fathers said the Son is similar to the Father, the Arians also admitted this, understanding him to be similar to the Father as men who are said to be made in the image and likeness of

God. Likewise when the Fathers said the Son is in God, is unchangeable, is always, is true God, the Arians conceded that all these things could be said of the Son, because all these things are equally said of men in Holy Scripture; to be in God: "In him we live and move and have our being," Acts 17; to be unchangeable: "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ," Rom. 8; to be always: "For we who live are always," II Cor. 4; to be true God, because he was made true God in time by the principle of power: therefore "the bishops, says Athanasius in his letter on the decrees of the Nicene synod, considering their hypocrisy and cunning, were themselves also forced by necessity... to repeat in clearer words what they had said before and to write that the Son is consubstantial with the Father."

The Arians objected: 1) this word ὁμοούσιον is not found in Holy Scripture; 2) it is new in the Church; 3) it was once condemned in the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata; 4) it provides occasion for multiple error: for some through it understood one person; others a substance prior to the persons which would then be communicated to them; others a substance which would be divided into three portions, assigned to the three persons, as is gathered from Hilary in his book on Synods: therefore.

To the first, I respond: Granted, this word is not found in Holy Scripture as to sound, it is found at least as to sense, as St. Athanasius proves in his book on the decrees of the Nicene synod, from various places of Holy Scripture and especially from these: "I and the Father are one"; and: "The Father is in me, and I in the Father"; it is the same, says the holy Doctor, as if he said: "I am from the Father and indivisible from him."

To the second, I deny. For Theognostus and both Dionyses, the Roman and the Alexandrian, who wrote before the Council of Nicaea around the year 266, "said the Son was produced from the Father's substance and consubstantial with the Father," witness St. Athanasius in his book on the decrees of the Nicene synod. Moreover, Dionysius of Alexandria in his letter to Paul of Samosata testifies that also by the more ancient Fathers the Son was said to be consubstantial with the Father, "whom, he says, the holy Fathers called ὁμοούσιον with the Father."

To the third, I distinguish: the word ὁμοούσιον was condemned by the Council of Antioch in the sense of Paul of Samosata, granted; in the sense of the Council of Nicaea, I deny. Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch around the middle of the third century, according to St. Athanasius in his book on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia, understood this word after the manner of corporeal substances, which when they are said to be consubstantial, are understood to be of the same substance as to species only, not as to number or individual. "If Christ was not made God from man, he says in the cited St. Athanasius, therefore he is consubstantial with the Father, and it necessarily follows that there are three substances, one indeed which is prior as principle, the other two however arising from it." And note that Paul says these things not from his own opinion, since he himself wanted Christ to be a pure man, he could not say that he was consubstantial with the Father, but from the opinion of Catholics, arguing against them from the incongruous; for since Catholics said Christ was true God, not from man but begotten from God the Father, Paul inferred as a grave incongruity: therefore according to you he is consubstantial with the Father, and thus there are three

divine substances, understanding namely ὁμοούσιον or consubstantial corporally as was said, and in this sense the Synod of Antioch denied that the Son is consubstantial with the Father. According to St. Epiphanius, heresy 65, and some others, Paul understood the word ὁμοούσιον in a Sabellian sense, so that it would signify not only one nature in God, but also one person. Whatever the case, it is certain that the Council of Nicaea understood this word in neither sense, but in this sense that the Word was of the same and individual nature with the Father, yet a distinct person from the Father.

I have allowed as something doubtful that this word ὁμοούσιον was condemned by the Council of Antioch against Samosata because some recent writers not altogether improbably think it was not condemned: 1) because in more accurate editions of councils, such as Labbe's, no mention is made of this condemnation in the acts of either Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata; 2) because in the first Council of Antioch the letter of Dionysius of Alexandria against Paul of Samosata was accepted, in which it is expressly read concerning Christ: "Whom the holy Fathers called ὁμοούσιον with the Father," and in the margin it is noted: "Behold the word homoousios among the Fathers before the Council of Nicaea." Therefore this word was accepted by the council; if accepted, how condemned? Hence they suspect that the Arians either corrupted or forged the acts of some Synod of Antioch, and hence St. Athanasius, St. Hilary and others who wrote that this word was condemned by the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata were deceived.

To the fourth, I respond: This word did not provide occasion for error, except accidentally and to those who, not attending to the council's explanation, more stubbornly

adhered to their own sense: for the Nicene Fathers by their explanations had removed all ambiguity, as Eusebius of Caesarea himself admits in Theodoret book 1, chapter 12. And St. Athanasius testifies in his book on the decrees of the Nicene synod, and St. Hilary on Synods, so that it could not be twisted to a corrupt sense even by the Paulianists then still surviving.

You will object: The word ὁμοιούσιον, that is, of similar substance, sufficiently expressed the faith of the Church: therefore the word ὁμοούσιον was less appropriately used, which was also offensive to some Catholics. I prove the antecedent: SS. Athanasius and Hilary on Synods acknowledged as Catholics those who, rejecting ὁμοούσιον, admitted ὁμοιούσιον, such as were Meletius of Antioch, Basil of Ancyra, Eusebius of Samosata and some others. Therefore.

I respond 1st: Granted that through the word ὁμοιούσιον the faith of the Church is sufficiently expressed, nevertheless the Arians misused it, and therefore their subterfuges had to be met by another word, which would more clearly express the faith of the Church, such as is ὁμοούσιον.

I respond 2nd, I deny the antecedent: because what is similar to another in substance can be separated from it and distinguished numerically, as the Son from the Father; for they are similar in substance, but separate from each other, not one and the same numerically in substance, as the eternal Son is with the Father.

Of those however who, rejecting ὁμοούσιον, admitted ὁμοιούσιον and were called Semi-Arians, SS. Athanasius and Hilary held as Catholics only those who from vain fear rejected ὁμοούσιον as to the sound of the word only, but

admitted its sense with Catholics, such as were the three praised and some others; hence however they sometimes labored under suspicion of heresy; whence St. Hilary in his book on Synods addresses them thus: "You are not Arians: why by denying ὁμοούσιον are you considered Arians?" But other Semi-Arians who so fought for ὁμοιούσιον that they rejected ὁμοούσιον both as to word and as to sense, were always held as heretics.

Digression II. On the Fall of Liberius.

(From the preceding dissertation)

Note 1: Liberius succeeded Julius I in the year 352. Due to his defense of the Nicene faith and St. Athanasius, he was sent into exile by Constantius to Beroea in Thrace, according to Theodoret, book 2, chapter 16. In the year 357, while Constantius was celebrating a triumph, Roman matrons petitioned him for Liberius' return. The emperor consented on the condition that Liberius would govern the church together with Felix, who had been intruded into his see. The people objected, crying: "One God, one Christ, one Bishop," according to the same source, chapter 17.

However, Constantius did not grant Liberius permission to return to Rome until he subscribed to the condemnation of St. Athanasius and to a formula of faith presented to him by heterodox parties. Worn down by the tedium of exile, he complied with this: 1) at Beroea toward the end of the year 357; 2) at Sirmium. We now inquire to which formula he subscribed, and whether he became a heretic. For which purpose:

Note 2: Two councils were held in Sirmium (a city in Hungary, commonly called Sirmich) against Photinus, who was reviving the heresy of Paul of Samosata claiming that Christ did not exist before Mary: the first by Catholics in the year 349, the second by Semi-Arians in the year 354.

Note 3: Three Sirmian formulas of faith are circulated: The first, issued in Greek at the second Council of Sirmium in the year 351, states in its first anathema: "Those who say that the Son came from non-being, or from another subsistence and not from God, or that there was a time or age when He was not, the holy Catholic Church considers alien to itself." And in its final anathema: "If anyone denies that Christ is God, the Son of God before all ages, and served as the agent in the creation of all things, but says that only from the time He was born of Mary was He called Christ and Son, and received the beginning of His divinity then, let him be anathema." St. Hilary, in his book On Synods, explains this formula as Catholic, as it truly is when considered in itself, even though it was composed by Semi-Arians, and therefore St. Athanasius counts it among Arian formulas.

The second formula of faith was issued in Latin at Sirmium in the year 357, six years after the second council, in a convention of a few bishops, and is purely Arian. It reads: "Furthermore, because many are disturbed by the term called in Latin 'substantia,' and in Greek 'ousia,' that is, to be more precisely understood, by the term 'homoousios' or 'homoiousios,' we judge that no mention of these words should be made, nor should they be discussed in the Church, because nothing about them is written in the Sacred Scriptures and because they transcend human understanding and intellect.... No one should doubt that the Father is greater, nor that anyone would question that the

Father is greater in honor, dignity, deity, and by the very name of Father.... The Son is subject to the Father together with all things which the Father has subjected to Him."

The third formula of faith was also issued in Latin at Sirmium eight years after the second council, namely in 359. It states: "As for the term 'substance,' because it was too simply employed by the Fathers, is not understood by the people, and causes scandal since it is not contained in the Scriptures, it has been decided that it should be eliminated and no further mention made of God's substance, since the Sacred Scriptures nowhere mention the substance of the Father and the Son. But we declare the Son to be similar to the Father in all things, as the Sacred Scriptures say and teach." This was brought by Valens and Ursacius to the Council of Rimini, as St. Athanasius testifies in his book On Synods. It is certain that Liberius did not subscribe to this one, since it was prepared after his return to Rome; for he returned to Rome on the second of August, 358. The difficulty remains, therefore, concerning the first and second formulas: to which did Liberius subscribe?

I say: Liberius did not subscribe to the second Sirmian formula, but to the first, which had been issued against Photinus.

Proof 1: According to St. Hilary in his Fragments, the Sirmian formula to which Liberius subscribed at Beroea was written by Narcissus, Theodore, Basil, Eudoxius, Demophilus, Cecropius, Silvanus, Ursacius, Valens, and others whom the holy prelate lists as twenty-two in number. But those twenty-two prelates did not write the second Sirmian formula, but the first. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: 1) Basil of Ancyra was neither the author nor approver of this second formula, which he condemned in the

Ancyran synod as soon as it was published. 2) Theodore of Heraclea had died in the year 355, two years before the publication of this second formula. 3) According to Sozomen, book 4, chapter 12, this second formula had been issued by Westerners; therefore, Cecropius of Nicomedia, Eudoxius of Germanicia, and others who were Easterners did not contribute to its formulation. Finally, the name of Germinius, bishop of Sirmium, who collaborated with Ursacius and Valens in writing the second formula, does not appear among those 22 named by Hilary, nor do the names of Hosius and Potamius, who subscribed to the same second formula. Therefore, those twenty-two bishops whom St. Hilary lists did not write the second Sirmian formula but the first.

Proof 2: The exiled Liberius at Beroea subscribed to the formula offered to him by Demophilus, as Liberius himself testifies in writing to the Easterners. But this was not the second but the first Sirmian formula. For Demophilus was a Semi-Arian, and the Semi-Arians were so displeased with the second formula written by the pure Arians, Ursacius, Valens, and Germinius, that they obtained its suppression from Constantius. Therefore.

Proof 3: Liberius, summoned from Beroea to Sirmium by Constantius, subscribed to another formula presented to him by the same Constantius on the advice of Basil of Ancyra and other Semi-Arians. But this also was not the second Sirmian formula, which was purely Arian. Therefore. Proof of the minor premise: 1) When the Anomoeans or pure Arians spread the rumor that Liberius at Beroea, just like Hosius, had condemned the "homoiousion" (similar) and accepted the "anomoion" (dissimilar), which was the heretical doctrine expressed in the second formula, Liberius,

to counter this false rumor, added to the formula that was then presented to him and to which he subscribed, an anathema against those who denied that the Son was similar to the Father in substance, according to Sozomen, book 4, chapter 15. Therefore, neither at Beroea nor at Sirmium did Liberius subscribe to a formula that denied the Son to be similar to the Father in substance, such as the second Sirmian formula was. 2) The rumor spread by the Anomoeans that Liberius at Beroea had condemned the "homoousios" and accepted the "anomoios," Sozomen calls false. But it would not have been false if Liberius at Beroea had subscribed to the second formula, since it contained that very heretical doctrine. Therefore. 3) The formula to which Liberius subscribed at Sirmium was presented to him by Constantius on the advice of Basil of Ancyra and other Semi-Arians. But this most certainly was not the second Sirmian formula, for Constantius had by then suppressed it, and had expelled Eudoxius and other Anomoeans from Antioch, and Basil of Ancyra and other Semi-Arians were the most bitter enemies of this second formula. Therefore.

If you ask to which formula Liberius subscribed at Sirmium—not to the first, for according to us he had already subscribed to that at Beroea; not to the second, as we contend; not even to the third, because it had not yet been written—I respond that according to Sozomen cited above, he subscribed to a certain collection containing the first Sirmian formula against Photinus, the formula or acts of the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata, and the formula of another Council of Antioch celebrated at the Encaenia in the year 341.

If you press further: Why then did Constantius with the Semi-Arians demand a new subscription from Liberius, if

he admitted nothing more at Sirmium in favor of Arianism than he had already admitted at Beroea?

I respond that Constantius and the Semi-Arians demanded a new subscription from Liberius for two reasons: 1) To dispel the false rumor of the Anomoeans mentioned above, that Liberius professed with them the dissimilarity, and therefore Liberius at the end of his subscription added an anathema against this pure Arianism, as stated; 2) Since the Semi-Arians could not force Liberius to openly condemn with them the "homoousios," they acted deceitfully, and by presenting a collection containing, among other things, the acts of the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata, they at least obtained Liberius' subscription to this Antiochene council where "homoousios" had been condemned in Paul's sense, so that they could then spread the report that the most holy Pontiff had subscribed to the condemnation of "homoousios."

You may further object: 1) St. Hilary in his book of Fragments calls the Sirmian formula to which Liberius subscribed "Arian perfidy," and because of this subscription he repeatedly pronounces anathema on Liberius in the same work. But St. Hilary could not call the first formula Arian, which he recognized and expounded as Catholic. Therefore. 2) St. Jerome, both in his Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers, chapter 97, and in his Chronicle, testifies that Liberius subscribed to heresy, saying in his Chronicle: "Liberius, overcome by the tedium of exile and subscribing to heretical depravity, entered Rome as a victor." But the first Sirmian formula was not heretical, while the second was. Therefore. The same is read in the Roman Breviary on the feast of St. Eusebius, priest and confessor, on August 14, and in other authors.

3. St. Athanasius in his Letter to the Solitaries implies that Liberius by his subscription retracted his former hatred of heresy. Therefore, he subscribed to heresy.

To the first objection, I respond: 1) It seems to many that here, as in many other places, the book of Fragments by St. Hilary has been interpolated, and these words "this is Arian perfidy" and the subsequent anathemas have erroneously crept into it. For when St. Hilary wrote this book (he wrote it after the Council of Rimini), Liberius had repented and was strenuously defending the Nicene faith against the Council of Rimini, as Pope Damasus testifies in his letter to the bishops of Illyricum in Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History, book 2, chapter 29. Hence St. Hilary could not then justly pronounce anathema on him as an apostate and prevaricator.

I respond: 2) Granting these are St. Hilary's words, I deny the minor premise. For although the first formula, considered in itself and according to its terms, is Catholic, and St. Hilary acknowledged it as such when taken this way, he could nevertheless also call it "Arian perfidy" because it was composed by Arians with the purpose of abrogating the Council of Nicaea and the doctrine of consubstantiality by silently omitting the term "homoousios." That Liberius subscribed to this deceitful formula composed by heretics for the subversion of the faith, that he communicated with them, and that he condemned St. Athanasius, whose cause was joined with the cause of the faith—for these reasons St. Hilary pronounces anathema on him as an apostate and prevaricator.

To the second objection, I respond similarly that St. Jerome and others say that Liberius subscribed to heretical depravity, not because he subscribed to a formula which,

considered in itself, was heretical, but because he subscribed to a formula written by heretics with the intention of fostering heresy, because he communicated with heretics, and because he condemned St. Athanasius who was defending the cause of the faith.

To the third objection, similarly: Liberius retracted his former hatred of heresy, not by professing it, but by communicating with heretics and by subscribing to a formula contrived by heretics.

You ask what should be thought of Hosius, at one time the principal defender of the Nicene faith and St. Athanasius, distinguished by so many merits that he was everywhere proclaimed the Great Hosius.

I respond that he, a centenarian, exiled to Sirmium by order of Constantius, and there afflicted with injuries and beatings, finally consented to the Arian perfidy by subscribing to the second heretical Sirmian formula. This is established by St. Hilary in his book On Synods; St. Epiphanius, Heresy 73; Severus Sulpicius, book 2; and others. Nevertheless, St. Athanasius testifies in his Letter to the Solitaries that he did not die in heresy, where, speaking of him, he says: "On his deathbed, as if in his testament, he protested against their [i.e., the Arians'] violence, condemned the Arian heresy, and forbade anyone to approve or receive it." And there, as well as in his Apology for His Flight, he speaks most magnificently of Hosius who had already died. Likewise, St. Augustine in his book Against Parmenian, chapters 4, 5, and 8, supposes that Hosius died in communion with the Church. Hence the Luciferians schismatics, Faustinus and Marcellinus, asserting the contrary in their pamphlet offered to Emperor Theodosius, are no more to be heard here than when they vomit

disgusting calumnies against Saints Athanasius and Hilary in the same place. If you say that the same is read in St. Isidore of Seville's On Illustrious Men, I respond that this work is not by St. Isidore of Seville, since St. Ildephonsus, who lists all the works of St. Isidore in another book On Illustrious Men, does not mention it.

Digression III. On the Council of Rimini.

Whether the Fathers of Rimini Subscribed to the Arian Heresy?

(From the preceding dissertation)

Constantius, for the purpose of settling controversies of faith, proclaimed an ecumenical synod at Rimini in the year 359. But on the advice of the Arians, he divided it into two parts, assigning to the Westerners the city of Rimini (commonly called Rimini) in Italy, and to the Easterners Seleucia in Isauria.

About 400 bishops convened at Rimini; among the Catholics, Restitutus of Carthage, Phoebadius of Agen, and Servatius of Tongres were prominent. Among the Arians and Semi-Arians, who numbered about 80, were Ursacius, Valens, Auxentius, Demophilus, and Geminius. From Athanasius, book On Synods; Socrates, book 2, chapter 25.

At Seleucia, 160 bishops convened, namely 105 Semi-Arians, whose chief representatives were Basil of Ancyra, Sylvanus of Tarsus, George of Laodicea, Macedonius of Constantinople, Eustathius of Sebaste, etc.; 40 Arians, whose leader was Acacius of Caesarea; and about 15 Catholics, among whom, by divine Providence, was Hilary of Poitiers,

already in exile in Phrygia for four years. With the Semi-Arians vigorously defending the similarity of the Son in substance, and the Anomoeans or Arians fiercely attacking it, the council was dismissed without resolution by the prefect Leonas. From Hilary's book Against Constantius; Socrates, book 11, chapter 4; Severus Sulpicius, book 2.

At Rimini, Ursacius and Valens presented to the assembled Fathers the third Sirmian formula for the council's approval, which the orthodox Fathers rejected, adhering only to the Nicene formula. They also condemned Ursacius, Valens, Auxentius, Geminius, Caius, and Demophilus, sending a synodical letter through legates to inform Constantius of all these matters: in Athanasius, book On Synods.

However, Ursacius and Valens reached the emperor before the orthodox legates and exasperated his mind against the council and the orthodox with their disparaging remarks. Hence, through threats, entreaties, rejection, and procrastination, Constantius persuaded the orthodox legates to subscribe to a formula of faith fabricated by the Arians at Nice in Thrace and to communicate with the Arians, rescinding the sentence passed at Rimini against Ursacius, Valens, and others. Moreover, this formula agreed in all respects with the third Sirmian formula, except that in the Sirmian it stated: "The Son is similar to the Father in all things"; while in the Nicene: "The Son is similar to the Father who begot Him according to the Scriptures." Socrates, book 2, chapter 29; Sozomen, book 4, chapter 18.

Meanwhile, the emperor, in a letter, ordered the prefect Taurinus not to allow the council to be dismissed until all had subscribed to the same formula of faith; those

who resisted, if they were no more than fifteen, were to be punished with exile. Severus Sulpicius, book 2.

The orthodox Fathers immediately rejected their returning legates from communion, but at last, broken by the emperor's threats, the prefect's persuasions, the deceptions of Ursacius and Valens, and partly also by the tedium of a prolonged absence from their churches, they subscribed to the same formula and communicated with the Arians, except for twenty, the chief of whom were Phoebadius and Servatius. Taurinus more urgently pressed these; Valens undermined them with artifice and simulation, protesting that he was not an Arian, and in a public assembly with all the orthodox he cursed the blasphemies of Arius. "He offered to our side," says Sulpicius Severus, book 2, "that if anything seemed less fully expressed in the present faith, they should add what they thought should be added; and that he would consent to these additions." This favorable promise was received with the eager approval of all, and our side no longer dared to resist, desiring now to bring matters to an end in whatever way. Then professions composed by Phoebadius and Servatius began to be issued, in which Arius and all his perfidy were first condemned, and the Son of God was declared equal to the Father and without beginning, without time. Then Valens, as if helping our side, added a statement that contained deceit, that the Son of God is not a creature like other creatures; and the fraud of the profession deceived the hearers. For the orthodox, overcome by force, threats, and most urgent insistence, and weariness, not paying sufficient attention, believed and intended that these words signified nothing other than what they had in mind, namely, that the Son was not a creature, and that He excelled all creatures in dignity. But with this profession admitted

and the council dismissed, the Arians immediately sang triumph, and openly proclaimed that they had drawn all their adversaries in a plenary synod to profess by their own writings that the Son of God was within the order of creatures, more excellent than the others, but still of created excellence. See the cited Socrates and Sozomen, St. Athanasius' letter to the Africans, St. Hilary in Fragments, and St. Jerome against the Luciferians.

The question here is whether the Fathers of Rimini subscribed to heresy and were heretics.

I say: The Fathers of Rimini did not subscribe to the Arian heresy.

This is evident from what has been said and is more explicitly proven: if the Fathers of Rimini had subscribed to the Arian heresy and professed it, it would be either because of the Sirmian or Nicene formula, or because of the craftily inserted proposition by Valens, that the Son is not a creature like other creatures, to which they subscribed. But neither can be maintained; therefore. Proof of the minor premise: First, regarding the Sirmian or Nicene formula which stated that the Son is similar to the Father according to the Scriptures, it contained nothing contrary to the faith according to the obvious sense of the words, as Jerome explains in his Dialogue against the Luciferians: "The words sounded pious, and among such great honey of praise, no one thought that poison had been inserted." Indeed, the name of "Ousia" and "consubstantial" was passed over in silence, but Jerome says there: "A plausible reason was given, because, they said, it is not found in the Scriptures and scandalizes many simpler people by its novelty; it was decided to remove it. The bishops were not concerned about the vocabulary, since the meaning was secure."

As for the proposition craftily inserted by Valens, "That the Son is not a creature like other creatures," it does not absolutely signify that He is a creature, for of that which is not a creature it can truly be said that it is not a creature like other creatures, so that the sense is: He is not a created being like other beings that are truly created, just as it is truly said of a just man that he does not yield to his passions like other sinners, that is, like other men who are sinners. And although the word "other" seems to insinuate that He Himself is also a creature, and therefore the proposition is at least equivocal, nevertheless, because in the Sirmian or Nicene formula the heterodox expressly stated that they believed in the only-begotten Son of God who was born from God before all ages and before every beginning, and because Valens in a public assembly had anathematized Arius and those who denied that the Son was begotten from the Father before the ages, that He was similar to the Father, that He was eternal with the Father, the orthodox Fathers, not suspecting deceit on the lips of priests, did not at all think that by the aforementioned proposition it was signified that the Son was a creature, but on the contrary that He was not a creature and that He excelled all creatures in dignity. Hence Jerome in his Dialogue against the Luciferians writes thus: "Bishops were coming together who, ensnared by the devices of Rimini without awareness of heresy, were testifying by the body of the Lord and whatever is holy in the Church that they had suspected nothing evil in their faith. 'We thought,' they said, 'that the sense agreed with the words, and in the Church of God, where there is simplicity and pure confession, we did not fear that one thing might be closed in the heart and another uttered by the lips. A good opinion of bad men deceived us; we did not think that priests of Christ

would fight against Christ.'" And they asserted many other things which I omit for brevity's sake, weeping, ready to condemn both their former subscription and all the Arian blasphemies.

This is confirmed by the same St. Jerome, ibid. against the Luciferians, where, speaking of the Fathers of Rimini, he says: "After the return of the confessors, it was subsequently established in the Alexandrian Synod that, with the exception of the authors of heresy, whom error could not excuse, the penitent should be associated with the Church: not that those who had been heretics could be bishops, but that it was established that those who were received had not been heretics. The West assented to this judgment, and through such a necessary council, the world was snatched from Satan's jaws." Jerome was speaking from the actual acts of the council which he had seen, as he himself testifies there.

Athanasius concurs with this in his letter to Rufinian, where he says that both in the East and in the West it was conciliarly established to grant indulgence to the penitent Fathers of Rimini, especially, he says, because they had offered a defense not far from the faith; and what had been done seemed to have been done with a certain economy. For they had never gone over to impiety, but rather than let the fury of certain impious men destroy the churches, they said they preferred to follow force and bear this burden than to let the people perish. Here Severus Sulpicius, cited above, agrees.

From which I further infer that even if the propositions to which the Fathers of Rimini subscribed had been truly heretical, which we have proven false, they themselves would only have been materially heretics

because, as is clear from what has been said, they did not consider them contrary to the Nicene faith, which as soon as they noticed, they immediately retracted; and no one becomes a formal heretic unless willingly and obstinately.

Objection: St. Jerome in the cited Dialogue against the Luciferians speaks thus of the fall of the Fathers of Rimini: "Then the name of Ousia was abolished; then the condemnation of the Nicene faith was acclaimed. The whole world groaned and was amazed to find itself Arian." Therefore.

I respond: 1) By opposing Jerome to Jerome. 2) To each word: He says "the name of Ousia was abolished" because by omitting it in the new formula of faith, the Fathers of Rimini appeared to be betrayers of the Nicene faith. He says "the condemnation of the Nicene faith was acclaimed," not by the Catholic Fathers, but by the Arians who, as we have seen, with their usual insolence were everywhere proclaiming that the Catholic bishops had subscribed to their heresy. He says "the whole world groaned and was amazed to find itself Arian"; this, I say, he says hyperbolically, so that he means nothing else than that many bishops and laypeople inadvertently and unintentionally admitted a formula of faith which, although it sounded pious and seemed to have a Catholic sense given the circumstances, nevertheless secretly contained the Arian poison according to the intention of its authors; hence he says "amazed," because it happened inadvertently and unintentionally.

And indeed, how could the whole world have been Arian at that time, when according to the same Jerome cited, and St. Athanasius, not even the Fathers of Rimini themselves were Arians, and many at Seleucia resisted the

Arians, and it is evident that there were far more Catholics than Arians in the world? This is clear: 1) from the fact that the people of Alexandria, Constantinople, Antioch, Samosata, and Milan resisted Arian bishops; 2) from the innumerable crowds of monks, inhabitants of Egypt, whom St. Athanasius praises as defenders of the Nicene faith; 3) from the enumeration of provinces adhering to the Nicene faith, which Athanasius makes in his letter On Faith to the Emperor Jovinian in Theodoret, book 4, chapter 3, where he lists the churches of Spain, Britain, Gaul, Italy, Campania, Dalmatia, Dacia, Moesia, Macedonia, Achaea, Egypt, Libya, Pontus, Cappadocia, "Finally, all the churches throughout the East, except a few which follow Arius's opinion"; 4) finally, from the synodical letter of the Roman Council of 90 bishops, partly Italians, partly Gauls, under Pope Damasus, Liberius's successor, to the bishops of Illyricum, which Theodoret describes in book 2, chapter 29, where among other things he presents these observations worthy of note: "For no prejudice could be made by the number gathered at Rimini, when it is established that neither the Roman bishop, whose judgment should have been awaited before all others, nor Vincent, who had held the episcopate blamelessly for so many years, nor others gave their consent to such things. Especially since these very people, as we have said, who through fraud appeared to have wavered, have testified by better counsel that these things are displeasing to them. Therefore let your sincerity note that this faith alone, which was founded at Nicaea on apostolic authority, is to be retained with perpetual firmness, and with this both Easterners who recognize themselves as Catholic and Westerners glory..."

Further objection: St. Augustine, letter 50, says the Fathers of Rimini "perished by the Arian poison"; St. Ambrose, on Luke 6, calls them "authors of perfidious prevarication who, while courting favor with the powerful, subjected themselves to perpetual curse"; Facundus Hermianus, book 5, chapter 3, says they "were subdued into the Arian dogma."

I respond that by these terms—"Arian poison," "perfidious prevarication," "Arian dogma"—the Fathers mean either communion with Arians who feigned themselves Catholic, to which the bishops of Rimini imprudently adhered, or the crafty profession of faith secretly containing the Arian poison, to which they subscribed because it sounded pious and they did not consider it contrary to the Nicene faith. Although in these matters the Fathers of Rimini sinned through imprudence or sloth, and are therefore rebuked by the Fathers, it was never through the sin of heresy.

Digression IV. On the First Council of Constantinople, the Second Ecumenical Council, in the Case of Macedonius.

§ I. Whether and how the First Council of Constantinople is ecumenical? Including its convocation and presidency.

(To the preceding dissertation)

Note: This synod was celebrated on the Kalends of May in the year 381, during the 15th year of Pope Damasus, under the emperors Theodosius the Elder, Gratian, and

Valentinian, during the consulship of Eucherius and Evagrius. It consisted of 150 bishops from the Eastern Empire only, with whom at the beginning were 30 bishops from the Macedonian faction, but they soon departed.

There were two principal reasons for convoking this council: first, to reaffirm the Nicene faith, which had been undermined by so many pseudo-synods and Arian formulas, and to condemn the heresies of Macedonius and Apollinaris. The second reason was to provide a legitimate bishop for the Church of Constantinople against Maximus the Cynic, who had been illegitimately ordained by Egyptian bishops. (Socrates, book 5, chapter 8; Sozomen, book 7, chapter 7).

We have spoken about the heresy of Macedonius above. Concerning the heresy of Apollinaris regarding the Incarnation, we will discuss in the treatise on the Incarnation how he maintained that the Word took the place of Christ's mind, and that his body was brought down from heaven. He also erred concerning the Trinity by distinguishing degrees within it, calling the Father greatest, the Son greater, and the Holy Spirit great. He also held the error of the Millenarians.

Our Natalis Alexander distinguishes three councils of Constantinople within a two-year period. The first at the beginning of the same year 381, in which St. Gregory Nazianzen was ordained Bishop of the Church of Constantinople by Meletius the Great along with other bishops. The second, the ecumenical one, which began on the Kalends of May of the same year. The third, which was celebrated in the following year 382, from which a synodical letter was sent to Damasus and the Roman Council with three delegates. However, the existence of the first council as distinct from the second is not certain, since Gregory could

have been ordained bishop at the beginning of the ecumenical council, and nothing to the contrary can be proved from the documents cited by the aforementioned author.

The difficulty, and it is a very serious one, is whether and how this Council of Constantinople is ecumenical.

Three obstacles seem to stand in the way: first, that it was assembled only from Orientals, as is clear from Theodoret, book 5, chapter 7, where he says: "Theodosius ordered only the bishops of his empire to come to Constantinople"; and Theodosius ruled only the East. This is agreed upon by all authors. Nor does it matter that Acolius of Thessalonica was from the Western patriarchate: one person from the West is not sufficient for a council to be called general.

Second, that it was not convoked by the authority, or at least with the consent, of Pope Damasus, which has never been properly done or permitted, as stated in the Council of Chalcedon, act 1, and as we proved regarding the Council of Nicaea. This seems to be confirmed by Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret as cited, and from the synodical letter of the same council to Theodosius, in which the synod is said to have been convoked by Theodosius, and no mention of Damasus is made in any ancient ecclesiastical documents.

Third, that the most holy Pope, St. Damasus, did not preside over this council, either personally or through legates, as this cannot be established from any ancient document. Some sources report that Timothy of Alexandria presided, others Meletius, others Gregory Nazianzen, others Cyril of Jerusalem, still others Nectarius; none mention Damasus or his legates.

To resolve this difficulty, some say that Damasus called a general council in Rome and also summoned the Orientals to it by letters sent to Theodosius. Theodosius, in turn, summoned the Eastern bishops to Constantinople without stating the reason until they arrived in Constantinople, where he revealed to them the Pope's intention. When the Eastern bishops received this, they appointed three delegates from their assembly, namely Eusebius, Cyriacus, and Priscianus, to go to Rome, and sent a synodical letter to Damasus and the council assembled there, excusing themselves from going to Rome: 1) because their churches, recently renewed, would be deprived of their pastors for too long; 2) because they had brought only the consent of the absent bishops for a council to be celebrated in Constantinople, and there was not enough time to prepare for a longer journey and to notify other bishops in the various provinces. Damasus accepted this excuse and agreed that they should hold a synod in Constantinople at the same time as he was holding a council of Westerners in Rome, having first sent a profession of faith against all the heresies then spreading to Paulinus, which the Orientals assembled in Constantinople were to subscribe to, which they did, afterward requesting from Damasus confirmation of their definitions.

This sequence of events is deduced: 1) from the aforementioned synodical letter of the Council of Constantinople held in the following year 382, in which the synodical Fathers address Damasus and other Westerners assembled in Rome as follows: "To the honorable and venerable lords, brothers and fellow ministers Damasus,

Ambrose, Britto, Valerian, Acolius, Basil, and the rest of the bishops assembled in great Rome, the Holy Synod of orthodox bishops gathered in the great city of Constantinople sends greetings in the Lord... Now since you, to show your fraternal charity toward us, have called us as your own members to a council assembled in Rome by the will and command of God, through the letters of the most God-loving emperor..." 2) "Indeed, we all desire, if possible, to leave our churches together and serve your desire, or rather the more necessary business of the Church... However, since in this way the recently renewed churches would be left bare, and since many are completely unable to do this—for we came to Constantinople by the mandate of the letters sent last year by Your Reverence after the Council of Aquileia to the most God-loving Emperor Theodosius, prepared only for the journey as far as Constantinople, and bringing with us the consent of the bishops who remained in the provinces only for this one council to be celebrated; and not expecting a longer journey, nor receiving any notice of it at all before we assembled in Constantinople. Moreover, the shortness of the appointed time does not allow sufficient opportunity either to prepare for a longer journey, or to notify the bishops in the various provinces who are in communion with us about this matter, or to obtain their consent. Therefore, since these and many other things prevent most of the bishops from coming to you, we have certainly done what was to be done in the second place, both for the proper ordering of ecclesiastical affairs and to show how much we value your charity toward us, for we have asked our most reverend fathers and colleagues Cyriacus, Eusebius, and Priscianus not to refuse to undertake the labor of coming to you." Later, after recounting what they had

defined concerning the faith against heresies, they continue: "Therefore, these are the things that are openly proclaimed by us as a summary concerning the faith, about which you may be more fully instructed if you deign to read both the tome produced in Antioch by the synod constituted there, and what was issued last year by the universal synod in Constantinople." Then, after recounting what they had decreed concerning the ordinations of certain bishops, they request confirmation of all these things with these words: "We therefore ask that your reverence also rejoice with us in these things that have been done so lawfully and canonically among us..."

From all this, therefore, it can be concluded that the Orientals had been called by Damasus the previous year to a general council to be celebrated in Rome, but upon receiving their excuses, Damasus consented that they should celebrate a synod in Constantinople, and sent them a profession of faith to subscribe to. The same is inferred both from Rufinus, epistle 2 to Macarius, who says: "Bishop Damasus, when deliberation was being held concerning the reception of the Apollinarists (namely in Rome), ordered the drafting of an ecclesiastical profession of faith to which they should subscribe (namely the Orientals), to which they most willingly subscribed." Also from an unknown author cited by Christopher Justellus, chapter 76, who says: "The most holy Damasus, having gathered a synod in Rome, issued a divine decree and sent it to the synod that was being assembled in Constantinople." And finally from a very ancient Vatican codex and another from St. Mary Major reported by Baronius, in which it is stated: "Damasus ordered that the sentence of condemnation against Macedonius and Eunomius be confirmed also in the second synod which was

celebrated in Constantinople by his command and authority."

1. The council is said to be gathered from East and West because, due to the agreement of minds between the two councils, Roman and Constantinopolitan, in proscribing errors, one seemed to coalesce from both, which can rightly be called Romano-Constantinopolitan.

2. It can truly be said to have been convoked by the authority of Damasus, who had called the Orientals to Rome by letters sent to Theodosius; and having accepted their excuse, had consented to their assembly in Constantinople.

3. He presided over it because he was personally present at the Roman council and had sent to Constantinople a profession of faith to be subscribed to by the Orientals; and he confirmed the definitions of faith sanctioned there at the request of the Fathers of Constantinople.

However, this opinion and explanation, although held by many and probable, does not completely satisfy: for it should be established that the Orientals gathered by Theodosius in Constantinople in the year 381 were informed of Damasus's mandate to celebrate a general synod in Rome, and that they then presented their excuses to him, so that, having accepted these excuses, they could hold this council of the year 381 in Constantinople with his assent and authority. This certainly is not proven from their synodical letter just cited, which was certainly written not in the year 381 at the general synod, but in the following year at another particular council, as is clear from these words: "If... you deign to read what was issued last year in Constantinople by the universal synod."

It is true that the Orientals also say in the same place that they came to Constantinople by mandate of Damasus's

letters sent the previous year after the Council of Aquileia to the emperor. But: 1) these words "previous year" are not read either in Nicephorus, book 12, chapter 15, or in Sixtus V's edition by Nicolinus, or in Dom. Bail's edition; but even if they were read, it is not thereby proven that they came to Constantinople in the year 381 by virtue of those letters sent the previous year. Indeed, the contrary is proved, since these letters are said to have been sent after the Council of Aquileia, which was also celebrated in the same year 381 on the Nones of September, according to Baronius for the year 381. And since the general Council of Constantinople was concluded at the end of July of the same year, according to the same author, it is clearly evident that the Orientals did not come to Constantinople for the general council of the year 381 by mandate of these letters.

This is also clearly established from Nicephorus, book 12. After having narrated in chapters 10, 12, and 13 the acts concerning faith and the institution of Nectarius in the general Council of Constantinople, in chapter 14 he says: "With these things thus accomplished, the synod also had its end, and the remaining bishops returned to their sees." And after saying in chapter 15 that Theodosius, on the advice of Nectarius, had convoked yet another synod a short time after the first synod because of disturbances stirred up by the expelled Arians, he goes on to say in the same chapter: "When the synod was held again in Constantinople, as has been said, under Emperor Theodosius, letters came from the West that they too should come to Rome to a great council established there, in which matters concerning Antioch between Paulinus and Flavian would also be decided. However, the bishops assembled in Constantinople declined the Roman journey as inconvenient; but they wrote a letter...

To the Most Reverend Lords, etc." Therefore, according to Nicephorus, the general Council of Constantinople of the year 381 was already concluded when the Apostolic letters arrived there by which the Orientals were called to the Roman council, and thus they did not celebrate the general council in Constantinople in the year 381 by mandate of these letters, nor with the assent of Damasus accepting their excuses.

This is also clearly stated by Theodoret in book 3 of his History, chapter 6, where, speaking of the first ecumenical Council of Constantinople, he says: "Moreover, after they had written canons for the right administration of the Church and had decreed that the formula of faith put forth in the Council of Nicaea should remain firm and stable, they each returned home. The following summer, very many of them returned again to the same city (for necessary Church business recalled them there) and received a letter from the council of bishops convened in the West, which exhorted them to come to Rome, where a gathering of bishops was already assembled. But they absolutely refused to undertake such a long journey, yet they wrote a letter in which they informed them of the tempest stirred up against the churches, etc." Therefore, the same as before.

Other testimonies adduced in favor of this opinion do not seem to be of sufficient weight to invalidate what we have deduced from the aforementioned synodical letter and from Theodoret and Nicephorus. Or it must be said that they confuse the last particular synod of the year 382 with the preceding general one of the year 381. Moreover, granted that Damasus convoked this council and sent to it a profession of faith to be subscribed to, as the aforementioned testimonies say, it does not follow from this that he presided

over it personally or through legates, nor that Westerners came to it, both of which are necessarily required for it to be considered general and ecumenical. As for what some say, that Acolius of Thessalonica, Damasus's vicar for Illyricum, presided over this council in his name, this is based on slight evidence contrary to ancient documents, in which there is complete silence regarding the presidency of Acolius; indeed, his name is not even read among those who subscribed to the council.

A more probable opinion is proposed.

More easily and plainly, as it seems to us, the difficulty is resolved by saying with many that this council, considered in itself and in view of its convocation and presidency, is not ecumenical, but only a national council of the East. However, it became ecumenical ex post facto, inasmuch as Damasus and the Western Church, then assembled in Rome and conciliarly agreeing in the same faith, confirmed it as regards the dogmas of faith, and thus conferred upon it the authority and dignity of a general and ecumenical council, so that from both assemblies agreeing in the same opinion, one ecumenical synod resulted, which, according to this view, can also be called Romano-Constantinopolitan.

For although it is not recorded in the acts of the Roman synod that Damasus, upon receiving the letters of the Orientals, confirmed their previous synod (because these acts have perished), Photius nevertheless reports in his book On the Seven Synods to Emperor Michael that, after listing the more illustrious bishops of the Constantinopolitan synod, he adds: "Not long after, Damasus, bishop of Rome,

joined them, confirming the same things and holding the same opinions." It is also evident from the constant usage and tradition of all the Fathers and churches who from then until now have regarded this council as ecumenical, which would certainly not be the case unless it had been strengthened by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

Nor is it an obstacle if you say that other provincial councils approved by the most holy Pontiff could likewise, at his discretion, be given the title of universal council. For it is unique to this present council of which we are speaking that the votes of all, both Orientals and Occidentals, conciliarly agreed in the same faith either by voice or in writing, and three delegates from the Oriental Church were present at the Occidental council, which does not occur in other provincial councils.

As for the fact that the Orientals, in the synod of the year 382, call the previous synod of the year 381 a universal or general council, this should be understood as a universal council of the East, not of the whole Church. Once this opinion is established, there is no need to trouble ourselves inquiring whether Damasus convoked this council and presided over it.

Besides the first canon condemning heretics, the council also issued other canons concerning discipline, about the number of which authors dispute—seven according to Christian Lupus, others counting only three with Dionysius Exiguus. The latter opinion is favored by the synod itself in its letter to Damasus, which mentions only three. As for the arguments proving there were more, it can be answered that they were issued after the council, not in it nor by it.

Regarding the authority of these canons, it is certain from the Council of Chalcedon, act 16, and from St. Leo,

epistle 53 to Anatolius, that they, or at least the second or third by which the primacy of honor after the Roman is granted to the bishop of Constantinople, were not immediately received by the Roman Church, but only in the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III. Hence St. Gregory, in book 6, epistle 125 to Eulogius, speaking of this synod, says: "In this synod, however, the Roman Church accepted what was defined by it against Macedonius."

This synod also issued a creed which we sing in the Church, or rather it augmented the Nicene Creed with some additions against newly arisen heresies. It is of the following tenor:

The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed

We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, *maker of heaven and earth*, of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, born of the Father *before all ages*. God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, homoousios with the Father, that is, of the same substance as the Father, by whom all things were made. Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate *by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary*, and was made man. *He was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried*. The third day he rose again from the dead, according to the Scriptures. He ascended into heaven and *sits at the right hand of the Father*. He will come again *with glory* to judge the living and the dead, *and his kingdom will have no end*. We believe in the Holy Spirit, *the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, and with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, who spoke through the*

Prophets. And in one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church. We confess one Baptism for the forgiveness of sins. We expect the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen.

All that is read in italic type was added to the Nicene Creed by the Council of Constantinople, both for the sake of greater explanation and against newly arisen heresies, as we have already said.

§ II. Whether the First Council of Constantinople Was Always Received in the Church?

We have already stated that it was always received; the question here concerns the definition or symbol of faith which it issued, regarding which:

I say that the First Council of Constantinople, with respect to its definition or symbol of faith, was always received in the Church.

This is proven, firstly, from the Council of Chalcedon, celebrated seventy years after the Council of Constantinople, where in Act 4, the letter of St. Leo is received because it agrees with the definition of the 318 Fathers of Nicaea and the 150 Fathers of Constantinople. And in Act 5, the definition of faith to be formulated is entrusted to the vicars of the Apostolic See and to Anatolius, Archbishop of Constantinople, in which those things established by the 318 Fathers at Nicaea and by the 150 at the First Council of Constantinople are received.

This is proven, secondly, from St. Gregory the Great, whose celebrated words are: "I venerate the first four councils as the four Gospels." Among these, the second place is occupied by Constantinople. Similarly, the Fifth

Ecumenical Synod: "I accept the four holy synods and what has been defined by them concerning one and the same faith."

This is proven, thirdly, from the most holy Pontiff Gelasius and the Roman synod, where, among the authentic writings which the Church receives after Sacred Scripture, it lists the holy Council of Constantinople, convened through Theodosius the Elder Augustus, in which the heretic Macedonius received his due condemnation.

You may object, firstly, that the decree of the Council of Sardica, which St. Athanasius praises in his epistle to the Antiochians, forbids adding anything to the Nicene Creed or formulating another; secondly, that the Egyptian bishops at the Council of Chalcedon refused to accept the additions made to the Nicene Creed by the Council of Constantinople, as is evident from Act 1; thirdly, that the author of the Pontifical Book writes of Pope Hilary that he confirmed three synods—Nicaea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon—with no mention made of Constantinople. Therefore...

I respond to the first objection that the Council of Sardica prohibited adding anything to the Nicene Creed or formulating a new one in the sense that the Arians did, who daily formulated new creeds, and deleted and altered the divinely inspired words of the Nicene Creed consecrated by the reverence of the whole world. It did not, however, prohibit the same creed, retaining all its articles and words, from being expounded with greater explanation against emerging heresies and augmented. Or more briefly, it prohibited adding to the Nicene Creed anything contrary to it, I concede; anything explanatory of it, I deny.

To the second objection, I respond that these outcries of the Egyptians were disregarded by the Council of

Chalcedon, as is evident from the first proof and from the response which the synodal Fathers gave to those thus protesting, namely this: "Eutyches said this." Nor is it surprising that the bishops of Egypt adhered only to the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus, for they stood on the side of Eutyches and Dioscorus, as is evident from their letter to Leo Augustus. Eutyches, moreover, in his profession of faith, admitted only the Synod of Nicaea and that of Ephesus, condemning by his silence the Council of Constantinople, because this, more than the others, explained more explicitly the mystery of the Incarnation.

To the third objection, I respond that not only Hilary, but also certain other Pontiffs and many theologians do not make mention of the Council of Constantinople, not because they do not accept it, but because they conflate it with Nicaea regarding the definition of faith and consider the symbol of both as one and the same; because Constantinople is nothing but an explanation of Nicaea. Thus Mark of Ephesus at the Council of Florence, session 5, says: "This," that is, the Constantinopolitan Symbol, "was seen to be included potentially in that one" (the Nicene), "so that both are considered as one." And below: "It is indeed evident from many very strong arguments that those two earlier symbols were accepted as one by all general councils." Hence the Master of the Sentences, book 1, distinction 14; Alexander of Hales, part 3, question 69, member 5, and certain others call the symbol that is sung in the Church the Nicene, although it is certainly the Constantinopolitan.

Concerning the addition of the word "*Filioque*," I will speak below.

DISSERTATION TWO
ON THE PROCESSIONS OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (ST. TH. Q. 27)

Since the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, as is evident from what was said in the preceding dissertation, consists in three Persons of the same and individual divine nature, and since the Persons are constituted by relations, and relations are founded in processions, therefore we shall speak with the author: 1° of processions; 2° of relations; 3° of Persons.

Article I. Whether there are Processions in the Divine?

Procession as such is nothing other than the origin of one from another: hence procession in the divine is the origin of one person from another, or from two.

Different people have understood procession in the divine in different ways. (1) Some according to the way an effect proceeds from a cause, and thus Arius understood it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as his first creature, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both; and according to this, neither

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[1] Here q. 27. a. 1. corp.

the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be true God. Others have understood this procession according to the way a cause is said to proceed into an effect insofar as it either moves it or impresses its likeness upon it; and thus Sabellius understood it, saying that God the Father himself is called Son insofar as he assumed flesh from the Virgin, and the same one is called Holy Spirit insofar as he sanctifies rational creatures and moves them to life: and according to this, there is only one person in God. We have refuted both of these heresies in the preceding dissertation.

But if anyone should carefully consider, both understood procession according to what is something external: ([2]) hence neither placed procession in God himself. But since every procession is according to some action, just as according to action which tends toward external matter there is some procession ad extra, so according to action which remains in the agent itself, a certain procession ad intra is considered: and it is asked here whether this is given in God.

I say: There are processions ad intra in God ([3]).

1. From Sacred Scripture. John 8, Christ himself speaking of himself says: "I proceeded from God"; Ecclesiasticus 24: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High"; John 5, concerning the Holy Spirit: "But when the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father." It is further proved by all those places of Sacred Scripture and testimonies of the Fathers by which we proved the divinity of

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[2] Here q. 27. a. 1. corp.

[3] Ibid

the Son and Holy Spirit, which they do not have communicated to themselves except by way of procession.

Proof 2° from the symbols of faith. In the Nicene-Constantinopolitan [Creed] concerning the Son it is held: "Born of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God": and concerning the Holy Spirit: "Who proceeds from the Father." In the Symbol which is called of St. Athanasius: "The Son is from the Father alone, not made nor created, but begotten: the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

Proof 3° by theological reasoning: (4) It is of faith that there are given in God several persons really distinct in the same numerical nature: therefore there are processions in God. Proof of the consequence: If there were no processions in God, there would be no relative opposition of origin; when relative opposition of origin ceases, several persons could not be distinguished except by diversity of nature: therefore. Concerning this reasoning [we will speak] again below when [treating] of the procession of the Holy Spirit against the Scotists.

With this faith of the Church supposed, certain fitting reasons are proposed. The first is sought from divine fecundity. For this, since it is the highest perfection, does not seem to be denied to God: hence Isaiah 66: "Shall I who make others to give birth not give birth myself, says the Lord; if I who give generation to others, shall I be sterile?" This fittingness is urged by St. Athanasius, oration 2, against the Arians; St. Cyril, book 5 of the Thesaurus, and others.

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4 Below q. 33. a. 4. ad 4

The other is from the author. (5) Whoever understands, from this very fact that he understands, there proceeds something within himself, which is the conception of the thing understood proceeding from the intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge; which conception indeed the voice signifies, and is called the word of the heart signified by the vocal word. But God is the most perfect intelligence: therefore.

But this reasoning of St. Thomas, which many attack, should not be understood as if in every act of understanding a word is produced. For the Son and Holy Spirit also understand and yet do not produce a word. Likewise the blessed according to us know God without a word; but in three other senses this principle of St. Thomas can be verified. 1° That in every connatural intellection of a proper object a word is produced. The Son indeed in the divine understands by connatural intellection and yet does not produce a word, because of one intellection there is one word when it is adequate; but the intellection by which the Son understands is the very same intellection by which the Father understands, and the Son himself, as infinite, is the adequate word of this intellection which therefore it entirely exhausts, so that no other word remains to be produced. 2° That whoever understands from this very fact that he understands, that is, from this very fact that he is of intellectual nature, in some of his intellection produces a word. 3° According to John of St. Thomas, the sense is that any understanding being who produces a word, produces it from the fact that he understands, so that the reason why a word is produced, when it is produced, is the power or

5 Here a. 1. corp.

reason of understanding, because to speak to oneself interiorly, to manifest, to express a concept, which is to produce a word, comes from the power and perfection of understanding. In whatever sense it is understood, St. Thomas's fittingness stands in this: that to produce a word is proper to intelligent nature, and is in itself a perfection which can be purified from the imperfections by which it is corrupted in creatures: therefore it is fitting to ascribe it to God, the supremely intelligent. If you say that in creatures a word is produced from need, namely so that what is intelligible in first act might become understood in second act, but God is understood in second act, and therefore we said in the preceding Treatise that the blessed do not produce a word in the beatific vision; I respond: the word in creatures has two functions: the first which is assigned in the argument; the second to manifest to the intelligence and speak the thing understood, which pertains to the perfection of the intellect, and in this way the Word proceeds in God, not from need, but from fecundity, or as St. Augustine says, from intelligence. What is added about the blessed—we denied that a word is produced in the beatific vision not only for this reason; but also because an infinite object cannot be quidditatively known through a word or created species.

Objections Are Resolved

Obj. 1°: Every procession involves imperfection: therefore. Proof of antecedent: 1° that which proceeds is diverse from that from which it proceeds; 2° it depends on that since it cannot exist without it; 3° it is posterior to it; 4° it is of passive and needy nature since it receives from it: therefore.

Resp. I distinguish the antecedent: every procession in created things involves imperfection, granted; in divine things, denied. For the nature of divine and created things is quite different; they are infinitely distant, hence when divine things are treated, the mind must be raised and abstracted from all created things. And so:

To the first I distinguish (6): that which proceeds by procession ad extra is diverse from that from which it proceeds, granted; that which proceeds by procession ad intra, I subdivide: in created things, granted; in divine things, I subdivide again: it is diverse as to person, granted; as to nature, denied; because what proceeds ad intra by an intelligible process, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds; for it is manifest that the more something is understood, the more the word or intellectual conception is intimate and more one; for the intellect according to this, that it actually understands, according to this becomes more one with the thing understood. Hence since divine understanding is of infinite perfection, it is necessary that the divine Word be perfectly one with that from which it proceeds without any diversity in nature. And although the reasoning is not the same concerning the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the will by way of love and impulse, by this very fact that he proceeds as something immanent to God, he is the same in nature, because everything that is in God, is God.

If you say that from this response of St. Thomas it follows that the Word does not proceed even as a distinct person, I respond by distinguishing: it does not proceed as a distinct person by virtue of procession as intelligible,

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6 Here a. 1. corp.

granted; by virtue of procession as real, denied. Since therefore the process as intelligible is assimilative, it requires numerical unity with the object; hence if it is the most perfect intellect, it requires the most perfect unity which is in substance. From this, however, the diversity of persons is not destroyed, which is only relative and from procession insofar as it is real, because process as real requires really distinct extremes, at least as to mode of being. Hence from procession itself under diverse consideration arises both the consubstantiality of the Word and the distinction of persons.

To the second, I deny that what proceeds in divine things depends on the producer either as to nature or as to person. Not as to nature, because it is numerically the same in the proceeding and producing. Nor as to person, because what proceeds does not proceed from another as from a cause, but as from a principle, nor from free will, but from necessity of nature on account of its infinite perfection, by which it happens that the Father understanding cannot not produce the Word, and the Father and Son loving themselves cannot not produce the Holy Spirit. To the proof, I deny the consequence; because something else is required for dependence than that one cannot exist without another: for the Father cannot exist without the Son any more than the Son without the Father, and yet the Father is not said to depend on the Son. Likewise omnipotence cannot exist without the possibility of creatures, and yet does not depend on them.

To the third, certain theologians admit no priority or posteriority in divine things, but only order of procession: others admit priority not indeed of causality or duration (for the three Persons exist simultaneously from eternity), but priority of origin only, which does not import imperfection.

To the fourth, I deny the antecedent. For the proceeding Persons in divine things never lacked or could lack that which they have: but what never lacked or could lack that which it has, is not considered of passive and needy nature.

Obj. 2: Any Person in God is God: but it is repugnant to God to be or proceed from another: therefore. Proof of minor: God is being from himself: but to being from itself it is repugnant to be from another: therefore.

Resp. I deny the minor. To the proof, I distinguish the major: God is being from himself by reason of nature, granted; by reason of person, I subdivide: he is being from himself by aseity excluding all causality and dependence on another, granted; by aseity excluding a principle of origin, denied.

You add: But according to the doctrine handed down, God is and proceeds from another by reason of nature: therefore. Proof of the addition: the nature of the Son, for example, is communicated to him by the Father: therefore he is and proceeds from the Father.

Resp. I deny the addition. To the proof, I deny the consequence. For although nature is said to be communicated to the Son by the Father, it cannot however be said to be and proceed from him, because it is numerically one in the Father and Son, which neither generates nor is generated; but procession requires distinction between what proceeds and what produces.

You say: Any Person is being from himself by aseity excluding a principle of origin: therefore. Proof of antecedent: any Person is first principle: therefore.

Resp. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: any Person is first principle ad

extra or with respect to creatures, granted; ad intra, denied: for thus the Father alone is unbegotten and unproduced.

Obj. 3: This is the difference between immanent and transient action, that the latter has a produced term, not the former, as philosophy teaches: but in divine things there is only immanent action ad intra: therefore.

Resp. I deny the major. For the difference between each action is not precisely that transient action has a term and immanent action does not have one, but that transient action necessarily has a term, and such as an end for the sake of which the action is done: but immanent action, although it does not necessarily have a term, can nevertheless have one, and such that it is not its end for the sake of which, but on the contrary which exists for the sake of the action; and so it is in divine things: for intellection is not for the sake of the word, but rather the word for the sake of intellection, so that in it as understood the object might be contemplated.

You ask why, since the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, procession is adapted to the emanation of the Holy Spirit rather than to the Son?

Resp. This is because of the poverty of words. (7) For since we cannot name God except from creatures, and there is found in creatures something subsistent proceeding by way of nature, which we say is generated: hence the procession of the Son, which is by way of nature, is called generation. But because in creatures we see nothing subsistent proceeding by way of love, it happens that the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is through love, has remained without a name and is called by the common name

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7 Here a. 4. ad 3. and in 1. d. 13. a. 3.

of procession; it could however be named spiration, because it is the procession of the Spirit.

Article II. What is the Principle by Which the Divine Processions are Proximate?

I suppose 1st, that the principle which [produces] the divine processions is the person of the Father and the Son: of the Father with respect to the Son, of the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit; because what proceeds really must be really distinguished from the producer, for nothing produces itself, and there is no real distinction in the divine except between the persons. I suppose 2nd, that the principle by which [the processions occur], at least remotely and primordially, is the divine nature: because it is that in which the begotten is assimilated to and agrees with the begetter; understand, however, of the nature as modified by relations, as I will now say concerning the proximate principle by which. In this double supposition theologians agree, but they differ in assigning the proximate principle by which the nature produces the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Durand taught that it is the divine nature itself, not as understanding or willing, but also as pre-understood by the intellect and will; so that, having prescinded by mind from intellect and will, the Son and the Holy Spirit would nonetheless be considered to proceed. Some have said that relations alone are the immediate principle by which of the divine processions; and this opinion is attributed to St. Bonaventure and others. Other theologians commonly assign intellect and will as the proximate principle of the divine processions; but because intellect and will are common to the three Persons, a reason must be assigned why the

intellect in the Father generates and not in the Son, why the will in the Father and Son spirates and not in the Holy Spirit: hence they say that the intellect in the Father generates because it is modified by the relation of paternity, not in the Son; the will in the Father and Son spirates because it is modified by the relation of active spiration, not in the Holy Spirit. What, however, are these productive acts of intellect and will, which are called notional, I will say in the following article.

I say: The proximate and immediate principle by which of the divine processions is not the divine nature pre-understood by intellect and will, but are the intellect itself and the will itself, not precisely according to themselves, but modified by the relations of paternity and active spiration ([8]), so that the proximate principle by which of the divine processions not only imports something absolute, namely intellect and will, but also relations, not however as co-principles, but only as conditions and modes ([9]).

I prove the first and second part, 1st from the Lateran Council under Innocent III defining against Abbot Joachim thus: "And that thing (namely the divine nature) is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates, and the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds."

2nd According to Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, the Son is the Word, and the Holy Spirit is love and dilection: but the word is immediately from the intellect and love from the will: therefore.

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[8] Here throughout q. 27. q. 10. On Power a. 4. c. 9. c. 11. and in 1 Sent. d. 7. and 13

[9] Here q. 41. a. 5. and q. 1. On Power a. 2. ad 5.

3rd The essence does not operate immediately through itself, but through its faculties which are in God the intellect and will: therefore.

4th The Father begets the Son, spirates with the Son the Holy Spirit through immanent vital acts: but in God there are no other immanent vital acts than those of intellect and will: therefore.

5th And especially: According to Durand's opinion the principal heads of the mystery of the most holy Trinity cannot be explained which are conveniently explained according to our opinion: therefore. I prove the antecedent. If the divine nature as pre-understood by intellect and will is the immediate principle by which the Son and Holy Spirit proceed, a reason cannot be assigned 1st why the Son is called the Word and the Holy Spirit Love; 2nd why the procession of the Word is generation and not the procession of the Holy Spirit; 3rd why the procession of the Son precedes the procession of the Holy Spirit; 4th why the Son proceeds from one person only and the Spirit from two; 5th why the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and not the Son from the Holy Spirit; 6th why there are only two processions and not more, for which inconveniences, this opinion of Durand is noted with censure by some. But all these things in our opinion are conveniently explained. 1st The Son is called the Word and the Holy Spirit Love, because the Son proceeds through the intellect and the Holy Spirit through the will. 2nd The procession of the Son is generation and not the procession of the Holy Spirit; because the Son proceeds through the intellect which is assimilative, and the Holy Spirit through the will which is not assimilative, as I will say below. 3rd The procession of the Son precedes the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the intellect acts prior

to the will. 4th The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and not vice versa; because at that instant in which the Son is conceived to be generated, the Son himself receives from the Father the will, not yet exhausted by any operation. 5th The Son proceeds from one person only and the Holy Spirit from two, because the Father alone first understands and by understanding produces the Word, but the Word produced and the Father by loving themselves spirate the Holy Spirit. 6th Finally there are only two processions, because there are only two productive faculties, namely intellect and will.

I prove the third part. 1st The principle by which of procession must at least according to something be really distinguished from what proceeds; for nothing, as already said, produces itself: but intellect and will in God precisely according to themselves, excluding relations, are in no part really distinguished from what proceeds: therefore.

2nd All absolute perfections are common to the whole Trinity: therefore if intellect and will are the principle by which of the divine processions without any modification, or connotation of relations, the power of generating and spirating will be common to all persons of the Trinity, and since in God everything possible exists, the Son will generate another Son and the Holy Spirit will spirate another Holy Spirit: just as therefore in created things the same form in diverse subjects modified produces diverse effects; so the same heat hardens clay, liquefies wax, in a woman produces milk, not in a man: so in some way at least (for no adequate parity can be found in created things) the same intellect of the Father and Son, in the Father modified by the relation of paternity generates, not in the Son. The same will of the three Persons modified in the Father and Son by the relation of active spiration produces the Holy Spirit, not in the Holy

Spirit. What we say here about the proximate principle regarding the connotation of relations, must be said about the remote principle by which, namely the divine nature.

I prove the fourth part. 1st The remote principle by which of the divine processions is that in which what proceeds is assimilated to the producer, the proximate principle by which is that through which it is assimilated; thus in human generation the nature is that in which the begotten is assimilated to the begetter, the generative faculty is that through which it is assimilated: but relation in the divine is not that in which and through which what proceeds is assimilated to the producer, but on the contrary is that in which and through which it differs: therefore.

2nd The proximate principle by which of the divine processions must be active; but relation is not active: therefore. The major is evident. I prove the minor. Relation is taken either as it is an order of one to another, or as it is subsistence or hypostatic form: but in neither way is it active, not as it is an order of one to another, as is evident: and moreover under this aspect it presupposes the processions and is founded in them; nor also as it is hypostatic form, because thus it is only the ultimate terminus of nature, inert and infecund, just as the subsistence or individual form of Peter for example is only the terminus of Peter's nature, rendering it further incommunicable: therefore.

In sum therefore it must be said ([10]) that both absolute and relative are imported in the principle by which of the divine processions, but not equally. The absolute is imported directly and as form; the relative obliquely as mode and condition.

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[10] Here q. 41. a. 5.

Objections are Solved

You will object 1st against the first and second part of the conclusion: The Holy Fathers often say that the Son is the work of nature, is from nature, from the essence, from the substance of the Father, essence is from essence, the divine nature begets and is begotten: therefore nature in God is the proximate principle by which, etc.

I respond by denying the consequence. For these and other similar expressions of the Fathers are understood in another and multiple Catholic sense. 1st It can be said that the Holy Fathers spoke thus, because nature in God is the remote principle by which of the processions. 2nd They spoke thus against the Arians who wanted the Son to be produced by God not naturally and necessarily, but freely as other creatures are produced. 3rd They spoke thus so that substance, nature, essence are not taken in the abstract, ([11]) but in the concrete, so that when they say: Essence from essence, nature begets, nature is begotten, the sense is, the Son who is essence is from the Father who is essence, the Father who is nature begets, the Son who is nature is begotten.

You insist: Some Fathers say that the Son exists and proceeds from God the Father through the will, but this cannot be said unless insofar as the will is the very nature and essence of God: therefore.

I respond that this was said by some Fathers, not that the will or nature is the proximate principle of the procession of the Son, but in another double sense. 1st Because they were acting against certain heretics who said that the Son proceeds from the Father not spontaneously, but as if from

[11] Here q. 39. a. 5. ad 1

an unwilling one compelled by a blind impulse of nature, as St. Hilary testifies in his book on the Synods. Hence when the Arians usurped this formula of speaking in a contrary sense, namely to signify that the Son is produced freely no differently than other creatures, then the Holy Fathers denied that the Son was begotten by will. 2nd Some spoke in an identical sense, because namely in God essence, intellect and will are really one and the same, not in a formal sense and according to virtual distinction. Thus the Fathers of the Council of Toledo, in the year 688, who use this formula of speaking, explain it.

Objection 2nd against the same: The divine nature from itself and as pre-understood by intellect and will is fecund: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: It is fecund radically and remotely, I concede; proximately, I deny. For nature, as has been said, does not act except through its faculties.

Objection 3rd against the same: Intellect and will in God are not distinguished, but are one and the same: therefore they cannot produce diverse terms, or diverse persons.

I respond 1st that this argument of Durand clearly militates against himself; for the divine nature is most simple, and yet according to him produces multiple persons. 2nd I distinguish the antecedent: intellect and will in God are not distinguished really, I concede; virtually, I deny. But this is more than sufficient for producing diverse terms: it is evident in God himself who is most simple and produces infinite kinds of creatures, indeed from created things, in one sun producing so many diverse effects.

Objection 4th against the same: Creatures do not generate because they understand or will: therefore neither does God.

I respond by denying the consequence because creatures namely corporeal ones, like humans, generate through a corporeal faculty, but God being pure spirit through a spiritual faculty.

You insist: Even purely spiritual creatures like Angels, by understanding or willing do not produce substances: therefore neither does God.

I respond by denying the consequence. The disparity is that the word or love in Angels are accidents, but in God nothing is accidental, but everything that is in God, is God, and therefore substance.

Objection 5th against the third part of the conclusion: The principle by which of the divine processions consists adequately in absolute perfection: therefore. I prove the antecedent: the power of generating belongs to the Son according to St. Augustine book 3 against Maximus chapter 12, where he says: "The Son did not beget another Son, not because he could not, but because it was not fitting": but it would not belong to the Son if it were not adequately absolute perfection: therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent, to the proof from St. Augustine, I say the sense of St. Augustine is, that the Son did not beget another Son, is not from infirmity, since he has the same power as the Father, but because since the Son is an infinite terminus he exhausts the whole fecundity of the intellect; hence we should not say that he could not from impotence proceeding from infirmity, but it is better said it was not fitting, and thus the Fathers spoke

against the Arians, so as to remove from the Son even the shadow of infirmity, which the name of impotence imports.

You insist: If generative power is not in the Son, some perfection will be lacking to him: therefore. I prove the antecedent 1st because according to Aristotle in the Meteorologics, something is perfect insofar as it can generate something like itself; 2nd because generative power is some virtue, some dignity and perfection: therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the first proof, I say the doctrine of Aristotle is verified in corruptible nature which cannot be conserved in one individual, otherwise in incorruptible nature, as is evident in Angels. To the second proof, I distinguish: generative power as to what it imports obliquely, namely the relative, is perfection, I deny; as to what it imports directly, namely the absolute, is perfection, I concede; and thus it is in the Son, for it is the same intellect, the same power of the Father and the Son under diverse function and diverse modification.

Objection 6th against the fourth part of the conclusion: according to St. Athanasius in the first dialogue on the Trinity and some others, the Father begets by hypostasis; therefore relation is the principle, or at least co-principle of generation.

I respond that it was said by some Fathers that the Father generates by hypostasis, not that it is the principle or co-principle of generation, but because it is required as a condition and complement of the principle by which, and constitutes the principle which or the person.

You insist: St. Thomas in 1 Sent. d. 11. q. 1. a. 3. says: "Generation does not proceed from the essence, insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is paternity, and if these two namely essence and paternity differed in the divine,

generation would proceed from both, but from paternity immediately, and from essence as from a first principle": therefore since they differ virtually, generation is immediately from paternity, and mediately virtually from essence.

I respond: whatever the younger St. Thomas thought, it is certain that he here in q. 41. a. 5. expressly teaches that paternity is not the principle by which of generation. "Neither," he says, "can paternity be understood as that by which the Father generates, but as constituting the person of the generator, otherwise the Father would generate the Father.... and therefore the power of generating signifies the divine nature directly, but relation obliquely." Hence Cajetan on the same q. 41. thinks that St. Thomas there recalled what he had said in the first [Sentences] cited. But it does not seem necessary to recur to retractation; for the earlier words of St. Thomas can be understood, as I was just saying about the sayings of the Fathers. Thus he says that generation does not proceed from essence insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is paternity; because essence is not the principle by which of generation unless as modified by paternity: he says also that if essence and paternity differed, generation would proceed immediately from paternity, because essence is not a principle of generation except by means of paternity as condition and complement.

Objection 7th against the same: The Father is the principle of generation by that by which he is powerful to generate: but he is powerful to generate by paternity: therefore. I prove the minor, 1st because what gives being, gives the ability to operate: but paternity gives the Father to be Father: therefore. 2nd The Father is powerful to generate

by that by which he is Father: but he is Father by paternity: therefore.

I respond by denying the minor. To the first proof, I distinguish the major: what gives specific being gives the ability to operate, I concede; what gives individual being gives the ability to operate, I subdivide: gives the ability to operate as that which [operates], I concede; as that by which [one operates], I deny. For the hypostasis or individual principle of Peter, for example, does not give him to operate as that by which, but human nature; but paternity in God gives individual being to the Father, not specific being. To the second proof, I distinguish similarly: the Father is powerful to generate as that which, by that by which he is Father, I concede; as that by which, I deny.

You insist: The Father is powerful to generate through that which is proper and singular to him and not common to the three Persons: but only the relation of paternity is proper and singular to him: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major: the Father is powerful to generate through that as through a required condition which is proper to him, I concede the major; as through a true principle, I deny. Three things concur so that someone is Father or complete principle of generation: 1st fecund nature, and it is the principal and radical principle by which in which the begotten is assimilated to the begetter; 2nd the faculty through which as through an instrument the fecundity of nature exerts itself, which is in God the intellect, and we have said it is the proximate principle by which; 3rd finally the hypostasis or subsistence by which the person and generator as that which is constituted, and it is in God paternity: but hypostasis is not the principle by which, but

the complement and required condition so that the principle acts, because actions belong to supposits.

Article III. In what do the Divine Processions Formally Consist when taken Actively?

Suárez and certain others maintain that the divine processions are not true actions, but simple emanations or resultants, in much the same way that properties arise from essence. The Scotists with Scotus say they are true actions of the intellect and will, though they are not intellection nor volition, but diction and spiration; for they posit two acts in the intellect formally distinct: intellection and diction; similarly two acts distinct in the same way in the will, love and spiration; and they say the Word proceeds through diction, not through intellection, and the Holy Spirit through spiration and not through love. Thus the most learned Father Henno [teaches], so that, according to the Scotists, the notional acts by which the Word and Holy Spirit proceed, or the active processions themselves, namely to speak and to spirate, are distinguished from intellection and volition equally as acts from acts. The Thomists, however, say that the notional acts or the active processions themselves are intellection and volition modified by relations, as was said in the preceding article concerning their principle.

1. I say first: The divine processions taken actively are not simple emanations, but true and proper actions. ([12])

Proof 1 from the preceding article; for if the immediate principles of the divine processions are active,

[12] Here a. 2, 3, and 5

namely intellect and will, then those [processions] are also acts of intellect and will.

2. The emanation of properties, at least the first, is immediate from nature; but the processions are not immediate from nature, as we have proved, and Suárez admits against Durandus: therefore.

3. The reason why divine processions are not actions according to Suárez is because action involves imperfection: the consequent is false; therefore also the antecedent. Proof of the minor: immanent action can be purified from all imperfection and be absolute perfection simply: therefore. Proof of the antecedent: an active principle can be purified from its imperfections and be in God, as it really is: therefore a fortiori the action which is the very act and perfection of that principle: and this is clearly evident both in active power and in the productive action of creatures which are properly in God purified from all imperfection.

You might say: It belongs to the nature of proper action that it be motion and departure from the agent, which involve imperfection: therefore.

I respond: it belongs to the nature of proper action only that it be the ultimate actuality of the agent departing from it by formal or virtual departure: but virtual departure does not express imperfection any more than the virtual emanation of properties in God.

Nevertheless, it should not be said that God is truly and properly an agent, but only truly and properly understanding: because this name "agent" is commonly taken for a principle producing through true causality with dependence; just as also, although the Father is the principle of the Word, nevertheless the Word should not be called

"principiated," because, as St. Thomas notes, (13) the name "principiated" implies diminution and inferiority which does not befit the Word.

However, when the Holy Doctor in q. 2 de Potent. a. 1 denies action proper to God, he understands predicamental and transient action, as he says there: and when here in a. 1 o. he calls procession an intelligible emanation, he takes emanation broadly insofar as emanation is distinguished from corporeal and transient action. It is indeed true that relations in created things are held by resultance from the positing of the term, because they are accidents of weak entity, but in God they are substantial, of which therefore there is properly a becoming.

2. I say second: Diction and spiration, which are notional acts and in which the divine processions formally consist, are not distinguished from intellection and volition virtually or, according to the Scotist way of speaking, formally ex natura rei, as acts from acts, but they are the very intellection and volition distinguished only by the connotation of relation.

Proof 1 from the Fathers. According to the Holy Fathers, the Word proceeds through thought: but to think formally is to understand: therefore. Proof of the major: Irenaeus lib. 2 c. 48: "God," he says, "existing wholly as mind and wholly as λόγος, what he thinks, this he speaks, and what he speaks, this he also thinks." Tertullian, against Praxeas c. 5, calls the Son God's reason, because the Father produces him by thinking. St. Fulgentius lib. 3 to Monimus c. 7: "Thus," he says, "is the Word with God, as a word is in the mind... For when the mind has a word with itself, it certainly

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13 Here q. 83, a. 1, ad 2

has it by thinking: because nothing else is to speak to oneself than to think to oneself; therefore when the mind thinks and by thinking generates a word within itself." What could be more express? Likewise St. Augustine 15 de Trinit. c. 13: "The Word," he says, "was born... from the Father's knowledge, from the Father's wisdom"; but to be knowing and wise is to understand, as Father Henno the Scotist himself says. Whence the same Holy Doctor lib. 7 c. 2 says that the Word is wisdom begotten.

Proof by reason. Diction and intellection in us are not two really distinct acts, but two formalities, or two inadequate functions of the same act, which insofar as it is directed to the object to be known is called intellection, and insofar as by knowing the object it forms a word, is called diction: therefore in God they are not virtually, or according to the Scotists formally ex natura rei distinct as two acts. The consequence is clear because if things that are distinguished in lower things, as is commonly said, are united in higher things; a fortiori things that are identified in lower things are one and the same in higher things. Proof of the antecedent: diction attains the word in intelligible being formally: but no act can attain something under the formal aspect of the intelligible except it be intellection: therefore. Proof of the major: diction attains the word formally as manifesting and representing the object qua understood: therefore. There is nevertheless this difference between our diction and the divine, that in us the formality of diction is conceived prior to the formality of intellection; conversely in God: the reason for the disparity is that in us the word is formed by the intellect from need so that we may understand, but in God it is formed from abundance, because he understands.

Confirmation: every act of intellect is intellection, and every act of will is volition: but diction is an act of intellect, and spiration an act of will: therefore diction is intellection, and spiration is volition. The Scotists admit the minor. Proof of the major: 1) every act of the power of sight is vision: therefore every act of intellect is intellection, and every act of will is volition. 2) The adequate formal object of intellect is the true qua intelligible: but every act attaining an object under the aspect of the true qua intelligible is intellection: therefore every act of intellect is intellection.

Father Henno responds that every act of intellect is intellection formally or radically, but not always formally.

But against this: 1) every act of the power of sight is vision formally: therefore every act of the intellectual power is intellection formally. 2) If there were granted some act of intellect that is not intellection formally, the true qua intelligible would not be the adequate specifying object of intellect, since there would be something else that it attains formally.

3. Proof by overturning Scotus's foundation. The reason Scotus feigns diction to be an act distinct from intellection is lest he be forced to admit the Persons proceed through an essential act common to the three Persons: but he incurs the same inconvenience: therefore. Proof of the minor: that diction as distinct from intellection is, in the nature of action, an absolute act, just like intellection itself, consequently essential and common to the three Persons, for all absolutes in God are essential and common to the three Persons.

Father Henno responds that diction is something relative; because, he says, although in human things relation is not productive, it is nevertheless in divine things.

But against this: 1) diction according to the adversary is an act of intellect: but an act of intellect is not formally a relation: therefore. 2) Relation in human things is not productive: therefore neither in divine things. The consequence is proved first by parity; or let a disparity be adduced. 3) Relation in divine things can be considered only in two ways, either as it is an order of one to another, or as it is subsistence or hypostatic form; under the first respect it is not productive, as this Franciscan theologian admits, nor under the second, for thus it is only the ultimate term of a sterile and unfruitful nature.

Father Henno continues: Divine Paternity, he says, can be called formally generation, not insofar as it is a relation referring one to another, but insofar as it is that by which the Son proceeds. But against this: paternity insofar as it is that by which the Son proceeds, is either something formally relative, or something formally absolute. The first cannot be said, both because that by which the Son proceeds is an act, namely diction, therefore not formally a relation; and because thus it is formally referring one to another, under which respect, the adversary admits, it is not productive nor generation. If the second be said, the entire force of the argument made stands, namely that it is something common to the three Persons no differently than intellection. If perhaps you say it is something absolute modified by relation, this we too say of intellection, whence it is useless to feign an action distinct from intellection in order to preserve that the productive action is not common to the three Persons.

Therefore intellection and volition in God can be considered in two ways: 1) precisely according to themselves and solitarily, and thus they are essential acts and common

to the three Persons; 2) as modified by the relations of paternity and active spiration, and thus they are notional acts and active processions, and hence intellection has that it is diction, and volition that it is spiration, in the way we said in the preceding article concerning the proximate principle quo.

But what we say here about processions taken actively, the same, proportion being preserved, must be said about processions taken passively; so that just as understanding modified by the relation of paternity is active generation, so being understood modified by the relation of the Son or filiation is nativity and passive origin: whence relation enters both, not as form, but as complement of form, as has been said.

You might say first with Father Henno and other Scotists: Intellection and volition are common to the three Persons: but the notional acts by which the Son and Holy Spirit proceed are not common to the three Persons: therefore.

I respond: 1) by retorting the argument: Diction, as it is an act of intellect, is under this respect something absolute, consequently common to the three Persons. 2) I distinguish the major: intellection and volition precisely according to themselves are common to the three Persons, I concede; as modified by relations, I deny; the solution is clear from what has been said.

The praised theologian insists: Hence it would follow that the goodness which is in the Father would not also be common to the three Persons, since it should no less be modified by paternity than intellection.

I respond by denying the consequence and its proof: because the Father does not generate through goodness, but

through intellection, and therefore relation affects intellection and not goodness.

You might say with the same: If the Father produced the Word by understanding, he would understand by means of the Word itself, and thus would be wise by the Word or by begotten wisdom, since to be wise is to understand: which St. Augustine reputes absurd in 15 de Trinit. c. 7; therefore.

I respond by denying the consequence, (14) because intellection simply said is predicated of God essentially and not notionally; whence although he produces the Word by notional intellection, it should not be said that he understands or is wise by the Word, but that he speaks by the Word; but he understands and is wise by himself.

You might say third with the same: Productive action must be distinguished from that which is not productive: but diction is productive, not intellection which of itself expresses only a tendency toward the object to be known, not toward the word to be produced: therefore.

I respond (15) by distinguishing the major: productive action must be distinguished from that which is not productive in some respect, I concede; simply and equally as act from act, I deny. We do not therefore deny that there is some distinction: intellection precisely imports only the relation to the thing understood; diction imports principally the relation to the word conceived, but nevertheless diction itself is intellection, because the word is conceived by understanding; thus, says the Holy Doctor, the human intellect speaks by the word which it conceives by understanding the stone; so that understanding and

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14 Here q. 37, a. 2, ad 1

15 Q. 34, a. 1, ad 3

speaking are two formalities, or two inadequate functions of the same action adequately taken: but intellection has that it is diction from the connotation of the paternal relation, as has been said.

You insist: Diction and intellection have diverse terms and diverse modes of tending toward them: therefore they are diverse actions.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: they have diverse terms and diverse modes of tending secundum quid, I concede; simply, I deny. For diction tends toward the word as understood, and thus also as produced by understanding; consequently it is intellection.

You might rejoin: There is given intellection which is not diction, as in the blessed: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: there is given intellection inadequately taken which is not diction, I concede; adequately taken, I deny.

Article IV. How Many Processions are there in God?

I say: in God there are two processions and no more: one through the intellect by which the Word is generated; another through the will by which Love is spirated ([16]).

Both parts are proven by the authority of Holy Scripture, which beyond the procession of the Word which it acknowledges in multiple places, as in John 1 and 8 and elsewhere, admits another procession of the Holy Spirit as distinct from the Word, in John 10: "I will ask the Father and he will give you another Paraclete." And in 15: "When the

[16] Here q. 27. a. 4. and 5.0.

Paraclete comes whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father." Beyond these, it acknowledges no other; so also the Fathers and Councils: therefore.

This is proven: ([17]) in the divine, procession is considered according to immanent action, not transient action; but in God, as an intellectual agent, there are two immanent actions and no more, namely intellection and volition, virtually distinct; therefore there are also two processions, one through the intellect which is the procession of the Word, the other through the will which is the procession of Love. For as through intellection or the conception of the word, says the Holy Doctor here ([18]), the thing understood is in the one understanding; likewise through love, the thing loved is in the lover, not in the sense that in the lover the thing loved or its likeness is produced, as in the one understanding, but a certain impulse and inclination of the will toward the thing loved.

Hence the thing loved is said to be in the lover, not as its object or likeness, but as the intrinsic term of love and volition.

You might argue 1 against the first part: In every nature there is only one mode of communicating it: therefore in the divine nature also there is only one, namely through the intellect and not through the will.

I respond by denying the consequence and the parity. ([19]) The disparity is that whatever is in God is God, which is not found in other things: hence through any procession

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[17] Ibid a. 5.0.

[18] Ibid. a. 3.0.

[19] A. 2. ad 2.

which is not ad extra [outward], the divine nature is communicated.

You might press further: Through the first procession the whole nature is communicated: therefore there is no place for another.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: through the first procession the whole nature is communicated and totally, or in every way in which it can be communicated, I deny; the whole nature, but not totally nor in every way in which it can be communicated, I concede. For the divine nature is not only fruitful and communicable through the intellect, but also through the will.

You might reply: Every infinite thing is unique, hence the divine nature is not multiplied, because it is infinite: but the divine procession is infinite: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major premise: every infinite thing is unique in its own order, or in that aspect in which it is infinite, I concede; it is unique excluding infinites of another aspect, I deny. And with the minor premise thus distinguished, I deny the consequence. Thus mercy is infinite in the aspect of mercy, or, so to speak, intensively, not however extensively, or in the sense that it is the only infinite attribute in God. Similarly regarding the processions.

You might argue 2: If there were two processions in God, they would differ either in number or in species; not in number, otherwise both would be either generation or spiration; not in species, otherwise the same nature would not be communicated in both: therefore.

I respond that in God there is not properly genus or species. Speaking, however, by a certain analogy to creatures, it can be said that these two processions are distinguished as if according to species, not indeed by reason of diverse

nature, but by reason of personal properties, which in the unity of nature are diverse, which does not occur in creatures.

You might infer: Therefore the Persons also differ as if according to species.

I respond by denying the inference: because those persons are considered of the same species who have the same nature: but the divine Persons have the same nature not only in species but in number.

You might argue 3 against the second part: The same intellect in us elicits multiple cognitions and multiple words. Similarly, the will elicits multiple loves: therefore similarly in the divine.

I respond by denying the consequence ([20]) because the Word of the divine intellect, as infinite, is adequate to the conception and knowledge of the Father which it exhausts: hence it is said: "Once God has spoken." The same applies to divine love. God, therefore, says the Holy Doctor, "by a single simple act understands all things and similarly wills all things."

You might argue 4: Procession according to power should be considered no less than according to intellect and will: therefore.

I respond ([21]) that power is the principle of acting upon another: hence according to power, action is ad extra, and therefore a procession of creatures, not of a divine Person.

You might insist: At least there is memory in God; but this is an immanent faculty: therefore.

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[20] A. 5. ad 3.

[21] Ibid. a. 5, ad 1.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: there is memory in God metaphorically, I concede; properly, I deny. For nothing is past to God, nor can He forget anything.

You might argue 5: Good is self-diffusive: therefore according to divine goodness a procession should be recognized.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent ([22]): good is self-diffusive objectively, I concede the antecedent; effectively, I deny the antecedent. In this sense, therefore, good is said to be self-diffusive, because it is an object and end desirable by the will, but not because it is an effective principle of operation or diffusion of itself. Hence since processions, which are the question here, are considered according to actions; according to goodness and other similar attributes, no other processions are recognized than those of word and love, insofar as God understands and loves His essence, truth, and goodness.

You might argue 6: The Son through generation receives the will by which with the Father He produces the Holy Spirit: therefore He likewise receives the intellect by which He can produce another word.

I respond by denying the consequence. The disparity is that the Son receives the intellect already exhausted by His own production, but He receives the will not yet exhausted. For although both the processions and the Persons are simultaneous in time, there is nevertheless among them an order of origin, such that, according to our mode of understanding, the generation of the Word is conceived as prior to the spiration of the Holy Spirit; because the intellect is prior to the will, and understanding is prior to loving, for

[22] A. 3. ad 2.

nothing is willed unless it is first known, as the common axiom states. In that moment, therefore, in which the Son is conceived as being generated through the intellect, this intellect is conceived as exhausted by the production of the Son Himself, inasmuch as He is an infinite term, adequate to infinite intellection: and since it is the same intellect of the Father producing, which the Son receives and by which He understands, there remains no place for this already exhausted intellect to produce another word; but He receives in the same moment and by the same generation the will not yet exhausted by the spiration of the Holy Spirit who in that moment of the generation of the Word is not yet conceived as being spirated; consequently, by this non-exhausted will, the Son can with the Father produce the Holy Spirit.

Article V. Whether the Procession of the Word Alone, and Not the Procession of the Holy Spirit, is Generation? What is the Reason for this Distinction?

Note. ([23]) Generation, as it applies even to non-living things, is a change from non-being to being in some subject. But as it applies only to living things, it is defined as: The origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle in the likeness of a specific nature. In this definition are explained the four causes that concur in generation, namely the efficient, material, formal, and final causes. The efficient cause, when it is said "origin from a living being"; the material, when it is said "from a conjoined living being"; for by these terms is signified the matter from which the

[23] Here a. 2. o

offspring is formed and proceeds; for the generator must produce the offspring from its own substance, or from something joined to it, at least at the beginning of generation. Due to the lack of this condition, Angels and men are not begotten by God, because although they are living beings proceeding from the living God, they have nothing of the divine substance in themselves. The final cause, when it is said "in the likeness of a specific nature," because the end of generation is the propagation of the nature of the generator in another similar being, for nature inclines to propagate itself so that it may be perpetuated, as far as possible, if not in the same individual, at least in different individuals of the same species. Due to the lack of this condition, hairs, nails, and worms erupting from a human are not properly said to be begotten, nor his children. Finally, the formal cause is signified by the same words "in the likeness of nature"; because what is begotten must not only be similar to the generator in itself and essentially, but must also proceed as similar to the generator by the force and mode of procession. That is, the mode of procession, considered according to its species, and not only according to the individual, must be a mode of assimilation or imply a reason why what proceeds is similar to its principle, so that this proposition: "The generator assimilates," is as formal in the fourth mode per se, as philosophers say, as these propositions: "the builder builds," "the hot makes hot," "the musician sings." The reason is: 1. because definitions are understood in the formal sense; 2. because the entire formality of generation consists in the expression of likeness or in the propagation of nature as similar, nor is generating anything other than expressing a propagative likeness of oneself; according to that in Genesis 5: "Adam begot in his

image and likeness." Due to the lack of this condition, Eve formed from Adam's rib is not begotten, nor his daughter; because although she is essentially human like Adam, and by the force of this procession considered individually proceeded similar to him, yet not by the force of procession considered according to its species; because the mode of proceeding from a rib is not assimilative, or does not imply a reason why what is thus made is similar in nature to him from whose rib it is made, for a horse or anything else could have been made from that rib: not so from the generative action instituted by nature. For the same reason, as we use the example of St. Thomas ([24]), if some man with divinely granted power made a man with his hands from some part of himself, as he makes an artifact, and another in the ordinary way instituted by nature, both would be essentially human, yet the first would not be begotten or a son, but an artifact, while the second would be begotten and a son. Why is this? Because the latter would proceed in a way that is in itself assimilative, but not the former; for something else than a human could be made by an action of the same species as the first, but not by the second. Thus these words "by the force and mode of procession" must be understood in the definition of generation. It was necessary to explain these things at somewhat greater length for understanding the present question.

If you say that a mule is generated from a horse, and yet a mule is not of the same species as a horse; I respond ([25]) that for generation absolutely speaking it suffices if it tends of itself toward assimilation of species, even if by

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[24] 4. Against the Gentiles, c. 23

[25] 3. On Truth a. 8. ad 4. and 7. Metaphysics lect. 7.

accident, due to a defect of matter or of active power in the male, it does not attain perfect assimilation, as happens in the mule, whose generation is therefore imperfect and contrary to nature.

I say first: The procession of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit. ([26]) The first part is clearly attested by the Scriptures. Psalm 2: "You are my Son, today I have begotten you"; Psalm 109: "From the womb before the daystar I begot you"; Isaiah 53: "Who shall declare his generation?"; John 3: "The Father loves the Son"; Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Where there is Father and Son, there is generation.

Reason supports this: ([27]) the procession of the Word is the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle in the likeness of nature; therefore. I prove the antecedent: 1. It is the origin of a living being from a living being, because it proceeds by way of intelligible action which is an operation of life: hence, John 5: "As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son also to have life in himself." 2. From a conjoined living being, because it is through an immanent action: hence John 10: "I and the Father are one." 3. In the likeness of nature, because the conception of the intellect is a likeness of the thing understood and existing in the same nature, because in God to understand and to be are the same.

The second part is likewise attested by Scripture according to which the Holy Spirit is never named Son or Begotten; and the Word is called the Only-begotten of the

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[26] Here a. 2. and 4. o.

[27] Ibid. a. 1. o.

Father, John 1 and 3, 1 John 4, and elsewhere; if he is the only-begotten, then neither the Spirit, nor anyone else besides him is begotten. It does not matter that Solomon in Proverbs 4 is called only-begotten, when he had brothers from the same father and from the same mother, 1 Chronicles 3. For Solomon is not called only-begotten simply, but only-begotten before his mother, by which it is signified that he was uniquely loved by his mother as if he were her only son; hence the Septuagint translated it as "beloved in the face of his mother."

Both parts are unanimously handed down by the Holy Fathers, as can be seen in the prior dissertation, and the whole Church professes them in all the symbols of faith, in which the second Person is said to be born, the third only proceeding, but most especially in the symbol which is called that of St. Athanasius: "The Son is from the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten: The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

If you say that Christ in the Holy Scriptures is also called the Firstborn; I respond that he is called firstborn in two senses: 1. not because others were begotten after him, but because no one was begotten before him, in which sense it was said of the Blessed Virgin, that she bore her firstborn Son; 2. he is called firstborn with respect to subsequent sons, not according to nature, but according to adoption, such as the faithful whom he called brothers, in which sense it is said in Romans 8: "The firstborn among many brothers." Thus the Council of Ephesus, ch. 4: "The Son of God," it says, "is named firstborn and only-begotten: firstborn in comparison to adopted sons, and only-begotten through the exclusion of a natural son." Here faith stops; but theologians do not stop

here, who laboriously investigate the reason for this distinction between the two processions, which nevertheless some Fathers sometimes said was inscrutable. Thus St. Augustine in book 3 against Maximinus, ch. 14: "Who can explain what the difference is between being born and proceeding, when speaking of that most excellent nature? But below: "I do not know how to distinguish between that generation and this procession, I am not able, I am not sufficient." Similarly St. Athanasius, epistle to Serapion; Damascene, book 1, ch. 10; Gregory Nazianzen, oration 37, and others. Indeed, the Fathers sometimes spoke thus, because since in this most profound question nothing can be adduced that fully and in all respects quiets the mind, they feared lest heretics should take occasion from it to ridicule our faith, as if it rested on these probable reasons. St. Augustine, or whoever is the author of book 1 against Felicianus, ch. 8, indicates this reason: "Let faith believe this," he says, "let understanding not inquire, lest either not finding it, it should think it incredible, or discovering it, should not believe it unique..."

This, however, did not prevent the Holy Fathers themselves from inquiring into the reasons for this distinction and proposing them as probable without contention. For some said that the Holy Spirit is not the Son, lest since he proceeds from two, he should be thought to proceed from father and mother, as among men. Thus St. Augustine, 15 On the Trinity, ch. 27; St. Basil, epistle 43. Some, because he proceeded as given, not as born. The same St. Augustine, 5 On the Trinity, ch. 14. Others, lest if there were two sons in God, an infinite multitude of sons should be thought to exist in God, as among men. Others, lest the Holy Spirit should be called the grandson of the eternal Father.

Indeed, these reasons and other similar ones which Petavius reports in book 7 On the Trinity, ch. 13, the Holy Fathers proposed for the understanding of the people and for those who cannot penetrate deeper matters, but measure divine things by human standards; as is evident from St. Augustine himself at the beginning of the cited chapter 15 of On the Trinity, where he says: "But meanwhile it is sufficient for those who cannot stretch to greater things." Therefore, theologians are not to be blamed who, following in the footsteps of the Fathers, labor in investigating the causes of this mystery and modestly propose them, not as decisive, as if our faith rested on them, but supposing faith, as probable. It is incumbent upon us here to choose the more probable among the probable ones. Hence

Opinions of the School

The first opinion says that the Word is begotten and not the Holy Spirit, because the latter proceeds from two, the Word from only one. Thus Aliscen cited by Vasquez disp. 113 ch. 3, but this reason seems insufficient, for whether something proceeds from only one, or from two, as among men, by the very fact that by the force of procession it proceeds in the likeness of nature it is a Son: hence if the Holy Spirit proceeded from two through the intellect he would be a Son. That St. Augustine, cited book 15 On the Trinity ch. 27 and St. Thomas, q. 10 On Power, a. 2 ad 11, seem to suggest this opinion; to St. Augustine the response has already been given; to St. Thomas, I respond that he assigned this reason not as an a priori reason, but as an a posteriori sign: for from the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the mutual love of the Father and the Son,

consequently from the will, but the Son from one through the intellect, it is rightly inferred that the Son is begotten, not the Holy Spirit.

The second opinion says that the Son is begotten and not the Holy Spirit, because although both by the force of procession proceed as similar in nature, yet the Son proceeds as an image, not the Holy Spirit; thus Vasquez. But neither does this reason seem admissible: 1. because by the very fact that something proceeds by the force of procession as similar, it proceeds as an image; for what else is it to be the image of another than to be similar to it, whence it would follow in this opinion that the Holy Spirit would be begotten; 2. because it is of the nature of a Son or one begotten not only that he be a purely representative image of another, otherwise an image of Caesar would be begotten, and a daughter of Caesar, but that he be a propagative image of the nature of the generator, either by multiplication of nature as in created things, or by consubstantiality as in divine things: but this opinion does not explain why the procession of the Word is more propagative of the divine nature than the procession of the Holy Spirit.

The third opinion says that the procession of the Word is generation, and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the Word receives a fecund nature capable of producing another supposit, not the Holy Spirit; thus Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, and others. But neither does this reason seem sufficient: for although the Son were not productive of the Holy Spirit he would still be Son: 1. because he would still be the Word, and he is the Son by the fact that he is the Word, as St. Augustine says, tract 44 on John; 2. because for true generation it suffices that nature under the concept of nature be communicated to the

produced term, but it is not of the concept of nature that it be a principle in relation to another, but that it be the principle of that in which it is, as is clear from its definition; and otherwise the Holy Spirit who is not productive of another supposit, would not be of the same nature as the Father and the Son; the concept of nature is therefore preserved in that it is the root of properties and the principle of actions whether transient or immanent.

The fourth opinion says that the procession of the Word, not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is generation, because the first proceeds naturally or by way of nature, not the second. Francis Henno disp. 1 On the Triune God q. 6. attributes this opinion to the Doctors Seraphic and Subtle and follows it, and thus explains and proves it in the third conclusion: generation is a work of nature: therefore it must proceed naturally, or from a natural agent, such as the intellect, which is naturally determined to act: but the will, even the divine will, is not a natural agent but a voluntary and free one with essential freedom even with respect to the procession of the Holy Spirit: therefore.

But against this, by essential freedom the noted theologian either understands the freedom of indifference, so that God could not have produced the Holy Spirit, just as he could not have produced creatures, and in this sense the minor proposition of his argument would be heretical, and as Arian commonly impugned by the Holy Fathers; for it is Catholic dogma that God so necessarily by necessity of nature loves himself that he can no more refrain from the love of himself than from the understanding of himself, consequently the Holy Spirit proceeds no less necessarily by necessity of nature through the will than the Word through the intellect. Or by essential freedom he understands

immunity from coercion, and this is indeed how he explains it in his treatise On the Principles of Human Acts disp. 1. q. 4. in response to the first objection. But the procession of the Word enjoys this freedom no less than the procession of the Holy Spirit: indeed it is beyond all doubt that the Father not by coercion, not unwillingly, but voluntarily and spontaneously produces the Word: for by whom could he be coerced? The difficulty therefore remains intact, why the procession through the will which is necessary by necessity of nature is not generation, and the procession through the intellect which is no more necessary, is generation, since what proceeds through the will also proceeds as a living being from a living being and similar in nature.

Having therefore omitted these opinions and certain other less notable ones, with St. Thomas ([28]), all Thomists and many others.

I say: The reason why the procession of the Word is generation and not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is because the procession of the Word is through the intellect which by its own power is assimilative, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is through the will which by its own power is not assimilative. Holy Scripture favors this opinion which, while it calls the Word Son, and does not call him who is not the Word, Son, indicates that he is the Son because he is the Word, and the Spirit is not the Son because he is not the Word. In accordance with this St. Augustine book 6 On the Trinity ch. 2: "He is Son by the fact that he is word, and he is Word by the fact that he is Son"; and tract 48: "Because he is Word, therefore he is Son." The same in Athanasius, oration

[28] Here a. 2. and 4. o.

2 and 3 against the Arians; Ambrose, book On the Incarnation, ch. 3, and others.

It is proven by reason. It is of the nature of generation that by its own power and per se, or considered according to its species, it proceeds in the likeness of nature; but this belongs to the procession which is through the intellect, and not to the procession which is through the will: therefore. The major is clear from what was said at the beginning of the article. I prove the minor: this is the difference between intellect and will, that the intellect understands by the fact that the thing understood is in the intellect according to its likeness, hence by its own power, per se, or considered according to its species it is assimilative: the will, however, wills not by the fact that some likeness of the thing willed is in the will, but from the fact that the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed: therefore the procession which is attended to according to the intellect is by its own power and per se according to the nature of likeness; but the procession which is attended to according to the will, is not by its own power and per se according to the nature of likeness, but more according to the nature of impelling and moving toward something.

Objections are solved

Obj. 1. with Honoré Tournely: It is not certain among all that the intellect, when it understands, forms within itself a word which is a formal representation of the object, indeed the Peripatetics think this, but other philosophers doubt it: but it is not permissible to offer as a foundation for the distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit that which is very uncertain and

doubtful. Is this consistent with the dignity and majesty of our mystery?

I respond 1: we, supposing faith, offer the reason for the present distinction, not as entirely certain and demonstrative, but as more probable among the probable ones, which should not be considered blameworthy in anyone, otherwise not only almost all theologians would be blameworthy, but many Holy Fathers Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Isidore and others, who put forward various probable reasons for this distinction, and, to speak candidly, less probable, at least in our judgment, than the reason of St. Thomas. The minor of the argument and its supposition must therefore be denied. For granted that it is not entirely certain that the intellect produces a word, it is nevertheless false that it is very uncertain: indeed, absolutely speaking it is far more probable and seems certain to us: some indeed call it into doubt; but these are few, far more and more intelligent affirm it, not only Peripatetic philosophers, but commonly theologians, indeed also the Holy Fathers, devoted to the principles not of the Peripatetic school, but of the Platonic: hence that saying from St. Augustine: "From object and power is born knowledge." The same St. Augustine, 9 On the Trinity ch. 12, proves that the Word is the Son and not the Holy Spirit, because "the mind begets its knowledge when it knows itself, and does not beget its love when it loves itself." And Anselm Monologium ch. 8: "The Word," he says, "as soon as it is considered, proves itself to be the offspring of that from which it is, by clearly offering the image of the Father: and love openly denies that it is the offspring."

I respond 2: If Tournely's argument had any validity, it would follow that we could use nothing from philosophy or

reason to defend the truth of our mysteries against the attacks and sophisms of heretics; for there is nothing so certain in philosophical matters that is not impugned by some; thus recent philosophers have denied to secondary causes the power of acting, thus they have called into doubt the most evident first principles. How many theological reasons has Tournely himself with other writers offered in support of faith against the absurd imaginations and cavils of heretics in his entire theology, and not to range too far, how many philosophical reasons has he offered in this present treatise? Does he perhaps believe all these to be so indubitable that they cannot be called into doubt by anyone? Indeed what else is a theological conclusion but a proposition inferred from two premises of faith, or from one premise of faith and another of reason? Hence it is commonly said that reason should serve faith, according to that saying: "Call the handmaid to the citadel"; where therefore does Tournely's argument tend, except that, having eliminated theology, we should remain in faith alone?

Obj. 2. with the same: It is not of the nature of intellect as such, as it abstracts from divine and human, to assimilate to itself a term in nature, but only to assimilate intentionally or intelligibly, therefore the divine Word does not have it that he is the consubstantial Son of the Father, precisely from the fact that he proceeds through the intellect.

I respond 1: According to the opinion which we embraced in the preceding treatise, according to which the divine essence is constituted by the intellective grade, in God intentional or intelligible being, and substantial being, are one and the same without virtual distinction; hence that which is assimilative in him in intelligible being, is formally assimilative in entitative and substantial being. But

abstracting from this opinion which does not please everyone,

I respond 2 by denying the antecedent for the second part. For it is false that it is of the nature of intellect as such and in general, to assimilate only intentionally or intelligibly; that belongs to an imperfect and created intellect: therefore intellect as such and in general, is assimilative as such, or tends to some likeness as such. But just as likeness as such is divided into perfect or substantial likeness and imperfect or merely intelligible likeness, so also intellect as such is divided into perfect or divine intellect and imperfect or created intellect; and just as imperfect intellect by its own power, as a species of intellect as such, tends to imperfect and merely intelligible likeness, so the perfect intellect by its own power, as an analogous species of intellect as such, tends to perfect and substantial likeness.

Inst. according to the given solution: Therefore the divine intellect is assimilative in substantial being, because it is divine; but similarly the will as divine is substantially unitive: therefore either what proceeds through the intellect does not proceed formally as similar and begotten, or the Spirit proceeding through the will also proceeds formally as similar and begotten, for nothing is so similar to another, as that which has the same nature with it.

I respond by denying the major. For we do not say that the divine intellect is substantially assimilative, precisely because it is divine, but because being divine, it is most perfect in the genus of assimilative things, so that if it were not divine, and were nevertheless the most perfect intellect, it would nonetheless be substantially assimilative. But the will from its genus is not assimilative, but ponderous and inclinative; for it does not by its power produce a term

similar to itself or to the object, but inclination and impulse toward the beloved object, but that this impulse is substantially the same with the lover and the beloved object, this happens not by reason of the will formally, but because this impulse, being divine, is immanent in God; and whatever is in God, is God substantially.

You will press: Just as it is of the nature of the most perfect intellection to produce the most perfect likeness, so it is of the nature of the most perfect love to produce the most perfect union: but the most perfect union is substantial identity, no less than the most perfect likeness: therefore. The minor is clear. I prove the major from St. Thomas himself 1. 2. q. 28. a. 1. ad 2, where he teaches that three kinds of union pertain to the nature of love, one from which love proceeds which is the union of likeness, and this is the cause of love. The third which love desires, and, if it can, effects, and is the real union which the lover seeks with the thing loved: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major: it is of the nature of the most perfect love to produce the most perfect union of the lover with the thing loved, I concede the major; and this is precisely what St. Thomas says. The most perfect union of love itself or impulse with the lover or thing loved, I deny the major. For love or impulse whatever it may be, is nothing other than the way and tendency to union, not of itself, but of the lover with the beloved. But here the question is not about the union of the lover with the thing loved, but about the union or likeness of love itself or impulse with the lover himself, or the beloved object: for the Holy Spirit is not the lover, or the thing loved, but is the love and impulse of the lover toward the thing loved. The lovers are the Father and the Son, the thing loved is the divine essence, the Holy

Spirit is that by which it is loved. Hence that he is one and the same with the beloved divine essence, does not come formally from the fact that he is love proceeding from the will, but from the fact that he is an act immanent in God, and that whatever is in God, is substantially God, as already stated. But that the Word which is the term of the intellect, should be similar to the object understood, which is the divine essence, it has from the very nature of the intellect, which is of itself assimilative.

Obj. 3. with the same: The Spirit by the force of procession formally proceeds as similar in the divine nature: therefore his procession is generation, or the procession of the Word is not generation. I prove the antecedent: The Holy Spirit by the force of his procession is God: therefore. I prove the antecedent: by the force of his procession he is a subsisting and divine person: therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent. The Spirit by the force of his procession considered individually is God, I concede the antecedent; by the force of his procession considered according to its species, I deny the antecedent. Therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit can be considered in two ways: 1. according to its species, as it is procession by way of will; 2. according to the individual, as it is this procession namely of love immanent in God. If this procession is considered individually, the Holy Spirit by the force of it proceeds as God, because since this action considered individually is divine and immanent, so also its term is divine, consequently God. But if the procession is considered according to its species as it is from the will, which procession is proper to the Holy Spirit, by the force of it thus considered, he does not proceed formally as God, because he does not proceed

formally as similar, since it is not of the nature of the will to assimilate, but he has this from elsewhere, namely because, as has been said, he proceeds as something divine and immanent in God. Indeed for a procession to be generation, it is not sufficient that it be assimilative identically, or considered according to the individual, but that it be assimilative considered according to the formal and specific nature, or, as others say, in the fourth mode per se, as we explained more fully in the note, otherwise as we said there, Eve produced from Adam's rib would be begotten and Adam's daughter. And hence some thus distinguish the same antecedent: The Holy Spirit formally by the force of his procession proceeds as God spirated, I concede; as God begotten, I deny.

To the proof therefore I similarly distinguish: The Holy Spirit by the force of his procession considered individually is a subsisting and divine person, I concede; by the force of his procession considered according to its species, or as it is from the will, I deny. For that he is a subsisting and divine person, he does not have formally from the fact that he is from the will, but from the fact that he is something divine and from the divine will. Moreover a person or supposit is not the quo term of procession, but the quod term, common to everything proceeding in the nature of substance, just as being existing, or existence, is the common term of every being, hence neither from person or subsistence, just as neither from existence can the formal and specific nature of procession be taken.

But, I ask, says Tournely, what triumphs do the Socinians achieve, when they hear from us that the Holy Spirit by the force of his procession does not formally have

that he is like to God, but only identically because he proceeds in God and from God.

I respond that this is a fictitious bugbear for children. For we acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is like to God, truly and essentially God by the force of his procession considered individually, although he does not have this formally by the force of his procession considered according to its species, and as it is precisely from the will: what reason, I ask, for triumph is afforded to the Socinians from this? For whether formally, or identically, or by the force of procession considered individually or specifically he is God, he is nevertheless truly and essentially God, no less than the Father and the Son: this indeed the Socinians fundamentally deny, caring little or nothing under what formality he proceeds as God. Here the Sorbonne doctor stops. However, several more instances could be made, but we omit them, because they are solved by the same solution.

Obj. 4: The Word by the force of procession proceeds as understood and not as understanding, for he proceeds as the term of paternal intellection; therefore by the force of procession he does not proceed as similar to the Father.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent. The Word by the force of procession proceeds as understood and not as understanding notionally, I concede the antecedent; essentially, I deny the antecedent. But likeness in nature is not attended to in terms of notional aspects, but in terms of essential aspects: hence just as in human matters although the Son does not proceed as generating, but as begotten, he nevertheless proceeds similar to the Father in nature, so proportionally in divine matters.

Obj. 5: The Word proceeds from the knowledge by which the Father knows not only the divine nature, but also

creatures, as we shall say below: therefore if by the force of procession through intellection he proceeds as similar to the Father in nature, he must also proceed as similar to creatures in nature, which is absurd.

I respond by denying the consequence. Because the Father knows creatures only in his nature and in himself as in their cause, and therefore since creatures are not the object of his knowledge, except as they are contained in the divine nature as in their source, he must produce an image of his nature only and not of creatures.

DISSERTATION THREE
ON DIVINE RELATIONS (ST. TH., Q. 28.)

Article I. Whether there are Real Relations in God?

I say: There are some real relations in God. (1)

Proof, first: It is certain by faith that there are three really distinct Persons in God, and that they are not really distinguished in their absolute attributes in which they are consubstantial, but rather in their relative attributes or relations. I further argue: But this cannot be in relations of reason, since these cannot create real distinction; therefore it must be in real relations. Therefore, there are real relations in God. We have extensively proven the major premise in our preliminary dissertation; the minor premise is self-evident. Hence St. Thomas, as cited, says that the conclusion is a matter of faith.

Confirmation: (2) The Father is only called Father because of paternity, and the Son because of filiation. Therefore, if paternity and filiation are not really in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only

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1 Here q. 28. a. 1. o. q. 8. on power a. 1. o. Q. 8. cited.

2 Here cited in Arg. s. c.

according to our rational understanding, which is the Sabellian heresy.

Nor does it present an obstacle that God is called Lord in a real sense, although the relation of lordship is not really in Him. For the disparity is that without a real relation of lordship in God, its real foundation remains, namely the production of creatures, which suffices for the denomination to be real, even though the relation is only one of reason. But in our case, without a real relation there remains no real foundation; because the real foundation is generation, and generation requires really distinct extremes or a real distinction between the generator and the generated. Since, therefore, all real distinction in the divine is derived from relations, if these are not real, there will be no real distinction between the extremes, or between the generator and the generated, and consequently no generation.

Proof, second (3): When something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, it is necessary that both, namely the one proceeding and that from which it proceeds, agree in the same order, and thus have real relations to each other, as is evident in human generation. But the processions in the divine are in the identity of nature; therefore it is necessary that the relations which are received according to divine processions are real relations.

From what has been said, you may infer that relations in God are real not only according to the concept of "in" but also according to the concept of "toward," because according to that concept of "toward," they cause a real distinction of persons, insofar as only the respect "toward" causes relative

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3 Here cited in Arg. 8. c. o

opposition, and all distinction in the divine is founded only on relative opposition.

Note, however, that although relation in the divine is real according to the concept of "toward," it does not have its reality from that concept, or from that part by which it is "toward something," but from that part by which it inheres. Because relation, according to the nature of its genus, insofar as it is relation, does not have that it is something, but only that it is "toward something." (4) That it is something in reality, it has from that part by which it inheres, either as identical in reality as in the divine, or as an accident in a subject as in creatures. Hence, although a real relation by its mode of signification does not explicitly express "in," it nevertheless implies it, since it is that by which a subject regards a term; and although it is not signified as inherent, it must nevertheless be inherent. (5)

Objection 1: A real relation involves many imperfections; therefore it is not in God. Proof of the antecedent: 1) It is of the weakest entity. 2) It causes composition with the related. 3) It makes it depend on the correlative. 4) It orders it to something, which also is repugnant to God. Therefore.

Response: (6) I deny the antecedent. To the first and second proofs, I respond that they are verified of real relations in creatures which are accidents, not of divine relations which are identified with the divine substance. To the third, likewise, I respond that it is true of real relations in created things which have a different being from the being of

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4 Q. 2. on Power a: 5

5 Q. 8. on Power a. 2.

6 Q. 8. on Power a. 1. ad 4. 5. and 10

the substance to which they are superadded, and from the being of the term to which they refer, because they are accidents, but not of divine relations which have the same being with the divine substance; for properly speaking, that is said to depend on another which has a being different from it, and is therefore dependent. If you say that at least one Person depends on another, because correlatives depend on each other, and St. Basil speaks this way in epistle 43; similarly he who represented the Latin position in the Council of Florence in the last session, I respond that this should not be understood as dependence properly taken for subordination, indigence, and inferiority, but improperly taken for mutual requirement or connection. To the fourth, I respond that it is repugnant to God to be ordered to something outside Himself, not to something within Himself; nor should this be understood as if the divine nature is referred, but the Person; for only that is referred which is relatively opposed, and that belongs only to the Persons.

Objection 2: God in producing creatures does not have a real relation to them; therefore neither in producing the Word.

Response: I deny the consequence. (7) The disparity is that God, freely producing creatures through an action virtually transient, does not communicate to them His nature, but remains outside the whole order of creatures; hence there is nothing in Him by which He is really related to them, although they are really related to Him, because they naturally depend on Him. But in naturally producing the Son through an immanent and necessary action, a Son

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7 Ibid. ad 3. and here a. 1. ad 3

consubstantial with Himself, He is of the same order with Him, and there is in both that by which they are really related to each other.

Therefore, when two things are of the same order, and there is between them a disposition according to something really agreeing with both, then there is a real relation on the part of both, (8) as is evident in relations that follow quantity, such as small and large, double and half, and the like, for quantity is in both extremes. And the same is true of relations that follow action and passion, like mover and moved, Father and Son. But when the extremes are not of one order, nor is there between them a disposition according to something really agreeing with both, then there is not a real relation on the part of both, but there can be a real relation on the part of one and only a relation of reason on the part of the other, as is evident, for example, in sense and the sensible, in knowledge and the knowable. For since things existing in their natural being and considered according to it are outside the order of the sensible and intelligible, although in sense and knowledge there is a real relation, insofar as they are ordered to sensing and knowing things, in the sensible and knowable things themselves, considered in themselves, there is no real relation by which they are referred to sense and to knowledge. Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are naturally ordered to Him and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to Him, but not He to them. But the Father and Son in the divine, since they are of the same order and nature, and there is between them a

8 Here q. 13. a. 7. 0.

disposition according to something agreeing with both, there is a real relation on the part of both.

Objection 3: Relations that follow the operation of the intellect are relations of reason. But the relation of Father to Son in the divine follows the operation of the intellect. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish (9) the major: Relations that follow the operation of the intellect in the things understood themselves, insofar as the intellect compares one to another, are relations of reason, I grant; that follow the operation of the intellect in the intellect itself, insofar as the word proceeding from the intellect says order to it, I deny. For both the intellect and intellection and word are real. And of this kind are paternity and filiation in the divine.

Objection 4: St. Augustine, book 7 of On the Trinity, chapter 1, compares the relation of the divine Father to the Son to the relation of lord to servant. And in book 5, chapter 16, to the relation of a coin to the price to be established by the prince. But both the relation of lord to servant, and of coin to price are not real, but only of reason. Therefore.

Response to the first: I distinguish: he compares them in some respect, I grant; in all respects, I deny. St. Augustine intends only in that place to show that in God there are some absolutes and to oneself, such as being good, wise, etc.; and some relatives and to another, such as being Father, which he illustrates by the example of a man in whom there is something absolute, namely being a human, and something relative such as being a lord. Hence his comparison holds regarding the notion of relation as such, not regarding the conditions of relation. To the second, I respond that St.

9 Here a. 1. ad 4.

Augustine there is speaking of the relation of God to creatures, which we admit is not real, not of the relation of God the Father to the Son. See many other arguments in the author, q. 8, on Power, cited, a. 1.

Article II. How Many Real Relations are there in God?

I say 1: There are in God four real relations of origin, namely paternity, filiation, active spiration and passive spiration or procession, yet in such a way that active spiration is not distinguished really from paternity and filiation, but only virtually (10).

The first part is proved: Real relations of origin are received in God according to the processions ad intra in which they are founded; consequently, there are as many real relations in God as the processions ad intra require. But there are two processions ad intra: one through the intellect which is the procession of the Word, the other through the will which is the procession of Love, and each requires two relations, namely of the principle to the principled and conversely of the principled to the principle. Therefore there are four real relations, namely paternity and filiation founded in the procession through the intellect, active spiration and passive spiration founded in the procession through the will.

The second part is proved (11): According to the commonly received principle, all things in God are really one

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10 Here a. 4. Cit.

11 Here q. 30. a. 2. ad 1. And in 1. d. 27. q. 1. a. 1. cit. Here a. 4. cit.

and the same, where relative opposition does not prevent this. But the common active spiration which is in the Father and the Son does not oppose paternity and filiation, but stands in a disparate relation to them. Therefore it is not really distinguished from them.

For the understanding of these matters, it should be observed that relations in created things are really distinguished on a twofold basis: first, from opposition to their correlative; second, from their limitation, insofar as since it is a created relation, it is by this very fact limited to its species, nor can it have the species and perfection of other relations. Hence one and the same thing entitatively cannot regard multiple terms, even if only disparate ones, the limitation of created relative reality being an obstacle to this. But truly in divine matters this reason of limitation does not apply because of the amplitude of infinity, but only the reason of correlative opposition. And therefore since the relations of paternity and filiation are not relatively opposed to active spiration, they are not really distinguished from it, but one and the same entity on account of its infinity can regard diverse terms.

Hence you will infer ([12]) 1, that although there are four real relations in God, there are nevertheless not four relative things, nor quaternity, as has been defined in the chapter "Damnamus," concerning the supreme Trinity; 2 there are not four persons, because Persons are constituted by opposed relations and not by disparate ones; whence active spiration does not constitute a person other than the person of the Father and the person of the Son.

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[12] In. 1. cit.

You will say: When the inferior is multiplied, the superior is multiplied, e.g., when man is multiplied, animal is multiplied. But relation is something inferior to being. Therefore where there are four real relations, there are four relative things, consequently quaternity.

I respond by distinguishing the major: when the inferior is multiplied really and entitatively, the superior is multiplied, I concede; when the inferior is multiplied only terminatively, or through the connotation of something extrinsic, the superior is multiplied, I deny. Now active spiration does not add entity to paternity, but the same entity of paternity which regards the Son by reason of its unlimitedness also regards the Holy Spirit, just as the same entity of mercy and justice in God punishes and shows mercy.

You insist: Real relation and relative thing signify exactly the same thing. But paternity and active spiration are two real relations. Therefore they are two relative things.

I respond by granting the major and distinguishing the minor: paternity and active spiration are two real relations, such that "two" falls upon the relations, I concede; such that it falls upon the realities, I deny. Therefore the sense of this proposition: "Paternity and spiration are two real relations," is that the same entity regards two distinct terms and has the force of a double real relation. Nevertheless we say simply two real relations, because this word "relation" calls upon its formal concept above the term and not above the subject, because the proper and formal nature of relation is to be toward a term, and therefore when a relation is spoken of and numbered, it is spoken of and numbered under the designation toward the term, whether it be entitatively one or several. However, although it is the

same entity of the relation of paternity and the relation of active spiration, it cannot be said that the relation of paternity is the relation of spiration, just as although it is the same entity of justice and mercy, it cannot be said that the attribute of justice is the attribute of mercy, because just as through "attribute," so through "relation" the virtual distinction itself is expressed, by which mercy and justice are virtually distinguished, as are paternity and active spiration.

I say 2: Besides the four real relations of origin assigned, there are no other real relations in God. This is the more common position with St. Thomas and the Thomists, against Scotus and the Scotists, who admit real relations of equality and similarity in God.

That there is equality and similarity among the divine Persons, faith teaches, and St. Thomas proves below q. 42. cited. Equality is considered according to quantity, similarity according to quality. In God, however, there is no quantity of bulk, but of power. Therefore the question here is whether this equality and similarity in God are real relations? The conclusion denies this.

Proof 1: In the divine Persons there is nothing to consider except the essence in which they communicate, and the relations in which they are distinguished. But a real relation of equality or similarity cannot be taken from the part of the essence, because the essence is numerically the same, and the same cannot be really referred to itself. Nor from the part of the relations, because a relation is not referred through some other relation, otherwise one would go to infinity, and moreover one relation cannot be founded in another, since the foundation ought to be firmer than what is founded, and all relations are of equally weak entity.

Proof 2, and the preceding reason is more fully explained: For a real relation of the first genus, namely of equality and similarity, it is required not only that the extremes or subjects be really distinct, but also that the foundations, at least the proximate ones, be really distinct. But the foundations of the relations of equality and similarity in God are not really distinct. For these are the magnitude of essence or power as regards equality, and the attributal qualities, e.g., goodness, wisdom, as regards similarity. But these in the three Persons are not really distinct, but are one and the same numerically. Therefore... The major is proved: the foundation is the reason why subjects are referred; thus two quantified bodies are not formally equal unless because two quantities are equal, and two white walls are not similar unless because two whitenesses are similar. Indeed, in these relations of equality and similarity, the foundations—two quantities—are referred before the two quantified extremes, and two qualities, e.g., two whitenesses, are referred as similar before two white walls. Therefore for a relation of equality and similarity it is required that the foundations be really distinct.

Confirmation: The extremes of real relations as such are relatively opposed to each other; but they cannot have this except by reason of the foundation. For example, two white walls are not relatively opposed to each other except by reason of the whiteness in each. But they cannot be relatively opposed to each other by reason of something which is the same and one in both. Therefore in order that they be really opposed to each other, there cannot be one and the same foundation in both; whence if there were one whiteness in two walls, there would not be a real relation of similarity between them.

You will say 1: The divine Persons are truly and really equal, independently of any operation of the intellect. Therefore equality among them is a real relation.

I respond by denying the consequence, because in order that the divine Persons be and be called truly and really equal, equality formally taken as a real relation is not required, but equality fundamentally taken suffices, or the foundation of the relation, which is the unity of magnitude with the negation of excess. Thus God is and is called truly and really Lord, although the relation of dominion is not real in him, but only its foundation. Thus Christ is and is called truly and really the son of the Blessed Virgin, because although the relation of sonship is not real in him, but only of reason, nevertheless there belongs to him independently of the intellect the foundation of this relation, namely passive generation. And if you infer: Therefore the divine persons are not formally equal, but only fundamentally, let it be so; they are nonetheless truly and really equal no less than God is really Lord, and Christ the son of the Blessed Virgin, because there is truly and really in them the unity of magnitude with the negation of excess, which provides our intellect with the foundation for conceiving them as referred, as if they were really referred.

You insist: According to us, the proximate foundation of the relation of equality is not the unity of magnitude with the negation of excess, unless joined with the distinction of one quantity from another. But in the divine Persons there is not really that distinction, for there is numerically one essence in all. Therefore there is not in them the proximate foundation of the relation of equality.

I respond by distinguishing the major: unless joined with the distinction of one quantity from another as the

reason for founding the relation, I deny; as a condition required for the actual relation of equality, I concede. Whence it follows only that the condition required for the actual relation to follow is lacking, but not that the foundation of this relation is lacking. Whoever wishes more concerning the present difficulty, let him read Gonet disp. 12. a. 1. § 2. and following.

From what has been said you will gather that among the very relations of origin there are no other real relations virtually distinct of similarity, dissimilarity, distinction and opposition, but the relations of origin themselves are similar, or dissimilar, distinct or opposed by themselves; just as in human affairs, e.g., paternity is similar to another paternity and dissimilar to filiation through itself, not through a relation of similarity or dissimilarity superadded, otherwise, as we have said and the logicians prove, one would go to infinity, and because one relation cannot found another. Moreover, what is per se such does not become such through another. Therefore paternity which per se is a relation is not referred through another relation.

Article III. On the Identity and Distinction of Relations From Essence.

In the preceding treatise, dissertation 2, article 3, we supposed: 1° as certain from faith, according to the Council of Reims in 1148 against Gilbert of Poitiers, and from Lateran IV under Innocent III in 1215 against Abbot Joachim, that the relations are not really distinguished from the essence. 2° In the first conclusion we established and proved against the Scotists from Sacred Scripture, from the aforementioned Councils, from the Fathers, and from the

supreme perfection, simplicity, and unity of God, that the relations in God are not distinguished from the essence by a formal actual distinction from the nature of the thing, commonly called Scotistic. 3° In the second conclusion we said that the relations are distinguished from the essence by a virtual distinction or a distinction of reasoned reason—not indeed the greater distinction which exists by way of the excluding and the excluded, but the lesser distinction which exists by way of the implicit and explicit. And let all these things, which we deduced there with sufficiently broad discussion along with solutions to objections, be held as said here, lest we uselessly repeat the same things twice.

However, many more recent authors further ask whether the relations are so really identified with the essence that they belong to the quidditative concept of the essence, and conversely, whether the essence belongs to the quidditative concept of the relations. Although we judge that this question, which seems to us of little utility, has been sufficiently satisfied by what we said in the cited place concerning the aforementioned virtual distinction by way of implicit and explicit, nevertheless, to serve the schools, we shall address it briefly.

I say: The relations in God are so identified with the divine essence or deity that they belong to its quidditative concept—not explicitly, but implicitly and inadequately—and conversely, the essence belongs to the concept of the relations, also implicitly but adequately.

Others explain this differently: some say that the essence and relations, as they are in reality, mutually imply each other in their concept, but as they are subject to our imperfect mode of conceiving, they imply each other implicitly, not explicitly.

Others say that the essence and relations mutually imply each other on the part of the thing signified, but not on the part of the mode of signifying. These and other similar ways of speaking amount to nearly the same thing as ours, and it seems there is a question of names among them.

Furthermore, when we say that the relations belong to the concept of the divine essence, we do not understand that they are its constitutive element, like a genus or difference, but that they are like modes essentially and necessarily belonging to it, or by which it essentially seeks to be modified. Thus the sense of the conclusion is that the divine essence or divinity is so intrinsically and essentially included in the relations, and vice versa the relations in the essence, that neither can the essence exist without the relations or be understood without them as it is in reality, nor can the relations exist or be understood as they truly are without the divine essence. Hence, although the essence can be conceived by formal precision without explicitly conceiving the relations, and the relations can likewise be abstracted or conceived without explicitly conceiving the essence, it is nevertheless impossible to conceive the essence or relations without simultaneously involving implicitly in them all things that are in God. Compare what I said about the beatific vision in the preceding treatise, dissertation 4, article 10, §1.

Proof of the first part: 1° St. Thomas here, question 27, article 2, reply to objection 3, says: "In the very perfection of divine being is contained both the Word proceeding intelligibly and the principle of the Word, as well as whatever pertains to its perfection"; and below, question 30, article 3, reply to objection 2: "Just as this proposition is per se: 'The

Father is God,' so also is this one: 'God is the Father.'" Therefore.

2° By the argument we used against the Scotists in the preceding treatise cited. If the divine essence were not of the at least implicit concept of the relations, nor conversely the relations of the implicit concept of the essence, such that they would not mutually include each other, the notion of most pure, most simple, and infinite act would not be preserved in God. Therefore. Proof of the consequence: because in this hypothesis the divine essence would be conceived with foundation in reality as being in potency to the relations, actualizable and contractible by them as by something extraneous and lacking them, just as animality, because it is not implicitly included in the concept of rationality, is conceived as being in potency to rationality, actualizable and contractible by it as by something extraneous and lacking it. But it is repugnant to most pure act that it be conceived with foundation in reality as further actualizable; it is repugnant to most simple act that it be conceived as being in potency to something extraneous; and finally it is repugnant to infinite being that it not include at least implicitly every being possible to it. Therefore.

The second part concerning adequate and inadequate concept is proved and explained. Although whatever paternity or another relation imports, all of that and totally is imported at least implicitly in the concept of essence or deity, nevertheless not everything that the essence imports is also imported implicitly in paternity, because deity or essence imports filiation, which is not imported even implicitly in the concept of paternity except correlatively, since it is really opposed to it and therefore really distinguished from it. Hence the concept of essence extends more broadly and

includes something other than the concept of any relation taken separately. Therefore.

You will say 1: St. Thomas below, question 33, article 3, reply to objection 4, says: "Things said absolutely in common... are included in the understanding of proper things, but not conversely; for in the understanding of the person of the Father, God is understood, but not the reverse." Likewise in 4 Sentences, distinction 8, On Power, article 2, reply to objection 9, he says that this proposition "essence is paternity" is not per se. And ibid., reply to objection 2: "The notion of essence is one thing, the notion of paternity another." Therefore.

Response: Since St. Thomas elsewhere expressly teaches our conclusion, as is evident from the proof, these testimonies must be reconciled with the former ones; they are reconciled from what has been said.

To the first, therefore, it is true that in the understanding of the person of the Father, God is understood and not conversely, insofar as deity is of the explicit concept of the person of the Father, but the person of the Father is not of the explicit but only implicit concept of deity, because deity extends more broadly than the person of the Father and includes something else, namely filiation and procession, as has been said. Thus in the understanding of the human person, animal is understood, but not conversely, because animality is of the explicit concept of the human person, but the human person is not of the explicit concept of animal, but only implicit, because animal extends more than the human person; or, to make the example more fitting, in the understanding of substance, being is understood, but not conversely, because being is of the explicit concept of substance, but substance is not of the

explicit concept of being, because it extends more broadly than substance.

To the second, I distinguish: this proposition "essence is paternity" is not per se according to explicit concept and on the part of the mode of signifying, I concede; according to implicit concept and on the part of the thing signified, I deny. To the third, similarly: the explicit notion of essence is one thing, that of paternity another, but the implicit notion is the same.

You will say 2: If paternity belongs to the divine essence and conversely, it follows that the Father in generating the Son communicates paternity to him, because he communicates the entire essence to the Son, and thus the Son will be the Father; otherwise, he communicates only part of the substance to him and retains part for himself, which the Council of Lateran IV forbids saying against Abbot Joachim. Therefore.

Response: This argument is not proper against us, but militates equally against all Catholics who do not acknowledge a real distinction between essence and relations, but profess that they are one and the same thing entirely in reality, as the Fathers and Councils speak. For supposing this complete real identity between essence and relations, the same argument can be formed thus: if paternity is really the divine essence, it follows that the Father in generating the Son communicates paternity to him, because he communicates the entire essence to the Son; otherwise, he communicates part of the essence to him and retains part for himself. Other difficulties that are usually opposed against our present conclusion run equally against this common opinion, for example: how does the Father generate and not the essence with which the Father is really

identified? How is each Person really God if it does not import the other Persons, which divinity really includes? And other similar things. Therefore, just as these are explained in the common Catholic opinion about the real identity of essence and relations, and we explained in the cited place by benefit of the virtual distinction by way of explicit and implicit, so also in the present opinion. It must be said therefore that although paternity and essence mutually imply each other implicitly, they do not do so explicitly, and therefore because they are virtually distinguished according to explicit and implicit concepts, and in the eminence of divinity they are identified while preserving their natures of communicability and incommunicability, the essence can be communicated to the Son regarding all the absolute essential things that it explains and that are communicable, without communicating the relative thing that it implies because of opposition to the term to which the essence is communicated. Nor does it follow from this that only part of the essence is communicated to the Son, for the essence is indivisible, but it follows only that although he gives the whole essence to the Son, he does not give everything that is his essence, or that he does not communicate the essence under every formality that the essence itself has. For the essence has the character of paternity insofar as it is in the Father, and therefore he does not communicate paternity to the Son, because it is a relation really opposed to filiation, although compared to the essence it is the same with it. In one word, the Father communicates the essence to the Son regarding all things in which relative opposition does not stand in the way, because one relative cannot be communicated to its correlative to which it is opposed; nor does the council intend anything else, otherwise it would

contradict other Councils and Fathers from whom this common principle is derived: All things in the divine are one and the same, except where relative opposition stands in the way.

That the relations mutually opposed to each other—namely paternity, filiation, and active spiration respectively to passive spiration—are really distinguished among themselves is evident from their very opposition and from what we have said up to now, especially in the prooemial dissertation concerning the distinction and plurality of persons who are constituted by these relations, as we shall say below.

How, however, supposing perfect identity of those relations with the essence, they can nevertheless be really distinguished among themselves and this principal principle of syllogistic art be verified: "Things that are the same to a third thing are the same among themselves"—we also explained in the cited prooemial dissertation, article 2, §3.

Article IV. Whether the Divine Relations have Relative Existences Really Distinct Among Themselves and Virtually Distinct from the Essential Existence?

I presuppose, as something commonly received against a few, that the divine essence as pre-understood by the relations exists through its own and absolute [existence], because as pre-understood by the relations it is the purest act, therefore actually existing; it is uncreated being, therefore existing from itself; it is operating by understanding and willing, therefore existing. Finally, in the very notion of divinity, existence itself is included, for it is

being existing from itself, according to that [passage] from Exodus 3: "I am who am." But the question is whether the relations or divine persons, just as they are relative entities really distinct among themselves and virtually from the essence, so have proper and relative existences really distinct among themselves and virtually distinct from the absolute existence of the essence. In one word, whether the three Divine Persons exist by one absolute existence, or by three relative existences? This latter [position] is affirmed by Richard of St. Victor, Scotus, Suarez, Isambert, to whom most recently Honor. Tournely subscribes. The opposite is commonly denied by others, not only our own [Thomists], but also outsiders with St. Thomas. Hence

I say: The relations or Divine Persons do not have proper relative existences, but exist by one absolute existence of the essence. (13)

Proof 1: From St. Thomas in the places cited. In q. 8 de Pot. cited: "In divine things," he says, "there is no being except of the essence: just as there is no understanding except of the intellect. And for this reason, just as in God there is only one understanding, so also one being." Q. 9 cited: "Diversity, according to being, follows plurality of supposita: just as diversity of essence in created things: but neither [obtains] in divine things." And 3 p. cited: "Because the divine person is the same as the nature, in the Divine Persons there is no other being of the person besides the being of the nature. And therefore the three Persons have only one being. But they would have triple being, if in them there were one being of the person and another being of the

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13 3. p. q. 17. a. 2. ad 3. q. 8. de Pot. a. 2. ad 11. q. 2, de Pot. a. 6. q. 9; de Pot. a. 5. ad 19.

nature." In all of these [passages], if the words are carefully examined, it is clear that the Holy Doctor is not speaking of the being of essence, as adversaries pretend, but of the being of existence: which will be more evident from the following reason taken from him.

Proof 2: By a twofold a priori reason. The first is: absolutes are not multiplied in divine things, because they are not relatively opposed to themselves, but all things are one in God, where relative opposition does not prevent [it], as has already been said; hence although there are three Persons, there is nevertheless not triple understanding, triple willing, triple power; but the existence of a relation or person which they abusively call relative, is something absolute: therefore. Proof of the minor: 1) The existence of a relation does not consist in order to a term, but in order to the subject in which it is; for the existence of a relation in created things is nothing other than being in [the subject], in divine things being per se: therefore it is something absolute and not relative. 2) Existence does not belong to a relation according to the concept "toward," but according to the concept "in," both because according to the concept "toward," it abstracts from existence, as I shall say in the next article, and because what confers existence must exercise some causality concerning it, but a pure term has only to terminate, not to cause anything actively: therefore.

The other a priori reason: those three relative existences, if they were granted, would be created or uncreated. Neither can be said: therefore. Not the first, because it is repugnant to God that anything should exist in him through created existence, and moreover it would follow that the persons insofar as they are many and relative, would be created, which is heretical. Not the second, because

uncreated existence is unique in God, otherwise there would be three uncreated [beings], not only adjectively, but also substantively, because form and subject would be multiplied, for there would be three entities having three uncreated existences; which is against the common faith of the church in the Athanasian Symbol: "Not three uncreated... but one uncreated."

Confirmation: in this hypothesis there would be equally three eternal [beings] substantively or three things having three eternities. Proof: duration is nothing other than continued existence, and so duration in God, as immutable, is eternity: therefore if there are three existences, there will be three immutable durations, consequently three eternities and three eternal [beings] substantively, that is three things having three eternities, which is again against the Athanasian Symbol: "Not three eternal, but one eternal," and is no less repugnant than saying three gods or three omnipotents relatively: therefore.

Proof 3: A posteriori. The relations or divine persons exist through the absolute existence of the essence: therefore relative existences are superfluous, indeed even imply [contradiction]. The antecedent and consequent are to be proved. Proof of antecedent: existence in God is essentially identified with essence, for it is being existing per se; essence is communicated to relations or persons, consequently also its existence: but existence cannot be communicated to anyone unless it renders [that one] existing, just as wisdom or whiteness cannot be communicated to man unless it renders [him] wise or white, for the formal effect of a form is the form itself communicated: therefore the relations or divine persons exist through the absolute existence of the essence. Proof of consequent as to the first part: what once

exists does not need another existence, for through the first it is outside nothing and outside all causes: therefore relative existences are superfluous. Proof of the same consequent as to the second part: 1) it implies [contradiction] that what is once outside nothing and outside all causes (which is the formal effect of existence) should again be placed outside all causes; 2) it implies [contradiction] to have two ultimate actualities, or two ultimate terms of the same order and nature, because then neither would be ultimate: but existence is the ultimate actuality and ultimate term of a thing: therefore.

Solutions to Objections

Objection 1: With Honoratus Tournely: St. Augustine lib. 7 de Trinit. cap. 4: "It is one thing," he says, "for God to be, another for the Father to be." St. Cyril of Alexandria Dialog. de Trinit, lib. 1, speaking of the Father and Son: "Since each is and subsists," he says, "and is said to have proper existence." Add St. Thomas who q. 9 de Pot. a. 5 ad 23: "It pertains to the perfection of divinity that there be several modes of existing in divine things": therefore.

Response: to St. Augustine, he also says there in the same place c. 6: "It is not one thing for God to be, another for the Person to be, but altogether the same." So that these may be reconciled, it must be said that the Holy Doctor is not speaking of the being of existence, but of the being of essence which is not other in God and in the Father under diverse aspects: it is not other from the part of the thing signified, it is other from the part of the mode of signifying, insofar as, although it is the same being really, nevertheless "to be God"

is signified as toward itself, and "to be Father" is signified as toward another.

To Cyril, he takes existence for subsistence, as is clear from the cited text, or he says proper existence by reason of mode, because although it is one existence common to the three Persons, nevertheless it belongs to them in different modes, to the Father as held from himself, to the Son as communicated through generation, to the Holy Spirit through spiration. In which sense the cited St. Thomas speaks; for he does not say that there are several existences, but that there are several modes of existing.

Objection 2: With the same [author]: 1) Relations insofar as distinct from nature, are something real: therefore they have proper existence. Proof of consequent: existence is nothing other than being itself in act: but relations as distinguished from essence, are truly in act: therefore. 2) When the Father produces the Son, it is necessary that some existence be produced, for every production is terminated to existence. 3) Each thing has its existence, but the divine Persons are things distinct from each other: therefore. And these Tournely calls manifest forces of reasons, which we call manifest hallucinations. Hence

Response: to the first, I deny the consequent. To the proof, 1) I deny the major. For according to Thomists in Metaphys., existence is not the thing itself, but the actuality of the thing by which it is placed outside nothing and outside all causes. 2) Given the major, I distinguish the minor: relations as distinguished from essence, are truly in act through the absolute existence of the essence, granted; through relative existences, denied. If you insist: They are several actual entities, I distinguish: several falling upon entities, granted; falling upon actualities, denied. For there

are three actual entities by the same actuality, just as there are three divine Persons by the same divinity.

To the second, I deny the antecedent. To the proof I distinguish: every production is terminated to existence produced or communicated, granted; always produced, denied. For to produce a thing, is to constitute it existing, which is equally well done by communicating existence already produced, as by producing a new one: just as although the divine essence modified by relation is the formal term of divine production, nevertheless this essence is not produced anew, but only communicated.

To the third, I distinguish the major: each thing has its existence proper or common, granted; always proper and distinct, denied. Thus the humanity of Christ is a thing and nevertheless does not have proper and distinct existence, but exists by the existence of the Word. If you insist: Created relation has proper and distinct existence, therefore also divine; I respond by denying the consequent. The disparity is manifold: 1) created relation does not exist through the existence of the subject, but through inexistence or inherence; divine relations exist through the absolute existence of the essence, but the same thing cannot exist by two existences, as we have proved; 2) created relation has accidental being, divine substantial: hence although in us wisdom, for example, has proper and distinct existence from the existence of substance, not so in God: so also relation; 3) absolutes can be multiplied in created things, not so in divine; 4) it is not repugnant to say several created [beings] substantively in one created composite: but it is repugnant to say several uncreated [beings] substantively in God.

Objection 3: Existence ought to be proportioned to the entity of which it is the existence: therefore the existence of divine relations ought to be relative.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: existence ought to be proportioned to the entity of which it is the existence as to the common notions of accident and substance, I grant the antecedent, because substance cannot exist through the existence of accident, which is inherence, so accident cannot exist through the existence of substance which is perseity; as to other particular notions, I deny. For body, for example, exists through the existence of the soul which is spiritual.

You will infer: Therefore the Father in divine things is toward himself and not toward another, which is against the nature of relatives, whose whole being is to be related to another.

Response: I distinguish the inference: the Father is toward himself as to the notion of existence, granted; as to quiddity and relative notion, denied. But when the relative is defined as that whose whole being is to be related to another, "being" is not taken for existence, which does not express "toward" but "in," as we have proved, but is taken for quiddity or formal notion.

Objection 4: Besides absolute subsistence in God there are three relative subsistences: therefore by parity besides absolute existence there are three relative existences.

Response: I deny the consequent. The disparity is that absolute subsistence gives only the perseity of independence, not of incommunicability, hence there remains place for relative subsistence which brings the perseity of incommunicability, nor are absolutes of the same nature thereby multiplied. But existence whether absolute or

relative has one unique effect, which is to place the thing outside all causes and outside nothing, which absolute existence accomplishes, consequently the second is superfluous, indeed implies [contradiction], as has been proved; and if it were granted, absolutes of the same nature would be multiplied, as we have also proved. This argument will return again in the next dissertation where [we treat] of those relative subsistences, and will be more accurately resolved.

Article V. Whether the Divine Relations, Beyond the Absolute Perfection of the Essence, Bring about Another Relative Perfection?

You see that we suppose the divine relations to be perfect in themselves and to have true perfection, for since they are really identified with the divine essence, they undoubtedly have the same infinite perfection with it, by reason of which they are necessarily loved by God and ought to be adored by us with the worship of latria, as St. Thomas teaches here in article 2 in the argument "But against." But because they are distinguished virtually and rationally from the essence, the question is whether, beyond the absolute perfection of the essence which they imbibe in themselves, they bring about by virtue and reason of their concept as relations another proper and relative perfection virtually distinct from the absolute perfection of the essence?

It does not appear, therefore, that Honoratus Tournely touches the point of difficulty when he says that the sense of the question is whether the relations of origin formally as relations and according to their being-toward and virtually distinguished from the essence, are true

perfections; and he resolves this question affirmatively in this sense. For no one, as I think, denies that relations even as such and virtually distinct from the essence are true perfections, namely by that very real and absolute perfection of the essence which they really include, as Tournely himself explains in his second proof. But the question is, I say, whether beyond that absolute perfection of the essence which they enjoy, they bring about by virtue and reason of their relative concept another relative perfection distinct from the absolute, just as absolute attributes, for example wisdom, beyond the perfection of the essence, brings about another proper to itself virtually distinct from the former, which Tournely neither touches upon nor explains.

This question is probably defended on both sides, with faith preserved, even in the school of St. Thomas. We embrace the negative part, as it seems to us somewhat more probable; but those to whom the affirmative seems more attractive will find its foundations in the objections and responses to our foundations in the body of the present article. Therefore:

I say: The divine relations, beyond the absolute perfection of the essence which they implicitly import, do not bring about by virtue of their relative concept another relative perfection virtually distinct from the absolute. This is held among Thomists by Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, and others, whom the Salmanticenses cite and follow; likewise Gonet, Marcus a Serra and others, against John of St. Thomas, Contenson, Bancel, and others.

Proof 1 from authority. St. Augustine in De Trinitate 7, chapters 1 and 6, says that goodness and magnitude of perfection in the divine are said not relatively but in themselves: therefore every perfection in God is absolute,

none relative. The same St. Augustine in book 5, chapter 8: "Great is the Father," he says, "great the Son, great the Holy Spirit, yet not three great ones, but one Great... Good is the Father, good the Son, good the Holy Spirit, yet not three good ones, but one is Good." But if goodness, if magnitude, which according to St. Thomas below in question 42, article 1, ad 1, signifies his perfection, were really multiplied in the divine Persons, these could be called three good, three great, three perfect, not only adjectively, but also substantively; because both the material and formal signification of these words, good, great, would be multiplied: therefore.

St. Thomas below in question 42, article 4, ad 2: "Paternity," he says, "is the dignity of the Father just as the essence is, for dignity is absolute and pertains to the essence: thus therefore just as the same essence which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. Truly therefore it is said that whatever dignity the Father has, the Son has; nor does it follow: the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity; for the what is changed into the toward-something. For the same is the essence and dignity of the Father and Son, but in the Father it is according to the relation of giving, in the Son according to the relation of receiving." By these words the holy Doctor not only openly asserts our conclusion, but also proves it, because namely the dignity or perfection of the Father is absolute and pertains to the essence, and the same is in the Father and in the Son.

Proof 2 by a double a priori reason drawn from the principles of St. Thomas. The first reason supposes from the holy Doctor above in question 5, articles 1 and 3, that good and perfect are convertible among themselves because something is good insofar as it is appetible, and everything is

appetible according as it is perfect, because all things seek their perfection; with this supposed, it is thus proposed. Something is good and perfect insofar as either it is in the act of existence, or it expresses an order to it: but the divine relations by virtue of their concept as relations and as they are pure respects to a term neither exist, nor express an order to existence, but only by virtue of the concept of or by reason of the divine essence which they include: therefore. The major is from St. Thomas in the cited question 5 and is clear because the will is not carried toward anything except under an order to existence, but only that is good and perfect which the will seeks. The minor is also from the holy Doctor in De Potentia question 2, article 5, where he says that relation insofar as it is relation does not have that it be something, but only that it be toward something. Moreover, it is clear by reason: because relation according to what is proper to it and as it is a pure respect regards nothing except by ordering to a term, because its whole being is to be related to another; but it cannot order its existence to a term, because the existence of relation is not toward a term, but toward a subject: therefore by reason of itself and by virtue of its concept as relation, it does not express an order to existence, but abstracts from it. Confer the second proof of the preceding article.

Second a priori reason. The reason of perfection ought to be taken through order to a subject considered by reason of itself and resting in it: but relation by virtue of its proper concept regards no subject by reason of itself resting in it, but by reason of the term: therefore. The minor is from St. Thomas here in article 2, where he posits the difference between relation and other genera. That in other genera besides relation, such as quantity and quality, even the

proper reason of the genus is taken according to comparison to the subject by reason of itself and toward itself, thus quantity is called the measure of substance, quality the disposition of substance; but the proper reason of relation is not taken according to comparison to the subject by reason of itself and resting in it, but through comparison to something outside, namely the term. This is also clear by reason, because by the very fact that some concept is relative, although it regards the subject, it nevertheless regards it by ordering to the term and by reason of the term, because its whole being is to be related to another. But the major is proved: perfection ought to regard the perfectible subject through commensuration with it: but if it does not regard the subject by reason of itself, but by reason of the term, it will not be commensurated with it, but with the term, which is the reason for regarding the subject: therefore.

Contenson responds that although absolute perfection regards the perfectible subject by reason of itself, relative perfection nevertheless regards the perfectible subject in order to another, as is clear in powers and habits. But against this, this most learned theologian badly confuses here predicamental relations with transcendental ones, such as powers and habits are; for these are not pure respects to a pure term, but are absolute forms affecting and regarding the subject by reason of themselves, and only secondarily connoting something extrinsic not as a pure term, but as an object perfective of itself and the subject: whence it is not surprising if they regard and perfect the subject in order to another; or, to speak more correctly, if they regard another in order to perfect the subject. But the relations of which we treat here are pure respects to a pure term, consequently

they do not regard the subject by reason of themselves, but by reason of the term.

From these two reasons you will gather the difference that exists between the divine attributes and relations, namely that attributes, since they are absolute, according to their proper reason express an order to existence and regard the essence by reason of themselves, and perfect it in order to itself, not in order to another, which has the character of a pure term, and thus they add some perfection virtually distinct; but relations from their proper explicit reason neither express an order to existence, nor regard the divine essence by reason of themselves, but the pure term correlated to themselves, consequently they do not add any relative perfection, but a pure respect abstracting from perfection and imperfection.

Proof 3 of the conclusion from inconveniences. If relations in the divine bring about and multiply relative perfection, it follows 1st that there will be three magnitudes, three goodnesses, three perfections, consequently three great ones, three good ones, three perfect ones substantively, against St. Augustine cited above. 2nd It follows that all three Persons will be something more perfect at least extensively than one; against the same St. Augustine in De Trinitate 6, chapter 8 and book 8, chapter 1, sermon 38 De Tempore, where he says: "So great is the Father alone, as great as the Father and Son and Holy Spirit together." 3rd It follows that no Person will be infinitely perfect, because none will have every perfection whatsoever; for paternity and the relative perfection of paternity will be lacking to the Father, just as paternity and the relative perfection of paternity will be lacking to the Son; for just as relative opposition exists between relations, so between relative perfections: therefore

the Father will not be formally infinitely perfect, nor similarly the Son.

Nor should you say that for the notion of infinitely perfect it suffices that it have every absolute perfection, not relative and especially correlative, because it is of the nature of this that it be incommunicable to its correlative: for that cannot be considered infinitely and in every part perfect which lacks some true perfection importing no imperfection in its concept, which relative perfection ought to be, if it is given, otherwise it would not be in a divine person. And indeed if that which lacks some true absolute perfection cannot be called infinitely perfect, by what right will you call that infinitely perfect which lacks a perfection equally true and pure although relative? Therefore either relative perfection is not given, or an infinitely perfect being ought to have it, and if it does not have it, it is not infinitely perfect. Moreover, it is contradictory for an infinitely perfect being to have repugnance and incompossibility with pure perfection which involves no imperfection, because the very repugnance and incompossibility with such perfection is an imperfection.

4th It follows that equality among the divine Persons is removed. Proof 1: by the very fact that paternity is a relative perfection distinct from filiation, it ought to be distinguished from it specifically or quasi-specifically and essentially, both because paternity and filiation do not differ in number alone like two paternities or two filiations, and because mere numerical distinction is sought from potentiality and matter which is not in God; whence whatever differs in God, differs specifically and essentially: but what differs specifically and essentially from another is necessarily of unequal perfection with it, because species are like numbers, of which one always either exceeds or is

exceeded by another. Proof 2: in the hypothesis the Father and Son would be more perfect than the Holy Spirit, because the Father beyond the perfection of paternity and the Son beyond the perfection of filiation, would have the perfection of active spiration; but the Holy Spirit would have only one perfection, namely of passive spiration: therefore.

The adversaries commonly respond that these inconveniences do not follow from their position, because although the relative perfection of one person is not in another formally, it is nevertheless eminently by reason of the essence, indeed, as some say, in some way formally through circumincession, or the reciprocal existence of one in another.

But against this: 1st, this response does not touch the first inconvenience, as is clear; then it does not sufficiently save the other inconveniences: 1st because a supremely and infinitely perfect being ought to contain all simply simple perfections in the most perfect mode, that is, those which involve no imperfection, such as relative perfections are if they are given: but the mode of containing formally and eminently is more perfect than the mode of containing eminently only: therefore. 2nd A supremely and infinitely perfect being ought to contain otherwise the perfections which involve no imperfection than those which involve imperfection: but it contains these eminently: therefore it ought to contain the former formally. 3rd If God did not contain formally all simply simple perfections, he would not be formally infinitely perfect: therefore if one person does not contain formally the perfections of another, it will not be formally infinitely perfect: therefore this eminential containment does not prevent the infinite perfection and equality of the Persons from being destroyed according to

the position of the adversaries, nor that all three Persons be something more perfect than one. But to what some add about circumincession: granted that paternity is in the Son through circumincession, it nevertheless does not formally affect and perfect the Son, otherwise it would constitute him Father: therefore neither does this manner of speaking save the inconveniences.

Our Bancel responds that one person has the total perfection of another compensatively, insofar as just as the relative perfection of paternity is infinite, so the relative perfection of filiation is infinite, and just as the perfection of paternity is in the Father alone constitutively and in the Son terminatively, so the perfection of filiation is in the Son alone constitutively and in the Father terminatively, and thus adequate compensation is made and therefore complete equality.

But against this: granted that this response saves equality among the divine Persons, the other inconveniences nevertheless remain, namely that there are three great ones, three perfect ones, that all persons are something more perfect than one, that none is infinitely perfect, since it lacks the perfection of another: whence Bancel falsely supposes when he supposes the Persons in his hypothesis remain infinite. But neither is equality among them saved by this reasoning; because, as was said, those which differ specifically are related as exceeding and exceeded, and therefore among them compensation cannot be given. Moreover, I press the point in the Father and Son; for they would have double relative perfection, the Holy Spirit only one: therefore no compensation.

Our Contenson responds that equality in the divine is attended to only according to absolutes, according to the

Holy Fathers and especially St. Thomas here in question 42, article 4, ad 2. But against this: it is indeed true according to the Holy Fathers and St. Thomas that equality in the divine is attended to only according to absolutes, because these alone and not relatives import perfection, as St. Thomas teaches in that very place which Contenson objects; but if relatives also by their virtue imported perfection, necessarily according to them no less than according to absolutes equality or inequality would be attended to. Moreover, this response does not save the other inconveniences, as was said of the preceding one.

The praised theologian responds again that although divine relations differ specifically, or quasi-specifically in the notion of relation, they nevertheless do not in the notion of perfection, but according to this notion of perfection, they differ only numerically, because they are terminated to the same term specifically, distinct only numerically, namely to God.

But against this: 1st, perhaps it has been unheard of until now in the school of St. Thomas to give in mere spirituals, especially in the divine, purely numerical distinction, which according to the principles of the holy Doctor is derived from matter. But even if it could be given, it would not be derived from the term, but from the subject which has the character of matter. 2nd It is unintelligible that relations specified through the term are distinguished among themselves specifically, and relative perfections having the same specificative term are distinguished only numerically; for it is false what Contenson supposes, that relative perfections are terminated to one term specifically, namely to God, and relations to a term specifically diverse. For just as paternity is terminated to the Son as begotten, so

also the relative perfection of paternity, if it is given; and conversely, just as filiation is terminated to the Father as generating, so the relative perfection of filiation, if it is given: but truly the Father as generating and the Son as begotten, are terms in the relative genus, specifically and not only numerically distinct; but even granting this response gratuitously, by the very fact that Contenson admits there to be numerically distinct relative perfections in the divine Persons, the other inconveniences follow, namely that no person is infinitely perfect, all three are more perfect than one, there are three great ones, and three perfect ones substantively.

Solutions to Objections

You will object first several authorities of the Fathers and Councils. 1st The sixth general Synod, act 18, in the edict of Emperor Pogonatus, says: "We believe... unity indeed on account of natural union and dominion, but trinity on account of the perfection of three subsistences and the riches of superexisting goodness." And Act 4: "We believe the divinity of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit to be in three perfect subsistences."

2nd Damascene book 1, De Fide chapter 11, says: "In the properties of paternity, filiation and procession according to cause and causal or caused and personal perfection (that is, mode of existence) we understand the difference." 3rd Cyril book 2, Thesaurus chapter 1: "The divinity cannot be perfect unless it has a Son." 4th St. Thomas De Potentia question 8, article 1, ad 1: "The divine essence, because it comprehends the perfections of all genera, nothing prevents relation from being found in it."

And ibid. question 9, article 5, ad 23: "There would not be complete perfection in the divine, unless there were the procession of the Word and Love..."

Other Fathers concur who everywhere teach that the deity would not be full and perfect without persons and relations, and that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity which is constituted through relations, expresses the supreme and infinite perfection in God, or pertains to the supreme perfection of God: therefore.

For the solution of these and similar authorities. Note 1: we, as we have already said, do not deny that the divine subsistences and relations even as virtually distinct from the essence import perfection, but we say it is absolute and indistinct from the very perfection of the essence which they include, not however relative and distinct from the very perfection of the essence. See what was said at the beginning of the article.

Note 2: it is one thing for divine relations to pertain to the perfection of the divinity, another for them from their formal concept to superadd perfection to the divine nature; for it can pertain to the perfection of some essence that it communicate its perfection to some formal notion, which although from its formal concept it does not bring perfection, is nevertheless capable of receiving the perfection of the essence and thus it is in the present case. Therefore divine relations are said to pertain to the perfection of the divinity and the mystery of the Trinity is said to express supreme perfection, insofar as the divine essence, since it is infinitely fruitful, seeks to be communicated to relations as terms of its fruitfulness, not however that relations superadd to it some relative perfection virtually distinct from the absolute. Thus the perfection which relations or the mystery of the Most

Holy Trinity import is held from the part of the nature communicated to relations, but does not come from the relations themselves; and thus from the negation of relations or processions it would indeed be inferred that God would not be perfect, but only argumentatively and a posteriori, just as from the defect of the possibility of creatures it would be inferred a posteriori and through an extrinsic locus the destruction of divine omnipotence. Therefore:

To the authority of the council and Damascene, I respond that they are to be understood, according to the first note, concerning the absolute perfection of the essence which we do not deny to relations, which perfection as modified by diverse relations and diverse mode of existing is called personal, for it is in the Father as unbegotten, in the Son as begotten, in the Holy Spirit as proceeding from both; and that this is the mind of the Fathers is clear, both because they place perfection in the singular, and because they explain that perfection through mode of existence, as Damascene does. Therefore there are three perfect subsistences, three perfect relations, three perfect Persons, but by one perfection of essence diversely modified.

To the other authorities, I respond that they are to be understood according to the sense of the second note. You insist: St. Thomas opuscule 1 Against the Errors of the Greeks chapter 7, says: "That the Father does not have his perfection from another; but the Son and Holy Spirit have their perfection from the Father": but no one calls his own what he has in common with others: therefore beyond the absolute perfection common to the three Persons, they have their own proper and relative perfection. Thus Banez.

I respond by distinguishing the minor: no one calls his own what he has in common with others as to thing and

mode, granted; what he has in common with others as to thing only, and proper as to mode, denied. Therefore in this sense St. Thomas says the Father has his perfection, the Son and Holy Spirit theirs, because although it is one perfection entitatively common to the three, it is nevertheless participated by them in a diverse mode proper to each, as we have said.

You reply: St. Thomas question 99, article 3 teaches that in God, to whom every perfection is to be attributed, the notion of person is found, because person signifies what is most perfect in all nature: but this reasoning would prove nothing, if personality added nothing of perfection to the essence: therefore.

I respond by denying the minor. For although divine Persons by reason of relative subsistences do not explicate perfection, they nevertheless implicate a double one, namely of absolute subsistence which they include, and of intellectual nature which they import obliquely; for person is an individual substance of rational nature: whence from the fact that divine nature contains every perfection St. Thomas correctly infers that the notion of person is found in it.

Objection 2 a priori: Everything real existing in God imports perfection explicitly; but relation is really existing in God, virtually distinct from the essence: therefore it imports perfection explicitly virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence. The minor is certain.

Proof of the major: 1st Whatever real entity, at least as it exists, is convertible with goodness; for it is repugnant that something be existing in the nature of things and that it not be good, since it is an object toward which the will is carried which cannot love except the good; and this is clear from St. Thomas above question 4, article 1 and question 5, article 3,

where he resolves that everything being in act is good: therefore everything real existing, etc.

Proof 2: What has whatever is required for its proper integrity and nothing is lacking to it in its proper genus, is perfect, as Aristotle teaches and St. Thomas subscribes above question 4, article 4. And it is clear from the etymology of the name itself; perfect is as if perfectly acted: but everything real existing in God, and therefore every relation has whatever is required for its proper integrity, and nothing is lacking to it in its proper genus, for example: nothing is lacking to paternity for the perfect, complete and full notion of paternity: therefore, etc. Proof 3 of the major: That is good and perfect which is suitable to the thing which is called good and perfect: but everything real existing in God is formally suitable to it, and especially relations are suitable to persons, inasmuch as persons are constituted by relations; but nothing is more suitable to a thing than its constitutive: therefore. Proof 4: Whatever is found formally in the most perfect being, such as God is, ought to breathe perfection: therefore, etc. The antecedent is clear; otherwise it would not befit the most perfect being nor would it be formally in God, but only eminently in the way that perfections secundum quid are in God: therefore. Contenson pursues this extensively.

I respond that this entire argumentation is easily solved from the established principles by which we have proved that nothing is called perfect or good, unless it expresses an order to existence and regards the subject by reason of itself. Whence to the first major of the entire argument, I distinguish: everything real existing in God imports existence, denied. Similarly to the minor: relation is really existing in God from its formal concept as relation,

denied; from the formal concept of being according to which it is identified with the essence, granted.

Hence flow the solutions to the four following proofs. To the first, I distinguish the major: whatever real entity at least as it really exists, is convertible with goodness from that part by which it exists, granted; from that part by which it does not exist, denied. But from the part of relation formally or the concept as relation, it abstracts from existence, or non-existence, as we have proved.

To the second proof, some distinguish between transcendental goodness or perfection, and perfective or qualificative, and they grant the major concerning transcendental goodness, but deny it concerning perfective and qualificative. This solution is probable; but, as it seems, more conformable to the established principles of St. Thomas, I distinguish otherwise the major: what has whatever is required for its proper integrity and nothing is lacking in its proper genus is perfect if it expresses an order to existence and is suitable to the subject by reason of itself, granted; otherwise, denied. Thus for example mathematical things as they are subject to abstraction from sensible and singular matter, likewise the specific notions of man, lion, etc., precisely according to their formal notions taken, although they are conceived to have whatever is required for their integrity, because nevertheless they abstract as such from order to existence, they are not good, nor perfect, as St. Thomas teaches in De Veritate question 21, article 2, ad 4, and with him the Thomists in metaphysics.

To the third proof, I respond 1st by distinguishing the major: that is good and perfect which is suitable to the subject by reason of itself and with order to existence, granted; otherwise, denied. And in that sense I distinguish

the minor and deny the consequent. For further explanation, I respond 2nd, granted the major, I deny the minor. For although divine relations really are suitable to the diverse Persons whom they constitute, because by reason of the essence, they are real and exist, nevertheless as they are pure respects to the term they prescind from the notion of suitability with them. 1st Because under this formality they prescind from existence and from order to it, but something is suitable to another insofar as it exists, or expresses an order to existing. 2nd Because they do not regard the subject by reason of themselves but by reason of the correlative term, but something is said to be suitable and consonant to another insofar as it regards it by reason of itself, and rests in it, as we have said. Whence you will infer that divine relations are neither infinite according to themselves, nor finite, but abstract from infinity or finitude as from perfection or imperfection, somewhat in the way that man, although from the side of the thing he is white or black, nevertheless according to himself abstracts from both qualities.

To the fourth proof, I distinguish the antecedent: whatever is formally found in God ought to breathe perfection from the part of itself or of another to which it is necessary, granted; always from the part of itself, denied. For it suffices that it be such without which a perfect thing would not subsist: thus it is in the present case, for although relations by reason of themselves do not explicate perfection, they are nevertheless necessarily required for the perfection of the divinity, insofar as they are terms of divine fruitfulness to which the very divine perfection is communicated.

You insist: If there were a unique subsistence in God, it would express perfection distinct from the essence: but no

reason can be assigned why from the plurality of subsistences personality loses perfection: therefore.

I respond by denying the minor and I assign the reason, because namely if there were given a unique subsistence in God, either it would be the very essence of God without virtual distinction, as many think concerning absolute subsistence, or at least it would add something absolute to the essence and consequently perfection; but now since it adds nothing except the relative, therefore it does not add perfection.

You reply: Created personality expresses perfection really modally distinct from the perfection of nature: but divine relations are divine personalities: therefore a fortiori, etc.

I respond by distinguishing the major: created personality taken as to the perseity of independence expresses perfection, granted; taken as to the perseity of incommunicability, denied. Similarly I distinguish the minor: but divine relations are personalities of God as to the perseity of incommunicability, granted; as to the perseity of independence, denied. Therefore personality expresses two things, perseity of independence and incommunicability to a further supposit: the first imports perfection, not the second, for it is not a perfection not to be able to be communicated to another, but the first the divine person has from absolute subsistence, the second from relations. Whence it does not follow from our position that created personality is more perfect than divine personality, as Contenson wrongly infers.

And hence you will solve another argument which is thus proposed: Created personality is a perfection: but the personality of the Word as virtually distinct from the essence and by virtue of relative concept terminates human nature in

Christ, and in this supplies the place of created personality: therefore the personality of the Word by virtue of relative concept is a perfection.

I respond from what has been said by distinguishing the major: created personality as to the perseity of independence, is a perfection, granted major; as to the perseity of incommunicability, denied major. In this sense I distinguish the minor: but the personality of the Word by virtue of relative concept supplies the place of created personality as to the perseity of incommunicability, granted minor; as to the perseity of independence, denied minor. For as to this it supplies the place of created personality by virtue of absolute subsistence which it implicitly imports.

You will urge: The personality of the Word as virtually distinct from the essence and as relation sanctifies human nature: but sanctity necessarily explicates perfection: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major: the personality of the Word as relation sanctifies human nature as that which, let it pass; as that by which, I subdistinguish: by reason of the divine nature which it implicates, granted minor; by reason of itself as it is relation, denied minor and consequent. Consult the treatise on the Incarnation to question 7 of St. Thomas.

DISSERTATION FOUR
ON THE DIVINE PERSONS IN GENERAL, THEIR PLURALITY, THE MODE OF SPEAKING ABOUT THEM, AND THEIR NOTIONS (ST. TH. Q. 29. 30. 31. 32.)

Article I. What is a Person? Whether it is the Same as Hypostasis and Subsistence? Whether it is Properly in the Divine, and What it Signifies? (St. Th. Q. 29.)

It is asked firstly: What is a person?

Response: A person is correctly defined by Boethius in his book On the Two Natures as "an individual substance of a rational nature." St. Thomas explains and defends this definition here and elsewhere,(1) and with him commonly the theologians.

For which note that, although the name "person" is derived from representing or sounding forth someone's deeds, as happens in comedies, in which formerly, as Boethius notes, the reciters, in order to represent someone whose deeds they were reciting, would cover their face with a certain mask, and thus they would "personate" their recitation; because nevertheless judgment about a name

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[1] Here q. 29. a. 1. c.

ought not to be according to that from which it is imposed, but according to that for the signification of which it is imposed, just as a stone, although it is said to be from "injuring the foot," nevertheless not everything that injures the foot is a stone. Hence although, as I said, the name "person" derives its etymology from "personating" and "representing," thence however by common usage it has been drawn to signify men themselves substantially in themselves, which usage is frequent in civil law, when there is question of action or injury of persons; indeed also in Sacred Scripture, as is evident in Wisdom 6: "God does not withdraw the person of anyone"; and Acts 10: "God is not an acceptor of persons"; and elsewhere. And because in comedies and tragedies certain famous men were represented, this name "Person" was imposed to signify some having dignity;[2] whence those in Churches who have some dignity are customarily called persons... and because it is of great dignity to subsist in rational nature, therefore every individual of rational or intellectual nature, namely man, Angel, God, is now called person by all. These things being noted,

The definition is explained: It is said "substance," which holds the place of genus and supposes for complete substance, whence not only accidents, but also parts whether integral or essential, indeed even the rational soul even in the state of separation, are excluded from the notion of person.

"Individual" is placed in the place of difference, that is, so singular that it is also incommunicable; wherefore

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[2] Ibid. a. 3. ad 3.

Richard of St. Victor adds this particle "incommunicable" to the definition of person, for the sake of greater explanation.

Moreover, according to the writing to Hannibald d. 5. q. unique a. 2, person excludes threefold communicability, namely of the universal to inferiors, because it is singular; of the part to the whole, because it is complete substance; of nature to the supposit, because it is ultimately terminated. Hence from the notion of person is excluded the humanity of Christ, because although it is individual and singular, insofar as singular is opposed to universal, it is nevertheless not incommunicable to the supposit. Likewise also the divine essence as pre-understood to the Persons, because although it subsists with absolute subsistence, it is nevertheless communicable to them. The relative subsistences in God, however, are true Persons, because although the nature under them is communicable, nevertheless the person itself, or the nature itself reduplicatively as personated, is not communicable; for indeed the person of the Father, or the nature as in the Father, is not communicable to the Son, and this suffices in the divine for the notion of person, although perhaps it does not suffice in human things. Because, as John of St. Thomas correctly notes, the divine personalities are relative, not absolute, and it is of the nature of the relative that it have a correlative, and indeed although distinct from itself insofar as it is opposed to itself, nevertheless not distinct from itself in that in which it is not opposed; moreover between relations and nature there is no opposition, but only between the relations themselves mutually. Therefore relation in the divine has a correlative term within the same nature, and therefore it is not an adequate term of nature, but inadequate, because it must give partnership to another correlative; whence it is not of

the nature of relative subsistence to render the nature itself incommunicable as nature is, but only the relative person itself, or the nature formally as personated and not absolutely, because it is its inadequate term as being relative. Created personality, however, is absolute, and therefore adequate, whence it renders not only the person, but also the nature itself incommunicable, and therefore such personality was excluded when humanity was assumed by the Word, as we shall say concerning the Incarnation.

It is said "of rational or intellectual nature"; because although other composite substantial things of irrational natures have their subsistence and are supposits, nevertheless they are not and are not called persons; for one says "supposit of a lion" or "of a stone," not "person": because namely, as we said, the name "person" bears before itself some dignity, and therefore it is appropriated to intellectual supposits alone.

It is asked 2: Whether person is the same as hypostasis and subsistence?

Response: Negatively, because hypostasis and subsistence extend more widely than person; for what hypostasis and subsistence signify in the whole genus of substances, the name "person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.

For the fuller understanding of this question, note that there was formerly a great controversy between the Greeks and Latins concerning this Greek word ὑπόστασις, concerning which Gregory Nazianzen speaks in oration 21 in praise of the great Athanasius, and about which St. Jerome consulted Pope Damasus. The Latins thought that hypostasis signified the same as ousia or essence, and therefore they rejected three hypostases, and accused the Greeks who

admitted them of Arianism: "Let three hypostases be silent," says St. Jerome in his epistle to Damasus, "let one be held; believe me, poison lies hidden under honey." The Greeks, however, thinking that "person" was used only in likeness to those things which are done in comedies, where one man exhibits several persons, and that through it is signified not substance, but office or quality, accused the Latins who admitted one hypostasis and three Persons of Sabellianism, as if they had acknowledged a unique supposit in God, which on account of various effects and various offices, would now be called Father, now Son, now Holy Spirit, which was the error of Sabellius. But finally this dissension, as the cited Nazianzen observes, arose from poverty of words, and what was only about words, was settled, and by common consent hypostasis was accepted for person, so that there is now no Latin theologian who does not confess three hypostases in God just as three Persons: whence in the symbol of St. Athanasius, where the Latins have: "Another is the person of the Father," the Greeks have "hypostasis," indeed this word has become so common among the Latins, that they are accustomed to call the union of humanity in the person of the Word the "hypostatic union."

Concerning subsistence, which for the Latins is what hypostasis is for the Greeks, although formerly among the Latins it was accepted for essence as hypostasis, as is evident from the Roman council in Theodoret, book 2, chapter 22, where it is said that the Holy Spirit has one subsistence with the Father and Son, that is, essence, afterwards by common consent it was used for person from the I Council of Constantinople in the epistle to Damasus, from the Council of Chalcedon act. 16, the V general council canon 1, the VI general council act. 4 and elsewhere, where three

subsistences are predicated in God no differently than three Persons.

It is asked 3: Whether the divine Persons can be called three substances, just as they are called three hypostases, or three Persons?

The reason for doubting is, because person is defined through substance. Before the response, note that substance according to etymology is said in two ways, either from sustaining, or from subsisting or existing per se. This being posited,

Response: If it is taken in the first sense, St. Augustine correctly said in book 7 of On the Trinity chapter 5, that God is abusively called substance, because namely he underlies no accidents. If it is taken in the second way, it most greatly befits God, because he is being from himself, most greatly subsisting per se and independent from everything else.

These things concerning substance according to that from which the name is imposed: but if it is considered according to that for the signification of which it is imposed, according to diverse nations there was diverse signification, and therefore equivocation: The Greeks used it for person and hypostasis, whence they said three substances in God, as St. Augustine testifies in book 15 of On the Trinity, chapter 8, with these words: "Very many of ours who treat this in Greek eloquence, are accustomed to say one essence, three substances." The Latins, however, used that word for essence, as the same St. Augustine testifies there in chapter 9, with these words: "But because our custom of speaking has already obtained, that this is understood, when we say essence, which is understood when we say substance, we do not dare to say one essence, three substances; but one essence or substance."

Wherefore, in order that equivocation and occasion of error be removed, and because we deal among Latins with whom substance primarily imports essence, we ought not to say simply three substances in God, but with an addition removing equivocation, e.g. three individual substances, for this is nothing other than to say three incommunicable supposits.

It is asked 4: Whether the notion of person is properly found in the divine?

Response: Affirmatively.(3) It is of faith defined in the Second Council of Toledo and the Lateran, chapter "Firmly," received by the universal Church singing from the Symbol of St. Athanasius: "Another is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit": and it is evident from all those things which we said about the truth of this mystery in the proemial dissertation.

Reason supports this:(4) person signifies that which is most perfect in all nature, insofar as it imports both intellectual nature, which is the most perfect of all natures, and the mode of existing per se, which is the most worthy of all. But whatever of perfection there is, is properly found in God: therefore.

Likewise, person is an individual, that is incommunicable, substance of intellectual nature, but in God there is intellectual nature and incommunicable subsistence; for indeed the person of the Father is not communicated to the Son, nor conversely: therefore.

You will say 1: According to Dionysius, chapter 1 On the Divine Names, nothing is to be said of the hidden

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3 Here q. 29. a. 3. c.

4 Ibid.

divinity, except those things which are divinely expressed to us in the sacred eloquences; but the name "person" said of God, is not expressed to us in Sacred Scripture of the Old or New Testament: therefore.

Response:(5) Although the name "person" is not found in Sacred Scripture of the Old and New Testament said of God, nevertheless that which the name signifies, is found said of God in Sacred Scripture in many ways, namely that he is most greatly being per se and most perfectly understanding. But if it were necessary to say of God only those things according to word which Sacred Scripture hands down of God, it would follow that never in another language could anyone speak of God, except in that in which Sacred Scripture was first handed down. But the necessity of disputing with heretics compelled the finding of new names signifying the ancient faith about God. Nor is this novelty to be avoided when it is not profane, inasmuch as it does not discord from the sense of Sacred Scriptures.

You will say 2: Person does not signify substance, but quality or office by which one man represents or personates the actions of others, as happens in comedies: but God is not ordered to representing the actions of others: therefore. Thus according to authors thought Laurentius Valla the grammarian, book 6 of Elegances chapter 34.

The response is evident from what has been said. For although person according to that from which the name is imposed, imports the office of representing the actions of others, nevertheless according to that for the signification of which it is imposed, it signifies individual substance of rational nature.

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5 Ibid. ad 1

Sabellius abused this equivocation, although he admitted a unique supposit in God, nevertheless he did not refuse to admit three Persons, insofar as he believed the same supposit to fulfill the role of many, namely of the Father through creation, of the Son through Incarnation, of the Holy Spirit through the sanctification of souls, and therefore three Persons according to that from which the name "person" derives its etymology.

It is asked 5: What does this name "person" signify in the divine?

Response:[6] Person in general does not signify relation, but substance, for person in general is an individual substance of rational nature. In the divine, however, it signifies relation, not however as it is formally and explicitly relation or respect to a term, but as it is substantially subsisting, because person in the divine is constituted through relation as subsisting, as we shall say presently. From which it follows that this name "person" even said of the divine, is not a relative name, but absolute, because although it signifies relation, it nevertheless does not signify as it is formally relation, or through the mode of the relative, but through the mode of the subsisting.

Article II. Whether the Divine Persons are Constituted by Relations?

Note 1: Relation imports a twofold concept, namely the concept in and the concept ad: the concept in is common to all accidents, and in divine matters, to all relations, with this difference that in created relations it imports inherence,

[6] Here q. 29. a. 4. c.

because it is an accident, while in divine relations it imports substance, because it is substance, identified namely with the divine nature; whence the foundation of the divine relation insofar as it is real is not something real distinct as in created things, but the very identification with the divine nature. The concept ad is specific to relation and by it relation is distinguished from other accidents, and diverse relations are distinguished among themselves, insofar as they express a respect to diverse terms.

Note 2: With Cajetan, whom John of St. Thomas and many other Thomists follow, in the very concept ad there can again be distinguished a twofold concept or twofold aspect: first, insofar as it is a relative entity in itself or in signed act and affecting as quo the subject; second, insofar as it actually and in exercise refers as quod to the term. For it is prior to conceive relation in itself entitatively affecting as quo the subject, than that it actually refers to the term, just as it is prior to conceive whiteness entitatively and in signed act affecting as quo the wall, than that it actually renders it white, although they are at once and simultaneously in time.

Nor should you say that this concept ad affecting as quo the subject or in signed act, coincides with the concept in: for the concept in pertains not only to the line of relative being, but also of absolute being: because it imports not only the inherence or subsistence of the ad itself, but also the intrinsic and absolute predicates of created or uncreated being. So that if it be a created and accidental relation, it imports not only inherence, but also the aspect of limited, dependent, potential being, etc., and all the perfections and imperfections of such an accident; if it be an uncreated relation, the concept in imports not only subsistent and real being, but also the very divine entity with all the attributes

and perfections which are included in the divine nature: with this distinction, however, that those things which are of perfection and pertain to the aspect of being and existing do not pass over to the concept ad, nor are they multiplied in its formal aspect, because all that is of divinity and perfection remains one and common to the three Persons, nor do relations oppose each other in this. But subsistent and real being do pass over to the ad itself, and are multiplied in its formal aspect, because relations are multiplied in the aspect of subsistence and reality. In the aspect of subsistence indeed, because incommunicable termination pertains to subsistence, and incommunicability is had through opposition and consequently through the ad itself as ad: in the aspect of reality, because the term is really respected and not only through reason, unlike a relation of reason. In one word, whatever pertains to perfection, to essence, to divinity, to being in divine relations, holds itself on the part of in and is not multiplied in relations, but is found identically in them: but whatever is of opposition and multiplication as relation, subsistence, personality, even if it be real, pertains to the ad itself, as it is distinguished implicitly from in, and is found formally in that concept ad; so however that the reality itself arises from the in itself, just as in created relations it arises from the foundation, but in divine relations the being or reality of the relation does not depend on the foundation, but on identification with the divine essence; but the foundation, for instance active generation, is required only for the exercise of the relation in respecting and attaining the term, as we shall say below. For more concerning the explanation of this distinction of Cajetan, see, if you please, the most profound theologian John of St. Thomas, dissertation. 16. a. 1, from whom we have drawn these few

things for the understanding of this difficult question; for whose resolution I say: The divine Persons are constituted by relations not under the concept of form exercising reference, but under the concept of entity or form affecting the subject and hypostatically subsisting (7).

Proof by the reasoning by which various opinions are simultaneously refuted. The divine Persons are constituted by something real, but that real thing in divine matters cannot be other than relation: therefore. The major is evident; for the divine Persons are real and are really distinguished among themselves independently of the intellect, and they are constituted by that by which they are and are distinguished. Proof of the minor: All the real that we can conceive in the divine Persons is either the Persons themselves according to their total selves considered, or something absolute common to all, or something notional proper to each, and this notional is threefold, namely origin, innascibility with respect to the person of the Father, concerning which there is the greatest difficulty, and relation: but of all these aspects none except relation can constitute the divine person: therefore. The individual parts of the minor are to be proved.

Proof of the first part of the minor against Praepositivus and Gregory of Rimini: The divine Persons are constituted in the aspect of such a person by that by which they are distinguished from each other as total selves, otherwise they would differ by essence and in essence, in which however they agree: therefore. Hence in the Council of the Lateran, chapter Firmiter, it is said: The most holy Trinity according to common essence is undivided, but

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7 Here q. 40. a. 2. and 4. q. 8. de Pot, a. 3.

according to personal properties is discrete. And in the Council of Florence, session 1, it is asserted that the divine Persons differ through their properties. Whence this opinion of Praepositivus, which St. Thomas mentions below q. 32. a. 2, is commonly rejected by theologians and marked with various censures.

Proof of the second part of the minor: What is common to the three Persons cannot constitute a special person discrete from others: but all absolute things in God are common to the three Persons, as all theologians confess: therefore. Whence this opinion, which is attributed to John of Ripa, Lichetus and few ancients, has already been exiled from the schools, as at least erroneous and rash.

Proof of the third part of the minor and first that the person of the Father is not constituted by innascibility, against Vasquez and Alarcon: because innascibility is taken either formally or fundamentally: if formally ([8]), then it posits nothing, but expresses only the negation of a principle, but the person of the Father is real and is constituted by something real; if it be taken fundamentally, that is for the foundation of such negation, either that foundation is absolute, and thus incapable of constituting a person, as we said, or relative, which cannot be other than the relation of paternity.

Vasquez responds that it is a relation of reason, and he thinks this suffices; because, he says, since the constitution of Persons is not real but of reason, a relation of reason suffices for it.

But on the contrary, although the constitution of the divine person is of reason, on account of the defect of real

[8] Q. 40. a. 3. ad 3

distinction between the constituent and the constituted; yet the constituted itself is real, and therefore ought to be constituted by something real. Thus in man, although his constitution is only of reason, because the rational does not really distinguish from that and other constituents, yet what is constituted is real, it cannot be constituted except by real rationality.

Alarcon responds that the foundation of this negation is not a real relation, but transcendental, namely the relation of fontal or radical principle.

But on the contrary, transcendental relation is something absolute as connoting another, as all philosophers teach, and this is evident in powers and habits, which, although they are constituted by transcendental relation, are nevertheless absolute entities, nor do they pertain to the category of relation. Proof (9) again of the third part of the minor, namely that Persons are not constituted by active and passive origins, which opinion is commonly attributed to St. Bonaventure.

1° It is against the nature of origin that it constitute a person: therefore. Proof of the antecedent 1°: Person imports from its essential concept fixed and permanent being, and being in fact, since it is the ultimate term of nature rendering it incommunicably subsistent; but origin is conceived essentially as in becoming, namely active as influx and egress from a principle, passive as way and tendency to a term: therefore. Proof 2° of the same antecedent: Active origin supposes the person from which it proceeds, for actions are of supposita, and it is prior for a person to be than for a person to operate: therefore it does not constitute it; but

9 Q. 40

passive origin is presupposed for the constitution of the person; because it is the way to constituting it; whence it cannot be said to constitute it formally, but only vially and causally; just as Peter is constituted formally man by humanity, vially only and causally by nativity; but here we ask about the formal constitutive: therefore.

2° In order that some two distinct things be understood, it is necessary that their distinction be understood through something intrinsic to each ([10]) just as in created things through matter or form: but the origin of some thing is not signified as something intrinsic to the divine Persons, but as a certain way from the thing or to the thing: therefore. And note that the Holy Doctor does not say that origin is not something intrinsic to God, for it is an immanent act in him, but that it is not signified as something intrinsic, because it is signified as a way from the generator to the generated, and thus according to our mode of conceiving, it cannot be constitutive and distinctive of the Persons.

It remains therefore that relation alone is the constitutive of the divine Persons, because it alone is their mutual distinctive; and it alone distinguishes, because it alone brings opposition and incommunicability, for all absolute things are common to the three Persons. Whence that celebrated saying of Boethius: Substance provides unity, relation multiplies trinity; and that common saying of Anselm: All things in divine matters are one and the same, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. And in the Council of Toledo II in the confession of faith it is held thus: In the relation of persons number is discerned;

[10] Ibid

and below: By this alone they indicate number that they are to each other.

By relation, I say, the Persons are constituted, not indeed by relation in exercised act or conceived as form actually and in exercise respecting or as it were kissing as quod the term, for thus it supposes the person and follows upon generation, but by relation in signed act conceived as quo according to quiddity insofar as affecting the subject and indeed substantially, as being identified with the divine nature, under which concept it has the nature of hypostatic and subsisting form. Note this carefully for the solution of difficult objections.

Objections for the Opinions Impugned.

Objection 1 for the opinion of Praepositivus: Paternity is really the same as the Father: therefore for the Father to be constituted by paternity, is to be constituted by himself.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: paternity is really the same as the Father, with virtual distinction by way of explicit and implicit, I concede; without such distinction, I deny. For indeed the Father imports explicitly and constitutively the divine nature, which paternity imports only implicitly and by real transcendence; whence the Father is said to be constituted in the aspect of person, not by himself but by paternity.

You will reply: The Father is no less simple than paternity: but paternity is constituted by no other, but by itself alone: therefore also the Father. Likewise the divine essence, supremely simple, is constituted and distinguished from any other thing by itself: therefore the divine Persons, most simple.

Response to the first, I deny the consequence. For the reason why paternity alone is constituted by itself, is not because it is simple, but because it is signified in the abstract and by way of form which does not consist of formalities virtually distinct: but, on the contrary, the Father is signified by way of whole and concrete consisting of nature and paternity mutually virtually distinct.

To the second, I deny the consequence likewise. The disparity is that in the divine essence nothing is distinguished which is a property, and something which is common, but by its total self it differs from any created thing: but the divine Persons have something common in which they agree, namely essence, and something proper in which they differ, namely relations, by which therefore they are constituted.

You will urge: If a person is constituted by something other than itself, it will be caused and depend on it; but: therefore. The major is evident; because the constituted is caused and depends on the constituent.

Response 1: There is no causality and dependence there, because between the constitutive and the constituted there is no actual real distinction, but supreme identity, and although the constituted is real, the constitution however is of reason, just as the distinction, as we said above.

Response 2 with others, only virtual causality and dependence intervene there, not however virtual in this sense, that it would be equivalent to real causality and dependence, for that would import imperfection, but virtual in this sense, that the Father is so compared to paternity, that if per impossibile it could be caused and depend on something, it would be caused and depend on nothing other

than paternity: thus attributes can be said to depend virtually on essence.

Objection 2 for the opinion of John of Ripa: Subsistence in God is something absolute; but the divine person is constituted by subsistence: thus St. Augustine lib. 7. de Trinit. cap. 4, says: Every thing subsists to itself, how much more God; and St. Thomas q. 9. de Pot. a. 5. ad 13, teaches that the divine Persons have from essence that they subsist: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major: subsistence insofar as it imports the independence of being per se from another as sustaining is something absolute, I concede; insofar as it imports the incommunicability of being per se, I deny. Saints Augustine and Thomas are understood of subsistence taken in the first sense.

Objection 3 for the opinion of St. Bonaventure, many authorities of the Fathers, Fulgentius, St. Augustine, Damascene, etc., by which it is asserted that persons are constituted by origins; indeed St. Thomas himself q. 40. cit. a. 2. o. says that "in both ways," namely by origins and by relations they are constituted, although first and principally by relations according to our mode of understanding: therefore.

Response 1: The Fathers by origins understood the relations of origins, or those which are founded in origin. Thus St. Thomas explains Augustine and Richard of St. Victor q. 8. de Pot. a. 3. ad 13 and 14.

Response 2: Persons can be said to be constituted by origins quasi a posteriori and as regards us, because we from the fact that one really proceeds from another collect that they are constituted by relations; or they are said to be constituted by origins not formally, but vially, just as Peter is

said to be constituted formally man by humanity, vially by nativity: and therefore St. Thomas says that they are constituted principally by relations.

Objection 4 for the same: The first distinctive of a thing is its constitutive; but origin, e.g. active generation distinguishes the Father from the Son and Holy Spirit, since it belongs to him and is repugnant to them, and is prior to paternity as being its foundation: therefore.

Response 1: I distinguish the major: the first intrinsic distinctive of a thing is, etc., I concede; extrinsic distinctive, I deny. But origin is conceived as proceeding, and thus extrinsic.

Response 2: I distinguish the minor: origin is prior to paternity in exercised act of referring as quod, I concede; to paternity in signed act as quo affecting the subject by way of hypostatic form, I deny. The solution is evident from what was said, and will be more evident from what is to be said.

You say against this second response: At least passive generation is prior to filiation under any concept: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: passive generation is prior to filiation, as something vial and extrinsic to the person of the Son, I concede the antecedent; as something permanent and intrinsic to it, I deny the antecedent; at least according to the mode of signifying and conceiving, of which we treat.

You will reply: Although origin both active and passive under the explicit concept of flux and way cannot constitute person, why not as hypostatic form and under the concept of subsisting which it implicitly includes, by this very fact that it is divine; just as in our opinion, although relation under the explicit concept of actually referring does not constitute person, it nevertheless constitutes it under the

concept of hypostatic form and subsisting, which it implies: therefore.

Response: I deny the antecedent and the parity. For which note that while we seek the constitutive of the divine Persons, we investigate that through order to our mode of conceiving, founded however in the thing known. Moreover according to our mode of conceiving and signifying, origin is not expressed except by way of tendency and way, or as St. Thomas says as way from thing and to thing, whence origin cannot be conceived except as going out from the subject, or tending to the subject and extrinsic to it, and consequently cannot be conceived as constituting the subject: but relation although it explicitly respects the term, nevertheless per se affects the subject which it refers, for it would not refer unless it affected. Hence arises the second disparity, or the preceding is more explained, namely that relation by virtue even of the explicit concept of referring, implies and requires permanence either by inhering if it be created, or by subsisting if it be uncreated: but origin by virtue of the explicit concept of origin does not imply or require permanence, as is evident in created generation, which, although it inheres, does not inhere permanently, but vially and transiently.

You will reply: According to the more probable opinion which we choose above, actual intellection is constitutive of the divine nature, not indeed under the aspect of action, but under the aspect of ultimate actuality per se subsisting: but divine origin, e.g. active generation is the very actual understanding, and indeed permanent, since it is not transient action: therefore it will be able to constitute the person of the Father, not indeed under the aspect of action and origin, but under the aspect of ultimate actuality in the

notional genus. The consequence is evident both from parity of reasoning, and because the divine nature does not have being less fixed and permanent than person.

Response: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that origin is signified as mere production and way to the term, nor by virtue of the explicit concept, as we said, does it imply or require permanence: but understanding is not signified as production or as action proceeding and vial, but as ultimate immanent act in intelligible actuality; whence it is per se apt to constitute nature in ultimate actuality purified, but not origin a person which is signified in being in fact and by way of per se standing and permanent, not by way of way.

Moreover for constituting the divine nature, incommunicability is not required, but first and supreme actuality which most actual understanding provides; but for constituting person incommunicability is required which is not had except by relations: for origins, e.g. active generation or notional understanding, are not incommunicable, except insofar as they are modified by relations as opposed. Hence you see that Contenson wrongly said that this instance in our opinion about the constitutive of divine nature is insoluble.

Objections Directly Against our Opinion

Objection 1: The Father, concerning whom there is the greatest difficulty, is supposed to be constituted in the aspect of person prior to generation, since generation proceeds from the generator, and it is prior for a person to be than to operate: but the relation of paternity does not belong to the Father prior to generation, but follows generation, as being founded in it: therefore the person of the Father cannot be

constituted by relation. This is the sum of the difficulty, and indeed the supreme difficulty.

Many respond, even among Thomists, according to the distinction of the concept in and the concept ad, and thus distinguish the minor: the relation of paternity under the concept ad does not belong to the Father prior to generation, I concede; under the concept in, I deny.

Although we do not deny that this response is probable, nevertheless since here we treat of the constitutive of a special person, and as incommunicable and distinct from other persons, we do not sufficiently conceive how this can be provided by relation according to the concept in. For 1° the concept in is something common to all persons: therefore by it a special person cannot be constituted according to its ultimate difference, and as distinguished from other persons; 2° and especially, a person is constituted by that by which it is rendered incommunicable, for it is an individual, that is incommunicable substance of intellectual nature: but relation under the concept in, does not give incommunicability, but only under the concept ad: therefore. Proof of the minor: insofar as relation gives incommunicability, it opposes another; insofar as it opposes another, it relates to that as to correlative; but it cannot relate to another as to correlative by the concept in according to which it respects only the subject, but by the concept ad alone: therefore. We think therefore it should be said, according to the distinction of Cajetan, proposed at the beginning of the article, that the relation of paternity even according to the concept ad, not indeed in exercised act, but in signed act, belongs to the Father prior to generation, and by this the person of the Father is constituted. Whence to the argument,

Response: I distinguish the minor: relation as quod and in exercised act or as to the exercise of the respect itself by way of actual tendency and attainment of its term does not belong to the Father prior to generation, I concede the minor, for thus it is founded in generation; relation as quo and in signed act, or under the concept of reality subsisting incommunicably does not belong, etc., I deny the minor, for thus it is not founded in generation, because thus it does not need foundation, but identification with the divine nature from which it radically has that it subsists formally, and the subsisting itself has incommunicability from the very relation in signed act, or from the very reality of relation as opposed and exclusive of its term, which in the instant of priority from which the foundation is not yet explicated, but rather the foundation arises and follows from such reality of relation as subsisting, because the notional act of generating arises from the very person as subsisting, and thus from the very relation as really incommunicable. You will infer: Therefore the Son is understood before generation, which is absurd. Proof of the inference: The Father is understood before generation: but relatives are simultaneous by nature and knowledge: therefore. Response: I deny the inference. To the proof, I distinguish the major: The Father is understood before generation as person subsisting incommunicably and as Father fundamentally, I concede the major; as actually related to the Son and as Father formally, I deny the major. Similarly, I distinguish the minor: relatives in exercised act are simultaneous by nature and knowledge, I concede; in signed act, I deny. Because then the term is not considered as attained by tendency, but excluded from the reality of the ad itself or relation as constituted in itself opposed. And so the term is always involved in some way in

the concept of the ad itself, but diversely, sometimes correlatively, sometimes exclusively: correlatively, when the relative is understood as actually tending and as it were touching and kissing the term; exclusively, when it is understood as incommunicable reality and subsisting in itself, and constituted in itself in the reality of opposition. Whence the inference can be distinguished: therefore the Son is understood before generation as existing and attained, I deny; as excluded and incompossible to the relation in its constitution and reality, I concede.

You say: Ad as ad distinct from in, precisely expresses respecting and tending to the term: therefore. The antecedent is evident, because relation relates to subject and to term; to subject it relates by in: therefore with that removed nothing remains of the ad itself except respecting and tending to the term. Response: I distinguish the antecedent: ad as ad, distinct from in, precisely expresses respecting the term as quo or as quod, I concede; always as quod, I deny. Or in other terms: it expresses only respecting either by opposition and exclusion of the term, or by attainment of it, I concede; always by attainment of it, I deny.

You will reply: It is prior in the ad itself to actually respect the term than to be the relative entity itself and incommunicable: therefore. Response: I deny the antecedent. For just as it is prior for whiteness to be constituted in itself as quo than to whiten the wall as quod, so it is prior for relation to be constituted entity as quo than to actually refer as quod.

You will urge: It is prior to actually respect than to oppose the term; therefore it is prior to actually respect than to be constituted relation in the aspect of opposition and

incommunicability. Proof of the antecedent: opposing in relation arises from respecting, for opposition is of one relative to correlative.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: opposing exercitively in relation, arises from respecting in exercise, I concede; opposing entitatively and according to itself, arises from respecting in exercise, I deny. For it arises from respecting in signed act and as quo: thus, e.g., by this very fact that whiteness exists in the wall it is in itself entitatively and in signed act opposed to blackness which does not yet exist in another wall, opposition is not exercised however, unless both opposed extremes exist and the other wall is blackened.

Objection 2: It is impossible to conceive form united to subject, or constituting it unless it gives it its formal effect; for the formal effect of form is the very form communicated, and for form to constitute something is to give it its formal effect: but the formal effect of relation is to actually and exercitively refer, and not only to be able in first act to refer, for it is not defined by being able to respect, but by the very actual respect, when it is said whose whole being is to relate to another: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major: it is impossible to conceive form united to subject or constituting it unless it gives it its formal effect for every real and in quo instant, I concede the major; for every instant of reason and a quo, I deny the major. I say therefore that while form has several formal effects, although in reality it gives all to the capable subject to which it is communicated, nevertheless not all for every priority and instant of reason; thus, e.g., grace although simultaneously with temporal simultaneity expels sin from the soul and renders it graced, nevertheless it is

understood by nature first to expel sin than to render the soul graced. Thus again, although the rational soul at once and simultaneously with temporal simultaneity gives to matter all grades of life, nevertheless it is understood by nature first to give it the grade of body than of vegetative, and this than of sensitive or rational. Similarly it should be said of relation, for it has two functions or two formal effects, namely to affect the subject that it be real entity, if it be created; or to subsist in itself, if it be uncreated, and to be referred or actually respect the term: although therefore the divine relation of paternity according to its formal concept ad gives its whole formal effect in reality, nevertheless it is understood first to confer the formal effect of subsisting in itself than of respecting the term exercitively, because it is prior for a thing to be constituted in itself and to subsist in itself than to tend to another: nor can it be conceived that it first touches the term than that it be in itself; for by some reality it touches and respects the term. Therefore the reality must first be understood as constituted, and this especially in relations which do not have reality and being from the term but from the subject: therefore insofar as it is understood as reality subsisting incommunicably in itself it constitutes the person of the Father.

You will infer: Therefore the person of the Father is constituted by something absolute. Proof of the inference: relation does not have that it be subsisting except because it is divine and identified with essence, which is wholly absolute: therefore.

Response: I deny the inference. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: relation has that it be subsisting radically because it is divine and identified with essence, I concede the antecedent; formally, I deny the antecedent. For

it is formally subsisting because it is infinite relation and purified from all potentiality; whence it repugnates to it to be accident which involves potentiality; but that it be purified from all potentiality, it has from identification with the divine essence: thus other divine attributes are formally substance and not accident because they are pure act, but radically because they are divine and identified with essence.

Objection 3: The constitutive of a thing ought to distinguish it from others: but by relation as subsisting the Father is not distinguished from the Son since for that prior instant the Son is not yet understood: therefore.

Response ([11]): I distinguish the major: The constitutive of a thing ought to distinguish it from others actually or potentially, I concede; actually always, I deny. For it suffices that it be distinctive: thus the constitutive of Adam, before there were other men, did not distinguish him actually from others, because they did not exist, but was only his distinctive.

Objection 4: The nature of hypostatic form and of exercised relation in paternity are not distinguished virtually or by reasoned reason, but only by reasoning reason, because they are only two formalities or two inadequate functions of that; therefore whatever is said of one ought to be affirmed of the other, and consequently if paternity as hypostatic form constitutes the Father, it also constitutes as exercised relation.

Some respond, and not improbably, that these two formalities are distinguished virtually, because they are equivalent to several created perfections pertaining to diverse lines, namely to relation and subsistence. But

[11] Q. 8. de Pot. a. 3. ad 7.

granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence. Because here we seek the constitutive of the divine Person according to our mode of conceiving and understanding: whence by reason of diverse concepts of which one is explicit, the other only implicit, we affirm one, the other not being affirmed although implicitly imported: thus e.g. of the second Person of the Most Holy Trinity we say that it is the Word of creatures, not the Son, although the nature of Word and the nature of Son in it are not distinguished virtually.

Objection 5 concerning the person of the Son and Holy Spirit: The production itself of the person is terminated to the person as produced not as related; therefore the person is understood first as produced than as related: therefore it is not constituted formally by relation. Proof of the antecedent according to the philosophers, there is not per se motion to relation: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: the production of person is terminated to the person as produced not as related as quod and in exercised act, I concede; not as related as quo and in signed act, I deny; because the entity of the produced term is the entity of relation nor is any other reality produced than the reality of relation. But what is opposed that there is not per se motion to relation, is true of created relations which are not substances but accidents of weakest entity which arises from the foundation. But of divine relations, although this is also true as to the exercise of respecting which follows from its foundation, which is generation, nevertheless not as to the reality which since it is per se subsisting, to it per se is given motion or act which is notional procession.

Article III. Whether in God, Considered in Himself and with Relations and persons Presupposed, there is Given some Absolute Subsistence?

Note 1: Subsistence imports four things: 1 singularity, for things in the universal do not subsist; 2 the mode of existing per se independently of another sustaining agent, which is called the per se character of independence; 3 the mode of existing incommunicably, or the incommunicability of nature as supposited and terminated to another term and suppositum, which is called the per se character of incommunicability; 4 the concrete itself of nature according to the mode of having it and of being the principle which acts, which is to explain nature not only according to the mode of a principle by which and according to the mode of a form by which something is constituted, such as deity, humanity, etc., but also according to the mode of having nature, such as God, man, and according to the mode of a principle which acts, whence it is commonly said that actions belong to supposita or subsistent beings.

Note 2: It is denied by no one that God considered in himself is singular, for he is not something universal, but one and singular God. Similarly, it is certain that God considered in himself, with personalities set aside, is not incommunicable, and therefore is not a supposit um or person, which essentially imports incommunicability. This is evident because otherwise there would be four persons, which is against faith; and on the other hand, it is certain that the divine nature according to itself is communicable to three Persons, otherwise these Persons would not be divine, nor God. Hence we concede that there is not given in God

absolute subsistence, if subsistence is taken adequately for the ultimate term of nature by which it is rendered per se existing and further incommunicable.

But the difficulty is whether in God considered in himself there is given absolute subsistence as regards the per se character of independence and the constitution of the concrete and principle which operates. Most outside the school of St. Thomas deny this; Thomists commonly affirm it, and with them many outsiders; but it seems almost a question of name, for it chiefly concerns whether the per se character of independence without incommunicability could be called subsistence or not.

I say: In God considered in himself and with relations and persons presupposed, there is given absolute subsistence, by which he exists per se independently of another sustaining agent and is constituted the principle which operates (12).

Proof 1 from authority: St. Augustine, De Trinitate 7, c. 4: "Every thing subsists in relation to itself, how much more God." Jerome teaches the same in Epistle 57 to Damasus, Cyril of Alexandria and others, but especially St. Thomas in the places cited; for he says in the first cited passage: "The divine nature is in itself having subsistent being, with no distinction of Persons understood"; Contra Gentiles 4, cited: "In God there are several subsistent things if relations are considered, and one subsistent thing if the essence is considered"; De Potentia q. 9, cited: "The supposita of the divine nature are not the principle of the divine essence's subsisting, for the divine essence itself is

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12 In Sent. 1, d. 21, q. 2, a. 1; Contra Gentiles 4, c. 14; De Potentia, q. 9, a. 5, ad 13.

subsistent according to itself"; finally in Sent. 3, dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "In God," he says, "the essence itself is subsistent, whence being is owed to it according to itself."

Vasquez responds that subsistence in these authorities is taken for existence. But against this: 1 In a similar way all the testimonies which are brought forward to establish against Durandus three relative subsistences could be glossed, which Vasquez does not admit. 2 According to this understanding, the expressions of St. Thomas would be nugatory, namely, when he says that the divine essence is its own subsistent being, it would signify that it was its own existing existence; and when in the last place he infers that being is owed to God because he is subsistent, the sense would be that existence is owed to God because he is existing, which inference would be entirely nugatory and ridiculous.

Proof 2 from fundamental reason: God considered in himself and with relations and persons presupposed is truly subsistent; but not by relative and personal subsistence: therefore by essential and absolute subsistence. The minor is evident. The major, in which lies the difficulty, is proved in multiple ways: 1 God considered in himself and as presupposed to persons creates and operates ad extra, otherwise the works of the Most Holy Trinity ad extra would not be undivided; likewise he is understood as understanding and willing in that prior state: therefore also as subsistent. The consequence is evident because since subsistence is a substantial act, it belongs by nature prior to operation, which according to common conception is not a substantial act: whence St. Thomas says below q. 75, a. 2: "Nothing can operate per se unless it subsists per se"; and that common axiom: "Actions belong to subsistent beings." 2

To subsist speaks of the greatest perfection, for it speaks of the most perfect mode of being: but to God considered in himself and with persons presupposed belongs every perfection: therefore. The minor is evident, both because God considered in himself and presupposed to relations is pure act, infinite, being itself in itself and from itself independently of any other thing. Also because he draws no perfection from relations, as we said above, but rather bestows his own upon them: therefore. 3 To God antecedently to persons belongs being or existing per se and as quod: therefore also subsisting. The consequence is evident, because by absolute subsistence here we understand nothing other than the per se character of independence and principle quod, or existing per se and as quod: and on the other hand in the principles of the Thomistic school and of St. Thomas especially Summa 3, q. 17, being or existing per se is the act of a subsistent being, so that existence does not follow but presupposes subsistence: therefore if God antecedently to persons has not only radically but also formally existence, a fortiori subsistence. But the antecedent seems manifest. And 1 that existence belongs to him according to himself is evident, because existence is something absolute, indeed the very essence of God without any virtual distinction: but that existence is per se and as quod also seems evident, because it is more perfect, more independent, and purer to have existence per se, or according to the mode of a subsistent being and as quod, than as quo, because to have as quod is to have being in itself and per se, not in another; but to have being as quo does not exclude but requires being in another, either as an accident in a subject, or as a part in a composite: but to God considered in himself as pure act, perfect and independent,

belongs the purer, more perfect and more independent mode of existing: therefore.

Solutions to Objections

Objection 1: According to the Councils and Fathers, subsistence in Latin is the same as hypostasis in Greek: but no theologian admits one absolute hypostasis in God: therefore neither subsistence.

Response: I distinguish the major: subsistence in Latin is the same as hypostasis in Greek in the more frequent acceptation, granted; in every acceptation of it, denied. Just as, for example, this name "substance," although it is taken more commonly for essence, is nevertheless sometimes also taken for supposit um; so similarly, although subsistence is used more commonly and frequently for hypostasis and person importing the per se character of independence together with incommunicability, it is nevertheless sometimes also used only for the per se character of independence constituting a principle as quod. Thus SS. Augustine, Thomas, Jerome and Cyril cited, and Hilary in book 7 De Trinitate, where he says that the Father and Son are mutually in each other, so that the subsistences of nature have perfect unity.

Hence the objection of adversaries is anticipated, by which they wish that the per se character of independence excluding incommunicability cannot be called subsistence; for securely, where there is only a question of name, we stand by the manner of speaking of the Fathers, and we consider it rash to say with a certain person that SS. Augustine and Jerome did not sufficiently understand the signification of this word "subsistence." And indeed, is not

the rational soul separated from the body said to be and truly subsistent, although it does not enjoy the per se character of incommunicability, as it is to be reunited to the body in the resurrection?

Moreover, I press thus: It pertains no less to subsistence to confer the per se character of independence than the per se character of incommunicability: but the divine relations are and are also called by adversaries true subsistences, because they confer the per se character of incommunicability, although they do not confer the per se character of independence: therefore by parity the formality of which we speak is to be called truly subsistence, because although it does not bestow the per se character of incommunicability, it nevertheless confers the per se character of independence, and especially because it bestows upon the divine nature not only the per se character of independence in existing, but also the character of principle quod in operating with respect to creation, conservation, and also essential intellection and volition: therefore also true subsistence; for actions belong to subsistent beings.

You will say with Tournelius: The humanity of Christ, prescinding from the personality of the Word, is independent of a subject, and yet it is not subsistent: therefore the per se character of independence does not suffice for something to be called subsistence.

Response: I distinguish the major: the humanity of Christ, prescinding from the personality of the Word, is independent of a subject in potentiality and aptitude, granted; actually, denied. Because under this precision it is not actually existing, for it exists through the Word, whence it is not surprising if it is not subsistent.

Furthermore, it should be observed with our Gonet that just as we do not say simply three substances, lest occasion of error be given, but with an addition, e.g., three individual or relative substances, so similarly, that equivocation and occasion of error may be removed, we do not say simply one subsistence, but one absolute subsistence, or with another similar addition, denoting that we speak of absolute subsistence.

Objection 2: If God with relations presupposed has absolute subsistence, he will be a person, and thus there will be four persons in the divine, which is heretical.

Response: I deny the antecedent. The solution is evident from what has been said; because for the character of person incommunicability is required, which absolute subsistence does not bring.

You say: According to St. Thomas Summa 3, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1, by the very fact that something is subsistent in intellectual nature, it is a person. "Whatever," he says, "of those things which are attributed to God in the abstract, if it be considered according to itself with others circumscribed, will be something subsistent and consequently a person, since it is in intellectual nature. Just as therefore now with personal properties posited in God we say three Persons, so with personal properties excluded by the intellect, there will remain in our consideration the divine nature as subsistent and as a person."

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the words of St. Thomas, some respond that he there takes person improperly and incompletely for an intellectual nature subsisting either communicably or incommunicably. But it seems more true that the holy Doctor speaks in the supposition that personal properties would be so excluded

that only one person would remain, such as the Jews imagine God to be, as he says ad 2, but not in the present supposition by which we hold by faith three Persons. For in the first supposition the divine nature would be a person, because with personal properties thus exclusively prescinded, it would be subsistent incommunicably. But in the second supposition, in which three Persons are supposed from which nature is prescinded only negatively and not privatively or exclusively, it is always communicable to the Persons, and therefore not a person.

If you say it would at least be a semi-person, because it will have one of the essential predicates of person, namely the per se character of independence.

Response: The consequence is attributed by some to Cajetan, but undeservedly, as Nazarius testifies in Contensonius, who reports that he said incomplete person, not semi-person. Therefore, I deny the consequence. For the essences of things consist in the indivisible just like numbers: whence just as with unity taken away the species of number is changed, so with some essential predicate removed the species is dissolved: just as therefore a horse is not called a semi-man, although it possesses animality which is an essential predicate of man, so neither should a communicably subsistent nature be called a semi-person, although subsistence of per se character is one of the essentials of person.

Objection 3: For the divine nature to subsist both by the per se character of independence and incommunicability, the personalities or relative subsistences suffice: therefore an absolute one is posited in vain. Proof of antecedent: 1 By parity in created things personality provides both: therefore a fortiori in divine things. 2 If there were a unique

personality in God, it would provide both; why could it not be provided by three? Therefore.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I deny the consequence. The disparity is that in created nature what is of perfection, namely the per se character of independence, and what is of mere incommunicability can be provided by the same form. But in God what is of perfection cannot be provided except by the essence, and what is of incommunicability cannot arise except from relations, both because relations in our opinion speak no perfection, and because even if they did speak it, they nevertheless presuppose the divine essence existing in a perfect mode in the absolute line, and therefore also subsisting, as we have seen in the proofs of the conclusion.

To the second proof, again I deny the consequence. And the reason for the disparity sought is that in the case where there would be a unique personality in God, it would be an absolute perfection, but there is no inconvenience that the per se character of independence should come from some essential and absolute perfection, especially if such perfection is identified with the essence without virtual distinction, as would happen in the hypothesis: but now the three personalities are relative and virtually distinct from the essence and posterior to it, but it is inconvenient that the most perfect mode of existing in God should depend on relations, as has already been said.

Objection 4: To subsist is to exist per se independently of another: but the divine nature prior to relations seeks to exist in them: therefore it does not subsist in the prior state.

Response: I distinguish the major: to subsist is to exist per se independently of another as sustaining, granted; independently of another as precisely terminating, denied.

Moreover, although the divine nature seeks to exist in relations, it is nevertheless not from neediness and so that it might exist per se, for it has this by reason of itself, as has been proved, but by reason of its infinite fecundity; whence it is in them as precisely terminating, not as sustaining.

You say: To be sustained by a supposit um is nothing other than to be completed by it: but relative subsistences are complements of the divine nature, for since they are not properties of the divine nature and yet pertain to it, they cannot be anything other than certain modes by which it is completed: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major: to be sustained by a supposit um is nothing other than to be completed by it from neediness for existing, granted; to be completed from supreme fecundity by reason of which it seeks to exist in three persons, denied. And with the minor distinguished according to the sense of the major, I deny the consequence. The solution is evident from what has been said.

You will rejoin: The divine nature cannot exist without relations: therefore it is completed by them from neediness for existing.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: the divine nature cannot exist without relations because it is supremely fecund, granted; because it is weak, denied. Whence I deny the consequence. Thus, for example, omnipotence cannot subsist without the possibility of creatures, nor divine intellection without the word, yet neither from neediness, but from fecundity.

Article IV. Whether Besides Absolute Subsistence, Three Relative Subsistences are Given in God?

I presuppose that absolute subsistence, or the per-se-ity of independence, is not multiplied in the persons, both because absolute things are not multiplied in divine matters, and because according to the rule to be established below, those things which belong to the persons by reason of essence are not multiplied; but absolute subsistence or the per-se-ity of independence, which is the greatest perfection, belongs to the persons by reason of essence, insofar as they are identified with it. Therefore the personality of the Father, for example, is for him the very reason of subsisting independently and incommunicably, but he has the first by reason of absolute subsistence unmultiplied in the three Persons; the second, by reason of relation multiplied; whence it does not follow, as some infer, that there would be incomplete personality, for although he has these two offices from different sources, he nevertheless has them. These things being presupposed,

I say: Besides absolute subsistence, three relative and personal subsistences are given in God. This is the more common opinion against Durandus and certain others who contend that the divine Persons are constituted by absolute subsistence alone, not indeed as absolute, but as modified by relations, but not by relative subsistences virtually distinct from the absolute. For since, they say, only two things are implied in the nature of person, namely to subsist incommunicably, the first is attributed to the divine Persons by absolute subsistence included in them by reason of essence, the second by relations which by reason of their

relative opposition imply distinction and incommunicability in the persons: whence it seems superfluous to construct three relative subsistences besides absolute subsistence, since absolute subsistence alone, modified by relations, could provide all that is required for the nature of person. This is the principal foundation of the adverse opinion. Whence the entire difficulty comes down to this: that we prove that, besides that absolute subsisting which the divine Persons have from absolute subsistence, they have in addition a threefold relative subsisting from three relative subsistences.

Proof 1 from the authority of Councils and Fathers, of whom very many testimonies can be gathered, but the following suffice. The Sixth General Council, act 11, says: "The most holy Trinity has been made numerable by personal subsistences." Damascene lib. 4 On Faith ch. 9: "The Son has his proper subsistence besides that which is the Father's." St. Cyril of Alexandria, Dialogue on the Trinity lib. 3: "Every word of our faith tends to this, that we see one nature which properly subsists in three subsistences." St. Ambrose in Symbol of the Apostles ch. 2: "It is Catholic both that we confess one God according to unity of substance, and that we acknowledge the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit each in his own subsistence."

These and most other testimonies are so perspicuous that they cannot be eluded by any subterfuges of adversaries.

For if they say that the Fathers take subsistences in the concrete for person or subsisting thing, this being granted, it follows that they also admit several subsistences in the abstract, because, as I shall say presently, substantive names are not multiplied unless their formal principle is multiplied. Moreover, what they assume is universally false,

for the general council speaks of subsistences insofar as the Trinity is constituted and numbered by them, and therefore of them as forms in the abstract.

But if they say that subsistence is taken by the Fathers for personality, again we have our intent: for personality is nothing other than incommunicable subsistence in intellectual nature.

The Angelic Doctor supports this here q. 29 a. 2 ad 2: "Just as we," he says, "speak of three Persons and three subsistences in divine matters in the plural, so the Greeks speak of three hypostases." And below q. 40 a. 3 ad 2: "By paternity the Father is not only Father, but also Person and someone, or hypostasis." Several other authorities of the holy Doctor can be seen in the authors.

Proof by reasons founded on his principles. First reason a priori: according to Catholic faith, in God there are three Persons, three hypostases, three supposita: but person, hypostasis, suppositum are constituted formally by subsistence: therefore in divine matters there are three subsistences. I prove the consequence: for the multiplication of a substantive name such as suppositum and person, multiplication of form is required: whence if only one subsistence were given in God, even if modified by three relations, just as one nature is given modified by three relations, we could no more say three Persons in divine matters than three gods, but we would be bound to acknowledge one person on account of unity of subsistence, just as we confess one God on account of unity of nature. Indeed we could not say three subsisting things even adjectively, just as we now say three divine things, because adjective names are not multiplied unless the suppositum is multiplied: for example, the same man having several arts is

not called several artificers; but subsistence not being multiplied, the suppositum would not be multiplied, which is formally constituted by subsistence, as we were saying just now.

This reason is urged more strongly and at the same time the foundation of the opposite doctrine is overturned. The divine Persons are constituted formally by relative subsistences: but there are three Persons: therefore three relative subsistences. The consequence is evident from the preceding discourse; the minor is of faith. I prove the major 1° from the superior principles by which I proved that Persons are constituted by relations, not as in exercised act, but as in signate act and constituted in their reality: but this reality is not accidental but substantial; indeed it is also substance, and therefore subsisting in its relative genus; and although it has this radically from the divine essence with which it is identified, yet proximately and formally it has it from this: that in its genus it is infinite and purified from all potentiality: therefore. I prove the same major 2°: The divine Persons are constituted not merely by negation of communicability, but by something real and positive founding this negation or incommunicability, otherwise they would not be multiplied nor really distinguished: but this real positive thing can be nothing other than relative subsistence: therefore. I prove the minor: This real positive thing founding incommunicability is not absolute subsistence, or something else absolute in God, since all absolute things in God are common and communicable to the three Persons: therefore something relative, not relatively accidental, since no accident is given in God: therefore relatively substantial and consequently relative subsistence, namely the very reality of relation in signate act,

as we were saying just now. St. Thomas embraces all these things briefly below q. 40 a. 3 when he says: "Personal properties are not preunderstood to come to divine hypostases as form to a preexisting subject, but they bring with them their supposita insofar as they are the very subsisting persons."

Second reason a priori. It is of the nature of subsistence as such, insofar as it abstracts from communicable and incommunicable, to render nature as having being by way of a whole subsisting thing and principle which acts, for as the common axiom states, actions are of subsisting things, and for this reason we admit in God, the persons being preunderstood, absolute subsistence by which it is constituted the principle which of essential and common actions: but in God there are not only essential operations common to the whole Trinity, but also notional ones proper to the divine Persons, such as to generate for the Father, to spirate for the Son, to be spirated for the Holy Spirit: therefore there must be given not only different modes of incommunicability, but true and distinct relative subsistences by which are constituted distinct principles which of these notional actions, namely the Father the principle which of active generation, the Son the principle which of active spiration, indeed also the Holy Spirit the terminus which of this spiration, because just as the principle which, so also the terminus which of this action, must be subsisting; for just as actions, so also passions or quasi-passions are of subsisting things.

Third reason a posteriori taken from the mystery of the Incarnation. Human nature was united to the Word not in something common to him and other Persons, otherwise three persons would be incarnate, but in something proper

to him: but it was united in his personal subsistence supplying the place of created subsistence: therefore there is given in the Son personal subsistence virtually distinct from the absolute: if in the Son, by parity of reason in the Father and Holy Spirit.

The objections are solved.

And 1°, the fundamental objection of adversaries remains solved, while we proved that Persons cannot be multiplied without relative subsistences being multiplied, and therefore that absolute subsistence precisely modified by relations does not suffice for the constitution and multiplication of Persons, but the very relations which are substantial bring with them relative subsistences proper to themselves which found in them the negation of communicability, and constitute them as the principle which of notional actions, just as absolute subsistence constitutes God as preunderstood to the persons, the principle which of essential and common operations.

Objection 2: St. Thomas q. 8 On Power a. 3 ad 7 speaks thus: "Although relations in divine matters constitute hypostases and thus make them subsisting, yet they do this insofar as they are the divine essence. For relation insofar as relation does not have that it subsists or makes subsist, for this belongs to substance alone. But relations distinguish insofar as they are relations, for thus they have opposition." In which words is contained the very opinion of adversaries: therefore. Response: I admit the words of St. Thomas and explain, and I say that the holy Doctor only wants that relation reduplicatively as relation, or by force of the precise concept of relation, does not constitute hypostasis, nor make

subsist, which is most true, since in created things it is a mere accident; but that in God it constitutes hypostasis and makes subsist, this it does not have precisely because it is relation, but because it is divine, most pure and infinite, and therefore substance; but that it is divine, most pure and infinite, it has radically from the divine essence with which it is identified. Therefore St. Thomas wants that divine relations have radically from the divine essence that they subsist and make subsist, not because they are relations, although nevertheless as they are divine relations they formally subsist in themselves and make subsist, because they are formally infinite and most pure, and consequently substances. That this is the mind of St. Thomas is evident from the very words objected, in which he expressly asserts that divine relations constitute hypostases and make them subsisting; and in the body of the same article he admits the opinion which teaches that nothing which is said absolutely of God can be understood as distinctive and constitutive of hypostasis, since those things which are said absolutely of God are signified by way of essence; therefore it is necessary to place the distinction and constitution of hypostases in divine matters in that which is first found not to be said of several, but to belong to one alone, which can be nothing other than relative subsistence.

You say: St. Thomas q. 9 seq. On Power a. 5 ad 13 has thus: "In divine matters personal properties have only this: that they distinguish supposita of the divine nature from each other, but they are not the principle of subsisting of the divine nature, for the divine nature itself is subsisting according to itself, but on the contrary personal properties have that they subsist from the essence." Which words cannot be understood according to the sense of the preceding

solution, since the holy Doctor says expressly that relations are not the principle of subsisting, but that they only distinguish supposita: therefore.

Response: St. Thomas in that place speaks of absolute and essential subsistence insofar as it expresses per-se-ity of independence which the persons have from essence, but not of personal subsistence implying per-se-ity of incommunicability and constituting the principle which of notional actions which relations have formally from themselves, not insofar as they are relations explicitly, but insofar as they are divine and infinite; radically however, because they are identified with the divine essence, as has been said. Nor does it matter that the holy Doctor said they only have that they distinguish supposita, for by this it is not excluded that they constitute, because they distinguish by that by which they constitute, since the same thing is constitutive and distinctive.

Thus also understand St. Augustine quoted above when he says that every thing subsists to itself, how much more God. Likewise also that which is opposed, that the nature of subsistence is something absolute. Unless perhaps you say that personal subsistence also is something absolute, in this sense that it does not explicate relation in exercised act.

Objection 3: For this reason we rejected relative existences virtually distinct from the absolute, because the absolute suffices for the three Persons to exist: therefore equally absolute subsistence suffices for them to subsist, and therefore relative subsistences are superfluous.

Response: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that existence only makes a thing be outside all causes and outside nothing: but by this very fact that persons are placed

once outside all causes and outside nothing through absolute existence, they cannot be placed through other existences which are therefore superfluous, indeed also impossible, as we proved; but truly subsistence does not only have to give per-se-ity of independence and constitute the principle which of essential actions, but also to give per-se-ity of incommunicability and constitute the principle which of notional actions: since therefore absolute subsistence cannot confer both of these latter things, it must be sought from relative subsistence.

You insist: For this reason existence cannot be actuated by another existence, nor besides absolute existence can relative existence be given in God, because existence is the ultimate terminus of nature in being: but subsistence is also the ultimate terminus of nature in the line of subsisting: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the minor: personal subsistence is, etc., I concede the minor; subsistence precisely absolute and essential which is not at the same time personal, I deny. For this, since it does not give per-se-ity of incommunicability and the principle which of personal operations, cannot be called the ultimate terminus of nature in the line of subsisting. Or you may say that it is the ultimate terminus of nature in the line of subsisting as regards the notion of independent and constituting the principle which of essential actions, but not as regards the notion of incommunicability and constituting the principle which of notional actions: whence since they are of different natures, it is not repugnant that they be actuated by each other. Other objections can easily be solved from the principles laid down.

Article V. On Matters Pertaining to Unity or Plurality in the Divine Regarding the Manner of Speaking. (St. Thomas, Q. 29.)

Saint Thomas in question 30 treats of the plurality of persons, about which we have spoken abundantly in the preliminary dissertation; therefore, having omitted this question here, we inquire about the manner of speaking concerning this mystery as regards unity or plurality. For since heresy is incurred from words inappropriately expressed, therefore when we speak about the Trinity, we must proceed with caution and modesty ([13]), because as St. Augustine says in book 1 of De Trinitate, chapter 3: "Nowhere is error more dangerous, nowhere is anything sought with more difficulty, nowhere is anything found more fruitfully."

I say, and I establish this as a general rule with our Baptiste Gonet: Those things which belong to the persons by reason of essence alone are said only in the singular; those things which belong to them only by reason of relations are said only in the plural; those things finally which belong to them by reason of both essence and relations are said both in singular and plural. The reason for this rule is evident: because relation is multiplied in the divine, but essence remains one and unmultiplied; therefore those things which belong to the Persons by reason of essence retain unity and are predicated singularly; those things which belong by reason of relations are multiplied and predicated plurally; those things which belong by reason of both are said singularly insofar as they belong by reason of essence,

[13] Q. 31. a. 2.

plurally insofar as they belong by reason of relations. The Second Council of Toledo also establishes this in its profession of faith with these few words: "This alone suggests number—what they are in relation to each other, and they lack number in this—what they are in themselves."

From this general rule it follows 1st, that three Persons are said to be in the divine, not one person, because the notion of person is taken for a subsistent relation. The same is said of hypostasis, which in the common understanding of the Church is now taken for person: otherwise concerning this term "individual," because in individuals nature is divided, not in persons. For person in its formal signification imports personality and in its material signification imports nature (14); conversely, individual in its formal signification imports nature and in its material signification imports personality. Hence just as nature is not multiplied in the divine, so neither is individual; and therefore although three Persons are said, they cannot however be said properly speaking to be three individuals, just as they cannot be said to be three gods, because there is one deity in three. They can however be said to be three divine ones, three eternal ones, three omnipotent ones, three good ones, etc., if these terms are taken adjectively, as they are taken in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, and elsewhere; because for the multiplication of an adjectival name, multiplication of the supposit suffices, as we have already said, so that the sense is: there are three having divinity, three having omnipotence, etc. But it is otherwise if they are taken substantively, as St. Athanasius took them in the Symbol saying: "Yet not three

14 Here Q. 31. a. 1. ad 8.

eternal ones, but one eternal"; because for the multiplication of a substantive name, multiplication of both form and supposit is required. Concerning which again below.

It follows 2nd that subsistence is said to be one and many, because subsistence taken for the per-se-ity of independence belongs by reason of nature, taken for the per-se-ity of incommunicability, belongs by reason of relation. Conversely, existence is said only singularly, because it belongs to the Persons by reason of essence as we have proved.

It follows 3rd that entity, thing, reality are said both singularly and plurally, namely, one thing which is essence, several things or realities which are relations, because entity, thing and reality are taken for being that is not fictitious but real; similarly being concretely, if it is taken as the same as "having entity," and is opposed to nothing, is also multiplied substantively, because truly the relations are three beings, three real and not fictitious entities. But if being is taken concretely as the same as "having essence or existence," it is not multiplied substantively, because there is one unique essence or existence in the three Persons, but only adjectively, insofar as there are three having essence or existence. And under this distinction the opposing opinions about the name of being are reconciled. Nor should you say that relations have their distinct formal reasons or quiddities and consequently distinct essences; for not every formal reason is properly called essence, but that which is the nature of the whole subsistent.

It follows 4th that God can be said to be triune, not triple, or that in God there is trinity, not triplicity ([15]):

[15] Here q. 31. a. 2., and ad 4

because triple and similar terms taken strictly denote number in God according to being or nature; for triple is as if triplicated, or thrice folded in being. But triune or trinity denotes precisely the ternary number or of three, because it is truly found in the divine: it can however be said triple person, double procession, because by adding person or procession, multiplication of nature is sufficiently excluded.

It follows 5th that the Son can be said to be one with the Father, not "one"; and conversely that he can be said to be "another" than the Father, not "another thing" ([16]), because the neuter name signifies something more confused and unformed, but the masculine something more formed and distinct, just as the feminine; and because the supposit is more formed and complete than nature: therefore neuter names are appropriated to nature and masculine ones to supposits or persons. Therefore the Son is said to be one with the Father, not another thing, because the nature of both is the same. He is said to be another, not one, because the Persons are diverse. Hence also you should infer that in the divine "something" is not multiplied, because "something" is the same as "some other thing."

And because by using names importing plurality or unity it is easy to decline into either opposite error, namely either of Arius who with the trinity of Persons posited diversity of essence, or of Sabellius who with the unity of essence posited unity of person, the Holy Doctor wisely warns that to avoid the error of Arius we should not use these words: diverse, unequal, different, alien, discrepant, divided, separated, because they import diversity in nature. We can however use the name of distinction and distinct,

[16] Ibid

because these words are most general and common, and signify only in general some distinction. Hence where you read "diverse" in certain Fathers, benignly interpret it as "distinct." To avoid the error of Sabellius these words must be avoided: singular, unique, confused, solitary; because they seem to remove the distinction and order of Persons, and the Sabellians understood and used them in that sense. Where however there would be no danger of error, one who would use some of the enumerated words would not be blameworthy, intending to signify unity not of person, but of nature, whence we read in the eleventh action of the sixth synod of "the singularity of the Deity."

It follows 6th that this exclusive particle "alone" if taken categorically, that is, as it applies its signification, namely solitude, to the subject, so that it is the same as solitary, as without companionship, does not have place in the divine: hence these propositions are false: "God is alone," "the Father is alone," because neither God nor the Father is without accompaniment or companionship. But if "alone" is taken syncategorematically, that is, so that it does not apply its signification to the subject, but denotes the order of predicate to subject, and is precisely exclusive, it has place in the divine, as if you say: "God alone is eternal," the sense is that eternity does not belong to others than God.

It must be noted (17) however that, when it is joined to a personal term, other persons are excluded only with regard to those things in which they have relative opposition, by which alone they are distinguished, but not with regard to those things in which they do not have such opposition, since in these they are one and the same: hence when it is said:

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17 Here q. 36. a. 2. ad 1.

"The Father alone generates," the Son and Holy Spirit are excluded, because in generation the Father has relative opposition immediately with the Son, as has been said, and mediately with the Holy Spirit, as we shall say below. But when it is said: "The Father alone knows the Son," or as it is said in Matthew 11: "No one knows the Son except the Father," the Son or Holy Spirit are not therefore excluded, because in this kind of knowledge they do not have opposition, but it is one and the same in all.

Article VI. On the Divine Notions. (St. Thomas Q. 32.)

Saint Thomas, in the first article of this question, teaches that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity cannot be investigated or known by any natural reason, which we have proven in the preliminary dissertation, article 4; see there. Then in the three following articles he treats of the notions or marks by which the divine Persons can be known and distinguished among themselves.

A notion ([18]) in divine matters is nothing other than "the proper reason for knowing a divine Person," or, as others say, the objective reason making known the Person; hence a notion is conceived as an abstract form, by which, as if by a mark and character, one Person is distinguished and recognized from the others, so that just as we say God is one by deity or essence, so we say the Father is constituted by paternity and distinguished from the Son.

[18] Q. 32. a. 2. et 3.

Three things are required for the true notion of the divine Persons ([19]): first, that it pertain to origin, because the persons are constituted and distinguished by relations alone founded in origin. Second, that it pertain to dignity, not that it be necessarily dignity in itself, but at least that it denote dignity, because person is a name of dignity, namely, subsisting in an intellectual nature. Third, that it be something special, because what is common to the three Persons is not a sufficient reason for recognizing and discerning one from another.

Although relation, property, and notion in divine matters are one and the same thing, or formality without virtual distinction—for paternity, for example, is a relation, is a property of the Father, is his notion—nevertheless there is this difference among them: that relation belongs to this thing or formality through respect to its correlative, property through respect to the person whose property it is; ([20]) notion through respect to the intellect to which it manifests the person. Hence the respect to the term is understood first, then the nature of property, lastly the nature of notion, because nothing can be the reason for manifesting one person unless it be proper to that person, and it cannot be proper to that person unless it be distinct from others; but it is distinguished through relation. These things being noted,

I say: There are five notions in divine matters, neither more nor fewer, namely: unbegottenness, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration or procession. ([21])

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[19] In 1. 1. 26. q. 2. a. 3. o.

[20] In 4. d. 26. q. 2. a. 3. o.

[21] Ibid. et hic a. 3. o.

Proof: The five assigned, no more and no fewer, possess the three conditions required for a true notion: therefore. Proof of the antecedent: although unbegottenness presents negation on its face, it nevertheless denotes and circumlocutes supreme dignity, namely to be from no one, but to be from oneself and the head and source of the divine emanations; moreover it is proper to the Father, because by unbegottenness we understand not only the negation of generation, but of every procession whatsoever from another, which belongs to the Father alone; finally it pertains to origin negatively, in that manner by which negation reductively pertains to the genus of affirmation, as "not-man" to the genus of man. Concerning paternity the matter is clear, for it is proper to the Father, signifies his dignity, and pertains to origin. Concerning filiation similarly, for it imports a perfection proper to the Son, founded in origin, through which he is constituted and separated from the other persons; the same concerning passive spiration or procession with respect to the Holy Spirit. Active spiration, although it be a perfection common to Father and Son, is nevertheless proper to them with respect to the Holy Spirit: therefore.

You say: Unbegottenness in the Father is taken either formally for negation or materially for its foundation: if the first be said, it cannot be a notion, for thus it is pure negation, but negation does not explain dignity; if the second, it follows that unbegottenness is not a notion distinct from paternity, because paternity is the very foundation of unbegottenness: therefore. Response: Whatever may be the case concerning the second member about which theologians dispute, I say that unbegottenness here is taken formally for the negation of every principle from which; and to the proof,

I distinguish: negation does not explain dignity formally and directly, granted; circumlocutively and a posteriori, denied. For by the very fact that the Father exists and is not from any other, it immediately follows that he is from himself and that he is the source and origin of the other Persons, which is the greatest dignity. It is not required for a notion, as we have already observed, that it be dignity in itself, but it suffices that it make known dignity at least a posteriori and circumlocutively, just as although it must necessarily pertain to personal property, it is not required that it be personal property, but it suffices that it make it known.

Nor should it seem strange that we signify that primacy and supreme dignity of the Father by a negative term, since we often express other positive perfections of God also by negative terms, as when we call him infinite, ineffable, immutable, etc. Add that we know infinite perfections better by removing imperfections which we can penetrate than by asserting perfections which we cannot sufficiently fathom; nor certainly do we know better that someone is first than when we say he presupposes no other.

Objection: If a notion can consist in negation, there will be more than the five assigned, namely inspirability with respect to the Son, unbegottenness or ungenerability; likewise also improduction or negation of productive power with respect to the Holy Spirit, for by these as proper marks the Son and Holy Spirit are recognized: therefore.

Response: I deny the antecedent; because none of these denotes dignity. This is clear concerning the negation of productive power. It is also clear concerning inspirability and unbegottenness taken not for the negation of every procession, such as we posit in the Father, but for the negation of procession by way of generation through the

intellect, such as belongs to the Holy Spirit, and for the negation of spirability through the will, such as belongs to the Son. For supposing that something is produced in some way, from the fact that it is not produced through intellect or will, it therefore denotes or expresses no dignity; thus all creatures, however imperfect, are produced neither by generation nor by spiration, but by creation, and therefore inspirability and ungenerability, or unbegottenness in this sense, belong to them, and yet no dignity or excellence is thereby denoted in them.

You say secondly: The notion of image and word with respect to the Son, the notion of gift and love with respect to the Holy Spirit, are notions proper to them by which they are recognized: therefore they are also notions. Response: I distinguish the consequent ([22]): therefore they are also notions indistinct from filiation and procession, granted; distinct, denied. I confess therefore that these names belong respectively to the Son and Holy Spirit, but they do not constitute diverse notions, because they are included in the adequate notion of the Son and Holy Spirit, which needs several names in order to be explained; thus the Son, that he may be shown consubstantial, is called Son; that he may be shown entirely similar, is called Image; that he may be shown coeternal, is called Splendor; that he may be shown immaterially begotten, is called Word: but one name could not be found through which all these things might be designated. Say the same proportionally of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3: Generation in the Father and nativity in the Son import dignity, and make known the Father and Son: therefore they are notions.

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[22] Hic q. 34. a. 2. ad 3.

Response: I deny the consequent; because both generation and nativity are either considered directly and thus are something absolute common to the whole Trinity, and therefore not a notion; or obliquely, and thus they are the very relations of paternity and filiation, and therefore not distinct notions.

Corollary: On Properties, Powers, and Notional Acts

From what has been said you will gather ([23]) that, although notions are the same formality with relations and properties under different respects, as we observed at the beginning of the article, nevertheless not every notion is a property or relation: for active spiration, although it be a notion of the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit, is nevertheless not a property at least simply, because it is not proper to one person but common to two; and unbegottenness which is also a notion, is not a relation, and although it be simply a property of the Father or person, it is nevertheless not a personal property, because it is not constitutive of him in the nature of person, which we understand by personal property.

Hence you have that although there are five notions assigned, there are nevertheless only four properties simply, namely unbegottenness, paternity, filiation, and procession; three personal properties: paternity, filiation, and passive spiration or procession; and four relations: paternity, filiation, active and passive spiration.

You ask: How many notional acts are there?

[23] In 1. d. 26. a. 2. a. 2. o.

Response: There are two, namely generation and active spiration, to which corresponds a twofold notional power, namely generative and spirative. But these notional acts are nothing other than the essential acts of understanding and willing modified by relations; hence directly they import something absolute and obliquely a relation, as we said in the preceding when treating of the Processions. Say the same of the notional powers which are not even virtually distinguished from the acts, inasmuch as they are most pure acts, and pertain to the same line, nor should they be called powers toward act so much as toward a term distinct from themselves.

You ask moreover: How many notional names are there?

Response: There are three proper to each person: to the first: Father, unbegotten or unbegetable, and principle; to the second: Son, image, Word; to the third: Spirit, gift, and love. Concerning which Saint Thomas treats below.

DISSERTATION FIVE
ON THE DIVINE PERSONS IN PARTICULAR (ST.TH. I, Q. 33 TO 38.)

Article I. On the Person of the Father.

First Question: Whether it belongs to the Father to be a principle?

Before the response, note that the name "principle" is taken in two ways in divine matters: either essentially with respect to creatures, or notionally insofar as it is attributed to one Person with respect to another. This being noted,

First Response: If the name "principle" is taken essentially with respect to creatures, it is common to the three Persons, because being the principle of creatures belongs to God by reason of omnipotence, which is common to the three Persons; whence the common axiom: The external works of the Trinity are undivided.

Second Response ([1]): If the name "principle" is taken notionally, it belongs especially to the Father; because this name "principle" signifies nothing other than that from which something proceeds, for everything from which something proceeds, in whatever manner it may proceed, we say is a principle: but the Father is that from which the Son

[1] Q. 33, a. 1, in the body of the article.

and the Holy Spirit proceed, and he himself proceeds from no one, whence he is a principle without principle; the Son, however, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from him, nevertheless himself proceeds from the Father, whence he is a principle with principle: therefore.

You might object: To be a principle and to be a cause are the same thing: but we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son: therefore.

Response (2): The Greeks use in divine matters indifferently the name of cause and principle: the Latins, however, rarely use the name of cause, but commonly the name of principle for various reasons. First, because the Father cannot be understood as the cause of the Son by the mode of formal cause, or material cause, or final cause, but only by the mode of originating cause which is efficient cause, but this we always find to be essentially different according to essence from that of which it is the cause, for we call that a cause upon which something else follows. Second, because among the Latins, effect corresponds to cause, but no divine Person is made. Third, because among the gentile philosophers the name of cause said of God designates his relation to creatures: for they say that God is the first cause and creatures are his effects. Therefore, lest anyone suspect that the Son or the Holy Spirit should be placed among creatures essentially different from God, we do not use the name of cause in divine matters, but the name of principle which is more common and generally signifies that from which something is, in whatever way it may be, even if it is not effected by it, nor has any essential diversity with it; thus

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2 Q. 33, ad 1; Q. 10, On Power, a. 1, ad 8, and Opusculum 1, cap. 1.

that from which motion begins is called its principle, not cause; thus the point is called the principle of a line, not the cause.

Moreover, when the Greeks use the name of cause in divine matters, they do not take cause as we do strictly insofar as it effects and has some essential diversity from the effect, but insofar as it signifies that from which something is, in whatever way it may be; and in this sense the Philosopher said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, text three, that principle and cause follow upon each other. Likewise in the same sense the Fathers of the Council of Florence in which the union of Greeks and Latins was treated, in the final session, said that the Father is the cause of the Son. But this diversity between Greeks and Latins arises from the diversity of idioms; for something is said inconveniently in the Latin language which in Greek can be said conveniently because of the property of the idiom.

Objection: If the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is principled, which seems to belong only to creatures.

Response (3): Although the Greeks also use this manner of speaking and it can be conceded among those who understand soundly, nevertheless this is not in the usage of Latin doctors, because to be principled seems to import some inferiority and diminution; but that which imports some diminution we avoid in divine matters because of the error of the Arians: whence, although we say the Father is principle, we do not however say the Son is principled, according to that of St. Hilary in the ninth book on the Trinity: "By the

3 Here cited ad 2, and Q. On Power, cited ad 9.

authority of the giver the Father is greater, but the Son is not lesser, to whom one being is given."

You reply: The name principle is taken from priority, but in divine matters there is no before and after: therefore.

Response (4): Although this name "principle," as to that from which it is imposed, seems to be taken from priority, nevertheless it is not imposed to signify priority, but origin, whence although the Father is not prior to the Son, he is nevertheless his principle.

Second Question: Whether this name "Father" is proper to the first divine Person?

Affirmative Response (5): This is evident first from that of Psalm 88: "He shall call upon me, you are my Father." It is evident second by reason; because the proper name of any Person signifies that by which that person is distinguished from others: but that by which the first divine Person is distinguished from others is paternity: therefore this name "Father" is proper to him.

You might say: "Begetter" or "begetting" is a more common name than "Father," for every father is a begetter, but not conversely: but a more common name is said more properly in divine matters because it determines and restricts less the immense ocean of divinity, as St. Thomas teaches above in q. 13, a. 11. Therefore.

Response, distinguishing the minor (6): A more common name is said more properly in divine matters, other things being equal, I concede; other things being unequal, I deny. But here other things are not equal, because "begetter"

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4 Here cited ad 3, and On Power cited ad 10.

5 Here a. 3.

6 Ibid. ad 2.

or "begetting" signifies the person as conceived in becoming and as on the way to having a son: but "Father" signifies the person according to the completion of generation, and as already having a son: but the denomination of a thing ought to be made from that which is more perfect in it. Add that "begetter" or "begetting" signifies only the property and not the hypostasis (7); but "Father" signifies both property and hypostasis, because it signifies the relation by which the hypostasis is constituted: and hence the author teaches in III, q. 66, a. 5, ad 7, that Baptism conferred in the name of the Begetter and the Begotten is invalid.

Third Question: Whether being unbegotten is proper to the Father?

Affirmative Response (8): Because by the name "unbegotten" here we do not understand what is not from another through generation, for thus it would belong also to the Holy Spirit, but we understand what is not at all from another, whether through generation or in any other way whatsoever, or what is altogether unproducible, but thus unbegotten is proper to the Father, who indeed is principle without principle, the Son principle with principle, the Holy Spirit principle from both.

Some here dispute with great contention whether the unbegotten is constituted in the notion of a notion through something positive or through something negative? To which question briefly and simply, I respond with the author (9) that, according to St. Augustine in the fifth book on the Trinity, chapter 7, "unbegotten" imports the negation of

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7 Below q. 40, a. 2, in the body of the article.

8 Here a. 4, in the body of the article and ad 2.

9 Ibid. ad 1.

generation or production passively, nor does it follow from this that the unbegotten ought not to be posited as the proper notion of the Father because first and simple things are made known through negations, just as we say that a point is that which has no part. Compare the preceding article, in the response to the first objection.

Article II. On the Person of the Son. (St. Th. Q. 36. And 35.)

Among the various names by which the second person of the Trinity is distinguished, there are three principal ones, namely Son, Word, and Image. ([10]) Although these three are entirely one and the same without virtual distinction, they are nevertheless distinguished according to their mode of signification and their relation to diverse extrinsic connotations. "Son" is said relatively to the Father; "Word" relatively to the intellect to which it manifests known things; "Image" relatively to the principle which it imitates. The concept of Son is considered and understood from the concept of Father: hence it remains to consider Word and Image.

Question 1: Whether Word in the divine is a personal or essential name?

Before the response, note that Word is properly taken in us in three ways, and in a fourth way improperly and metaphorically. ([11]) First, it is properly taken for the concept of the mind by which the mind speaks interiorly with itself, or for the term of intellection representing and signifying

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[10] Here q. 34. in the Proem

[11] Ibid. c.

intellectually understood things; second, for the voice of the mouth by which one externally manifests what one conceives interiorly; third, for the imagination by which one imagines a significative voice, even if one does not express it externally; fourth, it is taken improperly and metaphorically for that which is signified or effected by an external word, just as we are accustomed to say "this is the word which I spoke" or "which the King commanded," indicating some deed which was signified by the word, whether simply announcing or even commanding. In God, however, Word is properly taken only in the first sense, for the concept of the mind, or the term of divine intellection, signifying and representing intellectually understood things; but the other words in Him are only metaphorically, inasmuch as they are in some way corporeal and external. These things being noted,

Response: ([12]) Word properly spoken in the divine is a personal name and in no way essential: because Word properly spoken in the divine signifies something proceeding from another, for it is a concept of the mind, and it is of the nature of a concept that it proceeds from the one conceiving; but what signifies something proceeding from another is personal and not essential, because the divine Persons are distinguished by origin: therefore.

Objection 1: Love is said essentially in the divine, therefore also Word. The consequent is proved: just as Word expresses emanation from the intellect, Love expresses emanation from the will: therefore.

Response: I deny the consequent. ([13]) To the proof, there is a disparity in that Love is a common name for

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Below q. 37 a. 1. c.

signifying both the action proceeding from the will and its term due to poverty of vocabulary: but Word only signifies the term produced through intellection, not intellection itself; whence it happens that Love is taken both essentially and personally, but Word only personally.

Objection: According to St. Augustine in De Trinitate 9, c. 10, Word is knowledge; according to St. Anselm in Monologion c. 31, 32, 34, it is thought and intuition: but thought, intuition and knowledge are acts of the intellect and are said essentially: therefore.

Response: ([14]) Augustine and Anselm do not take thought, intuition and knowledge for the act of the knowing intellect, or for some habit of it, but for that which the intellect conceives in knowing; whence St. Augustine in De Trinitate 7, c. 2, says that the Word is begotten Wisdom.

Objection 2: It is of the nature of Word that it be spoken: but according to St. Anselm in Monologion c. 58: "Just as the Father is understanding, and the Son is understanding, and the Holy Spirit is understanding; so the Father is speaking, the Son is speaking, and the Holy Spirit is speaking, and similarly each of them is spoken": therefore the name of Word is said essentially in the divine of the whole Trinity, and not personally of one only.

Response: ([15]) "To speak" can be taken in two ways: in one way properly according to which "to speak" is the same as forming or conceiving a Word by understanding; in another way improperly insofar as it is nothing other than simply understanding, and St. Anselm takes it in this sense. Thus taken, it expresses only the relation of the one

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[14] Here q. 24. a. 1. ad 2

[15] Ibid. ad 3. and q. 9. de Pot. a. 9. ad 8.

understanding to the thing understood, in which relation no notion of origin is imported; for when I understand a stone, the stone does not proceed from my intellect, nor does my intellect from the stone, and therefore to understand simply is not said notionally in the divine, but essentially. But to speak properly imports principally the relation to the word spoken and produced by the speaker, whence it imports the order of origin, and therefore it is said notionally, not essentially. From which it follows that there is only one properly speaking, namely the Father; yet it does not equally follow that there is only one thing spoken, namely the Son. (16) For just as when we speak, we speak two things, first the word, then the things understood and signified through the word, so the Father understanding himself and other things first speaks the word, then the things understood and signified through the word: whence although only the Son is spoken as Word, nevertheless the whole Trinity and other things which the Father understands are spoken as things understood and signified by the Word. Hence the major proposition of the argument can be distinguished: it is of the nature of Word that it be spoken primarily and as Word, I concede; secondarily and as a thing understood by the Word, I deny.

Question 2: Whether Word is a proper name of the Son?

Response: Affirmatively, because Word properly spoken in the divine signifies a certain emanation of the intellect: but the person who proceeds in the divine through emanation of the intellect is called Son, and this kind of

16 Here cited, ad 3. and q. 4. de Vent. a. 2. ad 3.

procession is called generation; as was shown above: therefore.

Question 3: Whether image in the divine is said personally?

Before the response, note: Image is similarity expressed for representing from that of which it is the image. Whence two conditions are required for a true and properly spoken image. The first is that it be similar, not only in genus or in something analogous, or in common accidents, but in species or in the sign of species; whence worms bursting forth from a man are not images of the man, nor is a whitened wall the image of a white man, because they are not similar to man in species, or in the sign of species, but in genus or in common accident. The second condition is that this similarity should draw its origin, or be expressed from that of which it is the image, and this by virtue or mode of procession; for lack of which an egg, however much it may be similar to another egg, is nevertheless not an image of it. If you ask how a tablet representing Caesar is an image of Caesar, since it is not expressed from Caesar nor draws its origin from him? I respond that it is from Caesar, as he is in the idea of the painter, or it is from the painter insofar as Caesar is ideated.

Image can be distinguished as threefold: one artificial which imports similarity, not in specific nature, but only in the sign of species, like a statue or tablet, and this is an imperfect image; second intentional, like the expressed species which imports similarity not only in the sign of specific nature, but in the specific nature itself, yet not under the natural mode of being, but the intelligible, and this is more perfect than the first; third natural which imports similarity in nature and natural mode of being, like the Son

with respect to the Father, and this is a perfect image: it will be most perfect if it is numerically the same nature in the Father and in the Son, as happens in the divine. From these things, to the question:

Response: ([17]) The name of image in the divine is a personal name, because for something to be truly an image, it is required that it proceed from another similar to it in species or in the sign of species: but what imports procession or origin in the divine is personal: therefore.

Question 4: Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?

Response: Affirmatively with the Latin Fathers against the Greek Fathers. ([18])

Proof 1: ([19]) Because the name of Image is not found in Sacred Scripture spoken except of the Son; to the Colossians 1: "Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creation"; and to the Hebrews 1: "Who being the brightness of glory and the figure of his substance." 2 Because although the Holy Spirit is similar to the Father and Son in nature, he nevertheless does not have this similarity formally by virtue of his procession, but only identically, because he is divine Love; but the Son because he proceeds as Word, has formally by virtue of his procession that he be similar to the Father. Confer dissertation 2, article 5, where we extensively examine this reason.

Objection 1 with the Greek Fathers: to the Romans 8, it is said: "He predestined them to be conformed to the image of his Son": but what is the image of the Son, unless

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[17] Q.35. a. 1. c.

[18] Ibid. a. 1. c.

[19] Ibid.

the Holy Spirit? And to 1 Corinthians 15: "As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear the image of the heavenly": by the image of the heavenly, they equally understand the Holy Spirit.

Response: To the first, the locution is intransitive, so that it is understood of an image not which is other than the Son, but which is the Son himself, and the sense is, "conformed to his image which is his Son." To the second, the sense is: "As we have borne the image of earthly Adam in sins, let us bear the image of heavenly Adam in virtues." Or for reverence of the Greek Fathers, say that the Spirit is the image of the Father and Son, understanding image in a broad sense for similarity in nature, although he does not formally have this similarity by virtue of his origin.

Objection with Durandus: The Son is not similar to the Father by reason of essence, because thus there is identity, nor by reason of relation, because thus they are opposed. Likewise if the Son were the image of the Father, it would be because he represents him; but he also represents creatures: therefore.

Response: To the first, the Son is similar to the Father by reason of essence and relation together: because it is of the nature of similar things that they agree in something, and differ in something: for if they agreed in all things, there would be identity and not similarity, and if they differed in all things, there would be diversity: but the Father and Son agree in nature and differ in relation. Whence comparison should not be instituted between essence and essence, and between relation and relation, but between person and person. To the second, I respond that for the notion of image it does not suffice that it represent, but also that it be expressed and proceed from that of which it is the image; but

the Son does not proceed from creatures, but from the Father.

Article III. From the Knowledge of Which Things does the Word Proceed Per Se from the Father?

The Father knows the essence, attributes, relations, and all possible and future creatures. The question is whether the Word proceeds from Him through the knowledge of all these things, or only some of them, and which ones? All agree that it proceeds from the knowledge of the essence and attributes, and there Scotus stops, denying that it proceeds from the knowledge of relations and creatures. Puteanus says it proceeds from the knowledge of the essence, attributes, and paternity; Vasquez from the knowledge even of the Word itself; Turrianus also from the knowledge of the Holy Spirit. Others commonly teach that it proceeds from the knowledge of the essence, relations, and possible creatures. Some add even future ones.

This question proceeds under a very metaphysical precision; namely, which knowledge in the Father concurs per se in the fourth mode to the procession of the Word. That is said in philosophy to concur or agree per se in the fourth mode which agrees under the formal reason conducting to some operation, and not merely identically or concomitantly. That is said not to agree per se in the fourth mode, but per se in the first mode, which essentially and intrinsically agrees as to quiddity, but nevertheless does not express or import the formal reason conducting to the operation. Thus when I say "man reasons," this proposition is per se in the fourth mode, because in it is imported the reason or formal principle

conducting to reasoning, namely man. But if I should say "animal reasons," demonstrating man, it is only per se in the first and not the fourth mode, because although animal is of the quiddity of man, nevertheless animal is not the formal reason conducting to reasoning, for man does not reason by animality, but by the reason by which man is constituted in the being of man. We ask therefore whether the Word proceeds from the Father, per se in the fourth mode, from the knowledge not only of the essence and attributes, but also of relations and creatures? For the resolution of which,

I say first: The Word proceeds per se in the fourth mode from the knowledge not only of the essence and attributes, but of relations and possible creatures.

Proof 1 from Saints Augustine and Thomas. Saint Augustine in De Trinitate 15, chapter 14, says of the Father: "God the Father knows all things"; and of the Word: "It is born from the knowledge of the Father." Saint Thomas here, question 34, article 1, reply to 3: "The Father, understanding both the Son and the Holy Spirit and all other things that are contained in His knowledge, conceives the Word, so that thus the whole Trinity is spoken by the Word and also every creature." Understand this of natural and necessary knowledge, which is only of possibles, as I will say in the second conclusion, and it is clear from that other testimony of Saint Thomas in the same place, article 3, corpus: "God," he says, "knowing Himself, knows every creature: therefore the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that He actually understands, hence in us there are diverse words, according to the diverse things we understand. But because God understands Himself and all things in one act, His one Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures. And just as God's knowledge is

only cognitive of God, but cognitive and creative of creatures: so the Word of God, of that which is in God the Father, is only expressive, but of creatures it is expressive and operative." You see the Holy Doctor does not say "making" or "about to make," but "creative" and "operative," and therefore he does not speak of free knowledge, by which future things are or come to be, but of necessary knowledge by which things can come to be.

Proof 2 by reason. The Word proceeds per se in the fourth mode from the Father through the most perfect knowledge of the essence, consequently comprehensive, for it is the adequate term of paternal intellection which is most perfect and comprehensive. Hence Saint Augustine in De Trinitate 15, chapter 14: "The Father," he says, "would not have spoken Himself perfectly and completely, if anything were less in His Word than in Himself." But the most perfect and comprehensive knowledge of the essence attains not only the essence itself and attributes, but also relations and possible creatures: therefore. Proof of the minor: Comprehensive knowledge is knowledge equaling the cognoscibility of the object, so that through it the object is known extensively and intensively as much as it is naturally cognoscible, as we saw in the preceding treatise, dissertation 4, article 9; consult it. But the divine essence is not known as much as it is naturally cognoscible, unless relations and possible creatures are known in it: therefore. Proof of the minor: the divine essence is not known as much as it is cognoscible, unless it is known as fruitful and communicable, and as omnipotent; but it cannot be known as fruitful and communicable, unless the terms of fruitfulness and communicability are known, which are relations; nor can it be known as omnipotent unless possible

creatures are known in omnipotence, which are contained in it and have a necessary connection with it, for the power of a cause cannot be comprehended, or known as much as it is cognoscible, unless all the effects contained in it are known: therefore.

If you say: An angel comprehends its own intellect, and yet does not know all the intellections it can form: similarly the visual power can be comprehended without knowing all the particular visible things to which it can extend, but it suffices that the visible as such is known: therefore similarly for omnipotence to be comprehended it is not necessary to know all possibles in particular, but it suffices to know the possible as such. I respond by denying the consequence. The disparity is that the angelic intellect is not the adequate cause of all intellections it can form, nor is the visual power of all visions it can elicit, but for this each power needs species either infused or acquired by which it is made fruitful: but God's omnipotence is the cause adequately and most completely containing all possible effects in particular as to all specific and individual reasons.

The conclusion is confirmed: The Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of those things of which it is naturally and necessarily expressive and representative, for it is the expression of those things which the intellection understands, and as Saint Thomas says here in article 3, corpus: "The word that is conceived is representative of everything that is actually understood": but the Word naturally expresses and represents not only the essence and attributes, but also relations and possible creatures: therefore. Proof of the minor: The Word naturally and necessarily expresses and represents all things that God the Father naturally and necessarily understands: but God the

Father naturally and necessarily understands not only the essence and attributes, but relations and possible creatures; for these necessarily shine forth in the divine essence, since they do not depend on God's free decree: therefore.

I say second: The Word does not proceed per se in the fourth mode from the knowledge of future creatures, but only concomitantly and accidentally. Proof of the first part, first: The knowledge from which the Word proceeds per se is natural and necessary, because the Word proceeds naturally and necessarily: but the knowledge of future things is not natural and necessary, but presupposes God's free decree, and just as future things could not be, so their knowledge could not be: therefore.

Proof 2: That does not concur per se to the production of the Word, which if it were absent, the Word would nonetheless proceed essentially invariate and of the same nature as it now is, but if the knowledge of future things were absent the Word would nonetheless proceed essentially invariate and of entirely the same nature as it now is: therefore. The major is clear to those who understand the terms. Proof of the minor, first from Saint Anselm in the Monologion chapter 30, where he says: "Whether God is thought of with no other essence existing, or with others existing, it is necessary that His Word, co-eternal with Him, be with Him." If there were no future creatures, the divine will would remain the same invariate, for it is not changed by the free decree of future things: therefore similarly the divine intellect and the Word produced by it would remain invariate.

When the most learned Witasse responds to this argument that the Word in this hypothesis would remain invariate as to entity, not as to the representation which it

has in fact, he concedes by this response what we intend, namely that the knowledge of future things does not concur per se to the production of the Word as to its entity or essence, but only as to the accidental representation which it has from the hypothesis.

Confirmation: the knowledge from which the Word proceeds per se must agree with the Father prior in origin than with the Word: but the knowledge of future things does not agree with the Father prior in origin than with the Word because it presupposes a decree which is common to the three Persons, nor does it agree prior in origin with one than with another: therefore.

The second part is clear from what has been said: because since the Word proceeds from comprehensive knowledge of the essence, and future things are contained in it accidentally and from the hypothesis of the decree, it follows that it proceeds from their knowledge accidentally and concomitantly.

Solutions to Objections

Objection 1 against the first conclusion: The primary object of divine intellection is the divine essence, but relations pertain only to the secondary object: but the Word proceeds per se from the intellection of the primary object: therefore.

I respond by denying the minor. For by the very fact that the Word proceeds from comprehensive knowledge, it must proceed from the knowledge of both secondary and primary object, because the primary cannot be comprehensively known without the secondary object intrinsically connected with the primary.

Instance proving the denied minor: The primary object is known before the secondary: but the Word proceeds from primary knowledge: therefore.

I respond by denying the major again. For since the primary object is known by comprehensive knowledge, it cannot be known without simultaneously knowing the secondary connected intrinsically with it. But there is equivocation in this word "primary"; for the divine essence is not called the primary object, and relations secondary, because the essence is known before relations, but because the essence is known by reason of itself and relations by reason of the essence.

Objection 2: The knowledge from which the Word proceeds per se is intuitive: but it cannot be intuitive of the Word and Holy Spirit: therefore. The major is established; because the knowledge from which the Word proceeds must be most perfect, but intuitive knowledge is more perfect than abstractive. Proof of the minor: intuitive knowledge bears upon a thing actually existing: but for the instant in which the Word is conceived to proceed, the Son and Holy Spirit are not yet understood to exist, since the Son proceeds by this very knowledge, and the Holy Spirit presupposes it, for He proceeds from the Father and Son: therefore.

I respond by denying the minor. To the proof, I distinguish the minor: for the instant in which the Word is conceived to proceed, the Son and Holy Spirit are not yet understood to exist, and yet they really exist, I concede; and they really do not exist, I deny. This imperfect mode of our understanding must therefore be corrected, arising from the weakness of our mind, which cannot attain the reason of divine processions. Priority among the divine Persons is only priority of origin and "from whom" or of order and reason,

by no means priority of duration and "in which," for they exist simultaneously in the same now of eternity, so that priority of order and reason in no way interferes with their coexistence, nor consequently with intuitive knowledge.

You say: From our position it seems necessarily to follow that the Word is prior to itself, and that the Holy Spirit is both prior and posterior to the Word. The Word is prior to itself, because it is known intuitively as existing before it proceeds, and yet it does not exist except by procession. The Holy Spirit is prior to the Word, because, before the Word proceeds, He is known intuitively as existing, and He is posterior to the Word, because He proceeds from it.

I respond again, that our imagination must be corrected, and it must be attended that in the Trinity nothing is prior or posterior in duration, but only in origin and order, and thus no Person can be said to be or be prior or posterior to another. Yet if you wish to play with priority of order and reason, distinguish thus: The Word is prior to itself and the Holy Spirit is prior and posterior to the Word under the same aspect, I deny; under diverse aspects, I concede. The Word as known is prior to itself as proceeding. The Spirit as known is prior to the Word, as proceeding He is posterior. But as I repeat again, these priorities and posteriorities are figments of our reason. For in reality the Word and Spirit are known and proceed once and simultaneously from eternity.

Objection 3: If the Word proceeded from the knowledge of the Son, Holy Spirit and possible creatures, it would be their image: but this cannot be said: therefore. Proof of the major: it would be similar to them because it would be representative of them; for the Word represents those things from whose knowledge it proceeds: therefore.

I respond by denying the major. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: it would be similar to them, but would not proceed from them, I concede the antecedent; and would simultaneously proceed from them, I deny the antecedent and consequent. It is therefore one thing to proceed from the knowledge or through the knowledge of something, another to proceed from it. The Word indeed proceeds from the knowledge or through the knowledge of persons and creatures, because they are terms of that knowledge or objects known, but it does not proceed from them, but from the Father alone who knows all those things; but for the notion of image, similarity or representation does not suffice, as has been said, but procession from that of which it is the image is required.

You say 1: For the notion of image it is not required that it proceed as from a principle from that of which it is the image, but it suffices that it proceed from it as from an object existing in the intellect of him by whom it is produced: this is clear in an exterior image, e.g. of Caesar, which, although it does not proceed from Caesar as from an effective principle, is nevertheless his image, because Caesar has cognitive being in the mind of the painter: therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof taken from the exterior image, I deny that this is an image of Caesar as he is externally, but of Caesar as he is in the mind of the painter; hence it should be called an image of the painter insofar as he is Caesar ideated; but insofar as Caesar has the notion of an external object he is not regarded by the image primarily and formally in the notion of image, but only secondarily in the notion of similarity, by which notion also the Word is expressive and representative of relations and creatures.

You add: But the object of knowledge is the principle of knowledge, for from object and power knowledge is born: therefore if persons and possible creatures are the object of paternal knowledge, they are also its principle, consequently the principle from which the Word proceeds.

I respond by distinguishing the addition: but the object of knowledge is the principle "by which" of knowledge, I concede, the principle "which," I deny. But image is not spoken of with respect to the principle "by which," but to the principle "which": thus in human affairs, although offspring is from the father's nature as from a principle "by which," it is not nevertheless called son or image of the nature, but of the father who is the principle "which" expressing and originating his own likeness: so in divine things. Confer article 1 of this dissertation, question 4 in the response to objection 2. Add that relations and creatures are not the object of divine intellection by reason of themselves, but by reason of the essence in which they are involved.

Objection 4: Saint Thomas in question 4 De Veritate, article 5, corpus, says: "Because the Father principally speaks Himself by generating His Word, and consequently speaks creatures; therefore principally and as it were per se the Word refers to the Father, but consequently and as it were accidentally it refers to creature: for it is accidental to the Word that creature is spoken through it." Therefore the Word does not proceed per se from the knowledge of possible creatures, but accidentally, as we say of the knowledge of future things in the second conclusion.

Some respond that "accidentally" and "it is accidental" are taken there by the Holy Doctor, not as the same as accidentally, but as the same as "through another," because namely the Word does not represent possible creatures by

reason of itself, but by reason of the essence previously represented. This response is probable, which you can see more fully explained in Father Gonet, disputation 9, article 2, numbers 45 and 46, but more probably

I respond that Saint Thomas there speaks of future creatures; because, as is clear from the context, he speaks of creatures to which God is referred by the relation of Creator and Lord; but these are future ones.

Objection 5: If per impossibile creatures were impossible and there were no knowledge of them, God would nonetheless remain invariate, and consequently the Word would proceed of the same nature as it now is: therefore the knowledge of possible creatures does not concur per se to the production of the Word. The consequence is clear; because when that which concurs per se to the production of something is removed, either it is not produced or it is produced of another nature. Proof of the antecedent: God is not necessarily connected with creatures: therefore. Proof of the antecedent: if God were necessarily connected with creatures, it would follow (1) that He would depend on them; (2) that with the possibility of one creature removed, e.g. of one fly, divinity would be removed or changed, than which nothing more absurd can be said: therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: God is not necessarily connected with creatures through dependence of Himself on them, I concede the antecedent; through dependence of creatures on Himself, I deny the antecedent. For in order that two extremes be necessarily connected with each other it is not required that they depend on each other mutually, but it suffices that one depend on the other and that this other necessarily require this dependence on itself, as is clear in

the necessary connection of essence and properties, property depends on essence, not essence on properties: although therefore God's omnipotence in no way depends on the possibility of creatures, nevertheless the possibility of creatures depends on God's omnipotence, and God's omnipotence necessarily requires this possibility to depend on itself; for creatures are called possible, because God is omnipotent; hence if they were not possible, it would be because God were not omnipotent, and thus with the possibility of creatures removed it would follow a posteriori and by extrinsic place that God's omnipotence and consequently His divinity would be removed. From which the response to both inconveniences is clear. The first is to be denied. The second is to be distinguished thus: it would follow a posteriori and by extrinsic place that with the possibility of one fly removed God would be removed or changed, I concede; it would follow a priori and by intrinsic place, I deny. Confer what I said in the preceding treatise, dissertation 5, article 4, in the solution of the first argument.

Objection 6: The Holy Spirit does not proceed per se from love of creatures: therefore neither does the Word from their knowledge.

I respond by denying the consequence. The disparity is that in God there is no love of possible creatures, as I said in the preceding treatise, dissertation 7, article 5; but of future ones there is free love, from which the Holy Spirit cannot proceed per se, but only accidentally and concomitantly: but in God there is given knowledge of possible creatures, and that necessary, from which therefore the Word proceeds per se.

Objection 7 against the second conclusion: The Word proceeds per se from comprehensive knowledge: but

comprehensive knowledge attains even future creatures: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major: The Word proceeds per se from comprehensive natural and necessary knowledge, I concede; free, I deny. This is clear from what has been said. But the knowledge of future creatures in God is free, founded namely in a free decree which could not be.

Instance: The divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of creatures which it represents by force of procession: but by force of procession it represents future creatures: therefore. Proof of the minor: The Word in fact represents creatures: but whatever the Word has it has by force of procession: therefore. Proof of the minor: whatever the Word has, it has from the Father through generation and procession: therefore by force of generation and procession.

I respond by denying the minor understood formally. To the proof, I deny the minor. To the proof, I deny the consequence. Because it is one thing to have through procession, another to have by force of procession formally per se in the fourth mode; for something can be had through procession identically and concomitantly, which is not to have by force of procession formally per se in the fourth mode. Thus the Holy Spirit has being God through procession identically and concomitantly; nevertheless not by force of procession formally per se in the fourth mode. So similarly the Word has representing future creatures through procession identically and concomitantly, not by force of procession formally per se in the fourth mode, because even if it did not represent them, it would nonetheless proceed of the same nature as it now is as to entity and essence.

Certain other arguments are proposed by adversaries both from the authority of Saints Augustine and Thomas and

from reason, but they prove nothing other than what we concede in the second part of the conclusion, namely that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of future creatures accidentally and concomitantly. Hence we omit those.

If you ask whether the Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of conditional futures? I respond negatively; because according to us conditional futures depend no less on God's free decree than absolute futures. But the defenders of middle knowledge, if they speak conformably to their principles, must respond affirmatively.

Article IV. On the Person of the Holy Spirit Whether the Holy Spirit Proceeds From the Son? (St. Th. Q. 22.)

Preliminary Observations

Note 1. That the Spirit proceeds from the Father is a common and certain faith which Sacred Scripture expressly teaches, John 15: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father"; and which the first Council of Constantinople decreed definitively against the Arians and Macedonians, who reduced both the Son and the Holy Spirit to the order of creatures, saying that the Son was made by the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit by the Son alone, adding these particular clauses about the Holy Spirit to the Nicene symbol: "Who proceeds from the Father."

Note 2. When this error was then extinguished, another arose concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, which the Greeks long pertinaciously denied against the Latins, and which very many even now deny.

Saint Thomas traces the origin of this error to a certain Nestorian symbol condemned in the Ephesian synod, and from Theodoret (it seems should be read Theodoret), a supporter of Nestorius, in his censure of the ninth anathematism of Saint Cyril; Hugh Etherianus, Bellarmine, Petau, Garnier and others also designate this Theodoret as the first author of this error: although some more recent writers attempt to excuse him. But whatever the case may be, it is at least established that this error did not spread further at that time, but remained as if dormant until about the middle of the seventh century, when the Greeks began to restore their dogma, against whom Saint Maximus, martyr, wrote from the same nation, in his letter to Marinus found in Petavius lib. 7. c. 2. n. 2. But in the eighth century the battle was fought more openly and fiercely on both sides between Greeks and Latins, for which reason very many synods were held in Italy, Germany, and Gaul. And finally around the middle of the ninth century, through the work of Photius, the invader of the see of Constantinople, after Saint Ignatius was expelled, the dissension erupted into open schism. Pope Saint Nicholas I condemned Photius; Photius in turn insolently condemned him, and published virulent writings against Nicholas and the Latins, reproaching them especially because they said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. At the urging of Nicholas I, the Gallic bishops Odo of Beauvais, Aeneas of Paris, and Ratramnus, monk of Corbie, strenuously attacked him.

In the eleventh century the dispute revived and broke out into open schism, through the efforts of Michael Cerularius, patriarch of Constantinople, and emperor Constantine Monomachus: for which reason Urban II convoked the Council of Bari in Apulia in the year 1097, in

which Saint Anselm, bishop of Canterbury in England, completely defeated and crushed the disputing Greeks, and although the acts of this council do not exist, there remain however the disputations and arguments of Saint Anselm in the book which he published on the procession of the Holy Spirit.

In the thirteenth century, in the year 1215, in the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III, with the patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem and other Greek bishops present, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was defined, and peace was made between both Churches, which when it had not lasted long, was renewed again in the Council of Lyons in the year 1274, under Gregory X, with the Greeks abjuring their error, and singing the Symbol with the Latins during the solemnities of the Masses with the addition of "and from the Son."

But neither was this peace long-lasting, with the Greeks in their fickleness returning to their vomit, until finally in the Council of Florence in the year 1439, under Eugene IV, to which came with the patriarch of Constantinople several bishops of the Greek churches, among whom Bessarion stood out for his fame of erudition, later cardinal of the Roman Church, after various and lengthy disputations, in which our John of Montenegro, provincial of Lombardy, commonly called John the Theologian, or John the Provincial, played the principal parts for the Latins, again concord was established and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was sanctioned, to which all the Greeks subscribed, except Mark of Ephesus, who when he returned to his homeland, since he wielded authority among his own people, drew many to his side; nevertheless no profession of faith contrary to Florence was

issued; whence the error of those who among the Greeks now dissent from us, ought to be considered personal, and not of the entire Greek church.

Note 3. The Greeks have not denied, nor do they deny every relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Son ([20]): for they concede that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and is from the Father through the Son, indeed that he is from the Son, that he flows out, springs forth, emanates, is spirated from the Son, but not that he proceeds from him, because they think this implies two principles, and that the Father and Son are not one unique principle of that procession, since "to proceed" among them designates procession from a principle which does not proceed from another. Hence the question seems to be almost about a name, born from ignorance or obstinacy: because if anyone rightly considers, he will find that the word "procession" among all words that pertain to any kind of origin is most common and determines the mode of origin less than any other word; for we use it to designate any kind of origin, just as we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a fountain, and similarly in any other cases. Hence whatever is in any way from another can be said to proceed from that other, but not everything that in any way proceeds from another can be said to flow from it, to be spirated, generated, sent, or to emanate from it. Therefore, by the very fact that it is conceded that the Holy Spirit is in some way from the Son, it must necessarily be conceded that he proceeds from him. Hence for the defense of the Catholic dogma, let there be:

Resolution of the Question

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[20] Here q. 36. a. 1. o. and opusc. 1. c. 32. § They wish

I say: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. (21)

Proof 1 from the authority of Sacred Scripture. Sacred Scripture asserts three things which cannot stand, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. First, that the Spirit receives from the Son. Second, that the Son sends the Holy Spirit. Third, that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son. Therefore:

1. The Holy Spirit receives from the Son (22) John 16: "He will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you": but in divine matters one Person does not receive from another, except because it proceeds from it, therefore. Proof of the minor: what someone receives from another is either something accidental or something substantial: but since the Holy Spirit does not receive anything accidental from the Son, for both are devoid of accident: therefore something substantial and the substance itself through substantial action, which is to proceed in substance from the Son. Likewise the Holy Spirit receives knowledge from the Son, for he will hear from him whatever he will announce: but to know for him is to be, as Saint Augustine says, tract. 99 on John. And this is evident, because knowledge in God is not distinguished from essence.

Nor should you say that these words, "he will take what is mine," do not signify "he will take from me," but "from my Father," or "from the divine substance which is

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21 Ibid. and q. 10. on Power a. 4. in 1. d. 11. q. 1. 4. Against the Gentiles c. 24. Opusc. cited. c. 32

22 Ibid. § of another.

also mine, but nevertheless from the Father alone"; for Christ himself demonstrates that this interpretation is false, assigning in the following verse why the Holy Spirit takes from his own: "All things," he says, "that the Father has are mine, therefore I said to you, that he will take what is mine": but the Father has the power of spirating the Holy Spirit: therefore so does the Son. Thus argued John the Theologian in session 21 of the Council of Florence after Saint Athanasius in his letter to Serapion, Saint Hilary in book 8 on the Trinity, and Saint Thomas cited. Moreover according to this interpretation, the Son could equally be said to receive from the Holy Spirit since he has from the Father the substance, which is also the substance of the Holy Spirit.

Nor does it matter that he speaks in the future, "he will take what is mine," because there the future is used not with respect to the eternal procession, but with respect to the temporal effect which is the announcement of heavenly truths; or because, as Saint Augustine says in the place cited, "In that which is eternal, whatever tense of time is used, whether past, present, or future, it is not used falsely, because what is eternal both was, and will be, and is; it was because it never was lacking, it will be because it will never be lacking, and it is because it always is."

2. The Son sends the Holy Spirit ([23]) John 15: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father"; and chapter 16: "If I do not go away, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you": but for the Holy Spirit to be sent by the Son is for him to proceed from him, therefore. Proof of the minor: The mission of one

[23] Here q. 36. a. 1. o. and Opusc. 1. c. 32. § Similarly. and cont. Gentiles cited.

from another happens either as from a superior through command, or as from one wiser through counsel, or through procession or origin as from a principle: but the Holy Spirit is not sent by the Son as from a superior through command, nor as from one wiser through counsel: therefore as from a principle through procession or origin.

If you say that the Son is also sent by the Holy Spirit, Isaiah 61: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, he has sent me to evangelize the poor"; I respond ([24]) that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit according to his assumed nature; but the Spirit did not assume a created nature, so that according to it he could be said to be sent by the Son. Nor can it be said that the Spirit is sent and given to us by the Son, insofar as the gifts of grace which are called gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred on us: because, as I will say below, the divine persons themselves through mission dwell and remain in us, according to that of John 14: "We will come to him and make our dwelling with him." Besides, "to be sent" is not said of any created quality, but of a person.

3°. The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son ([25]) Acts 16: "When they had come to Mysia, they attempted to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit of Jesus did not permit them"; Galatians 4: "God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts"; and elsewhere. From these I argue thus: in the same way the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son as he is called the Spirit of the Father, Matthew 10: "the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you": but he is called the Spirit of the Father insofar as he proceeds from the Father: therefore. Likewise the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, either because

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[24] Ibid

[25] Opusc. cited. § To show.

he proceeds from the Son, or because the Son proceeds from him; not the second: therefore the first. Proof of the major: The Holy Spirit is not called the Spirit of the Son by reason of subjection or servitude, but as a coequal person: therefore by reason of origin because namely he proceeds from the Son, or the Son from him, for nothing else is assignable.

Proof 2 from the Fathers, especially the Greeks who flourished before the origin of the schism. ([26]) Saint Athanasius, oration 3 against the Arians: "Whatever," he says, "the Spirit has, he has from the Word"; epistle 3 to Serapion: "What property we know the Son to have toward the Father, the same we find the Holy Spirit to have toward the Son, and just as the Son says: 'All things whatsoever the Father has are mine,' so we find all these things to be in the Holy Spirit through the Son"; in the book on the Human Nature of Christ: "David knew that with the Father, the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit"; and in the Symbol which is inscribed with his name: "The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."

Saint Basil, book 2 on the Holy Spirit, against Eunomius saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son alone, [argues] 1° because no operation of the Son is divided from the Father, for "all things mine are yours, and yours are mine": how therefore does he attribute the cause and origin of the Spirit to the Son alone? 2° because there are not two principles of the Holy Spirit but one principle; 3° because the Apostle joins both Father and Son, naming sometimes the Spirit of the Father, sometimes of the Son, which are our proofs.

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[26] Ibid through various §§.

The same Saint Basil, book 5 against the same Eunomius, proves that the Holy Spirit is third in order in the Holy Trinity, and second after the Son: as one who has his being from him. Concerning this passage there was sharp dispute in sessions 20, 21 and 22 of the Council of Florence between Mark of Ephesus for the Greeks and John the Theologian for the Latins, with Mark of Ephesus accusing John the Theologian of interpolation in the codex he was using, John responding that it was a codex of proven faith, as it was written on parchment 600 years before the Council of Florence, and brought by Cardinal Cusanus.

The same Saint Basil in the same book, when Eunomius asked why the Holy Spirit is not called the son of the Son, responds that he is not so called, not because he is not from God through the Son, but lest the Trinity be thought to be an infinite multitude, if anyone should suspect it, as happens in humans, to have sons from sons. From all these things it is clear that not only does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son according to Saint Basil, but this was then held as indubitable by all, both Catholics and heretics.

Saint Epiphanius, heresy 62: "The Spirit is not alien from the Father and the Son, but of the same substance, the same divinity from the Father and the Son"; heresy 74: "The Holy Spirit arises from both, Spirit from Spirit; for God is SPIRIT"; and in the Ancoratus n. 8: "Spirit of the Father and Spirit of the Son... let it be believed that God is from God and Spirit from Christ, or from both, as Christ asserts with these words: 'Who proceeds from the Father'; and: 'He will take what is mine.'" By which passage of Scripture, we proved the same above.

Cyril of Alexandria with the synod of Alexandria in the letter to Nestorius n. 10: "Although the Spirit subsists in his

proper person and is considered in himself insofar as he is, and is not the Son, he is nevertheless not alien from him, since he is called the Spirit of truth; but Christ is truth, and therefore he proceeds from him as well as from God the Father." This letter was read and approved in the Council of Ephesus and others, as I will say presently. The same one, book 10, Commentary on John, after he said that the Spirit knows the things that are of the Son, gives this reason: "Without the work of a teacher he knows all things that are his; from whom and in whom he is."

I omit very many other Greek Fathers who can be read in Saint Thomas, Opusculum 1 cited, chapter 32, through various sections; and in Bellarmine, book 2 on Christ, from chapter 20 to the end. As for the Latins, Tertullian against Praxeas chapter 4; Hilary book 2 on the Trinity; Ambrose, book 1 on the Holy Spirit chapter 10; Saint Augustine book 15 on the Trinity, chapter 20; Saint Leo epistle 93; Fulgentius on Faith to Peter chapter 11; and others commonly assert the same truth constantly, but we do not cite their texts, nor do we press them, because the Greeks confess that they dissent from the Latins. Nevertheless the testimonies of the Latin Fathers joined with the testimonies of the Greeks are valid, to show them that this faith of ours is the constant tradition of the entire Church.

Proof 3° from Councils. And 1° the letter of Saint Cyril to Nestorius, in which, as we saw, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is expressly asserted, was read and approved in five general councils: in the III or Ephesian act 1; in the IV or Chalcedonian act 5; in the V collation 6 and 8; in the VI act 18; and in the VIII final session. 2 The same truth, with Greeks present and consenting, was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III in the year

1215, Lyon II under Gregory X in the year 1274, Florence under Eugene IV in the year 1439, and several other provincial councils.

Proof 4 by reasons which the author reduces to three in this present question 36, article 1. The first is from inconvenience; the other two, from congruence and greater conformity to what the natural order of things seems to demand.

1. If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be distinguished from him; for Persons are distinguished by relation of origin alone; but because Scotus with his followers attacks this reason, we defer its fuller examination to the following article.

2. The Son proceeds through the intellect, as Word, the Spirit through the will, as Love; but love proceeds from the Word, for we do not love anything except according to what we apprehend by mental conception, or, as it is said, except what is pre-known: therefore. Nor does it matter that in the beatific vision there is love without the Word, for it is not without that which supplies the place of the Word, which is the divine essence. Nor does it matter that the Word does not concur effectively to love, but only objectively and finally. This being granted and not conceded, by the very fact that the Word in divine matters is a subsisting person, just as it is then the principle which operates outwardly, so it ought to be the principle of notional love.

3. Although several things materially and numerically distinct alone can proceed from one without order, just as one craftsman produces many knives materially and numerically distinct from each other, having no order among themselves: nevertheless we never find that from one several things specifically distinct proceed without some order either

of origin and causality, or of greater and lesser degree of perfection; which is evident in the various species of this universe which proceed from God according to the order of greater and lesser perfection; likewise in immaterial substances, namely Angels, in which there is also an order of diverse perfection according to diverse gifts of grace: but the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from one and the same Father, specifically, or quasi-specifically distinct, nor can there be in them an order of greater and lesser perfection: therefore an order of origin, by which either the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit from the Son. The first cannot be admitted: therefore the second. To these reasons the following can be added.

4. All things in divine matters are common where relative opposition does not prevent it, as the commonly received axiom holds: but between the Father and Son there is no relative opposition by reason of active spiration: therefore this is common to both.

5. If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son would not have the entire essence of the Father, therefore he would not be Son nor coequal with the Father: therefore. Proof of the antecedent: he would not have the same will with the Father, for if he had it, he would produce the Holy Spirit through it just as the Father produces: therefore. If you say: The Son has the same intellect with the Father and yet does not produce the Word as the Father does: likewise the Holy Spirit has the same will with the Father, and yet does not produce another Holy Spirit as the Father does. I respond: there is a disparity because the Son by proceeding through the intellect by his very procession exhausts the entire fecundity of the divine intellect since he is its adequate term, and thus no other Word remains to be

produced. Similarly the Holy Spirit by proceeding through the will equally exhausts the entire fecundity of the divine will, as being its adequate term; whence no other term remains to be produced. But truly while the Word through his generation receives the will from the Father, this will is not yet conceived as exhausted, nor as having its adequate term through the procession of the Holy Spirit; because the Word is conceived to proceed before the Holy Spirit: and therefore the will is no less fecund in the Son for the production of the Holy Spirit than in the Father.

6. Whatever is not against the nature of something is not impossible: but to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is not against the nature of the Son, neither insofar as he is God, because the Father who is God is the principle of the Holy Spirit, nor insofar as he is Son because the procession of the Holy Spirit is different from that of the Son. But it is not repugnant that what is from a principle according to one procession, should be the principle of another procession, just as the Son is from the Father as from a principle, and is the principle of another Son: it remains therefore that it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Spirit: but in divine matters being and being able do not differ: therefore the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit.

The Arguments of the Greeks are Solved

Objection 1: Sacred Scripture expresses that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, never from the Son: therefore. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: Sacred Scripture does not express that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as to words, I concede the antecedent; as to meaning, I deny the antecedent. This is evident from the proofs of the conclusion.

Moreover it should regularly be held in Sacred Scripture that what is said of the Father must be understood of the Son, even if an exclusive expression is added, except only in those matters in which the Father and Son are distinguished according to opposite relations. For when the Lord says in Matthew 11: "No one knows the Son except the Father," it is not excluded that the Son knows himself: so therefore when it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if it were added that he proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not be excluded from this, because as to being the principle of the Holy Spirit, the Father and Son are not opposed, but only as to this, that this one is Father, and that one is Son.

Objection 2: The second general synod of Constantinople I, in its symbol expresses the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, makes no mention of the Son: therefore.

I respond that this argument, being again negative, is of no weight. For the synod makes mention of the Father and not of the Son; because then the issue was about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father which the Eunomians denied, not about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son which they admitted. But this is the religion of councils, that they insert nothing in the symbol except what is necessary for the circumstances of the times.

Objection 3: When Charisius the presbyter in act 6 of the Council of Ephesus had publicly recited the Nestorian symbol, in which among other things these are read: "It is necessary to confess that we believe in one God the Father eternal... And in the Holy Spirit... but we do not think him to be Son, nor to have his subsistence through the Son," then the synod, when it had condemned the other articles about

the Incarnation, did not disapprove this article. And when Theodoret in the impugning of the ninth anathematism of Saint Cyril, which is read in the third part of the same synod, had said: "But the proper Spirit of the Son, if because he is of the same nature and goes out from the Father, he said (Cyril), we consent and receive it as a pious voice; but if because he has existence from the Son or through the Son, we reject this as blasphemy and impiety; for we believe the Lord saying: 'The Spirit who proceeds from the Father.'" Cyril made no reply to these things in his defense; from which both the silence of the council and of Cyril it seems evidently to follow, that the denial of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was not then held to be erroneous.

I respond 1°, that this objection does not much favor the Greeks, who willingly say that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, which nevertheless the cited authorities deny as erroneous.

I respond 2°, that both the synod and Saint Cyril, if not so distinctly, nevertheless sufficiently for the importance of the matter and the circumstances of the times disapproved the error of Nestorius and Theodoret concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. And 1° indeed the synod in the definition of faith against that Nestorian symbol, not only condemns what it contains about the incarnation of Christ but also generally, the wicked and perverse dogmas of Nestorius which are connected with it. Likewise and especially it approved the letter of Cyril to Nestorius in which it is expressly said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as from the Father, as we saw above; by which approbation it sufficiently condemns the contrary error contained in the Nestorian symbol. And for this reason Saint Thomas was probably led to say here that this symbol

was condemned in the council. Similarly Saint Cyril did not entirely neglect the accusation of Theodoret, but solved his objection by the very words of Christ, concerning which we spoke above; for thus in the defense of the same ninth anathematism against the censure of Theodoret he speaks: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father according to the voice of the Savior, but he is not alien from the Son, for he has all things with the Father (consequently spiration), and he himself taught this saying of the Holy Spirit: 'All things whatsoever the Father has are mine: therefore I said to you that he will take what is mine and will announce it to you': therefore the Holy Spirit glorified Jesus working admirably as his Spirit and not an alien power." And in his defense against the oppositions of the Orientals to the same ninth anathematism he says: "The Holy Spirit is proper to him (Christ), just as he is of the Father," but he is the Spirit of the Father through procession.

But why the Ephesian Fathers, especially Cyril, did not rise up more openly against this article of the symbol and this objection of Theodoret and did not condemn it more distinctly, there was a double cause. First, the words both of the symbol and of Theodoret could bear a legitimate sense, namely that the Holy Spirit does not have subsistence or existence from the Son as creatures have, that is, that he is not created by the Son, as the Eunomians and Macedonians said, whose error then still recently spread, and truly some more recent writers want Theodoret to have understood thus, and that he, carried away by the heat of disputation, falsely imposed this error of the Eunomians on Saint Cyril; concerning which see, if you please, Witasse and Tournely. The other cause was that in the Council of Ephesus there was no question at all about the mystery of the Holy Trinity, but

only about the mystery of the Incarnation, to which Saint Cyril and the other synodal Fathers were totally intent, and what seemed to be said incidentally against the mystery of the Holy Trinity and could bear a good sense, they also touched upon incidentally, lest they seem to bring new controversies to the Church without cause, imitating in this prudent doctors who when they see a patient laboring under multiple diseases, attend more carefully to that which is more urgent and needs cutting, but other doubtful or less urgent ones, though perhaps graver in their own kind, they either put off to another time, or apply certain common and light remedies to them.

Objection 4. When it displeased the Greeks that the Latins said the Spirit proceeds from the Son, Saint Maximus in his letter to Marinus excuses the Latins to this extent that, although they say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, they do not however say that he is the principle of the Holy Spirit. And Saint John Damascene in his book on Orthodox Faith chapter 11 says: "We establish that the Holy Spirit is from the Father, and we call him the Spirit of the Father; but we do not say that he is from the Son but we name him the Spirit of the Son."

I respond to the first, that "principle" among the Greeks is taken for "first," as Petau notes in book 7 on the Trinity chapter 17. Therefore Saint Maximus teaches that the Latins do not say the Son is the principle, that is, the first fountain of the Holy Spirit, although they say he is a principle simply.

To the second, I respond with the same author ([27]) that Saint John Damascene followed the error of many;

[27] Here q. 36 a 2. ad 3

whence in this his opinion is not to be followed: although by some it is said, that Damascene just as he does not confess the Holy Spirit to be from the Son, so also he does not deny it by force of those words. And therefore it can be responded 2°, that Saint John Damascene understands that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, as from the first fountain of origin, because as the praised Petau again observes in the place cited from Demetrius, Calecas and Bessarion, the particle "from" just like the name "principle," among the Greeks denotes the first fountain. And indeed Damascene in the objected place compares the Father to the sun, the Son to the ray, the Holy Spirit to the splendor, which is also from the ray. And in chapter 18, he says the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son, just as the Son is the image of the Father.

Objection 5: When the custom of singing the symbol with the addition "and from the Son" had prevailed in Gaul, and the legates of Charlemagne and the synod of Aachen asked Leo III to permit both the addition and the custom of singing, the Holy Pontiff refused and disapproved both, and ordered the symbol to be written without that addition on silver tablets and hung at the doors of the church: therefore.

I respond that Leo III disapproved only the addition "and from the Son" made to the symbol, and the custom of singing solemnly with that addition, because no necessity then yet compelled this, nor had sufficient authority been accessed. But truly the Catholic dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, far from disapproving, he solemnly professed, as is evident from the acts of the conference of the said legates with him, which Smaragdus the abbot described from Sirmond tome 2 of the Councils of Gaul, in which it is thus held: "For when the aforesaid envoys had read in order the testimonies concerning the procession

of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, and they had been most diligently heard by the Lord Apostolic, he said: 'Thus I think, thus I hold, with these authors and the authorities of Sacred Scripture. If anyone wishes to think or teach otherwise about this matter, I defend, and unless he be converted, and wishes to hold according to this sense, I utterly reject him as thinking contrary.'"

We omit the other arguments of the Greeks, because for the most part they run on false suppositions; for they think, as we have already said, that the word "principle" and the particle "from" designate the first principle absolutely which is from no principle. Hence they suppose that if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son, there would be two principles of the Holy Spirit, which savors of the heresy of the Manicheans, and therefore they do not refuse, as I have already observed, to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son; concerning which in the following article. But whoever wishes to see more arguments, let him consult the author, both here, and especially in question 10 on Power, article 4.

Article V. Whether, if the Holy Spirit did not Proceed From the Son, He would be Distinguished From Him?

Through the discussion of this question, the nature of the procession of the Holy Spirit is more fully understood, and the reasoning which the Councils and Fathers used to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is more clearly illuminated. Therefore, although it deals with an impossible hypothesis, it is nevertheless not useless. The Scotists with their followers hold the affirmative position;

Saint Thomas, whom not only the Thomists but also other theologians commonly follow, holds the negative position. And note that the Scotists do not deny that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by active spiration, but they maintain that He would also be distinguished by filiation, so that, even if active spiration were removed per impossibile, He would still be distinguished. Against these I say: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be really distinguished from Him ([28]).

Proof 1 from the authority of the Fathers and Councils. Gregory of Nyssa in book 1 against Eunomius says: "If the principle of origin is removed, the Holy Trinity differs in no way from itself." Saint Augustine in tract 39 on John: "Only in this do they indicate number, that they are toward each other." The Council of Toledo II, in the year 675, repeats the same words in its confession of faith. But to interpret with Father Henno that they are toward each other through disparate relations seems plainly forced; for no one would say that disparate relations, for example, paternity and likeness, are toward each other. Indeed, they are called disparate because they are not toward each other, just as in absolute things, white and hot, for example, are called disparate because they are not toward each other as would be white and black, cold and hot. Saint Anselm in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 3: "The aforementioned opposition of relation, which arises because God is from God in the two aforementioned modes, prevents the Father and Son and Holy Spirit from being predicated of each other, and the proper attributes of each from being attributed to the others." And in the same place: "All things

[28] Here a. 2, q. 4, q. 10 On Power, a. 5, in book 1, d. 11, a. 1.

in the divine are one where opposition of relation does not stand in the way." What the Scotists respond, we shall say presently.

The Council of Florence proves against the Greeks that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, chiefly by this reasoning that otherwise He would not be distinguished from the Son: "According to the doctors, both Greek and Latin," says John the Theologian in session 18, "it is relation alone that multiplies the persons in the divine productions, which is called [relation] of origin." No Greek, not even Marcus of Ephesus, the principal adversary of the Latins, contradicted this principle. And although this is not a definition of the council, nevertheless this reasoning should be of the greatest weight, which is commonly approved by Greeks and Latins, and by which the Church was moved to define the Catholic dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son.

Proof 2 by reason: The persons in the divine are not really distinguished from each other except through opposite relations. But opposite relations in the divine are founded in origin or procession of one from another. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, He is not relatively opposed to Him, nor consequently really distinguished from Him. The major premise is established from this principle most accepted in the schools and derived from Boethius in his book On the Trinity and from Saint Anselm in his cited book On the Procession: "In the divine all things are one where opposition of relation does not stand in the way." And indeed in God there is nothing except essence, attributes, and relations. The persons agree in essence and attributes with which they are identified from God's supreme simplicity. Therefore they are distinguished through

relations alone, insofar as nothing is referred to itself. The minor premise is also established and commonly admitted, because God, being the most simple being, admits no distinction or opposition except what He cannot remove, and this is that which is founded in origin, because the same thing cannot proceed from itself.

The Scotists respond by denying the major premise, and to the proof they say that the common principle should be understood concerning opposition of relation either relative or disparate, not always relative. For they say opposition of relation and relative opposition are different things. Relative opposition of relation, says the most learned Father Henno in disputation 1, question 10, is the repugnance found between two relations that mutually regard each other, as between paternity and filiation, active and passive spiration. Disparate opposition of relation is the repugnance found between two relations of which one by its formal nature is not really the other, although they do not regard each other, except insofar as one distinct thing regards another from which it is distinguished, and such are filiation and passive spiration. If you say that disparate relations are not incompossible in the same supposit, nor therefore constitute distinct persons, as is evident in paternity and active spiration which are in the same Father, likewise in filiation and active spiration which are in the same Son, the same Henno responds with his followers that although paternity and active spiration are not incompossible in the same supposit, nevertheless filiation and passive spiration are incompossible and require two supposits; because, he says, it is contradictory for the same thing to be produced by two total productions, which would happen if a single person had filiation and passive spiration,

since it would be the term of generation and spiration. But it is not contradictory for the same supposit to have double total action of two effects, and therefore neither for the Father to generate the Son and spirate the Holy Spirit, since the same man wills, understands, hears, sees, generates, etc., which are nevertheless total actions. So says the praised theologian, and on this turns the hinge of the difficulty. Whence

Against [this], first, this response of the Scotists does not preserve the doctrine of Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Saint Anselm, and the cited Council of Florence, according to which relation of principle or procession alone multiplies the persons. Likewise, the holy Fathers and theologians unanimously say that the Persons are distinguished not by disparation, so to speak, but by opposition. But to feign disparate opposition is to abuse terms contrary to common understanding and to confuse the notions of things. For disparate things are called such because they are not opposed, and because they are not opposed; for if they were opposed, they would not be disparate. Thus white and hot are called disparate because they are not opposed; white and black are not called disparate because they are opposed. Second, that disparate relations are not compatible in the same supposit does not arise from the very nature of relation, for this of itself is not incommunicable except to its correlative term, with which alone it has relative opposition; but this can arise from nothing else than that they are not in the same subject, either because they do not have the same being, but each has its own limited being divided from the other, as is evident in created disparate relations, and indeed in disparate absolute things, which although they are not correlatively opposed to each other as relation and term,

nevertheless are distinguished as two limited accidents having diverse being. But in the divine, relations do not have limited and diverse being, since they are identified in the same essence, nor do they have a diverse subject, since they are not accidents. Therefore they cannot be really distinguished except from relative opposition. This is confirmed: the nature of disparation is not proper to relations, but belongs also to absolutes; but disparate absolutes which are really distinguished in created things by reason of their limitation, such as mercy, justice, wisdom, etc., are identified in infinite being because they are not relatively opposed. Therefore similarly disparate relations.

Against [this], third, directly against the foundation of the Scotists. When the Scotists say that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, they would nevertheless be really distinct persons because there would be two really distinct total productions, but it is contradictory for the same person to be produced by two total productions, they beg the question and prove the same by the same. For there are not two really distinct total productions except insofar as there are two really distinct terms or persons, for the production of a person is a person in becoming. Therefore to prove that there are two really distinct persons because there are two really distinct total productions is to prove that there are two persons because there are two persons, which is to beg the question and prove the same by the same. It therefore belongs to the Scotists to prove that there are two really distinct persons from something other than the distinction of double total production, which we deny. But they do not prove this, and as I think, they will not prove it. Meanwhile we say that in this hypothesis generation and spiration would be one and the same total production formally eminently

generative and spirative, only virtually and rationally distinct. And just as in the Father intellect and will is the same entity virtually distinct, likewise generation and active spiration the same entity virtually distinct, so the Son and Holy Spirit would be the same person, who insofar as He would proceed through the intellect would be called Son, insofar as through the will would be called Holy Spirit; just as now one and the same person, insofar as He produces through the intellect, is called Father, insofar as through the will, spirator.

Father Henno objects: the existence or absence of fecundity in the Son for spirating cannot render generation and active spiration, which are in the Father, two or one. For granted that the Son is fecund or infecund for spirating, there is indeed the same generative and spirative power in the Father, and consequently the same generation and spiration.

I respond, with peace to the most learned man, that this is not a question about generation and active spiration in the Father, for all theologians acknowledge that there are not two really distinct actions in the Father, because they are not correlatively opposed to each other, otherwise they would constitute distinct persons. But the question concerns generation and passive spiration, which we say would then be one and the same total production only virtually distinct. Whence to the argument, I deny the antecedent. For from the fact that the Son is not fecund for spirating the Holy Spirit, He is not relatively opposed to Him and therefore is not a person distinct from Him, but one and the same person under diverse aspects begotten and spirated, nor consequently double, but one and the same total production terminated to Him. And when he adds that the same

generative and spirative power remains, therefore also the same generation and spiration, I distinguish the consequent: the same generation and spiration remains entitatively, I concede; terminatively, I deny. From these things the principal arguments of the Scotists are solved, but to satisfy the others:

Objections Are Solved

You will object fourth with Father Henno: Saint Anselm in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 3, teaches that the Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished from each other precisely in this, that the Son proceeds by being born through the intellect, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding through the will: "The Son and Holy Spirit," he says, "have their being from the Father, but in diverse modes, because one by being born, the other by proceeding... And therefore... even if the Son and Holy Spirit were not plural through something else, through this alone they would be diverse." Saint Augustine in book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 14, says the Holy Spirit is not the Son because He goes forth not as born but as given. Similarly Saint John Damascene in book 1 On the Faith, chapters 7, 9 and following. Therefore.

First I suppose, which the Scotists will not deny, that Saint Anselm in the same work, indeed in the same chapter, does not contradict himself. But it is established from the proofs of the conclusion that Saint Anselm in that same cited chapter 3 asserts our position and establishes its fundamental reasoning as an indubitable principle. Therefore the words objected are not to be understood in the sense the Scotists understand them, nor does Scotus himself

seem to trust them much when in book 1, distinction 11, question 2, he says: "I do not wish to dwell much on his [Anselm's] intention." Therefore a twofold response is applied to this objection taken from Saint Anselm ([29]). The first is Saint Thomas's, that Saint Anselm spoke from the opinion of the Greeks, relating in what way they really distinguished the Holy Spirit from the Son. Whence the aforesaid words of Saint Anselm are adduced more as a disputative supposition than a definition of truth.

The other response is that Saint Anselm truly said the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son because He proceeds through the will, for by this very fact that He proceeds through the will He necessarily proceeds from the Son, because the will is common to Father and Son, and also because, as was said, love proceeds from the word. And thus at least Saints Augustine and Damascene should be understood. But you will object from what Saint Anselm adds: "If they were not plural through something else, through this alone they would be diverse." But according to the given explanation, there would not be something else through which they would be plural. Therefore.

I respond by denying the minor, because Saint Anselm speaks of origins according to the concept of origin and way. Besides this, however, there are relations and notional properties in actual being. Therefore Saint Anselm thinks that if per impossibile the Holy Spirit did not differ from the Son through relations and notional properties in actual being, He would still be distinguished through origin from Him in the nature of origin and way, although in reality it is impossible to give the one without the other.

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[29] Question 10 On Power, article 5, to objection 2.

Second objection with the same: The constitutive of one is distinctive of it from every other. But filiation is constitutive of the Son. Therefore it is also distinctive from any other and consequently from the Holy Spirit. I respond by distinguishing the major: the constitutive of one is distinctive of it from every other that is distinct or distinguishable, I concede; from every other that is not distinct or not distinguishable, I deny. Thus the rational, for example, which is constitutive of man, distinguishes him from every other distinct thing, yet does not distinguish him from animal which is identified with man. Similarly paternity constitutes the Father, and yet does not distinguish Him from the spirator, because it is identified with the Father. Whence, granting the minor, in the hypothesis the supposition of the consequent must be denied, namely that there is a Holy Spirit as a person distinct from the Son, for then there would not be one and another, but the same person of Son and Holy Spirit under diverse aspects begotten and spirated, as was said.

Third objection: In the hypothesis the Son would still proceed through the intellect and the Holy Spirit through the will. But through this they would be distinguished. Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the minor: through this they would be distinguished virtually and rationally only, I concede; really, I deny. For just as intellect and will in God are distinguished only virtually, so procession through intellect and procession through will from this aspect are distinguished only virtually. Whence just as in the Father active generation which is through the intellect and active spiration which is through the will are distinguished only virtually, so generation and passive spiration are also

distinguished only virtually unless something else is added through which they are really distinguished, but this other thing can be nothing but the origin of one from the other.

Fourth objection: If the Spirit proceeded from the Son alone, He would still be distinguished from the Father. Therefore equally if He proceeded from the Father alone He would still be distinguished from the Son.

I respond, granting the antecedent which some deny, I deny the consequent. The disparity is that in the case of the antecedent, the Holy Spirit would still proceed mediately from the Father, namely through the spirative power which He would communicate to the Son, and thus between the Father and Holy Spirit there would still be sufficient relative opposition for distinction. But in the case of the consequent, the Holy Spirit would proceed from the Son neither mediately nor immediately. You object: The divine essence gives the Father generative power, and yet does not therefore oppose the Son mediately. Therefore although the Father gives the Son spirative power, He would not therefore in the hypothesis oppose the Holy Spirit mediately.

I respond by denying the consequent. The disparity is that generative power is from the essence not through real procession and opposition with the Father, but through virtual emanation. Whence it is not surprising that if it does not oppose the Father mediately, it does not oppose the Son mediately. But the Father gives the Son spirative power through real relative procession with Him. Whence since He is immediately opposed to the Son, He is mediately opposed to the Holy Spirit proceeding immediately from the Son. I omit other arguments because they are solved for the most part from what has been said. Whoever wants more should consult the author in question 10, On Power, article 3.

Article VI. Various Questions are Resolved Concerning the Present Matter.

Question 1: Is it correct to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son? Response: Affirmatively. For thus have spoken the Greek Fathers and among the Latins Saint Hilary in book 12 of the Trinity. The reason is that the Son has from the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him: therefore it can be said that the Father through the Son breathes forth the Holy Spirit, or what is the same thing, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, in which sense it is also said concerning operations ad extra, John 1: "All things were made through him."

The sense is not, therefore, that the Son is the cause of the spirative action in the Father, or why the Father breathes forth the Holy Spirit; just as when it is said that an artisan operates through art, art is the reason why the artisan operates; but the sense is that the Son as cause is the principle of the thing produced, namely of the Holy Spirit, just as it is said that an artisan operates through a hammer, it is not signified that the hammer is the cause for the artisan to act, but that it is the cause for the artifact to proceed from the artisan, and that the hammer itself has this from the artisan. Nevertheless, it should not be thought on this account that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son as through an instrument or assisting minister, but as through a supposit which by origin is intermediate between the Father and the Holy Spirit, and which by virtue of origin from the Father has that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him.

Objection 1: What proceeds from someone through another does not proceed from him immediately: but nevertheless the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from the Father: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major: what proceeds from someone through another does not proceed from that one immediately, by immediacy of supposit, I grant the major; by immediacy of power, I deny the major. And in this sense having distinguished the minor, I deny the consequence. Thus if we consider the spirative power, the Holy Spirit is from the Father and Son immediately, because the spirative power is one and the same, indeed the same action of breathing forth in both. But if the breathing supposit is considered, the Holy Spirit is from the Father in a different sense mediately and immediately: for as regards the supposit of the Father it is immediately because the Father and Son breathe forth together; as regards the supposit of the Son it is mediately, insofar as the Son who breathes forth is from the Father, in a proportional manner to how Abel proceeded immediately by immediacy of supposit from Adam, because Adam was his father, and mediately of supposit, insofar as Eve, who proceeded from Adam, was his mother.

Objection: When someone is said to operate through another, it can be said conversely; for just as we say that a king operates through a bailiff, so it can be said that the bailiff operates through the king: but in no way can it be said that the Son breathes forth the Holy Spirit through the Father: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major: when someone is said to operate through another, it can be said conversely, sometimes, I concede; always, I deny. For conversion is

admitted only in those things of which one is a more immediate cause by reason of power, and the other more immediate by reason of supposit: thus we say that a king operates through a bailiff, because the bailiff is the more immediate cause or principle by reason of supposit, and conversely we say that the bailiff operates through the king, because the king is the more immediate cause by reason of power. But truly the order which exists between the Father and Son in divine matters is not according to power, which is indeed the same in both, but according to supposits, according to which the Father cannot be said to be a more immediate principle than the Son, but rather the contrary, since the Son is from the Father and not the Father from the Son: for which reason also when it is said in Sacred Scripture that the Father made all things through the Word, it is not said conversely that the Son made all things through the Father.

Question 2: Does the Holy Spirit per se and by reason of personal property require to proceed from two Persons? Response: Affirmatively.

1. The Holy Spirit per se and by reason of his personal property is really distinguished from the Father and Son: but real distinction in divine matters is not had except through relative opposition, and relative opposition is not had except by reason of the origin of one Person from another: therefore.

2. The Holy Spirit proceeds per se as the unitive love of the Father and Son, or as the terminus of the mutual love of both: therefore per se he requires to proceed from both.

Objection: The productive power of the Holy Spirit is found perfectly and adequately in one Person, for example in the Father: therefore the Holy Spirit per se does not require

to proceed from two, but only accidentally and concomitantly. The consequence is clear, because when in one supposit there is adequate power to produce some terminus, several supposits are required accidentally; thus because creative power is adequately in one person, plurality of persons is required only accidentally for creation. Confirmation: if per impossibile there were no Son, the Father could breathe forth the Holy Spirit, because there would still remain in him the principle of spiration, namely fecund will: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: the productive power of the Holy Spirit as regards everything absolute that it imports is found perfectly and adequately in one Person, I concede; as regards the notional relations that it connotes, I deny. For it connotes essentially the Father and Son, because, as has been said, the Holy Spirit per se requires to proceed as a Person distinct from the Father and Son and as the terminus of the mutual love of both, which would not be if he did not proceed from both. And clearly there is disparity to creative power: for creatures require to proceed from the omnipotent simply, whether one or several. To the confirmation, I distinguish the antecedent: if per impossibile there were no Son, the Father could breathe forth the Holy Spirit who would be of the same adequate nature as he now is, I deny; who would not be of the same adequate nature, I concede. For then he would not be the third Person, nor the terminus of mutual love.

Question 3: Are the Father and Son one principle of the Holy Spirit?

Response: Affirmatively.

Proof 1st from the Fathers. Saint Augustine in book 5 of the Trinity chapter 14: "It must be confessed," he says,

"that the Father and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles." Likewise Basil book 2 against Eunomius; Anselm, in the book on the Procession of the Holy Spirit.

Proof 2nd from Councils. The Second Council of Lyon: "We condemn," it says, "those who with rash audacity presume to assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son as from two principles and not as from one." This is reported in chapter Fideli concerning the supreme Trinity in the 6th and the Council of Florence in the letters of union: "We define that the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son... proceeds eternally as from one principle and by one spiration."

Nor does it help Durandus and Gregory of Rimini who hold the opposite opinion because of that particle "as": for it is not taken here diminutively but explicatively, just as Acts 2: "As of a rushing mighty wind." The reason is evident; because the Greeks in these councils objected as a grave inconvenience to the Latins that they posited two principles of the Holy Spirit, which the Latins denied. If therefore the particle "as" were taken diminutively, the sense would be that the Holy Spirit in reality proceeds from two principles, but only in a qualified sense or by way of likeness from one; and thus they would fall into the inconvenience which the Greeks reproached the Latins for, and deceive them by crafty equivocation.

Proof 3rd by reasons. 1. The Father and Son are one in all things in which relative opposition does not distinguish them: but in this that they are the principle of the Holy Spirit they are not relatively opposed; therefore. 2. This is the difference between a substantive and adjective name, that a substantive name, since it signifies form by way of something standing per se and therefore brings with it its own supposit,

requires for its multiplication the multiplication of form and supposit: whence several supposits having one form, e.g., of deity, are not called several gods, but one God: and an artisan having several arts is not called several artisans, the first lacking multiplication of form, the second lacking multiplication of supposit. An adjective name on the contrary, since it does not signify form as bringing with it its own supposit, but as adjacent to another from which it has being, does not require for its multiplication the multiplication of form, but only of subject or supposit; whence if one whiteness were in two walls, they would be called two white things. But this name, "principle of the Holy Spirit," is a substantive name and the form signified, namely the spirative power, is one: therefore one principle.

From this you will also gather that there is one spirator, because spirator is also a substantive name, although there are several breathing ones, because "breathing" is an adjective name. And although the Holy Doctor in 1st distinction 11 article 4, and distinction 12 article 3, said there are several spirators, just as there are several breathing ones, taking "spirator" adjectively, nevertheless it is better, he says, to say here one spirator, because speaking rigorously, "spirator" should be taken substantively, like "creator," "begetter" and similar terms, and therefore in the same place he explains Saint Hilary saying that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and Son as authors, who put the substantive for the adjective.

Question 4: For what does "principle of the Holy Spirit" or "spirator" supposit? Some think that just as from the divine essence and absolute subsistence preceding the relative subsistences, one subsistent is constituted, which exists per se and is the principle of creatures, yet not a

person; so from the divine essence and the active relation of spiration an individual subsistent is constituted which is the principle of the Holy Spirit common to the Father and Son, or spirator, yet not a person. But this does not seem to be admissible, because according to our mode of conceiving, active spiration comes to the persons of the Father and Son already constituted from the essence and their personal relations: therefore it cannot constitute some individual per se subsisting common to the Father and Son; for a person once constituted and subsisting cannot further be terminated and subsist through another subsistence; because personality is the ultimate terminus of nature rendering it further incommunicable and interminable: whence active spiration, although it is a relative property, is nevertheless not a personal property, because it does not constitute a person, but presupposes one already constituted. Nor should you say that active spiration belongs immediately to the nature, not through the mediation of paternity and filiation, for it belongs immediately to the Father and Son, as they are two persons mutually loving each other. Therefore it is better

Response: with the author, this name "principle of the Holy Spirit," or "spirator," supposits confusedly and indistinctly: do not understand, however, confused supposition in the strict dialectical sense, in which sense we say: "One eye is necessary for seeing"; but understand with our Serra confused and indistinct supposition by which this name "principle" or "spirator" supposits for two persons simultaneously, yet not for them simultaneously only, but also for each one separately, and not for each one separately only, but also for both simultaneously, according to the requirement of the subject in the proposition: just as when I say: "Father and mother are the principle of the son,"

"principle" is taken adequately, and supposits for father and mother simultaneously; but when I say: "The father is the principle of the son," "principle" is taken inadequately and supposits for the father only: thus with proportion preserved, when I say: "The Father and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit," "principle" is taken adequately, and supposits for the Father and Son simultaneously; when I say: "The Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit," "principle" is taken inadequately, and supposits for the Father only. Nor does it matter that Saint Thomas here ad 4 does not admit this proposition: "The Father and Son are one principle which is the Father"; because "which" restricts the notion of principle to the Father alone; but if "which" were taken not restrictively, but copulatively, so that the sense would be: "The Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, and that principle is the Father," the proposition would be true.

Article VII. Whether The Particle "Filioque" was Rightfully inserted into the Holy Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed?

There was a sharp and protracted dispute through many sessions of the Council of Florence between the Greeks and Latins concerning this matter. The Greeks contended that this addition could not have been made, being forbidden by the law of the Council of Ephesus and others, and that it had been the cause of schism between both Churches; the Latins, on the contrary, maintained that this addition could rightfully be made without violating any law of the councils, and that the Greeks had undeservedly taken from this an occasion for departing from the Latin Church. The Greeks did not, however, deny that the creed could be explained, but

they denied that an explanation could be inserted into the creed. Against them I say: This particle "Filioque" was rightfully added to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed.

Proof 1: In the Second Council of Lyons the Greeks themselves approved this addition, and by repeating this addition three times in the creed, they sang together with the Latins during the solemn ceremonies of the Mass. And the Council of Florence, after the cause had been most diligently discussed, in the definition of faith to which all the Greeks subscribed with the Latins (except Mark of Ephesus), says thus: "We further define that the explanation of those words 'Filioque,' for the sake of declaring the truth and because of the necessity then imminent, was lawfully and reasonably appended to the creed." Therefore.

Proof 2: For any addition to be rightfully made to the creed that is explanatory of truth contained therein latently and implicitly, two things are required and sufficient: legitimate authority and necessary cause. But both of these concurred in the addition of this particle "Filioque" made to the creed: therefore. The major premise is established, for what else would be required? The minor premise is also certain regarding both parts. 1° Legitimate authority intervened, namely the supreme authority both of the Church and of the Supreme Pontiff, which in preserving the deposit of faith against rising heresies cannot be derogated by anyone, not even by a General Council, as it was instituted and conferred by Christ. 2° A necessary cause was present, namely the repression of an error then more widely spreading against the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son: therefore.

Confirmation: The Church rightfully added to the Apostles' Creed in the Council of Nicaea this particle

"consubstantial" concerning the Son against the Arians; and in the Constantinopolitan Council it added to the Nicene Creed against the Macedonians concerning the Holy Spirit these particles: "the Lord, the Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is adored," and others. But the authority of the Church has not been diminished from these times, but always remains the same, and what was the reason or necessity for adding these particles to the former creeds was the same for inserting the particle "Filioque," namely the restraint of rising and spreading error: therefore.

Solutions to Objections

Objection 1: The Third Ecumenical Synod of Ephesus, assembled against Nestorius in the year 431, in the third part, act 6, thus defines: "The Holy Synod decrees that it is not permitted for anyone to bring forward, or write, or compose another faith, besides that defined by the Holy Fathers who were assembled at Nicaea with the Holy Spirit. But those who have dared either to compose another faith or to bring it forward... if they are bishops or clerics, the synod has decreed that bishops be alien from the episcopate and clerics from the clergy; but if they were laymen, let them be subject to anathema." The Fourth Ecumenical Synod of Chalcedon, convoked against Eutyches in the year 450, in the fifth act, repeats the same in almost the same words.

To this argument, which is the principal one of the Greeks, I respond with two points that entirely evacuate its force. First, that what was prohibited by the Synod of Ephesus and after it by Chalcedon was bringing forward another faith contrary to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan,

that is, contrary to it, but not an explanation of the same faith against new rising heresies. But the addition of this particle "Filioque" is not contrary to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan faith, but is its explanation. For by this very fact that in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed it is expressed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, it is implicitly contained that He proceeds from the Son, because what is understood of the Father must also be understood of the Son, since they differ in nothing except that this one is the Son and that one is the Father. Second, granted that the aforementioned synods also prohibited explanation of the ancient faith, this prohibition concerns only private individuals, not the Church itself or the Supreme Pontiff.

The first point is evident for multiple reasons. 1° From the occasion on which that decree was issued by the Ephesian synod. For when Charisius the presbyter had recited in the synod some Nestorian creed contrary to the ancestral faith, the synod condemns it and prohibits bringing forward another faith than the Nicene, that is, as is evident, one contrary to the Nicene faith, such as was that other Nestorian faith. 2° St. Cyril, president of the Council of Ephesus, when peace was made with John of Antioch, received and approved with praise his profession of faith, although in it were many things added to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, which Cyril certainly would not have done if the synod itself had prohibited every new explanation of the pristine faith. 3° The Council of Chalcedon, celebrated a little after the Ephesian, in act 5, after reciting the Nicene and Constantinopolitan creeds, adds: "This wise and salutary symbol of divine grace would indeed suffice for the full knowledge and confirmation of piety... But since those who try to reject the preaching of

truth through their own heresies have generated new voices, in order to refute them, beyond the Nicene and Constantinopolitan symbol which it confirms, it declares that it accepts the synodical letters of St. Cyril to Nestorius and to the Orientals against the heresy of Nestorius, and the dogmatic letter of St. Leo to Flavian against Eutyches," then it expounds the dogma of the double nature in Christ against the same, and finally adds: "The holy and universal Synod has defined that it is not permitted for anyone to bring forward or write or compose or think or teach others another faith." Who does not see that by this decree, just as by the Ephesian, only bringing forward another faith contrary to the true and ancient faith is prohibited, not an exposition of this true faith, since that very synod admits both an explanation of the Nicene symbol through the Constantinopolitan and of the Constantinopolitan through the letters of Cyril, and of its own definition through the letter of Leo, indeed it brings forward its own explanation concerning the error of Eutyches. 4° But I also draw another more clear moment from that same Synod of Chalcedon. When certain synodical Fathers thought that the letter of St. Leo should not be admitted because of the canon of the Synod of Ephesus forbidding the introduction of anything new, that very synod in the allocution to the emperor which appears at the beginning of the third part says thus: "Lest anyone... accuse the series of his letter, that it is not permitted for anyone to expound the faith besides the Fathers who harmoniously convened at Nicaea (behold the very objection from the Ephesian decree), the law of the Church prescribes to us that the confession of doctrine of the three hundred and eight Fathers is indeed to be held as if in a principal place, which we deliver as a common decree of the

saints for the firmness of those who are called to the adoption of sons. But against those who resist the truth, various causes of struggles have been granted to us, fittingly applied by pious men against those things which are fallaciously inferred by them. And for believers, indeed, the undisturbed perspective toward the confession of pious dogma suffices for the utility of faith, drawing devoted souls. But for those who attempt to pervert right doctrine, it is necessary to occur against individual things which they badly produce, and to provide suitable things for their objections. For if all were content with the constitution of faith, and disturbed the path of piety with no innovation, it would befit the sons of the Church to think nothing further than what is established to have been declared in the symbol. But because many deviate from the straight line through the windings of error, constructing for themselves some new path of falsehood, it is necessary for us to convert them by the invention of truth; also to refute their deviant conceits with salutary ADDITIONS, not as always seeking something new for piety (as if faith were lacking), but as devising against those things which have been innovated by them, those things which are judged salutary." What it continues through the whole allocution. These things certainly need no commentary, for they are the very solution which we draw out from whence the argument was taken.

Nor should you say that these explanations which we bring forward from the Synods of Ephesus and Chalcedon were not inserted into the creed, but the Greeks contend that only the insertion of a new explanation into the creed is prohibited by the Ephesian and Chalcedonian decrees. For the decree both Ephesian and Chalcedonian has not even a word about a new explanation not to be inserted or not to be

added to the creed, but speaks only about another not to be brought forward, not to be written, not to be composed or offered, nor do the Chalcedonian Fathers, to prove that they are not acting against the Ephesian decree in receiving the explanation of St. Leo, employ this reason, nor do they say that by that decree only the insertion of a new explanation into the creed is prohibited (which was readily available), but they say that they hold the Nicene symbol in the first place, and that the law of the Church prescribes this, but that it is not prohibited, but necessary, when new heresies arise, to occur with new explanations added. Otherwise, what utility would a decree have that prohibited inserting a sound explanation of the true faith into the creed, if it permitted publishing everywhere outside the creed whatever professions or explanations of faith you wished.

But what I said second is not sufficient either: Granted that the synod prohibited adding a legitimate explanation of the Nicene faith to the creed, this prohibition concerns only private individuals, not the Church or the Supreme Pontiff. And this is clearer than the noonday light: 1° from the occasion on which, as we saw above, this decree was given; 2° from the censures which the Synods of Ephesus and Chalcedon subject against those acting contrary: for it would be foolish to think that the synods wanted to subject the Church itself or the Supreme Pontiff to anathema; 3° because the Church in the praised councils neither wanted nor was able to despoil itself or the Supreme Pontiff of the authority by which it then flourished and which it received as conferred by Christ. Since therefore the same authority of the Church and Supreme Pontiff now remains which was formerly, and since from it the Church was able to add to the Apostles' Creed, and afterwards to the Nicene

Creed, the same can now be done if necessity requires. With all these things established at once, I do not sufficiently wonder by what dizziness of mind the Greeks were seized, that they raged for so long with such impotent spirit against the Roman Church, and departed from it by such a horrible and pertinacious schism on account of this one particle "Filioque," added to the Nicene symbol for the sake of explanation.

Nevertheless they insist: The Synod of Ephesus did not want to add the name "Theotokos" to the creed, although it seemed necessary against the heresy of Nestorius. Likewise St. Cyril in his letter to John of Antioch says: "We suffer in no way that faith, or that symbol of faith which was once published by the holy Nicene Fathers, be shaken by anyone: for we permit neither ourselves nor absolutely anyone else to change even one word placed there, or to pass over even one syllable." And in his letter to Arcadius he says that the synod provided that no other exposition of faith should be brought into the Church besides that which already existed: therefore.

Response to the first: We concede that the Synod of Ephesus did not want to add the name "Theotokos" to the creed because it was not necessary to refute the error of Nestorius, since that error was sufficiently explicitly exploded by two distinct articles of the Constantinopolitan symbol, namely that Christ is true God consubstantial with the Father, and born from the Virgin Mary. But we concede that nothing should be added to the creed unless compelling necessity demands it.

To the second: What is the mind of Cyril concerning the sense of the Ephesian decree is evident from the profession of faith of John of Antioch which he received and

praised, as I said. Truly St. Cyril said that it is not permitted for anyone to shake the symbol, but those who explain it catholically do not shake it; likewise that no word is to be changed, no syllable to be passed over, which would pervert the sense, not which would legitimately explain it; finally that no other exposition of faith should be brought in that is contrary to the true and already received faith, not one that is consonant with it if necessity thus requires.

They reply: In the Synod of Chalcedon, act 2, when the judges sought that an exposition of faith consonant with the Niceno-Constantinopolitan symbol be published, "The most reverend bishops cried out: No one makes another exposition, nor do we attempt nor dare to expound; for the Fathers taught and the things which were expounded by them are preserved in writings, and concerning these we cannot speak." Therefore it is not permitted to add even an explanation of the true faith, not even to a general council itself.

Response: This text is cited in a truncated manner, which, if cited in full, not only removes the objection but favors us; for it is immediately added: "Cecropius, the most reverend bishop of Sebastopolis, said: Those things which pertained to Eutyches emerged, and concerning these a form was given by the most holy archbishop of the Roman city, and we follow him, and we subscribe to all the letters. The most reverend bishops cried out: Thus we all say, those things which have been expounded suffice, it is not permitted to make another exposition." Hence it is clear in what sense the synodical Fathers said that another exposition of faith could not, was not permitted to be published, because it was not necessary; for the prolific exposition made by St. Leo sufficed, as they themselves say,

which all accepted, and otherwise the error of Eutyches was sufficiently refuted by the Niceno-Constantinopolitan symbol, in which Christ is distinctly said to be God on one hand and made man on the other. But if they had judged it necessary, they could have published it by the same right by which the Supreme Pontiff St. Leo was able, indeed by the same right by which they themselves approved and admitted that exposition of St. Leo: for if it were absolutely illicit to publish a catholic exposition of faith, it would also be illicit to approve and receive one published, and to extol the publisher with the highest praises.

They urge: The Seventh Ecumenical synod, after reciting the Nicene and Constantinopolitan symbol, in act 7, says: "This is the faith of the Apostles; we keep the laws of the Fathers, we anathematize those who add anything or take away from the Church." Therefore.

Response: The same solution always runs, namely that the synod speaks of addition or subtraction contrary to the faith, not consonant and necessary to it; and this is more certain because that very Seventh synod connects various expositions of faith to the Nicene and Constantinopolitan symbols, especially against the Iconoclasts: whence this objection harms the Greeks more than it favors them. Moreover, recalling what we say in the second place in the first response: granted that these and similar sayings of the councils extended to consonant expositions of faith, they do not regard the Church, but private individuals.

Objection 2: When the legates of Charlemagne and of the Council of Aachen consulted Leo III concerning this addition "Filioque," already then made to the symbol by certain churches and customarily sung by them in the Mass, the Supreme Pontiff disapproved it and ordered the

Constantinopolitan symbol to be written on silver tablets and hung at the doors of the church without that addition: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: the Pontiff disapproved this addition as made without sufficient necessity and authority, I concede; he disapproved it as if it could not be done when necessity urged and legitimate authority of the Church or Supreme Pontiff concurred, as it was afterwards done, I deny. But that he ordered the symbol to be written and hung at the doors of the church without that addition, he did this from zeal for antiquity, which he did not suffer to be changed without cause, and to show that no one was bound by this addition made without sufficient necessity and authority.

Objection 3: At least this addition could not be made without consulting the Greeks: therefore.

Andreas, Bishop of Rhodes, responded to this objection in session 7 of the Council of Florence: 1° it is not established that the Greeks were not called; 2° the Roman Church was bound by no law to call them to make this addition, when necessity urged to restrain the insolence of many who were disseminating erroneous dogma against the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son more openly and widely than before. Add that this addition was made by the Western Church, with the Greeks knowing and not resisting, except perhaps one Photius alone, who was then not heard by his own people; since he, unjustly invading the Constantinopolitan see and justly ejected, was in exile for several years. But when the Greeks later protested after the schism was made, they were no longer to be heard, but to be corrected and recalled from schism. Moreover, when was this addition made? We shall say in a special digression.

Article VIII. On the Various Names of the Holy Spirit.

Question 1: Whether this name "Holy Spirit" is proper to the third Person?

Response: If this name "Holy Spirit" is taken complexly and in the force of individual words, it is common to each person of the Trinity; for the Father is spirit and holy, similarly the Son is spirit and holy. But if it is taken incomplexly and in the force of one expression, from the usage of Sacred Scripture and the custom of the Church, it is accommodated to signify the third Person. And of this accommodation there is a twofold appropriateness. The first is because the name "Holy Spirit" is common to the Father and the Son, as has been said, therefore it is fitting that he who proceeds from both and is the bond of both should be called properly by the name which both have in common. The second, because the name "Spirit" in corporeal things seems to signify a certain impulse and motion, for we call breath and wind "spirit"; but it is proper to love that it moves and impels the will of the lover toward the beloved: moreover, holiness is attributed to those things which are ordered toward God; therefore, since the third Person proceeds by the mode of love, by which God is loved, he is fittingly named "Holy Spirit."

Question 2: Whether "Love" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

Response: If Love is taken essentially insofar as it imports only the relation of the lover to the thing loved, it is a name common to the whole Trinity. But if it is taken personally insofar as it imports the relation of the thing

which proceeds by the mode of love to its principle, it is a name proper to the Holy Spirit: because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the mutual love of the Father and the Son, as a certain impression, or impulse into the thing loved.

Question 3: From the love of what things does the Holy Spirit proceed?

Response: The Holy Spirit proceeds per se from the love of all things which are formally in God, namely from the love of the essence, attributes, and Persons; per accidens and concomitantly from the love of future creatures, in no way from the love of possible creatures. These things are evident partly from what we have said above concerning the knowledge from which the Word proceeds, partly from what was said in the preceding treatise, concerning the will and love of God regarding created things. Therefore briefly:

I prove the first part because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the most perfect love; but the most perfect love is of all things which are formally in God: therefore. I prove the second part: because the procession of the Holy Spirit is natural and necessary: therefore he must proceed per se from natural and necessary love: but the love of future creatures is not natural and necessary, but free, and presupposes a decree concerning their future existence, which decree could not have been: therefore. Nevertheless, because future creatures express an order to existence, they are loved by God, and thus per accidens and concomitantly the Holy Spirit proceeds from their love. The third part is evident: because, as we said in the preceding treatise cited, God in no way loves possible creatures.

Question 4: Whether the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit?

Response: If "to love" is taken essentially, the Father and Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit, but by their essence, because the Holy Spirit is not essential love, but notional love. But if "to love" is taken notionally, the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit; because to love notionally is nothing other than to breathe love, just as to speak is to produce the Word, and to flower is to produce flowers; just as therefore a tree is said to flower by flowers, and the Father to speak the Word and creatures, so the Father and Son are said to love themselves and us by the Holy Spirit or proceeding love.

Question 5: Whether "Gift" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

Before the response, note that "gift" can be taken essentially, notionally, and personally. Essentially, insofar as it is considered only as a thing which can be given gratuitously, and thus it belongs to the whole Trinity and to individual Persons, since they can communicate and give themselves to us gratuitously. Notionally, insofar as it expresses passive origin from the giver, and it belongs only to some persons and not all, and thus it is proper to the Son and Holy Spirit, not to the Father, because the Son and Holy Spirit have origin from the Father, the Father from no one. Personally, insofar as it belongs only to one person. And thus:

Response: Gift taken personally is a proper name of the Holy Spirit: because gift properly imports gratuitous donation: but the reason of gratuitous donation is love, for we give gratuitously to someone because we will good to him: therefore the first thing we give to him is the love by which we will good to him, and thus love has the nature of the first gift, through which all gratuitous gifts are given: therefore

since the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, he proceeds in the nature of the first gift, consequently Gift is a name proper to him.

Among various other names which are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, singular is the name of Paraclete or Consoler. But the reason of this appropriation is, because it is proper to friendship that someone delights in the presence of a friend, and finds consolation in him against all anxieties, whence in sorrows we flee especially to friends, for the sake of consolation. Therefore since the Holy Spirit constitutes us as friends of God and makes him dwell in us, and us in him, for the sanctification of souls is appropriated to him, it is consequent that through the Holy Spirit we have joy concerning God and consolation against all the world's infirmities and attacks; whence in Psalm 50 it is said: "Restore to me the joy of your salvation, and strengthen me with a willing spirit." Some add also that he is called Paraclete, because after the Ascension of Christ, he descended upon the sad Apostles and the sorrowful Church as a Consoler.

HISTORICAL DIGRESSIONS

Digression I. When was this Clause "Filioque" added to the Creed. (Regarding Article 7 of the Preceding Dissertation)

In Spain this addition is first read as having been made to the creed in the Third Council of Toledo in the year 589; from the Spanish it passed to the Gauls in the declining 8th century; for it is read in the Council of Fréjus in the year 791, and of Frankfurt in the year 794. It is also established from the embassy sent by the Council of Aachen and Charlemagne in the year 810 to Leo III, that he should approve this addition and the custom of singing the creed with this addition, both of which the Pontiff refused, as was said above. Hence at least it can be gathered that this addition and this custom had already been in force in Gaul for some years.

Historians agree on these points. But when was this addition received at Rome, and in the whole Western Church? The matter is very uncertain.

From the fact of Leo III disapproving this addition (this fact is established from Smaragdus who at that time wrote the acts of this conference, which the very learned Sirmond inserted in tome 9 of the Councils of Gaul; from Anastasius the Librarian in [his life of] Leo III; from the

Master of the Sentences book 1, distinction 11, and from others): from this fact, I say:

I conclude first, that this addition was not made by Pope Damasus and the Roman council, as some write, for Leo III would surely not have been ignorant of this and would not have disapproved what he knew. But the creed which is read among the works of St. Jerome under the name of Damasus with this addition is held by scholars to be spurious.

I conclude second, that St. Leo the Great did not permit this addition to the Spanish, as Sylvius seems to think with Baronius from St. Leo's epistle 93; for the Gauls who had borrowed this addition from the Spanish would undoubtedly have alleged this to Leo III, which he would not have rejected. Moreover, in the praised epistle of St. Leo which is to Turrilius, it is contained only that the Spirit proceeds from both, but no permission is read as given for adding this clause "Filioque" to the creed.

I conclude third, that this addition was not made in the Second Council of Nicaea concerning Images in the year 787, or a little before, as some of the Latins contended in the Council of Florence, from a very ancient codex, in which it is read that in that council the creed was recited with that addition. For: 1st this would not have escaped Leo III, who would not have despised the authority of the council; 2nd because the Greeks would not have dared to attack this addition so pertinaciously, nor to harass the Latins as its authors with so many injuries; 3rd because Anastasius the Librarian who after only 70 years gave the acts of this synod to the Latin language, makes no mention of this addition. From which the trustworthiness of this very ancient codex wavers, of which there is no certainty from elsewhere.

But when finally did the Roman Church receive this addition? The Catholic disputant for the Latins in the Council of Florence, session 7, said that the Roman Pontiff had admitted it in a great council of Westerners; St. Thomas had said this before him here, question 36, article 2, but since they do not say at what time and under which Pontiff this council was celebrated, the question remains unsolved.

I say: It is probable that this addition was made by Nicholas I or around his times. He was seated in the year 858.

Proof 1st from Photius who in his epistle to the Eastern primary sees written against Nicholas I: "Besides those absurdities which we have commemorated, they have also attempted to falsify the sacred and holy creed... not without incredible audacity."

2nd From Ratramnus, monk of Corbie, who in book 2, chapter 2, for the Roman Church against the Greeks, which he wrote in Photius's times, acknowledges that Photius brought it as a charge against Nicholas I and the Roman Church that they had added the clause "Filioque" to the creed, but he dissolves the accusation and defends the fact; for after he showed that the Nicene and Constantinopolitan synods had added something to the Apostles' creed, concerning the clause "Filioque," he thus continues: "But neither is the authority of 150 bishops so established, that what was permitted to them, should not be permitted both to the Roman Pontiff and to all the churches of Christ."

3rd From St. Antoninus who in Chronicle 3rd part, title 22, chapter 3, number 1, narrates that Photius reproached Nicholas I that because of this addition he had incurred the anathema pronounced by the Council of

Ephesus. Manuel Calecas and Pithæus testify the same in the book "On the Procession of the Holy Spirit."

Andreas of Colossos had undoubtedly not attended to these considerations when in the Council of Florence, session 6, he said that Photius had made no mention of the addition to the creed against Pope Nicholas.

You will say: In the codex which is preserved at Rome in the Greek college, the epistle of which in the 1st proof is not ascribed to Photius, but to Sisinnius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who was seated in the year 995; and that Nicholas I in his epistle to the Gauls does not report this accusation about the creed made to him by the Greeks.

I respond to the 1st, that one codex does not overturn the trustworthiness of others, nor the other considerations alleged. To the 2nd, likewise the silence of Nicholas alone does not outweigh so many clear testimonies: for it is a negative argument which is worth nothing against several positive ones.

Note: Although it is probable that this addition was made by Nicholas I or around his times, nevertheless the creed with that addition was not yet then sung universally in the Roman Church; this first obtained during the reign of Benedict VIII, around the year 983, from whom Emperor Henry obtained it, as Baronius observes for this year from Berno of Reichenau.

But finally, what is beyond all controversy: in the Second General Council of Lyons in the year 1274, the creed with the aforesaid addition "Filioque" was solemnly sung by Greeks and Latins, with these words repeated three times: "Who proceeds from the Father and the Son," although nevertheless then it was granted to the Greeks that they might sing in their churches without this addition. And

afterward in the Council of Florence 1439, by the consent of both the Greek and Latin Church, with the dogma concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son being admitted, the addition of this clause "Filioque" made to the creed was approved, as we saw above.

DISSERTATION SIX
ON THE COMPARISON OF THE PERSONS TO THE ESSENCE, TO PERSONAL PROPERTIES, TO NOTIONAL ACTS, TO EACH OTHER, AND TO CREATURES (ST. THOMAS, I, Q. 39 TO 43.)

After we have treated of the Persons considered in themselves, it remains for the completion of the present treatise to treat of them considered comparatively. A fivefold comparison of the divine Persons can be distinguished from the title. The first is to the essence with which they are identified. The second is to personal properties, or the relations by which the Persons are constituted in being. The third is in relation to the notional acts which emanate from the Persons and through which the Persons emanate. The fourth is to each other. The fifth is to creatures, insofar as they are sent to them. The author treats these five comparisons of the Persons in as many questions; but we, because we have already discussed many things pertaining to this in the preceding sections, shall treat them briefly.

Article I. On the Comparison of the Persons To The Essence. (St. Thomas in Q. 39.)

What St. Thomas teaches in the first two articles of this question 39 concerning the identity of the Persons with the essence, we have explained in art. 3 of dissertation 3; refer there. What he teaches in the four following articles concerning the manner of speaking plurally or singularly about the divine Persons, you also have sufficiently in art. 5 of dissertation 4. Nevertheless, so that I may add one thing, or explain more what has already been said, It is asked 1 whether essential names, that is, those which signify the essence or things pertaining to the essence purely without any insinuation of the Persons, are predicated singularly of the three Persons.

Response: (1) If essential names signify the essence substantively, they are predicated of the three Persons singularly and not plurally; but if they signify the essence adjectively, they are predicated of the three Persons in the plural. The reason for this is that substantive names signify something in the manner of substance: but substance, just as it has being per se, so it has unity or plurality per se; whence the unity or plurality of a substantive name is considered not only according to the suppositum, but also according to the form signified by the name. But adjective names signify something in the manner of an accident which inheres in a subject: whence accidents, just as they have being in and from a subject, so they receive unity or plurality from the subject, and therefore in adjectives, singularity or plurality is considered according to the supposita or subjects. Therefore, for the multiplication of a substantive name, multiplication of both form and suppositum is required; but for the multiplication of an adjective name, multiplication of the

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[1] Here q. 39, a. 4, obj. 3.

suppositum or subject alone suffices. And therefore in human matters we say Socrates, Plato, Cicero are three men; and in divine matters we do not say the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three Gods, but one God; because in three supposita of human nature, there are three humanities, but in the three divine Persons, there is one divine essence. Conversely, we say three existing, three wise, three eternal, three uncreated, if they are taken adjectively, as St. Athanasius took them in the Creed saying: All three Persons are coeternal with each other and coequal. But if they are taken substantively, we say one uncreated, one immense, one eternal, etc., as the same St. Athanasius took them saying: Not three uncreated, nor three immense, but one uncreated and one immense.

You will say: God is signified as having deity, just as man is signified as having humanity: but the three Persons are having deity: therefore three gods.

Response: I deny the consequence; because although God signifies one having deity, there is nevertheless another mode of signifying, for God is said substantively, and having deity is said adjectively. Therefore, although there are three having deity, it does not follow that there are three gods, because the divinity which is the signified form is not multiplied.

It is asked 2 whether essential names are fittingly appropriated to the Persons? Appropriation (2) as I have already said in the proem of the dissertation, art. 3, obj. 4, is the attribution of some essential property, common to the three Persons, made nevertheless to one person for its manifestation. Whence one thing is proper, another

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2 Here q. 39, a. 7, obj.

appropriated. That is called proper which is so attributed to one Person that it cannot be attributed to another; but appropriated is that which is common to the whole Trinity, but is attributed to one Person for the sake of greater manifestation. This being noted, to the question.

Response: affirmatively (3) Proof: although the trinity of Persons cannot be demonstratively proved, as I said in the proem of the dissertation, art. 4, it is nevertheless fitting that it be declared through some more manifest things: but essential attributes are more manifest to us through reason than the properties of the Persons; because from creatures from which we receive knowledge, we can arrive at certain knowledge of essential attributes, but not at certain knowledge of personal properties.

Appropriation or manifestation can be made in two ways (4): in one way through the path of likeness, such that those things which pertain to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds through the intellect; in another way through the path of unlikeness, such that power is appropriated to the Father, as St. Augustine says; because among us fathers are usually weak due to old age, lest we suspect such a thing in God. The use of appropriation is very frequent in Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers according to various considerations of God. For God can be considered in four ways: 1) as being; 2) as one; 3) as having in himself the power to operate; 4) as having a relation to his effects; and according to these various considerations, appropriations are made by Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers.

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3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

According to the first consideration, eternity according to Saints Hilary and Augustine is appropriated to the Father, beauty to the Son, enjoyment to the Holy Spirit. For eternity, insofar as it signifies not being from a principle, has likeness with the property of the Father who is the principle from no principle. Beauty or pulchritude has likeness with the property of the Son. For three things concur in beauty: integrity, proportion, and clarity of color: but the Son has the nature of the Father integrally, is his perfect image, and is the light and splendor of the intellect. But enjoyment has likeness with the property of the Holy Spirit, taking enjoyment in a broad sense, insofar as it comprehends under itself fruition: therefore enjoyment, by which the Father and Son mutually enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Spirit who is Love; for the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, as has been said.

According to which God is considered as one, unity is appropriated to the Father, equality to the Son, concord or connection to the Holy Spirit by St. Augustine, book 1 of Christian Doctrine, chapter 5: which three imply unity, but differently. For unity is said absolutely, not presupposing anything else, and thus is appropriated to the Father, who does not suppose any person, since he is the principle from no principle. Equality implies unity with respect to another, for equal is that which has one quantity with another, and therefore equality is appropriated to the Son, who is principle from a principle. But connection implies the unity of some two things; whence it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is from two.

According to the third consideration by which sufficient power is considered in God for causing, power is

appropriated to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. And this appropriation is made both according to the reason of likeness if what is in the divine Persons is considered, and according to the reason of unlikeness, if what is in creatures is considered, lest we suspect such a thing in the divine Persons. For power has the character of a principle, whence it has likeness with the heavenly Father, who is the principle of the whole divinity: but it fails in the earthly father due to old age. Wisdom has likeness with the heavenly Son, insofar as he is the Word, which is nothing other than the conception of wisdom; but it sometimes fails in the earthly son due to the shortness of time. Goodness, since it is the reason and object of love, has likeness with the divine Spirit who is love, but seems to have repugnance to the earthly spirit according as it implies a certain violence. Consequently, operations in which power especially shines forth, such as the creation of the world, are appropriated to the Father. Operations in which wisdom is most manifested, such as the reparation and redemption of the world, are appropriated to the Son. And operations in which goodness singularly shines forth, such as the conferring of graces, to the Holy Spirit.

According to the fourth consideration insofar as God is considered in relation to his effects, that appropriation is taken: from whom, through whom, and in whom. For this preposition "from" implies a certain relation of efficient cause, which belongs to God by reason of his power, whence it is appropriated to the Father, just as power. But this preposition "through," insofar as it designates the relation of the form through which the agent acts, just as we say that the artisan acts through his art, is appropriated to the Son just as wisdom and art. This preposition "in" finally denotes the

relation of the container. But God contains things not only according to their likenesses, according to which containment is appropriated to the Son, but also insofar as God by his goodness conserves things and governs them by leading them to a fitting end; and in this way "in whom" is appropriated to the Holy Spirit just as goodness. Various other appropriations besides those enumerated are found in Sacred Scripture and the Fathers.

Article II. On the Comparison of the Persons to Relations and to Notional Acts. (St. Thomas Q. 40 And 41.)

The author, in art. 2 of this question 40, proves that the Persons are constituted and distinguished by relations: we have established this in dissertation 4, art. 4; refer there. It is asked 1 whether in God relation is the same as person? Response: affirmatively.

In God there are four real relations, as I said in dissertation 3, art. 2, namely paternity, filiation, active spiration and passive spiration. Three, namely paternity, filiation and passive spiration, are called personal properties, because persons are constituted by them; the fourth, namely active spiration, is called a property, because it does not belong to all Persons, but not personal, because it does not constitute a person. But these four relations, both personal and non-personal, are the same as the person, but in different ways.

For the understanding of which it must be considered that on account of divine simplicity there is in God a twofold real identity of things which differ in created things: because since divine simplicity excludes the composition of form and

matter, it follows that in God the abstract and concrete are the same, as deity and God. But because divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God is his essence, and on account of this wisdom and power are the same in God, because both are the divine essence. And according to this twofold reason of identity, property or relation in God is the same as person. For personal properties are the same as Persons by that reason by which the abstract is the same as the concrete: for they are the Persons themselves subsisting, as paternity is the Father himself, and filiation the Son, and procession the Holy Spirit. But non-personal properties are the same as persons according to another reason of identity, by which reason that which is attributed to God is his essence: thus therefore common active spiration is the same as the person of the Father and as the person of the Son, not that it is one person subsisting per se, but just as one essence is in two Persons, so also one property. From which you have that the relation of paternity and the relation of active spiration in the Father are the same according to reality with only a virtual distinction. Similarly the relation of filiation and the relation of active spiration in the Son. For which see dissertation 3, art. 2, conclusion 1. It is asked 2 whether notional actions are pre-understood to properties or relations?

I said "pre-understood," that is, according to our mode of understanding; for in reality all things are simultaneous in God. Notional acts are the origins themselves both active and passive, namely active and passive generation. These things being noted,

Response: Passive origins taken simply precede according to our mode of understanding the relations or

properties of the proceeding persons; because origin passively signified is signified as the way to the person and to its properties: thus passive generation or nativity in our intellect precedes filiation, or being the Son; and similarly passive spiration is understood prior to being the proceeding Spirit.

Active origins or notional acts taken actively precede according to the intellect the personal property or relation precisely as it is a relation, or as it expresses pure respect, because relation as such is founded upon an act. But according as the relation or personal property is constitutive of the person, thus it is pre-understood to the active origin, because the acting person is pre-understood to the action.

From which you will infer that both are truly said: Because he generates, he is Father; and: Because he is Father, he generates. For if by the name of Father is understood precisely the relation as pure respect, it is truly said: Because he generates, he is Father; because the relation of paternity thus taken follows upon generation and is founded in it. But if by the name of Father is understood the relation as subsisting and constituting the person, it is truly said: Because he is Father, he generates; because the relation thus taken is pre-understood to active generation, just as a person is understood to be prior to operating.

You will infer 2, that the relation or non-personal property, as is active spiration in the Father and Son, since it cannot be considered as constituting a person, but only according to pure respect, is posterior according to the intellect to the active origin.

It is asked 3 whether notional acts are voluntary?

The sense of the question is whether the Father voluntarily generates the Son; the Father and Son voluntarily

spirate the Holy Spirit? For the understanding of which it must be noted that something can be understood to be voluntary, or to be done by the will, in two ways: in one way by concomitant will, just as I can say that I am a man by my will, because namely I will and it pleases me to be a man; secondly by antecedent and initiating will, or by will having itself as the effective principle of that thing which is said to be voluntary, or to be done by will, just as it is said that an artisan operates by will, because his will is the principle of the work. Again, this antecedent will can be considered in two ways: 1) as nature, insofar namely as it is the natural and necessary principle of some thing, just as man wills naturally and necessarily happiness; 2) as will, insofar namely as it is a principle acting freely and with indifference. By this will God wills creatures, we will means to an end. These things being premised,

Response 1: Notional acts are voluntary by concomitant will, so that according to this will it can rightly be said that the Father voluntarily generates the Son, the Father and Son voluntarily spirate the Holy Spirit, by concomitant will, I say; because just as by that will God wills himself to be God, so the Father wills himself to generate the Son; the Father and Son will themselves to spirate the Holy Spirit; for the Father does not unwillingly or by coercion generate the Son, nor do the Father and Son unwillingly and by coercion produce the Holy Spirit.

And according to this sense St. Hilary, book 1 On Synods, is to be understood when he says: "The Father did not generate the Son induced by natural necessity," as is clear from the preceding. For he says: "For the Father did not generate the Son with the Father unwilling, or coerced, or induced by natural necessity." Likewise also what the

Council of Sardica says in the same place, that the Father generated the Son by counsel and will, namely by concomitant will.

Response 2: Notional acts are not voluntary by antecedent will considered as it is will or a principle of acting freely.

Proof: will as will and nature differ in this in causing, that nature is determined to one thing, but will as will is not determined to one thing. The reason for which is that an effect is assimilated to the form of the agent through which it acts: but it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form, through which the thing has being: whence such as it is, such it makes; but the form through which the will acts is not only one, but there are several understood reasons; whence what is brought about by will as will is not such as the agent is, but such as the agent wills and understands it to be. Therefore, will as will is the principle of those things which can be thus or otherwise; but of those things which cannot be except thus, the principle is nature. But what can be thus or otherwise is far from the divine nature. I wanted to transcribe this text of the author deliberately, so that the reader might see in advance how deeply the holy Doctor establishes the roots of our freedom, concerning which in I-II. For I could have said more briefly thus: What is from antecedent will, as will is and free, can not be: but notional acts cannot not be; for the Father could not not generate the Son, nor could the Father and Son not spirate the Holy Spirit, otherwise the Son and Holy Spirit could not be: therefore.

Response 3: The production of the Holy Spirit is from antecedent will as nature is; not so the Son; because the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, consequently through the will; the

Son proceeds as Word, consequently through the intellect; and thus the Spirit proceeds as the term of that volition by which the Father and Son naturally and necessarily love each other; the Son as the term of the paternal intellection or speaking.

You will say 1: The Father according to our mode of conceiving wills to generate before he generates: therefore the generation of the Son is also voluntary by antecedent will as nature. Proof of the antecedent: the absolute and essential according to our mode of conceiving are prior to the notional; but willing to generate is absolute and essential: therefore. Thus thinks Cajetan.

Response: I deny the antecedent. Because, according to the author, the Father generates the Son by will, just as he is God by will; but he is God by concomitant will only and not antecedent. The reason is that according to our mode of conceiving, the act of intellect is prior to the act of will; nothing is willed unless first known: therefore God first understands generation before he wills it; therefore he first generates, because by understanding he generates. To the proof to the contrary, I respond that it is true only of those things which are purely essential; but willing to generate is not purely essential, since it includes the notional, namely to generate, as object.

You will say 2: Only the Son in God proceeds by way of nature; therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from will as nature is. Response: I deny the consequence. (5) For it is one thing to proceed by way of nature, another to proceed from will as nature is. To proceed by way of nature is said of what proceeds just as those things which in creatures

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5 Q. 10 de Pot. a. 2 ad 4

proceed from nature and not from will; but what proceeds from nature does not suppose another action except accidentally, insofar namely as one natural agent depends on another; but what proceeds from will as nature per se and always supposes another procession, because will does not tend toward anything unless there pre-exists the production of an intellect conceiving something. Whence the Holy Spirit proceeding as necessary love proceeds from antecedent will as it is nature, or proceeds by way of will, nevertheless he does not proceed by way of nature.

Article III. On the Comparison of the Persons to One Another. (St. Thomas Q. 22.)

Question 1: Whether the divine Persons are coequal to each other?

According to the Philosopher, in the 5th book of the Metaphysics, unity in substance makes identity, unity in quantity makes equality, unity in quality makes likeness (6). In God, however, there is no quantity of mass, nor quality properly so called which is an accident: there is nevertheless a quantity of power which is considered according to the perfection of essence. For in those things which are not great by mass, says St. Augustine in the 6th book On the Trinity, chapter 8, to be greater is to be better. Similarly, those things which are signified by way of quality, such as wisdom, mercy, etc., are found in the divine. Having noted these things, we proceed to the question.

Response: The divine Persons are coequal to each other. This is a matter of faith. In Philippians 2, the Apostle

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6 Q 42, a. 1, ad 1, and in Book 1, d. 19, q 1, a. 1, response.

says concerning Christ: "He did not consider it robbery to be equal with God." Likewise in the Symbol of St. Athanasius, and in the canon "Firmiter," concerning the supreme Trinity.

The reasoning is (7): First, equal is said by the negation of greater and lesser; but in God there is no greater and lesser: therefore [they are equal]. Second, things that are unequal cannot have one quantity numerically; but quantity in God is nothing other than His essence: therefore if there were any inequality in the divine Persons, there would not be one essence in them, and thus they would not be three Persons, one God, which is impossible: therefore [they are equal].

From this you may infer, first, that the Persons are equal in magnitude and power. In magnitude, because the magnitude of God is nothing other than the perfection of nature, and there is the same perfection of nature in all, since it is the same nature numerically, and moreover the generative power of the Father is not defective, nor does the Son successively arrive at perfection. In power, because the power of acting follows upon the perfection of nature, and there is the same perfection of nature, as has been said.

You may infer secondly that the three Persons are coeternal, because they proceed from an agent whose power of acting is always perfect and instantaneous. Add that both the intellect and the will in God are always in act: therefore the intellect never lacked the Word, nor the will Love or the Holy Spirit. You have some vestige of this coeternity in the sun from which splendor proceeds, and yet it is coeval with it, so that there is no instant in which there was sun and not splendor.

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7 Q 42, a. 1, ad 1, and in Book 1, d. 19, q 1, a. 1, response.

You may infer thirdly (8) that the three Persons are also similar to each other, because where equality is considered according to the quantity of power, equality includes similarity in itself and something more, because it excludes excess. For whatever things communicate in one form can be said to be similar, even if they participate in that form unequally, just as if air were said to be similar to fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal, if one participates in that form more perfectly than another. Hence all things equal according to the quantity of power are similar, but not all similar things are equal. And because there is not only one nature of the Father and Son, but it is also equally perfect in both, therefore we not only say that the Son is similar to the Father (so as to exclude the error of the pure Arians who were called Eunomians, denying that the Son is similar to the Father), but we also say equal, so as to exclude the error of the Semi-Arians who said the Son was similar to the Father, but denied that he was equal and consubstantial or ὁμοούσιον. And because, as has been said, the similar is not always equal, therefore the word "similar" or ὁμοιούσιος alone was rejected at the time of Arianism, yet it was also sometimes admitted among those who said the Son was similar to the Father in all things; and they denied "consubstantial" or ὁμοούσιον only as to the word because of its novelty, but they admitted the meaning, as we saw in the first historical digression, section 2, to the prooemium of the dissertation.

Arguments which can be opposed against the responses and inferences, we have anticipated from both sides, and these can be seen in the author. That equality and

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8 Book 1, d. [15], article 1, ad 2.

similarity are not real relations in God we proved against the Scotists, dissertation 3, article 2. See there.

Question 2: Whether there is an order of nature in the divine Persons?

Response: Affirmatively (9). First, because wherever there is plurality without order, there is confusion; but in the divine Persons there is no confusion: therefore [there is order]. Second, order is always spoken of by comparison to some principle: hence just as a principle is spoken of either according to position, like a point, or according to understanding, like the principle of demonstration, or according to individual causes, so also is order spoken of. But in the divine there is a principle according to origin without priority: therefore there is order according to origin without priority and posteriority even of nature. For that which is posterior to another by nature must depend in its nature upon the nature of the other, which cannot be said of the divine Persons, whose nature is one. Wherefore this order is called by St. Augustine in book 3 Against Maximus, chapter 14, an order of nature not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another.

Question 3: Whether the circuminsession of the divine Persons is to be admitted?

Circuminsession is the mutual coexistence of the divine Persons in each other, so that the Father is in the Son, the Son in the Father, both in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit in both.

Response: Affirmatively. This is a matter of faith. Thus Christ says in John 14: "Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?" And throughout the

9 Q. 42, a. 3, in the argument sed contra and response.

Fathers: Tertullian Against Praxeas, chapter 25; St. Hilary, book 8 On the Trinity; St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 9 on John, chapter 39; St. Ambrose, book 10 on Luke, to chapter 20; St. Jerome on chapter 3 of Ezekiel; St. Augustine, book 6 On the Trinity, final chapter; and others.

The reasoning is because several persons distinct from each other, yet in such a way that their nature is numerically one and indivisible, with which they are identified, necessarily exist in each other: but the three divine Persons are distinct from each other, yet in such a way that their nature is numerically one and identified with them: therefore necessarily one is in another, and conversely.

You see that two things are required for circuminsession. First, the distinction of supposita: for the same suppositum is not said to be in itself, except improperly by reason of parts, which has no place in the divine. Second, the numerical unity of essence; for if the essence were diverse, there would be more perfection in all than in one, and less in one than in all, which also does not befit the divine Persons.

You might object: One of opposites is not in another; but the Father and Son are relatively opposed; therefore one is not in another.

Response: I distinguish the major premise: one of opposites formally and qua opposite is not in another, I concede the major; identically by reason of something common to both, I deny the major. And granting the minor, I distinguish the consequent: therefore one is not in another formally and considering the relative opposition, I concede the consequent; identically, by reason of the same essence identified with the relation itself, I deny the consequent. And from this it follows that although paternity is in the Son, and

conversely filiation in the Father, nevertheless the Son is not the Father, nor is the Father the Son; because paternity does not constitute as Father whatever person it is in, in whatever way, but that person in whom it is by way of constituting form or personal property: but it is not in the Son by way of constituting form or personal property, but by identity with the essence. Similarly concerning filiation with respect to the Father, and concerning spiration with respect to the Holy Spirit.

Article IV. On the Mission of the Divine Persons. (St. Thomas, Q. 43)

Question 1. It is asked first whether it is fitting for any divine Person to be sent?

Response: Affirmatively. In John chapter 3, it is said: "God sent his Son into the world"; in chapter 6, Christ says of himself: "The living Father has sent me"; in chapter 8: "I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me." Concerning the Holy Spirit, in the same Gospel chapter 14: "The Holy Spirit whom the Father will send in my name"; and chapter 15: "The Paraclete whom I will send to you."

The reason is this: in the notion of mission, two things are implied, one of which is the relationship to him by whom one is sent; the other is the relationship of the one sent to the term to which he is sent. For by the fact that someone is sent, a certain procession of the one sent from the sender is shown, either according to command, as when a master sends a servant, or according to counsel and persuasion, as when a counselor is said to send a king to battle, or a physician to the baths, or according to origin, as when it is said that a flower is emitted from a tree, or splendor from the

sun. Likewise, it shows the relationship to the term to which one is sent, either so that he begins to be there where he was not before, or so that he begins to be in some new mode in which he was not before. But although mission cannot befit a divine Person according to command or counsel, it can nevertheless befit according to what it implies of procession of origin from the sender. Likewise, although on the part of the term it cannot befit according to what it implies of being where one was not before, it can nevertheless befit according to what it implies of a new mode of existing in another; just as the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, according to the fact that he began to be in the world in a new mode through the assumed flesh, and yet he was in the world before, as is said in John 1. Therefore.

From this you will infer first that the mission of the divine Persons can be defined thus: The procession of origin of one Person from another with a new mode of existing in another.

You will infer secondly that the Father is not sent because he proceeds from no one; he can nevertheless be given, because although no one can send himself, he can nevertheless give himself. You will infer thirdly that not just any Person sends, if mission is taken properly and adequately, but only that one to whom it belongs to be the principle of the one who is sent; because, as has been said, mission properly and adequately taken implies two things, namely the origin of the person sent from the sender, and the relationship to the term to which he is sent, and thus the Son is sent only by the Father, the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. But if mission is taken improperly and inadequately for the relationship alone of the one sent to the term or effect to which he is sent, prescinding from the relationship of the

one sent to him by whom he is sent, then it can be said that the whole Trinity sends, because the whole Trinity works this effect. And according to this sense is to be understood St. Augustine in book 2 De Trinitate, chapter 5, where he interprets that passage from Isaiah 48: "The Lord God has sent me and his Spirit," concerning the person of the Word, whom he says was sent by the Holy Spirit to be incarnated. Many others, however, interpret it of the human nature of Christ, according to which he was sent by the Holy Spirit to preach.

Question 2. It is asked secondly whether mission should be called eternal or temporal?

Response: It should be called temporal only, because beyond the relationship to an eternal principle, it implies a relationship to a temporal term by which it is completed in the notion of mission; therefore it should be called temporal only, just as creation, although its principle is eternal, because nevertheless the effect which it connotes is temporal, is not called eternal, but temporal.

Question 3. It is asked thirdly whether the invisible mission of the divine Persons is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?

Note before the response that mission, on the part of the term or temporal effect which it connotes, is divided into visible and invisible. Visible is that which is made in some sensible effect or sign manifesting the Person sent, as when the Word was sent to be incarnated, when the Holy Spirit was sent upon the Apostles under the appearance of fire. Invisible mission is that which is made in some spiritual and invisible effect, such as occurs in the justification of a sinner through the gift of grace. But these missions differ: firstly, that in visible mission one Person is sent and manifested

without the other, but in invisible mission, two proceeding Persons are sent, and although the Father is not sent, he nevertheless comes and communicates himself to the soul with the others, according to that saying of Christ in John 14: "If anyone loves me... my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him"; secondly, that visible mission can be made through any visible thing, but invisible only through a supernatural gift produced in the soul; and since there are various supernatural gifts, such as sanctifying grace, actual assistance, gratuitous grace, the gift of faith, etc., the question is whether invisible mission is only according to the gift of sanctifying or justifying grace, or whether only through sanctifying grace is the soul disposed and perfected so that it is a suitable temple and dwelling place of the divine Person sent; for in mission, not only graces are sent or given, as I will say presently, but the divine Persons themselves. These things being noted, to the question.

Response: Affirmatively. Because then a divine Person is sent when he exists in another in a new mode; but through sanctifying grace alone does a divine Person exist in a new mode in man; therefore. The major is evident from the definition of mission. I prove the minor: the common mode by which God is in all creatures is through immensity, namely through essence, presence and power, as we have said elsewhere; but beyond this common mode, there is one special mode which belongs to rational nature, by which God is said to be in it, as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover, namely when the rational creature has God invisibly present to itself through grace and charity and is made a temple of God and his dwelling place; but this is not done except through sanctifying grace and charity by

which man so has God that he can freely use and enjoy him as a friend possessed; therefore. You might say: God exists in a new mode: first, in sinful believers through faith and natural love; secondly, in penitent sinners through actual graces moving them to acts of contrition; thirdly, in the Supreme Pontiff and Councils through special assistance in defining matters of faith; therefore.

I respond that these three modes do not depart from the common mode of existing in another through immensity, except in a qualified sense and imperfectly, nor do they attain that new and special mode of existing in another as in a dwelling place and temple, by which the existing thing is so held and possessed by another that this other can freely use and enjoy it: this indeed is not had except through charity and perfect friendship; but through faith and natural love, even though God is in the soul as known in the knower and beloved in the lover, it is not however by knowledge and love proceeding from charity and perfect friendship, by which the lover so has and possesses the beloved that he can freely enjoy him. Through actual graces by which the Holy Spirit moves penitents to acts of contrition, he does not yet dwell in them, as Trent says, session 14, chapter 4, but only stands at the door and knocks. Similarly, through that special assistance which is given to the Supreme Pontiff and Councils in defining matters of faith, the Spirit indeed moves and directs the intellect lest it err, but does not inhabit; whence, as I said, these modes depart only in a qualified sense and imperfectly from the general presence by which God is in all things through operation.

From these things you will gather that a threefold invisible mission of the divine Persons is made in man: the first, in the first justification of man; the second, in any

increase of grace; the third, in beatitude in which God will be in the soul in a new and special mode through the union of his essence in the capacity of an intelligible species.

Question 4. It is asked fourthly whether through invisible mission, the divine Persons become substantially present to the soul, so that if per impossibile they were not substantially present through immensity, they would nevertheless be present by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace?

Response: Affirmatively. I prove firstly from Sacred Scripture. In Romans 5, it is said: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us": where a distinction is made between the charity given and the Spirit given; but Sacred Scripture would distinguish between the two in vain if the Spirit were not substantially present, but only in the gift of charity.

Secondly, because of this kind of presence by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace, the just person is called a temple of God, 1 Corinthians 3: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God?"; and immediately: "The temple of God is holy, which you are." But this cannot be verified of the gifts of grace by which a temple is not consecrated, but only of the divine Persons.

Thirdly, the divine Persons through invisible mission by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace are present to the soul otherwise than through immensity, otherwise whenever anything would be produced in the soul, they would be said to be sent, since they are substantially present through immensity wherever anything is produced; but unless they are specially present substantially to the soul by reason of the gift of sanctifying grace, they will be present only through

immensity, insofar as they would produce some effect in the soul; therefore.

To what is objected from St. Chrysostom, homily On the Holy Spirit, which Sylvius cites from the end of volume 3 of the Paris edition of the year 1570, it is responded that the holy Doctor speaks against heretics who wanted the Holy Spirit to be sent as a servant, and given as an accident, which he rightly denies.

If you further object that God through grace is in the just person as known in the knower and beloved in the lover, but the known is in the knower and the beloved in the lover only objectively and not substantially; I respond that through sanctifying grace God is so in the knower and lover that the knower and lover is his temple, and freely enjoys him, for which objective presence does not suffice, but substantial presence is required.

And this concerning the Most Holy Trinity: Glory, Honor and Glory through infinite ages of ages. Amen.

Mystery of the Holy Trinity

Fr. Charles-René Billuart's On the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity stands as one of the most rigorous treatments of Trinitarian doctrine in the scholastic tradition. Originally published as part of his Summa Sancti Thomae Hodiernis Academiarum Moribus Accommodata, this work represents centuries of theological development following the method of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Written by a Dominican professor at Douai, this treatise systematically addresses the fundamental questions surrounding the Trinity: the distinction of persons, their consubstantiality, divine processions, relations, and divine personhood. Billuart methodically refutes the principal heresies—Sabellian, Arian, and Macedonian—while establishing the mystery's foundation in Scripture and Tradition.

The work's six dissertations progress from fundamental apologetics to sophisticated metaphysical questions. Beginning with scriptural proofs, Billuart advances through divine processions, real relations in God, the constitution of divine persons, and the missions of the three Persons. Historical digressions on the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, and Rimini provide crucial context for understanding Trinitarian doctrine's development.

Billuart's precision and logical rigor make this an indispensable resource for students of classical Thomistic theology. This translation makes available to English readers one of the finest examples of 18th-century scholastic theology, preserving the technical vocabulary and systematic method of the Thomistic tradition.

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Prima Pars Q. 27–43

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